Opinion
CRIMINAL ACTION NO. 02-10207-RWZ
April 8, 2003
FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION
Lamont Cooper is charged with being a felon in possession of a firearm, possessing crack cocaine with intent to distribute, and using a firearm in connection with a drug offense. The indictment stems from of a series of events that occurred in the early evening of February 22, 2002, in Dorchester and Quincy, Massachusetts. Defendant has moved to suppress all items seized from his person and car. Defendant asserts that police officers did not have probable cause to arrest him or search his car.
I note that the testimony of all of the participants places the events on February 22, 2002, whereas the indictment charges conduct on April 22, 2002. Even allowing for some latitude in precision of dates in an indictment, the "on or about" convention probably does not cover a difference of this dimension. For purposes of Defendant's Motion to Suppress, I will adhere to the testimony and accept the February date.
Based on the testimony of two Boston Police officers, Martin Columbo and Stephen Mead, and Defendant's affidavit, I find the following facts: Officer Columbo, who is assigned to the Drug Control Unit in Area C-11 Dorchester, was sitting in an unmarked car with his partner, Frank Colon, at the intersection of East and Dorchester Streets. At about 6:30 p.m., he noticed a man standing on the sidewalk talking into a cell phone. After the conversation, the man remained on the sidewalk and looked up and down the street. Shortly thereafter, Defendant drove up in a green Honda Accord and stopped where the man was waiting. The man got into the car, which drove on for about half a block. Then the car stopped, and Defendant's passenger got out and walked up Linden Street.
Columbo left the unmarked police car and followed the man on foot while Colon continued to follow Defendant by car. When Columbo identified himself as a police officer, the man began to run, but he fell and dropped a plastic bag containing an off-white substance, which Columbo thought to be crack cocaine. Columbo recovered the bag, arrested the man, James Rooney, and gave him the requisite Miranda warnings. Rooney told Columbo that he bought the drugs from Defendant for $100.
The two officers had radioed their initial observations to Sergeant Detective Stephen Mead, who was supervising their Drug Control Unit. Colon continued to update Mead, who was en route with his partner, Officer Englander. Mead and Englander caught up with Defendant and Colon on the Southeast Expressway. The officers maintained radio contact and upon hearing that Columbo recovered drugs from Rooney, they decided to arrest Defendant. The latter, apparently aware that he was being followed, took evasive action and suddenly took the Furnace Brook Parkway exit. He drove down a small street under the Expressway and appeared to stop in a dead end circle, Dupont Court. When Mead approached the Honda, however, Defendant attempted to escape. Mead headed him off and walked to the passenger side of Defendant's car, while Englander went to the driver's side. Mead informed Defendant that he was under arrest and when Defendant asked why, Mead answered: "drugs in Dorchester." Englander took Defendant out of the car and patted him down. Englander confiscated a gun and subsequently realized it was loaded. He also found seven bags containing crack cocaine and a quantity of money. When asked about a firearms license, Defendant said that it was at home.
Defendant argues that based on the totality of the circumstances, the officers did not have probable cause to arrest and search him or the car. In particular, he contends that the hearsay statement of Rooney, a "major factor arousing the suspicion of the officers," is itself suspect because Rooney is a known crack user and he was not known to be reliable. However, the statement was not hearsay; Rooney merely recounted what he had done. Furthermore, the record is devoid of any evidence that Rooney was a known crack user. However, the record is replete with the officers' observations of Rooney at the intersection before, during, and after the pursuit, and Defendant's conduct when he apparently perceived that he was being pursued.
Contrary to Defendant's assertions, the initial stop was justified by the totality of the circumstances. Both of the testifying policemen involved in the arrests had years of experience in drug investigations, and each had participated in numerous arrests for drug offenses. Moreover, I credit Columbo's testimony that the area they had staked out was known to be rife with illegal drug activity and that the conduct of Rooney and Defendant was consistent with a drug transaction. These observations, together with Rooney's statement, unquestionably provided the officers with probable cause to stop and arrest Defendant. See United States v. Trullo, 809 F.2d 108, 112 (1st Cir. 1987) (holding that experienced officers were justified in stopping the driver of a car after observing him pick up a passenger in a high crime area of Boston and drive for a block and a half before depositing the passenger back onto the street.).
Defendant does not dispute the propriety of the search incident to a lawful arrest.
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion to Suppress is DENIED.