Opinion
No. 04 Cr. 158 (WHP).
December 13, 2004
Sigal Mandelker, Esq., Assistant United States Attorney United States Attorney's Office New York, NY.
Joyce C. London, Esq., New York, NY, Attorney for Defendant.
ORDER
Defendant Cartense A. Beckett moves to suppress certain statements he made to law enforcement agents pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(C) and to dismiss the Indictment pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3)(A). For the following reasons, defendant's motion is denied.
BACKGROUND
On or about January 27, 2004, an unidentified witness entered the 44th police precinct in the Bronx and told an officer that there was an armed man in a nearby fast food restaurant. (Criminal Complaint, dated Feb. 4, 2004 ("Compl.") ¶ 2.a.) That eyewitness stated that the armed man was wearing a black jacket and a white t-shirt, and was accompanied by a female. (Compl. ¶ 2.a.) Three officers from the 44th precinct went to the restaurant to investigate but did not see anyone matching that description. (Compl. ¶ 2.b.) The eyewitness then told the officers that he observed the armed man walking towards Jerome Avenue. (Compl. ¶ 2.c.) Two of the police officers drove towards Jerome Avenue in a marked police car. (Compl. ¶ 2.d.) A third officer proceeded in that direction on foot. (Compl. ¶ 2.d.)
The officers in the police car observed a man and woman matching the description provided by the unidentified eyewitness. (Compl. ¶ 2.d.) They ordered the man to put his hands up. (Compl. ¶ 2.d.) Defendant maintains that one of the officers grabbed him under his arms and immediately placed him in handcuffs. (Affidavit of Joyce C. London, dated Nov. 8, 2004 ("London Aff.") ¶¶ 8-9.) One of the officers asked Beckett whether he was in possession of anything that he was not supposed to have. (Compl. ¶ 2.d.) Beckett replied that he had a gun. (Compl. ¶ 2.d.) The officer then frisked defendant and found a 0.40 caliber Smith and Wesson semi-automatic pistol loaded with ten rounds of ammunition. (Compl. ¶¶ 2.d, 4.) The officers also found a pistol on the woman, who turned out to be Beckett's wife. (Compl. ¶ 2.e; London Aff. ¶ 14.) Defendant asserts that he told the officers that he had a gun before they gave him his Miranda warnings. (London Aff. ¶ 10.)
After the weapons were discovered, defendant was detained and transported to the local precinct where he received his Miranda warnings and signed an acknowledgment that he had been advised of his rights. (London Aff. ¶¶ 12-13, Ex. B.) Beckett then prepared a written statement admitting that he purchased a gun and carried it for protection. (Compl. ¶ 2.f.) He also stated that he gave a gun to his wife. (Compl. ¶ 2.f.) Defendant maintains that he gave the statement to police because he believed that if he admitted the pistols belonged to him, no charges would be brought against his wife. (London Aff. ¶ 15.) Defendant further claims that he "is an extremely fearful person with a documented tendency to paranoid and persecutory ideas" and believed "he was being forced to make a statement in order to protect his wife." (London Aff. ¶ 16.)
Defendant was subsequently charged in a one-count indictment for unlawfully, willfully and knowingly possessing two firearms and ammunition, which had been shipped in interstate commerce, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
DISCUSSION
I. Pre- Mirandized Statement
Defendant moves to suppress his statement acknowledging possession of a gun on the grounds that he was in police custody at the time of the search, and had not received his Miranda warnings. (Def. Mem. at 4.) The Government responds that the statement is admissible because, at the time defendant was approached by the officers near Jerome Avenue, he was subject to a minimally intrusive Terry stop and, therefore, his Miranda rights had not yet attached. (Govt. Mem. at 3.)
This Court need not determine whether defendant was subject only to a Terry stop because even under his version of the facts, the statement that he was in possession of a firearm is admissible.
During a hearing on December 10, 2004, the parties agreed that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary. The Government maintains that, even if this Court accepts Beckett's recitation of the facts, he is not entitled to the relief he seeks.
