Opinion
Case No. 1:02-CR-46
April 7, 2003
OPINION
Defendants Jack and Ruth Christians were convicted of income tax evasion in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201 after a four-day jury trial in this Court. Now before the Court are defendants' renewed motion for judgment of acquittal (dkt. # 189), motion for a new trial (dkt. # 190), and motion for reconsideration (dkt. # 196). The government has filed briefs in response to the first two of these motions, to which the Court has permitted defendants to reply. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motions will be denied.
I. Background
1. Procedural Background
This case has a complex procedural history. On February 27, 2002, a grand jury returned an indictment charging defendants Jack and Ruth Christians with one count each of an attempt to evade or defeat tax in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7201. The indictment charges that defendants committed tax evasion by filing a false 1995 joint individual tax return with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS).
Attorneys Robert Elsey and Douglas McNabb represented the Christians from shortly after their indictment through several months of pre-trial proceedings. These proceedings included several adjournments of the trial date as well as an order granting defendants' unopposed motion for a bench trial.
On August 22, 2002, the Court granted defendants' motion to substitute trial counsel, replacing Elsey with attorney Robert Forrest. The Court also granted a further adjournment of the trial date and granted defendants' motion to withdraw their jury trial waiver. Later, attorney McNabb withdrew, leaving Forrest as defendants' sole trial counsel.
The case finally proceeded to trial in November 2002. After four days, a jury returned guilty verdicts as to each defendant. One week after the trial concluded, the Court denied attorney Robert Alan Jones' motion to appear pro hac vice on behalf of defendants, finding no cause for such admission under W.D. Mich. L.Crim.R. 57.1(c) (iii) ("This Court disfavors pro hac vice admission and prefers that all lawyers appearing before it become full members of the bar of the Court.").
Jones then applied for full admission to the bar of this Court. Pending the resolution of this application, the Court denied a motion to withdraw filed by Forrest, whose services the Christians apparently no longer desired. Also while Jones' application was pending, attorney Elsey re-appeared on behalf of defendants, filing a motion for a new trial on December 2, 2002. Several days later, Forrest filed motions for judgment of acquittal and for a new trial.
At the end of December, Jones was admitted to the bar of this Court and filed an appearance in this case. Then, on January 3, 2003, the Court permitted Forrest to withdraw. On the same day, the Court ordered the defendants to file a notice stating which, if any, of the post-trial motions that had been filed they intended to pursue.
Jones responded on behalf of defendants, electing to pursue the two motions filed by Forrest. Shortly thereafter, however, Elsey filed an objection moving the Court to reconsider its January 3 order, arguing that the Court lacked the authority to order defendants to make such a choice. These three motions are now before the Court and will be addressed in turn.
2. Factual Background
At trial, witnesses for the government testified that the Christians are the former owners of a 20 acre parcel of land located at "Knapp's Corner" in Grand Rapids, Michigan. In summer 1995, Jack and Ruth Christians entered into negotiations for the sale of this property to Waters Corporation, a buyer's agent representing Meijer, Inc. After extensive negotiations with Waters vice-president Joe Zania, the Christians eventually agreed to sell the property for $3.1 million.
Just before closing the deal, however, defendants conveyed the property to Cornerstone Management Trust ("Cornerstone"), a trust they had recently created with themselves and their son Stuart Christians as trustees. After being notified of this development, Waters wrote the check for the $3.1 million sale price to Cornerstone rather than to the Christians jointly. Upon receiving this check, Cornerstone immediately indorsed it over to Ottawa Trust ("Ottawa"), another trust that Jack and Ruth Christians had created with themselves as trustees.
The money was then deposited in Ottawa's bank account, upon which defendants drew several checks over the next few months. The Christians wrote checks from this account for $5,000 to Stuart Christians, for $6,885.96 to Paul Southland, and for $35,000 to Jack Christians. The remainder of the sale proceeds were then transferred to a Barclay's Bank account in the Cayman Islands. This transfer offshore, according to Ottawa Trust minutes and Jack Christians' testimony, was effected in order to minimize defendants' access to the funds. Once there, however, the Christians drew upon the account to purchase a $169,000 home in the Grand Rapids area in the name of Sands Investment, yet another trust that defendants had created.
