Opinion
CRIMINAL ACTION NOS. 02-300-01, 02-300-02.
October 7, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
On April 16, 2004, Defendant Franklin Butler was found guilty by a federal jury of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base ("crack") in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count One), possession with intent to distribute cocaine base ("crack"), and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (Count Two), and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (Count Three). In the same proceeding, on April 16, 2004, Defendant Bill Murray was found guilty by a federal jury of conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute cocaine base ("crack"), in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846 (Count One) and maintenance of a location for storage and distribution of a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2) (Count Five). Butler and Murray filed separate motions for acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29(c), arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conspiracy convictions. In addition, Butler argues that his conviction for carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime (Count Three) should be overturned due to a lack of evidence and Murray disputes his conviction under 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). For the reasons that follow, the Motions are denied.
Murray was acquitted on Count Two of the Indictment, possession with intent to distribute cocaine base ("crack"), and aiding and abetting the same, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C) and 18 U.S.C. § 2.
I. Legal Standard
In a post-verdict motion for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29(c), the defendant bears the heavy burden of establishing thatno "rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." United States v. Voight, 89 F.3d 1050, 1080 (3d Cir. 1996). In considering the motion and the evidence presented at trial, the Court is required to draw all possible inferences in favor of the jury's verdict.See United States v. Smith, 294 F.3d 473, 476 (3d Cir. 2002). Consequently, a defendant's challenge of the sufficiency of the evidence should be sustained only where "the prosecution's failure is clear." Id. (quoting United States v. Leon, 739 F.2d 885, 891 (3d Cir. 1984)).
II. Discussion
A. Butler's Conviction for Possession of Firearm in Furtherance of Trafficking
To sustain a conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), a jury must have been able to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that Butler possessed a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.See United States v. Flemming, 2004 WL 1965035, at *4 (E.D. Pa. March 4, 2003). In this case, there was clearly sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Butler was engaged in drug trafficking. The present question is whether there was sufficient evidence to prove possession of a gun "in furtherance" of that drug distribution. As the Third Circuit noted in United States v. Sparrow, this determination is based on the "totality of the evidence, both direct and circumstantial." 371 F.3d 851, 852. In deciding if a firearm was used "in furtherance" of drug trafficking, Sparrow directed courts to consider
Indeed, Butler does not challenge his conviction on Count Two.
the type of drug activity that is being conducted, accessibility of the firearm, the type of weapon, whether the weapon is stolen, the status of the possession (legitimate or illegal), whether the gun is loaded, proximity to drugs or drug profits, and the time and circumstances under which the gun is found.Id. at 853 (quoting United States v. Ceballos-Torres, 218 F.3d 409, 414-15 (5th Cir. 2000); see also Flemming, 2004 WL 1965035 at *4.
The evidence police discovered upon entering the apartment at 941 Hamilton Street was consistent with recent or on-going drug distribution. Butler was arrested in possession of 37 small packets of cocaine and approximately $672 in cash. See Testimony of Officer Christopher Cruz ("Cruz") at 44. Officers discovered small baggies for drug packaging and isositol, a substance typically used to "cut" cocaine. Cruz at 50. Agent Kenneth Bellis testified at trial that these were all consistent with drug distribution. See Testimony of Agent Kenneth Bellis ("Bellis") at 136. Significantly, these activities were all in proximity to the firearm. In addition, if jurors credited the testimony of Officers Cruz and Hough, there is evidence that Butler answered the door holding the firearm and later stated that he "needed [the gun] to protect his product." Cruz at 35 48; see also Testimony of Officer Kyle T. Hough ("Hough") at 127. Officer Hough further confirmed that the firearm was discovered in close proximity to Butler and was easily accessible for use. See Hough at 104. In addition, the gun was loaded when it was recovered. See Cruz at 43. In sum, considering the factors outlined in Sparrow, there was substantial evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the firearm was possessed in furtherance of drug trafficking, and the verdict on this count must be upheld.
All referenced portions of Officer Cruz's testimony are from the April 13, 2004 trial transcript (docket no. 100).
Portions of Agent Bellis's testimony are from the April 14, 2004 trial transcript (docket no. 96).
