Opinion
Case No. 00-40089-01-DES
April 19, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This matter is before the court on defendant's Motion to Suppress Statements and Evidence Obtained as a Result of and Following an Illegal Search and Seizure Which Occurred on or About July 20, 2000 (Doc. 25) and defendant's Motion to Suppress Defendant's Statements Made on or About September 24, 2000 (Doc. 27). The government has filed a Combined Response (Doc. 33). On April 17, 2001, the court held an evidentiary hearing on these motions. This order is meant to memorialize the court's contemporaneous rulings.
• FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. Events Occurring on July 20, 2000
Topeka Police detectives identified defendant as a suspect in several robberies that occurred in Topeka, Kansas, between July 17, 2000, and July 20, 2000. On July 20, 2000, Detective Ronald Gish received a phone call from an individual claiming defendant could be found in Room 29 at the County Club Motel, 3732 S.W. Topeka Boulevard, Topeka, Kansas.
Topeka Police Detectives Gish and Karim Ahzim went to the hotel and asked a female employee working at the front desk if there was anyone staying in Room 29. Apparently, the detectives' conversation with the employee was hampered by a language barrier. The female employee eventually gave them a key, which the detectives assumed would open Room 29. The detectives went to Room 29 where they knocked repeatedly on the door. They received no response.
Near Room 29, the detectives encountered a male hotel employee. Once again, however, the detectives' conversation was stymied by a language barrier. Detective Ahzim attempted to explain to the male employee that they needed to "contact" whoever was staying in Room 29. The employee proceeded to Room 29, where he knocked at the door several times, announcing that he was from housekeeping. When no answer was heard, the employee used a key to open the door. The detectives both testified that it was not their intent to have the employee open the door, but rather, the employee quickly opened the door without being asked by the detectives.
From their position outside the room, the detectives testified they could see the defendant laying in a bed. Still remaining outside the room, the detectives drew their service weapons and announced their presence. Defendant did not stir or react to the detectives' speech. At this point, the detectives entered the room and shook defendant in an effort to wake him. Defendant was asked to accompany the detectives outside the room. Once outside, the detectives placed defendant under arrest.
A record check commenced after defendant was in custody revealed several outstanding arrest warrants for defendant. A search warrant was later issued and a search of the room was conducted.
After defendant was arrested outside the motel room, he was taken to the Topeka Police Department and placed in an interrogation room. A video camera recorded what took place within the interrogation room.
The videotape shows the inside of a small interrogation room. Facing the camera is a standard clock. References to points on the videotape correspond with the time shown on the clock. When the video begins, defendant is handcuffed and shirtless, standing alone in the room. The clock reads 7:15. It is presumed to be a.m., but that fact is undetectable from the video.
The parties have filed a Joint Stipulation on Admission (Doc. 46) concerning the videotaped evidence in this case. The court accepts the stipulation and accepts the videotapes as admitted.
From 7:15 till 7:45, defendant remains alone in the room. During this time, he has brief conversations with officers standing outside the room, off-camera. During this thirty minutes, defendant is heard to yell or state that he does not want to talk to any officers a total of eight times. There is no confusion as to what defendant is saying.
At 7:45, a plain-clothes, African-American detective enters the room. This detective is not identified by the parties. At 7:47, defendant tells this detective, "I don't want to talk to anybody." The detective proceeds to ask defendant questions and tries to initiate a conversation with defendant. This detective subsequently leaves the room.
At 7:59, Detective Eaton enters the room. At 8:00, defendant states, "I don't want to talk to you." Detective Eaton continues to attempt dialogue with defendant. At 8:12, Detective Eaton reads defendant his Miranda rights. One minute later, defendant acknowledges his rights and states he will talk to Detective Eaton. Defendant proceeds to give numerous incriminating statements regarding several robberies.
B. Events Occurring on September 24, 2000
Defendant was apparently released from jail sometime after his arrest on July 20, 2000. Within days of his release, area hotels and convenience stores were robbed. The Topeka Police once again apprehended and arrested defendant. He was taken to the Topeka Police Department and placed in what appears to be the same interrogation room. Again, a video camera recorded the events in the room. When the videotape begins, the clock reads 6:07. Whether this is a.m. or p.m. is again indiscernible.