In April 1996, three days after purchasing the new home, defendants filed a self-prepared IRS Form 1040 joint income tax return for tax year 1995. This return, signed by both Jack and Ruth Christians, did not acknowledge the $3.1 million sale of the Knapp's Corner property, any capital gains from that sale, or any resulting tax liability. Rather, it listed taxable income of $51,933 and capital gains of $438.
The Christians also filed a tax return on IRS Form 1041 on behalf of Cornerstone Management Trust. This return, signed by Jack Christians as trustee, listed total income of $2,949,200 and a total tax liability of $1,166,540. Attached to this return, however, was a disclaimer denying any obligation to pay this liability.
Upon receiving defendants' 1040, which failed to list any tax liability resulting from the sale of the property, and the Cornerstone 1041, which listed a tax liability but then disclaimed it, the IRS found sufficient evidence of fraud to turn the matter over to their Criminal Investigation Division (CID). During the course of the CID investigation, agents met with defendants to discuss settling the tax liability. Toward this end, agents asked defendants to provide support for their claim that no taxes were owed. Rather than cooperating, however, defendants refused to provide any documents or explanation. After furthers investigation, the government initiated this criminal case.
II. Renewed Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
A. Standard of Review
In considering a renewed motion for judgment of acquittal under Fed.R.Crim.P. 29(c), the Court must determine whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. United States v. Pearce, 912 F.2d 159 (6th Cir. 1990); United States v. Quinn, 901 F.2d 522 (6th Cir. 1990). The prosecution must be given the benefit of all inferences that could reasonably be drawn from the evidence, even if the evidence is circumstantial. United States v. Newman, 889 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1989). Moreover, circumstantial evidence alone may be sufficient to sustain a conviction. United States v. Stone, 748 F.2d 361, 362-63 (6th Cir. 1984).
B. Analysis
To obtain a conviction for tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201, the government must prove each of the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt as to each defendant:
1) the existence of a tax deficiency,
2) an affirmative act to evade or defeat that tax, and
3) willfulness.
26 U.S.C. § 7201; Sansone v. United States, 380 U.S. 343, 351 (1965); United States v. Daniel, 956 F.2d 540, 542 (6th Cir. 1992).
The final element, willfulness, connotes "bad faith" or "a voluntary, intentional violation of a known legal duty." United States v. Pomponio, 429 U.S. 10, 12-13 (1976). As defendants have pointed out, however, this element may be negated by a good faith belief that one's actions do not violate the law. See Cheek v. United States, 498 U.S. 192 (1991). The Cheek court noted: "In the end, the issue is whether, based on all the evidence, the Government has proved that the defendant was aware of the duty at issue, which cannot be true if the jury credits a good-faith misunderstanding and belief submission, whether or not the claimed belief or misunderstanding is objectively reasonable." Id. at 202.
The evidence adduced at trial, when viewed in the light most favorable to the government, disclosed that Jack and Ruth Christians filed a joint 1995 1040 tax return that did not reflect any capital gain or income from the $3.1 million sale of their property at Knapp's Corner in Grand Rapids. While this sale and the resulting tax liability were reported on the Cornerstone 1041, the Christians attached to that return a disclaimer of liability. According to Jack Christians, he and his wife believed that they were not required to report the sale proceeds on their 1040 and that attaching a disclaimer to the 1041 would require the IRS to file a notice of deficiency before any tax would be due. IRS revenue agent Ronald Sikorsi testified, however, that based on his calculations a tax of $835,580 was due and owing from defendants in addition to that declared on their 1040.
Furthermore, the Christians established at least two trusts — Cornerstone and Ottawa — through which to channel the proceeds of the sale. The evidence at trial indicated that defendants maintained complete control over this money as it traveled through these various trusts. Indeed, defendants drew at least three checks off the Ottawa account — one each to Jack Christians, Stuart Christians, and Paul Southland. Furthermore, even after transferring the bulk of the proceeds to a Barclay's Bank account in the Cayman Islands — ostensibly to keep the money away from themselves — defendants used the proceeds to purchase a new home in the Grand Rapids area in the name of a third trust.
On the basis of this evidence, a rational juror could have found that a tax deficiency of approximately $835,000 existed on the part of defendants, and that filing the 1040 constituted a affirmative act to evade that tax. In light of the use of trusts and the complete control defendants exercised over the proceeds of the sale, a rational juror could have rejected defendant good faith defense and further found that this act was willful. Given that sufficient evidence exists for a rational juror to find each of the elements of tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201 beyond a reasonable doubt as to each defendant, their renewed motion for judgment of acquittal will be denied.
