Opinion
Case No. 00-40024-19-SAC
June 20, 2001
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case comes before the court on the motion of defendant Steven Keith Rawlins to suppress any and all statements he made to law enforcement officers or agents on or about March 27, 2000, and all fruits and evidence derived therefrom. An evidentiary hearing was held on May 31, 2001. Defendant's primary claim is that his waiver of his Miranda rights was coerced and involuntary because he feared that if he did not waive those rights, his wife would be arrested and he would lose his children.
The parties agree that on the morning of March 27, 2000, defendant was arrested by multiple agents with firearms drawn outside his place of business, and was informed that he was being charged with federal drug offenses. The parties' versions of the events which transpired immediately thereafter differ significantly.
Defendant and his wife testified that during defendant's arrest his wife arrived, that she was placed in plastic hand restraints, that no firearms were pointed at her, and that she was placed in the passenger seat of her own vehicle. Agent Sinnegan testified that defendant's wife arrived in a vehicle behind him, and that he decided to detain her for his safety. Agent Sinnegan stated that he pointed his gun at her and "froze her out," that he had her restrained in metal handcuffs and placed in her vehicle, and that although he did not have any reason to arrest her he decided to remove her from the scene to decrease the possibility of any domestic disturbance there.
An agent whom defendant believed to be Agent Robert Ryan, but defendant later testified was actually Agent Sinnegan, then transported the defendant approximately two miles to his home. Defendant resides there with his wife and children, aged 6, 9 and 11, but Agent Sinnegan had no knowledge of nor any reason to know of defendant's children. Another agent drove defendant's wife there as well.
Agent Sinnegan testified that no conversation occurred while he transported the defendant from his work to his home. In contrast, defendant testified that agent Sinnegan asked him during that ride to his residence who the safe in the garage belonged to, what its combination was, and what was in it. Defendant stated that he replied that it belonged to Johnny Shane Wright and that he did not know the combination to or the contents of the safe. Defendant admitted at the evidentiary hearing, however, that he did, in fact, know that the safe in the garage contained a gun when he told agent Sinnegan otherwise.
Agent Sinnegan testified that he Mirandized the defendant immediately upon arriving at defendant's residence, and that the defendant was "willing to talk from the very beginning." Agent Sinnegan stated that at no time did attempt to coax information out of the defendant or convince him to cooperate. Agent Sinnegan then asked defendant if his wife were involved in the methamphetamine operation, and defendant replied that she was not. Agent Sinnegan testified that he then identified and released defendant's wife, who had been in restraints approximately ten minutes total, and that no other discussion was had regarding her. Defendant's wife testified that she remained in restraints for approximately one hour.
Defendant testified that upon arriving at his residence, he saw his wife still in restraints, was asked to and did open the door to the garage, then asked if his wife was going to be charged, to which Agent Sinnegan replied, "that depends on how well you cooperate." Defendant then walked around the property with the agents. A search of the surroundings revealed, among other matters, two burn pits containing items commonly used in the manufacture of methamphetamine, including acetone cans and iodine bottles. Defendant admitted at the hearing that he had been forewarned about the search of the property, but left the cans in the trash pile or burn pit because he thought they had been burned beyond recognition.
Defendant testified that agent Sinnegan Mirandized him for the first time at the trash pile or burn pits, then told him that he would testify on defendant's behalf if defendant cooperated. At that time, and allegedly as a result of the agent's prior threat regarding defendant's wife, defendant waived his Miranda rights and gave a complete statement implicating himself and others charged in the indictment. Thereafter, according to the defendant, he heard agent Sinnegan tell the female officer to "let her go, she's free," and saw an agent release his wife from her restraints. Later that day defendant was transported to the Joplin, Missouri police department where he was again Mirandized, and again waived his rights. No conflicting testimony was offered regarding the events there. Agent Sullivan testified that he and agent Ryan first saw the defendant at approximately 5:00 p.m. on the evening of the arrest, at which time the defendant was in jail. Agent Sullivan told the defendant the purpose of their questioning, to which defendant replied, "You've got me." Agent Sullivan then Mirandized the defendant, who made further detailed statements implicating himself and others in methamphetamine operations. Agent Sullivan testified that at no time did he have to coax information out of the defendant or otherwise encourage him to cooperate, but that the defendant answered the questions willingly, making it the easiest interview he had ever conducted.
Defendant admitted that all the agents with whom he dealt seemed fairly nice, that there were no raised voices, that his conversations with agents were gentlemanly, that his requests, such as to speak with his mother and move his handcuffs to a more comfortable position, were accommodated, and that nothing confrontational occurred. Defendant further admitted that the agents made no statements or threats about his children, and that at no time did he discuss his children with the agents, nor did the agents see defendant's children. Defendant additionally testified that the agent was telling the truth when he said that if defendant cooperated, he would testify on his behalf regarding that cooperation. Both Agent Sinnegan and Agent Sullivan testified that the defendant was compliant, cooperative, and forthcoming in providing information as asked.
Under either version of events, the defendant was Mirandized prior to making the incriminatory statements which he now seeks to suppress. Defendant does not contend that he did not waive his Miranda rights, but contends solely that his waiver was not voluntary because of the alleged coercion flowing from the agent's statements about defendant's wife. He testified that he waived his Miranda rights because he feared that if he did not, his wife would be arrested and he would lose his children.
This court recently reviewed the governing law regarding a waiver of Miranda rights, in stating:
A suspect who has been informed of his Miranda rights "may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444, 86 S.Ct. 1602. The government bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant's waiver of rights was voluntary. United States v. Toro-Pelaez, 107 F.3d 819, 825 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 845, 118 S.Ct. 129, 139 L.Ed.2d 78 (1997); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168-69, 107 S.Ct. 515, 93 L.Ed.2d 473 (1986). To prove a voluntary waiver of Fifth Amendment rights, the government must establish:
(1) that the waiver was the product of free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion, or deception; and (2) that the waiver was made in full awareness of the nature of the right being waived and the consequences of waiving. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421, 106 S.Ct. 1135, 89 L.Ed.2d 410 (1986). Only if the totality of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation shows both an uncoerced choice and the requisite level of comprehension can a waiver be effective. Id.; United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d at 1501.
In considering whether the confession or statement is one of free will, the courts look to several factors, including: (1) the characteristics of the defendant: age, education, intelligence, and physical and emotional attributes; (2) the circumstances surrounding the statement, including the length of detention and questioning and the location of questioning; and (3) the tactics, if any, employed by officers. (Citations omitted). "In no case, however, is any single factor determinative." [United States v.] Chalan, 812 F.2d 1302, 1307 [(10th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 983, 109 S.Ct. 534, 102 L.Ed.2d 565 (1988).]
United States v. Castorena-Jaime, 117 F. Supp.2d 1161, 1170 (D.Kan. 2000).
The traditional indicia of police coercion are absent in this case. Defendant does not allege that the questioning was unduly long or intimidating, that he was physically punished or threatened, or that he was tricked into making statements. Instead, defendant alleges solely that his waiver of his Miranda rights was the result of coercion and intimidation on the part of an agent who expressly or impliedly conveyed to him that the extent of his cooperation with the law enforcement officers would determine whether his wife would be charged, how long she would remain in jail, and the fate of his three young children.
"A defendant's statement that is extracted or induced by threats or promises is involuntary." United States v. Hernandez, 93 F.3d 1493, 1503 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing Hutto v. Ross, 429 U.S. 28, 30 (1976)). "Intimidating statements obtained by government acts, threats, or promises that permit the defendant's will to be overborne are coerced confessions running afoul of the Fifth Amendment. . . ." Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1540, 1543 (10th Cir. 1993) (quoting United States v. Short, 947 F.2d 1445, 1449 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 989 (1992)). However, the state is not prohibited from inducing a confession with an honest promise of leniency. United States v. Westbrook, 125 F.3d 996 (7th Cir. 1997).
Agent Sinegan conceded that he had no reason to arrest defendant's wife, and the government does not assert a good faith basis to arrest defendant's wife. See Westbrook, 125 F.3d at 1006 (as long as agents had a good-faith basis for pressing charges against the defendant's wife, they impose no undue psychological coercion on a defendant by suggesting that it would be to his or her benefit to cooperate.) Thus, the threat, if any, to arrest defendant's wife was unfounded. Unfounded "threats to arrest members of a suspect's family may cause a confession to be involuntary." United States v. Finch, 998 F.2d 349, 356 (6th Cir. 1993) ( citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961); see Lynumm v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528, 534 (1963); United States v. Tingle, 658 F.2d 1332, 1336 (9th Cir. 1981).
The crucial issue in this case is whether agent Sinnegan told the defendant that his wife would be arrested if the defendant did not cooperate, and if so, whether that unfounded threat caused defendant's confession to be involuntary. Testimony regarding this issue is conflicting.
The court credits Agent Sinnegan's testimony that no conversation occurred in the vehicle while he transported the defendant from his place of business to his residence, that he Mirandized the defendant immediately upon arriving at his residence, that he released defendant's wife upon being told by the defendant that she was not involved in the methamphetamine operations, and that he did not threaten to arrest her if the defendant did not cooperate. The court finds that no threat, whether implied or express, to arrest defendant's wife was made, and that the agents did not make statements or take actions which would lead the defendant to reasonably believe that the fate of his wife depended upon the degree of defendant's cooperation with law enforcement officers.
The facts establish that at no time did any agent misrepresent the government's intention or purpose, or even urge the defendant to cooperate. The record reflects that after defendant learned that his wife was free to leave and would not be arrested, he made a voluntary, common-sense decision to cooperate.
The evidence shows that defendant voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently waived his Miranda rights. Under clearly established Supreme Court precedent, the relevant inquiry is whether the defendant appreciated the consequences of his actions, based on a totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., Patterson v. Illinois, 487 U.S. 285, 296-97 (1988); Moran, 475 U.S. at 421. Defendant is a thirty-one year old man with an 11th grade education. Defendant does not allege that he could not understand what he was saying or doing at the time he spoke with the officers. Instead, he specifically disavowed any lack of understanding on the date in question flowing from his then recent methamphetamine use. Further, agents Sinnegan and Sullivan testified that the defendant agreed to speak to them at different times and places, then gave clear, full and coherent answers containing specific and detailed information, demonstrating his ability to recall names, places, events, amounts of drugs, and other significant details regarding drug-related activities.
The circumstances surrounding defendant's wife's detention do not remotely prevent the defendant from making a rational decision about whether to speak with the officers. See United States v. Lawal, 231 F.3d 1045, 1048 (7th Cir. 2000) ("a confession is voluntary if the totality of the circumstances demonstrates that it was the product of rational intellect and not the result of physical abuse, psychological intimidation, or deceptive interrogation tactics calculated to overcome the defendant's free will"); Westbrook, 125 F.3d at 1006 ("nothing in this record leads us to believe the agents misled him or exploited Mr. Westbrook's anxiety to the point that he was unable to make a rational decision about whether to confess"); Sprosty v. Buchler, 79 F.3d 635, 647 (7th Cir. 1996) ("the police did not magnify or exploit Sprosty's fears, anxieties and uncertainties to the point where he was unable to make a rational decision about whether to confess").
Any moral or psychological pressure to confess which defendant may subjectively have felt emanating from a desire to be a good family man has no place in examining the voluntariness of Miranda waivers. Voluntariness of a waiver depends upon the absence of police overreaching, not on "free choice" in any broader sense of the term. As the United States Supreme Court has held:
There is obviously no reason to require more in the way of a "voluntariness" inquiry in the Miranda waiver context than in the Fourteenth Amendment confession context. The sole concern of the Fifth Amendment, on which Miranda was based, is governmental coercion. See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 187, 97 S.Ct. 1814, 1818, 52 L.Ed.2d 238 (1977); Miranda, supra, 384 U.S., at 460, 86 S.Ct., at 1620. Indeed, the Fifth Amendment privilege is not concerned "with moral and psychological pressures to confess emanating from sources other than official coercion." Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305, 105 S.Ct. 1285, 1290, 84 L.Ed.2d 222 (1985). The voluntariness of a waiver of this privilege has always depended on the absence of police overreaching, not on "free choice" in any broader sense of the word. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S., at 421, 106 S.Ct., at 1141 ("[T]he relinquishment of the right must have been voluntary in the sense that it was the product of a free and deliberate choice rather than intimidation, coercion or deception. . . . [T]he record is devoid of any suggestion that police resorted to physical or psychological pressure to elicit the statements"); Fare v. Michael, 442 U.S. 707, 726-727, 99 S.Ct. 2560, 2572-2573, 61 L.Ed.2d 197 (1979) (The defendant was "not worn down by improper interrogation tactics or lengthy questioning or by trickery or deceit. . . . The officers did not intimidate or threaten respondent in any way. Their questioning was restrained and free from the abuses that so concerned the Court in Miranda").
Respondent urges this Court to adopt his "free will" rationale, and to find an attempted waiver invalid whenever the defendant feels compelled to waive his rights by reason of any compulsion, even if the compulsion does not flow from the police. But such a treatment of the waiver issue would "cut this Court's holding in [ Miranda] completely loose from its own explicitly stated rationale." Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 345, 96 S.Ct. 1612, 1615, 48 L.Ed.2d 1 (1976). Miranda protects defendants against government coercion leading them to surrender rights protected by the Fifth Amendment; it goes no further than that.
Connelly, 479 U.S. at 169-171.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that defendant Rawlins' motion to suppress statements (Dk. 614) is denied.