From 6:07 till 7:40, defendant appears to be sleeping by himself in the room. No contact with officers is apparent. At 7:40, Detective Eaton enters the room, casually asks defendant if he is alright and removes defendant's handcuffs. Detective Eaton then exits the room. At 7:49, Detective Eaton returns to the room. At 7:50, Detective Eaton asks defendant if he remembers him from when they "did this before." Defendant replies, "I don't know nothing today. I'm gonna go, take my ass to jail." Detective Eaton states, "OK," and then proceeds to tell defendant that he has been "busy lately."
At 7:52, Detective Eaton reads defendant his Miranda rights. Shortly thereafter, defendant states, "I'll talk to ya." Defendant proceeds to discuss several robberies with Detective Eaton and gives numerous incriminating statements. At 7:58, defendant states, "I'm on a lot of drugs."
II. DISCUSSION
At the April 17, 2001, hearing, defense counsel reserved the right to present additional evidence concerning defendant's arrest and the subsequent search of the hotel room in question. The court has, therefore, reserved its ruling on the suppression of the seized evidence.
A. Motion to Suppress Statements on July 20, 2000
Defendant moves for the suppression of his statements made while in custody at the Topeka Police Department. Defendant asserts detectives failed to honor his invocation to remain silent, so violating his Miranda rights and compelling suppression. For the following reasons the court agrees.
In Miranda v. Arizona, the Supreme Court stated:
If the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease. At this point he has shown he intends to exercise his Fifth Amendment privilege; any statement taken after the person invokes his privilege cannot be other than the product of compulsion, subtle or otherwise.384 U.S. 436, 473-74 (1966).
In this particular case, the government concedes defendant invoked his right to remain silent. The government argues, however, that defendant's statements after his waiver at 8:13 should be admissible. This issue is squarely answered by the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Mosley, 423 U.S. 96 (1975). In Mosley, the Court held that once a suspect invokes his right to remain silent, the interrogation must cease, but the interrogation may be reinstated if four factors are satisfied. Under Mosley, questioning may be reinitiated if: (1) at the time the defendant invoked his right to remain silent, the questioning ceased; (2) a substantial interval passed before the second interrogation; (3) the defendant was given a fresh set of Miranda warnings; and (4) the subject of the second interrogation was unrelated to the first. See United States v. Glover, 104 F.3d 1570, 1580 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing Mosley, 423 U.S. at 104-105).
Applying these factors to the present case leads to only one conclusion, the police blatantly ignored defendant's invocation of his rights. Only factor three is satisfied, the other factors are woefully absent. Without question, the police were made aware of defendant's intent to invoke his right to remain silent. Their actions in continuing the interrogation violated defendant's Fifth Amendment right, so defendant's statements will be suppressed.
As a related issue, defendant asserts that not only should his statements be suppressed because of the Miranda violation, but the statements should be inadmissible for any purpose, including impeachment. The government argues, however, that the statements made by defendant were voluntary and may therefore be used for impeachment purposes under the rule announced in Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). While the officers violated defendant's right to remain silent, nothing occurred during the interrogation that would call the trustworthiness of the statements in question. Cf. United States v. Short, 947 F.2d 1445, 1449-50 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding statements "obtained by government acts, threats, or promises" are involuntary and inadmissible). The statements, therefore, should be admissible for the limited purpose of impeachment.
B. Motion to Suppress Statements on September 24, 2000
Defendant moves for the suppression of the incriminating statements made on September 24, 2000, claiming (1) Detective Eaton did not honor defendant's invocation of his right to remain silent and (2) defendant was too impaired to voluntarily waive his right to remain silent.
1. Invocation of Right to Remain Silent
Defendant claims his statement of "I don't know nothing today. I'm gonna go, take my ass to jail" is an invocation of his right to remain silent. If such statement is an invocation, then Detective Eaton certainly violated defendant's right by continuing the interrogation. However, the government argues that such statement is too ambiguous to operate as an invocation.
An "objective inquiry" is employed to determine whether an accused has actually invoked his rights under Miranda. See Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 459 (1994). Within the related context of requesting the presence of an attorney, the Supreme Court noted:
Invocation of the Miranda right to counsel requires, at a minimum, some statement that can reasonably be construed to be an expression of a desire for the assistance of an attorney. But if a suspect makes a reference to an attorney that is ambiguous or equivocal in that a reasonable officer in light of the circumstances would have understood only that the suspect might be invoking the right to counsel, our precedents do not require the cessation of questioning.Davis, 512 U.S. at 459 (internal citation and quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original). In Davis, the Supreme Court also declined to rule that officers were obligated to ask clarifying questions when a suspect made an equivocal invocation. See id. at 458-59.
While no direct authority compels the court to apply Davis in this situation, a majority of courts have adopted the standard when considering possible invocations of the right to remain silent. See, e.g., United States v. Ramirez, 79 F.3d 298, 305 (2d Cir.) (applying Davis to the right to be silent), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 850 (1996); Coleman v. Singletary, 30 F.3d 1420, 1424 (11th Cir. 1994) (same), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1086 (1995); United States v. Landers, No. 00-40093, 2001 WL 83278, at *2 (D.Kan. Jan. 10, 2001) (same).
Assuming Davis applies, the court finds defendant's statement was an ambiguous invocation. The statement could reasonably be construed as only a denial of defendant's involvement or knowledge about the robberies. No part of the statement implies an unwillingness to speak or talk to Detective Eaton. Defendant does tell Detective Eaton that he wishes to be taken to jail, however, to exercise in speculation that this desire to go to jail ultimately implies a desire to remain silent, stretches the definition of unequivocal beyond the holding in Davis. See United States v. Sanchez, 866 F. Supp. 1542, 1559 (D.Kan. 1994) (holding statement "I can't say nothing" was ambiguous). Therefore, because defendant failed to make an unequivocal invocation of his right to remain silent, Detective Eaton did not violate defendant's right in continuing the interrogation. Suppression will, therefore, be denied on this issue.
2. Defendant's Intoxication
Defendant argues his state of intoxication makes his confession involuntary. However, intoxication does not singularly or automatically render a confession involuntary. See United States v. Muniz, 1 F.3d 1018, 1022 (10th Cir. 1993). As with any issue of voluntariness, the court must consider the totality of circumstances surrounding defendant's confession. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986). In the context of an allegedly impaired defendant, the court must be diligent to consider whether the police overreached and exploited defendant's state of intoxication in coercing a confession from defendant. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 165 (1986).
While defendant admits that he is "on a lot of drugs," he seems perfectly capable of conversing with Detective Eaton during his interrogation. All of his answers are lucid and sensible. Defendant is able to recall particular dates, people, and places without difficulty. In fact, defendant makes efforts to avoid answering some questions or give illusive answers to others. These interrogation "tactics" weigh heavily against defendant's assertion that his statements were involuntarily given. The statement "I'm on a lot of drugs" is given in response to Detective Eaton's question concerning exactly how much money was taken from a particular store. After reviewing the entire videotape, the court finds that defendant's cognitive functioning was not sufficiently impaired.
Additionally, it does not appear from the videotape that Detective Eaton capitalized or took advantage of defendant's intoxication. Detective Eaton's questions are not worded in complicated or confusing language, nor are his questions overly suggestive.
Because defendant's intoxication did not appear to significantly alter his cognitive function and because Detective Eaton did not exploit defendant's mental state, defendant's statements were not made involuntarily due to defendant's alleged consumption of illicit drugs. Suppression will, therefore, be denied on this issue.
IT IS THEREFORE BY THIS COURT ORDERED that defendant's Motion to Suppress Statements and Evidence Obtained as a Result of and Following an Illegal Search and Seizure Which Occurred on or About July 20, 2000 (Doc. 25) is granted in part. As to defendant's statements made on July 20, 2000, the motion is granted. As to evidence seized on July 20, 2000, the court reserves its ruling.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED BY THIS COURT that defendant's Motion to Suppress Defendant's Statements Made on or About September 24, 2000 (Doc. 27) is denied.
Dated this ___ day of April, 2001, at Topeka, Kansas.