II. Motion for a New Trial
A. Standard of Review
Defendants also move for a new trial under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33. The Court may grant such a motion "if the interest of justice so requires." Fed.R.Crim.P. 33; United States v. Davis, 15 F.3d 526, 531 (6th Cir. 1994). In other words, Rule 33 gives the trial court "broad discretion to set aside a jury verdict and order a new trial to avert a perceived miscarriage of justice." United States v. Ferguson, 969 F.2d 1409, 1413 (2d Cir. 1992); see also Davis, 15 F.3d at 531 ("The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial rests within the district court's sound discretion."). The defendant bears the burden of proving a new trial should be granted. Id. B. Analysis
Defendants offer several grounds in support of their motion for a new trial. First, defendants argue that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. Second, defendants contend that the Court's erred in its instructions to the jury, particularly by failing to give a lesser-included offense instruction. Finally, defendants argue that their right against self-incrimination was violated, as jurors allegedly considered the fact that defendant Ruth Christians did not testify during their deliberations. The Court will address each of these contentions in turn.
1. Manifest Weight of Evidence
Defendants first argue that the verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The Court has broader discretion to grant a Rule 33 motion challenging the weight of the evidence than it does a Rule 29 motion for judgment of acquittal, as in the former the Court may consider the credibility of the witnesses and the quality of the evidence in determining whether the verdict is fundamentally unfair. United States v. Arrington, 757 F.2d 1484, 1485 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Mack, 868 F. Supp. 207, 209 (E.D. Mich. 1994). Even so, such motions are generally disfavored and should only be granted with great caution. See United States v. Seago, 930 F.2d 482, 488 (6th Cir. 1991); United States v. Costello, 255 F.2d 876, 879 (2d Cir. 1958).
Applying this broader standard under Rule 33, the Court cannot agree with defendants that the verdict was fundamentally unfair as against the manifest weight of the evidence. Indeed, after considering the credibility of the witnesses and the quality of the evidence presented at trial and summarized above, the Court finds that the weight of the evidence supports, rather than undermines, a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt as to each defendant.
2. Jury Instructions
Defendants next claim that the Court committed certain errors in its instructions to the jury. The choice of which instructions to give is within the discretion of the Court. United States. v. Tarwater, 308 F.3d 494, 510 (6th Cir. 2002). When challenged, jury instructions must be examined "as a whole to determine whether they adequately inform the jury of relevant considerations and provide a basis in law for the jury to reach its decision." Innes v. Howell Corp., 76 F.3d 702, 714 (6th Cir. 1996).
Defendants first argue that the Court should have instructed the jury on failure to file a tax return under 26 U.S.C. § 7203, which they contend is a lesser-included offense of tax evasion under 26 U.S.C. § 7201. The Sixth Circuit has noted that a defendant is only entitled to a lesser-included offense instruction if he can meet both prongs of a two-part test: (1) the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense; and (2) the evidence would allow a rational jury to find the defendant guilty of the lesser offense but not of the greater offense. United States v. Waldon, 206 F.3d 597, 604-05 (6th Cir. 2000), citing Fed.R.Crim.P. 31(c) (permitting a jury to convict a defendant of a lesser offense as long as it is "necessarily included in the offense charged").
The first prong of this analysis, referred to as the "elements test," was affirmatively adopted by the Supreme Court in United States v. Schmuck, 489 U.S. 705 (1989). Under this test, "one offense is not `necessarily included' in another unless the elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense." Id. at 716. In other words, "where the lesser offense requires an element not required for the greater offense, no instruction is to be given under Rule 31(c)." Id.
In a recent unpublished opinion the Sixth Circuit applied the Schmuck elements test to § 7201 and § 7203. See United States v. Harris, No. 95-4356, 1997 WL 369439 (6th Cir., July 1, 1997). In Harris, the Court noted that the elements of tax evasion under § 7201 are: (1) the existence of a tax deficiency, (2) an affirmative act to evade or defeat that tax, and (3) willfulness. Id. at *9 The Court compared these elements to those of failure to file a tax return under § 7203: (1) having an obligation to file a return, (2) failure to file by the due date, and (3) willfulness. Id. The Court concluded that "by its language, under a Schmuck elements analysis, § 7203 has one element not required under § 7201, the failure to file a return by the due date, and is not necessarily included in the § 7201 offense." Id. (emphasis in original).