Portions of Officer Hough's testimony are from the April 14, 2004 trial transcript (docket no. 96).
B. Butler and Murray's Convictions for Conspiracy to Distribute Crack-Cocaine
Both Butler and Murray challenge the sufficiency of the government's evidence in support of the charge of conspiring to distribute crack-cocaine. In order to establish a conspiracy between the two defendants, the government must show a unity of purpose, an intent to achieve a common goal, and an agreement to work together towards that goal. United States v. Gibbs, 190 F.3d 188, 197. These elements can be proven from entirely circumstantial evidence and can be inferred from "evidence of related facts and circumstances from which it appears as a reasonable and logical inference, that the activities of the participants . . . could not have been carried on except as the result of a preconcieved scheme." Id. (quoting United States v. Kapp, 781 F.2d 1008, 1010 (3d Cir. 1999)).
The evidence of a conspiratorial agreement in this case was sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a conspiracy to distribute drugs existed. See United States v. Polidoro, 1998 WL 634921, at *2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 16, 1998) ("When considering a motion for judgment of acquittal, [a] Court may not weigh the evidence or substitute its opinion for that of the jury."). The jury could have credited the circumstantial evidence presented by the government to infer an arrangement between the two defendants, whereby Murray permitted Butler to sell drugs from the apartment that Murray had leased. As described above, the government clearly presented sufficient evidence of drug distribution. Furthermore, when police searched the apartment, Murray was discovered apparently in the process of handling cocaine. See Hough at 103; Testimony of Officer Michael Mancini ("Mancini") at 70. Officer Cruz testified that Murray admitted to renting the apartment and paying the rent, Cruz at 49-50, and this was confirmed by an August Rental Agreement listing Murray as the lessee. See Testimony of Bill Murray ("Murray") at 21. Finally, on an evidence release form that Murray completed at the police station, he listed 941 Hamilton Street as his home address. Murray at 20.
Portions of Officer Mancini's testimony are from the April 14, 2004 trial transcript (docket no. 96).
Portions of Bill Murray's testimony are from the April 14, 2004 trial transcript (docket no. 101).
This evidence of Murray's rental of the apartment and his knowledge of drug activity, coupled with his presence at the apartment at the time of Butler's arrest for drug distribution, was enough for a reasonable jury to infer the existence of a conspiratorial agreement. See United States v. Dent, 149 F.3d 180, 188 (3d Cir. 1998) (finding sufficient evidence to support conspiracy charge from defendant's proximity to drugs and paraphernalia, while others around defendant were engaged in distribution activities); United States v. Gaines, 726 F. Supp. 1457, 1462-63 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (ruling evidence sufficient to infer that all defendants were involved in drug distribution when they were apprehended in same house, where on-going distribution activities were occurring).
Butler and Murray rely heavily on the Third Circuit's decision in United States v. Wexler, 838 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1988), in arguing that their conspiracy convictions should be overturned. In Wexler and its progeny, conspiracy convictions were reversed because there was insufficient evidence to prove that defendants knew that the activity in which they were participating involved the distribution of drugs. See Wexler, 838 F.2d at 91. Specifically, in Wexler, there was evidence that the defendant was involved in a conspiracy to transport cargo via a Ryder truck, but no evidence that he realized that the cargo was illegally imported hashish. See id. This lack of evidence regarding the defendant's knowledge of the specific aim of the conspiracy was fatal to the government's case. Id.
Butler and Murray's reliance on this line of cases is misplaced. In this record, there is ample evidence from which to infer that both Butler and Murray were aware of drug trafficking in the apartment. The only real question centers around whether Murray acquiesced in, or otherwise played a role in facilitating, that trafficking, pursuant to a conspiratorial agreement with Butler. The government's evidence was enough for a jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the two men were working together and, accordingly, the jury's verdict against both Butler and Murray must be upheld.
C. Murray's Conviction for Maintenance of a Location for Drug Distribution
Finally, a reasonable jury had ample evidence to conclude that Murray was guilty of maintaining a drug-involved premises, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 856(a)(2). As outlined above, the evidence linking Murray to the apartment was enough for a jury to conclude that he was the lessee or occupant and that he had made the space available for drug distribution. Accordingly, the jury verdict on this count must be upheld.