Under Miranda v. Arizona, police may not interrogate a suspect who has been taken into custody without first warning the suspect "that he has the right to remain silent, that anything he says can be used against him in a court of law, that he has the right to the presence of an attorney, and that if he cannot afford an attorney, one will be appointed for him prior to any questioning if he so desires." 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966). "If a suspect is not so warned, the prosecution is barred from using statements obtained during the interrogation to establish its case in chief." United States v. Newton, 369 F.3d 659, 668 (2d Cir. 2004). However, the Supreme Court has recognized a "narrow exception to the Miranda rule," namely, when arresting officers ask a suspect "questions necessary to secure their own safety or the safety of the public." New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 658-59 (1984). This "public safety exception" applies as long as "the questioning relate[s] to an objectively reasonable need to protect the police or the public from any immediate danger." Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659 n. 8; Newton, 369 F.3d at 677; United States v. Garcia, 279 F. Supp. 2d 294, 300 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Assuming, arguendo, that defendant was in custody at the time of the stop, it was objectively reasonable for the officers to question him based on safety considerations since an eyewitness had informed them that a man matching defendant's description was in possession of a firearm. See Newton, 369 F.3d at 678 (information that suspect, who was already handcuffed, possessed a firearm supported an "objectively reasonable belief that [he] was dangerous" and that "until the gun was found, there was a serious and immediate risk of harm to anyone in the apartment");United States v. Reyes, 353 F.3d 148, 152 (2d Cir. 2003) (upholding public safety exception where suspect was asked whether he had "anything on him that [could] hurt [the officer] or anyone on [the] field team"); Garcia, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 302 (public safety exception warranted to determine if suspect had weapons where defendant was handcuffed and officer had just recovered a firearm from suspect's person).
Accordingly, even if defendant was in custody at the time he acknowledged having a gun, his statement is admissible under the public safety exception as recognized in Quarles, 467 U.S. at 658-59. See Newton, 369 F.3d at 679 ("[A]lthough [defendant] was in custody when he was interrogated and had not been advised of his Miranda rights, his responses leading to discovery of the charged firearm were properly admitted under the public safety exception to Miranda."); Garcia, 279 F. Supp. 2d at 302.
II. Statement While in Custody
Defendant also moves to suppress his written statement acknowledging that he purchased a gun for protection and provided another gun to his wife. Defendant maintains that the statement is inadmissible because it was coerced. Specifically, defendant argues that the officers assured him that they could help his wife if he gave a written statement. (Def. Mem. at 5.) He further contends that because he suffers from paranoid delusions, he was easily pressured into providing the written statement. (Def. Mem. at 5.)
Criminal suspects must be advised of their Miranda rights prior to any custodial interrogation. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. Any statements made by a defendant during such interrogations are inadmissible unless the defendant has knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479. "A suspect who has knowingly waived his Miranda rights may nevertheless claim that his confession was coerced in violation of the Due Process Clause." Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 433 (2000). To determine whether a statement was voluntary or coerced under the Due Process Clause, courts focus on "whether a defendant's will was overborne." Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434.
Defendant concedes that he provided the written statement after being apprised of his Miranda rights. (London Aff. ¶¶ 12-13, Ex. B.) Providing a statement after receiving the Miranda warnings is a strong indicator that a defendant does so voluntarily. See Missouri v. Seibert, 124 S.Ct. 2601, 2608 (2004) ("[G]iving the warnings and getting a waiver has generally produced a virtual ticket of admissibility; maintaining that a statement is involuntary even though given after warnings and voluntary waiver of rights requires unusual stamina, and litigation over voluntariness tends to end with the finding of a valid waiver."); Bruno v. Cunningham, No. 03 Civ. 937 (MBM), 2004 WL 2290503, at *11 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 8, 2004).