This conclusion finds support in other courts as well, although for varying reasons. See United States v. Nichols, 9 F.3d 1420, 1421-22 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding that § 7203 is not "necessarily included" in § 7201 because "failure to file a return is an element of the offense of failure to file but is not an element of tax evasion"); United States v. Becker, 965 F.2d 383, 390-91 (7th Cir. 1992) (finding that § 7203 is not a lesser-included offense of § 7201 because "§ 17203 does not require an affirmative act, whereas a § 7201 offense requires some affirmative act"); United States v. Fusero, 106 F. Supp.2d 921, 925-26 (E.D. Mich. 2000) (Gadola, J.) (following Nichols).
In light of these decisions, the Court finds that the elements of § 7203 are not a subset of the elements of § 7201, since under § 7203 the government must prove that a defendant failed to file a return by the due date. See Nichols, 9 F.3d at 1421-22; Harris, 1997 WL 369439 at *9, Having failed to satisfy the elements test, the Court finds that failure to file a tax return is not "necessarily included" in tax evasion and need not consider whether the evidence in this case would allow a rational jury to find the defendant guilty of the former but not of the latter. See Waldon, 206 F.3d at 604-05. The Court therefore properly declined to give the lesser-included offense instruction requested by defendants.
Next, defendants contend that the Court should have given the jury a "permissible inferences" instruction. Even had such an instruction been warranted, a detailed review of the record reveals that it was never requested. In the absence of a request, the failure to include an instruction is only erroneous if it results in "a grave miscarriage of justice." United States v. Humphrey, 287 F.3d 422, 439 (6th Cir. 2002), quoting United States v. Sanderson, 966 F.2d 184, 187 (6th Cir. 1992). The Court finds that the absence of a permissible inferences instruction in this case did not result in a grave miscarriage of justice.
Such an instruction might have stated: "If one or more writings or documents create equally permissible inferences, a choice of one or the other will not support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Defendants' Brief at 8.
Finally, defendants argue that the Court should not have given an "economic substance" instruction. This argument is without merit, however, as the instruction has a firm legal basis and was supported by the evidence presented at trial. The Sixth Circuit, for example, has explicitly noted that the tax consequences flowing from a situation depend on substance rather than form. See Owens v. Commissioner, 568 F.2d 1233, 1237 (6th Cir. 1977) ("The law does not permit a taxpayer to . . . cast transactions in forms where there is no economic reality behind the use of the forms. The incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a transaction.)
This instruction stated:
Under the law, tax consequences depend on the substance of a situation, not the form, and income is taxed to the person or entity that, in fact, earns it. Therefore, a transaction entered into for the principal purpose of evading taxes that lacks economic substance is disregarded by the law as a sham. A transfer is not recognized for tax purposes if the transfer has no economic substance.
In this case, the government contends that each defendant knowingly participated in conveyances of assets to various trusts. The government further contends that the trusts and the asset transfers lack economic substance. You should examine if there was a real or significant change in a defendant's relationship to property as a result of the creation of a trust. In determining whether a particular transaction or entity lacked economic substance, you are instructed to consider the overall circumstances surrounding that transaction. A trust arrangement is a sham for tax purposes if the trust originator retains control over the property or income placed in the trust and does not change the way the property or income is treated.
Trial transcript 11/7/02 at 105-06.
Furthermore, the notion that a trust entity may lack economic substance when viewed under all the circumstances finds recognition in the courts. See Chase v. Commissioner, 926 F.2d 737, 740 (8th Cir. 1991) (trust created for principal purpose of avoiding taxes was a sham); United States v. Noske, 117 F.3d 1053, 1059 (8th Cir. 1997) (approving of instruction stating that "trust arrangements are shams for tax purposes if the trust's originator retains control over the property or income placed in the trust, and does not change the way the property or income is treated").
Given this broad support in the courts, and given the evidence indicating that defendants established at least two trusts and retained complete control over trust assets, the Court finds that its "economic substance" instruction was proper.
