Opinion
No. 3D19-530
06-26-2019
Rebecca UTRIA, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee.
Rebecca Utria, in proper person. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee.
Rebecca Utria, in proper person.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, for appellee.
Before SCALES, HENDON, and MILLER, JJ.
HENDON, J.
Rebecca Utria appeals the denial of her motion for credit for jail time served prior to sentencing pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.801. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for the trial court to determine whether Utria is entitled to additional credit for jail time served. See Davis v. State, 219 So. 3d 201 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017).
Utria was sentenced on March 15, 2018, to twenty-four months in prison in case number F16-1233A, concurrent with the twenty-four month sentence imposed on the same date in case number F16-1415. The plea agreement encompassing both cases provided that the defendant understood and agreed that, as part of the plea, she would receive credit for time served from November 21, 2017 to March 15, 2018. In her Rule 3.801 motion for presentence jail time credit, Utria contends that she is owed 388 days of jail time credit for time spent in custody from the time of her initial arrest. Based on Utria's motion, she was awarded 114 days for time spent in jail between November 21, 2017 and her March 15, 2018 sentencing. However, her motion also states that she was incarcerated in the same cases for 388 days prior to November 21, 2017. The trial court denied Utria's request for additional pre-sentence jail time credit based on the plea agreement. Utria appeals.
Rule 3.801 is the exclusive means to request or challenge pre-sentence jail time credit. Bryant v. State, 240 So. 3d 55 (Fla. 3d DCA 2018) (holding Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.801 is the exclusive method for seeking a correction of jail credit). Unlike a rule 3.800(a) motion to correct an illegal sentence, rule 3.801 does not place any burden on the defendant to "affirmatively allege that the court records demonstrate on their face an entitlement to relief ..." Rather, "[p]ursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.801(e), which incorporates Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure rule 3.850(f), the circuit court is required to attach records which conclusively refute the defendant's motion seeking additional jail credit." Williams v. State, 141 So. 3d 686, 687 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014) ; see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850(f)(5) ("If the denial is based on the records in the case, a copy of that portion of the files and records that conclusively shows that the defendant is entitled to no relief shall be attached to the final order."); Hoskins v. State, 259 So. 3d 892 (Fla. 4th DCA 2018) (same).
The record before us is a very limited one; neither the record nor the trial court's order specifically addresses Utria's claim for the additional credits for presentencing jail time served. Critically, there is no indication in the plea agreement that Utria affirmatively waived her entitlement to additional jail credit. See Evans v. State, 237 So. 3d 1068 (Fla. 3d DCA 2017) ; Cozza v. State, 756 So. 2d 272, 273 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000) ; Cisneros v. State, 985 So. 2d 678, 679 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008) ; see also Smith v. State, 52 So. 3d 781, 783 (Fla. 3d DCA 2010) (holding a waiver of jail credit will not be presumed, and the State has the burden to clearly establish a waiver occurred).
On appeal from a summary denial, this Court must reverse unless the postconviction record shows conclusively that the appellant is entitled to no relief. See Fla. R. App. P. 9.141(b)(2)(A) and (D). Because the trial court failed to attach any documents refuting Utria's claims, and the record does not conclusively show whether she waived any credit for time served, we reverse in part to determine Utria's entitlement to those additional credits she seeks to have applied to her sentence; we affirm in part the 114 days of jail credit already awarded. On remand, the trial court shall examine the court file and the jail card, if necessary, to determine whether Utria is entitled to additional credit for time served. See Davis, 219 So. 3d at 202 ; Galarza v. State, 962 So. 2d 985, 986 n.1 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007). If the trial court again enters an order summarily denying the motion for jail credit, the trial court shall attach those portions of the record conclusively showing that Utria is not entitled to the relief sought. If Utria did not waive her right to additional pre-sentencing credit, the trial court shall award her the appropriate credit for time served.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions.