Opinion
CRIMINAL DOCKET NO. 99-CR-395 SECTION "L"
June 19, 2000
ORDER AND REASONS
Before the Court is defendant's motion to suppress evidence. For the following reasons, defendant's motion to suppress evidence is DENIED in part and GRANTED in part.
I. BACKGROUND
The defendant Jean Perkins is charged with two counts of conspiring to produce and use false Louisiana driver's licenses to commit fraud, theft, and forgery.
During the investigation of the conspiracy, Postal Inspector Michael Paulhus obtained information from a confidential source that Perkins had computer identification technology and equipment in his residence for the purpose of making drivers' licenses. On September 16, 1998, Paulus obtained a search warrant for Perkins' residence at 3024 Delachaise Street and it was executed on September 17, 1998. The search discovered counterfeit checks but no computer equipment. Paulus only found a picture of Perkins seated in front of a computer.
Paulus then went to 6747 Tara Lane, the residence of Perkins' ex-girlfriend, Keila Carrie, to interview her about the investigation. He identified himself as a U.S. Postal Inspector and asked to speak with her about the Perkins investigation inside of Carrie's home. Carrie agreed, and Paulus proceeded to enter Carrie's house.
Upon his entrance into Carrie's home, the inspectors immediately identified a computer and stand identical to the one in the picture of Perkins. When asked if the computer was hers, Carrie stated that it was not hers and she did not know who owned the computer but that Perkins had brought it to her home a few days earlier. Paulus explained to Carrie that he could obtain a search warrant to search the premises, but Carrie instead consented to the search and signed a consent to search form. During his search of the residence, Paulus also discovered several other pertinent items such as a digital camera and blank checks. Upon finishing the search, Paulus took the computer back for inspection of its programs and files.
Perkins moves to suppress any and all evidence seized as a result of the search of Carriers apartment including the information from the computer files. The Court heard testimony from Carrie and Paulus and oral argument from counsel on the motion on June 16, 2000.
II. ANALYSIS
Perkins' motion to suppress raises two issues for the Court to address. First, Perkins contends that Carrie did not voluntarily consent to the search of her residence. Second, Perkins argues that Carrie lacked sufficient authority over the computer to consent to a search of it. Considering the credible evidence presented at the hearing and the applicable law, the Court finds that Carrie did voluntarily consent to the search of her home but that she did not have valid authority to consent to a search of the computer and its contents.
The search of Carrie's residence was a valid search because the credible evidence shows that Carrie voluntarily consented to a search of her home. Although the inspectors did not have a warrant to search Carrie's home, a warrantless search is valid if the government can prove by a preponderance of evidence that the consent given by Carrie was authorized and voluntary. See United States v. Jaras, 86 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 1996). Carrie, the lone occupant of the residence, had authority to permit Paulus to enter. When she invited Paulus into the residence, Carrie was not threatened. Paulus identified himself as a U.S. Postal Inspector before entering the house and indicated that he could obtain a warrant if she did not wish to consent to a search. Carrie agreed to the search and signed a consent to search form and testified that she was advised of her right to refuse the search. Carrie also noted that Paulus or his accompanying officer neither threatened her nor spoke forcefully. Therefore, the credible evidence demonstrates that Carrie voluntarily consented to a search of her residence.
While Carrie may have the authority to voluntarily consent to a search of her home, her consent does not necessarily extend to all the contents within her residence. "A homeowner's consent to a search of the home may not be effective consent to a search of a closed object inside the home." United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 725-26 (1984) (O'Connor, J. concurring). "Consent to search a container is effective only when given by one with common authority over or other sufficient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be inspected." United States v. Salinas-Cano, 959 F.2d 861, 863 (10th Cir. 1992) (quotations omitted). Common authority is defined as "mutual use of the property by persons having joint access or control for most purposes." Karo, 468 U.S. at 725 (quotations omitted).
In the present case, Carrie lacked sufficient common authority over the computer and its contents to consent to its search. She did not own the computer nor did she know who did. Carrie testified that Perkins had brought the computer to her apartment only a few days prior to the search. While the computer was m her home, Carrie never used it nor even knew how to operate it. The fact that the computer and its contents were kept in her home did not give Carrie the authority to consent to a search of it. See Jaras, 86 F.3d 383, 389 (5th Cir. 1996) (holding that the owner and driver of a vehicle did not have the authority to consent to a search of his passenger's suitcases contained in the trunk of the car); cf. United States v. Smith, 27 F. Supp.2d 1111, 1115-16 (C.D. Ill. 1998) (finding that the defendant's live-in girlfriend had authority to consent to a search of a computer because it lacked password protection, was located in an open, accessible area, and was mutually used by the defendant, his girlfriend, and her young child); see generally Stephen K. Bayens, The Search and Seizure of Computers: Are We Sacrificing Personal Privacy for the Advancement of Technology? 48 Drake L. Rev. 239 (2000). Therefore, the postal inspectors did not validly search the contents of the computer.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to suppress is DENIED with respect to the search of Carrie's residence and all contents therein with the exception of the internal files and programs stored on the computer. Defendant's motion to suppress is GRANTED with respect to the programs, files, and all other evidence stored within the computer.