3. Self-Incrimination
Finally, defendants contend that their right against self-incrimination was violated because one juror's decision was influenced by defendant Ruth Christians' decision not to testify at trial. This argument is based on a Grand Rapids Press article that quoted this anonymous juror as saying: "I would have liked to heard from her. Her signature was on there too." See Ed White, Pair Guilty of Tax Evasion in $3.1 Million Land Sale, Grand Rapids Press, Nov. 9. 2002. On the basis of this quote, defendants seek an evidentiary hearing to determine the extent to which Ruth Christians' decision not to testify influenced the jury's verdict.
The Fifth Amendment guarantees every defendant the right to remain silent and the right not to have adverse inferences drawn from the exercise of that right. Carter v. Kentucky, 450 U.S. 288, 299-301 (1981). When allegations of improper jury influence are raised, whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing is a matter left to the discretion of the trial court. See United States v. Copeland, 51 F.3d 611, 613 (6th Cir. 1995).
In considering whether to hold an evidentiary hearing, the Court must first determine whether the alleged influence was extraneous or internal, since Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b) prohibits a juror from testifying regarding "matters that take place during deliberations, the effect of anything on the juror's mind or emotions, and the mental process of any juror." United States v. Logan, 250 F.3d 350, 379 (6th Cir. 2001). Rule 606(b) permits, however, a juror to testify regarding "whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear on any juror." Fed.R.Evid. 606(b).
Examples of extraneous influence include a bribe attempt on a juror, prior business relationships between a juror and a party or witness, any publicity received and discussed by the jury, and any communications between jurors and outside persons. See Tanner v. United States, 483 U.S. 107, 117-18 (1987); United States v. Herndon, 156 F.3d 629, 635 (6th Cir. 1998); United States v. Rodriguez, 116 F.3d 1225, 1227 (8th Cir. 1997). The refusal to conduct an evidentiary hearing upon allegations of extraneous influence may constitute an abuse of discretion. United States v. Shackelford, 777 F.2d 1141, 1145 (6th Cir. 1985).
Internal influences upon a jury, on the other hand, include the behavior of jurors during deliberations, the jurors' ability to hear or comprehend trial testimony, and the physical or mental incompetence of a juror. Herndon, 156 F.3d at 634-35, citing Tanner, 483 U.S. at 118. Such internal influences also include the "internal processes of the jury." Tanner, 483 U.S. at 120.
In this case, the Court instructed the jury on Ruth Christians' decision not to testify:
Mrs. Christians did not testify in this case. A defendant has an absolute right not to testify. The fact that a defendant did not testify cannot be considered by you in any way. Do not even discuss it in your deliberations. Remember that it is up to the government to prove each defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. It is not up to either defendant to prove that he or she is innocent.
Trial transcript 11/7/02 at 107. As a general matter, juries are presumed to follow the instructions they are given. See Washington v. Hofbauer, 228 F.3d 689, 706 (6th Cir. 2000). Despite this, and relying on the quote from the Grand Rapids Press, defendants contend that the jury was influenced by the fact that Ruth Christians chose not to testify at trial.
Faced with a similar factual scenario, however, the Eighth Circuit noted:
That [defendant] did not testify is not a fact the jurors learned through outside contact, communication, or publicity. It did not enter the jury room through an external, prohibited route. It was part of the trial, and was part of the information each juror collected. It should not have been discussed by the jury, and indeed was the subject of an instruction to that effect. But it was not "extraneous information," and therefore does not fall within the exception outlined in Rule 606(b).United States v. Rodriguez, 116 F.3d 1225, 1227 (8th Cir. 1997). Given this, the Rodriguez Court found that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing.
Here, the Court questions whether the cryptic quote in the Grand Rapids Press article indicates that the jury considered or drew any adverse infuence from Ruth Christians' decision not to testify. To the extent that it does, however, such influence would be internal rather than external. See id. Since jurors are prohibited under 606(b) from testifying regarding internal influences, an evidentiary hearing is not warranted.
As a final matter, defendants contend that Ruth Christians was confused and afraid to protest against her not being called to testify, and that allowing their convictions to stand without allowing both of them to testify would be a miscarriage of justice. This claim is wholly without merit, however, as Jack Christians did testify and Ruth Christians was given that chance but declined to do so. During the course of the trial, the Court had the following discussion with defendants outside the presence of the jury:
THE COURT: All right. Mr. and Mrs. Christians, I want to speak directly to you now for a moment. This is the last government witness, I would say that it's probably unlikely that this witness' examination by the government and by your attorney will be completed by the end of the day today, but it's at least theoretically possible. If we are done with this witness and there's still time left in the day, you'll see me turn to Mr. Forrest to call his first witness.
Now, the reason that I'm talking to you about this now is that you are going to be called upon to make the decision whether you want to testify in this case potentially as early as this afternoon. I have no idea, of course, whether there are other witnesses that might be called on your behalf, and so we wouldn't get to you if you wanted to testify anyway, but I won't be sure that I have time to have this conversation with you unless I have it now at this break, so that's why we're doing this.
I want to make sure that both of you understand that you have an absolute constitutional right to testify on your own behalf in this case, if you wish, and similarly, to not testify, if you choose not to. I also want to make sure that you understand that this is a right that each of you possess yourselves. It's not Mr. Forrest's right, it's not Mr. Seitz' right, it's not my right. It's not anybody in this courtroom's right, except each of your rights.
Now, in making the decision, when we get to that point in the trial, whether you wish to testify on your own behalf, I fully expect that you will consult with Mr. Forrest and consider his advice. He doesn't make the final decision, however, he just gives you advice, and then you take it into account, because you have to make that final decision. The reason for that is simple: If this trial doesn't go the way you want it to go, and you are found guilty of this crime, the punishment will be imposed on you, it will not be imposed upon Mr. Forrest or anybody else. So that's why it's your decision to make.
Now, if you decide to testify, I will give the jury an instruction at the end of the case that says something to the effect that the jury will be required to consider the credibility or believability of whichever one of you or both of you might choose to testify in the same way they would any other witness. If you choose not to testify, which of course, as I've explained is your absolute constitutional right, I will advise the jury that you have that right, and that it would be improper for them to even discuss among themselves the fact that you did not testify in this case, and that cannot be used as evidence against you in any way.
* * *
Now, do either of you have any questions about the f act that it's your decision, and ultimately your decision alone, as to whether you testify on your own behalf in this case or not testify, as you choose, when we get to that stage of the trial? Mr. Christians, do you have any questions?
MR. CHRISTIANS: No, Your Honor, I don't.
THE COURT: Ms. Christians, do you have any questions?
MS. CHRISTIANS: No questions.
THE COURT: All right.
Trial transcript 11/6/02 at 153-55. This discussion reveals that both defendants fully understood their right to testify or remain silent and that this right belonged to each of them alone, to be exercised after consulting with counsel. In light of this, defendants' claim must be rejected.
III. MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
On January 24, 2003, attorney Robert Elsey filed an objection on behalf of defendants moving the Court to reconsider its order of January 3, 2003. This order required defendants to choose which, if any, of the several post-trial motions that had been filed they intended to pursue. At that time, one motion for judgment of acquittal and two motions for a new trial were pending before the Court.
In a February 13, 2003, telephone conversation, Jones advised the Court that defendants had not authorized Elsey to re-appear or file motions on their behalf. In addition, the Christians copied the Court on a February 14, 2003, letter they wrote to Elsey stating: "You are not authorized to represent us in our criminal case. The current situation arose from a mistake when we were in a transition between Mr. Robert Forrest and Mr. Robert Alan Jones. Our determination that we wish Jones and no one else to represent us at this time is not a reflection on you." Dkt. # 206.
In light of this correspondence, it is not clear that Elsey was authorized to file the motion for reconsideration at issue here. Even if he was, however, the motion will be denied on its merits, since the Court finds that it had inherent authority in this case to order defendants to choose which motions they intended to pursue. See Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630-31 (1962) (describing "inherent power" as "the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases").
IV. CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the Court finds that sufficient evidence existed for a rational juror to have found each of the elements of tax evasion beyond a reasonable doubt as to each defendant. The Court further finds that, given the absence of merit in the grounds asserted by defendants in their motion, the interests of justice do not require a new trial. Finally, the Court finds defendants' objection to its January 3, 2003, order to be without merit. For these reasons, the Court will deny defendants' renewed motion for judgment of acquittal, motion for a new trial, and motion for reconsideration. The Court will enter an order consistent with this opinion.
ORDER
In accordance with the Court's opinion of even date,
IT IS ORDERED that defendants' renewed motion for judgment of acquittal (dkt. # 189) is DENIED; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' motion for a new trial (dkt. # 190) is DENIED; and
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' motion for reconsideration (dkt. # 196) is DENIED.