In determining whether Beckett's written statement was voluntary, this Court must consider the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant's personal characteristics and the conditions of his interrogation. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 434; United States v. Ruggles, 70 F.3d 262, 264-65 (2d Cir. 1995); United States v. Anderson, 929 F.2d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 1991). Beckett maintains that, because he suffers from paranoid delusions, he was especially vulnerable to police pressure. However, even a defendant who suffers from a mental impairment can provide a voluntary statement. See United States v. Santos, 131 F.3d 16, 18-19 (1st Cir. 1997). There still must be some evidence of coercive police pressure to render the statement involuntary. See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 170 (1986); Santos, 131 F.3d at 18-19 (defendant's confession was voluntary despite chronic paranoid schizophrenia where police actions were not coercive); Henderson v. Norris, 118 F.3d 1283, 1288 (8th Cir. 1997) (statement was voluntary despite defendant's paranoid schizophrenia because there were no allegations of overbearing police conduct).
Here, there is no evidence that Beckett was subjected to any coercive pressure while he was in custody. See Santos, 131 F.3d at 19 ("While [defendant's] mental history is certainly pertinent to the voluntariness of his statements, the precedents still require some degree of coercion or trickery by government agents to render a statement involuntary.") (citing Connelly, 479 U.S. at 167). Even if, as defendant maintains, the officers told him that he could help his wife by offering a written statement, that would not amount to impermissible coercion. See Ruggles, 70 F.3d at 265 (stating that a confession is not involuntary simply because a defendant was promised leniency in return for cooperation); United States v. Tutino, 883 F.2d 1125, 1138 (2d Cir. 1989) ("Once [defendant] had been advised of his rights, the agents were free to discuss with him the evidence against him and the reasons why he should cooperate."); see also United States v. Guarno, 819 F.2d 28, 31 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[A] confession is not involuntary merely because the suspect was promised leniency if he cooperated with law enforcement officials."); United States v. Ferrara, 377 F.2d 16, 17-18 (2d Cir. 1967) (statement that if defendant cooperated with the government he "would get out on reduced bail" did not cause his confession to be involuntary). Discussing the potential benefits of cooperating with law enforcement is a far cry from circumstances which have been held to be inherently coercive.See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 287 (1991) (finding coercion where defendant was promised protection from physical violence of inmates in return for his confession);Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398-99 (1978) (finding that suspect, who was near a state of coma, was coerced where he was subjected to persistent interrogation while "lying on his back on a hospital bed, encumbered by tubes, needles, and breathing apparatus").
This Court finds, therefore, that defendant's written statement was not involuntary given the totality of the circumstances. Defendant's motion to suppress his written statement after receipt of his Miranda warnings is denied.
II. Dismissal of the Indictment
Finally, defendant moves to dismiss the Indictment on the grounds that the officers lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him or, in the alternative, to suppress the evidence seized as a result of that stop.
An indictment which is valid on its face may not be dismissed based on inadequate or insufficient evidence. See United States v. Williams, 504 U.S. 36, 54 (1992); United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1182 (2d Cir. 1989). Defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the Indictment itself. "Thus, at this stage in the proceedings, such a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence does not provide a basis for dismissal of the Indictment . . . because the Government is not required to demonstrate the sufficiency of its proof until the close of its case-in-chief at trial." United States v. Elson, 968 F. Supp. 900, 905 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Accordingly, defendant's motion to dismiss the Indictment is denied.
Defendant's motion to suppress the gun found on him during the search must be denied because it was recovered in response to questioning under the public safety exception to Miranda. See Quarles, 467 U.S. at 659-60 (holding that gun was admissible since it was located based on questioning falling under public safety exception). Defendant's motion to suppress the gun that was found on his wife is similarly unavailing because he lacks standing to challenge the admissibility of that evidence. See United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S. 77, 81 (1993) ("The established principle is that suppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself, not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging evidence. Co-conspirators and codefendants have been accorded no special standing.").
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion to suppress and to dismiss the Indictment is denied in its entirety.
SO ORDERED.