Opinion
Case No. 2:00CR121C
September 1, 2000.
ORDER
On or about March 29, 2000 a grand jury indicted Defendant Harold George Barton under 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), 2113(d), 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), and 2, for bank robbery committed by the use of a deadly or dangerous weapon and aiding and abetting. This matter comes before the court on Barton's motion to suppress statements made to law enforcement officers on the grounds that the officers failed to inform him of his rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978).
Although the motion to suppress and supporting memoranda focus exclusively on the officers' failure to inform Barton of his rights under Miranda, Barton raised the issue of voluntariness of his statement under 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) at oral argument. Because this issue has not been briefed, this order addresses only Barton's Miranda argument.
Barton seeks to suppress statements made during three separate time periods: (1) statements made at Barton's house during an initial interview; (2) statements made at Barton's house after the interviewing officer became aware of Barton's potential involvement in the bank robbery; and (3) statements made at police headquarters. The government argues that the motion should be denied because Barton was not entitled to Miranda warnings during any of the three time periods.
Background
On March 22, 2000, the First Security Bank located at 1773 West North Temple in Salt Lake City, Utah was robbed. Officers Jason Knight and Ralph Evans and Detective Steve Cheever were among the Salt Lake City police officers called to investigate the robbery. Special Agent Karl Schmae was also called to investigate the scene for the Federal Bureau of Investigation. As Cheever was arriving at the bank, the police dispatcher advised over the radio that Barton had called the police department to report that his car had been carjacked at a location near the bank. (See Cheever, Tr. 1 at 8, lns. 8-13.)
Throughout this order, the May 15, 2000 transcript is designated as "[Speaker], Tr. 1 at [page number], ln. [line number]," and the May 17, 2000 transcript is designated as "[Speaker], Tr. 2 at [page number], ln. [line number]."
During his investigation at the bank, Knight received information on the vehicle allegedly used in the robbery. The license plate was registered to Defendant Barton at his home address and Knight and Evans went to Barton's home to investigate. (See Knight, Tr. 2 at 4, lns. 20-24.) Other officers were already present by the time Knight and Evans arrived at Barton's home. Knight spent approximately fifteen minutes talking with Barton about the reported carjacking. (See id. at 7, ln. 3.)
At some point during Knight and Barton's conversation, Evans heard a request from the police dispatcher that an officer at Barton's home call the dispatch officer for information. (See Evans, Tr. 2 at 19, ln. 16-19.) Evans called the dispatch office, and was told that there was a possibility that Barton was involved in the bank robbery. Evans testified that the dispatch officer told him that he should detain Barton, but not let Barton know that something was wrong. (See id. at 20, lns. 3-11.) Evans testified that he understood the instructions from the dispatch officer to mean the following:
A: My interpretation of that was that we were not to handcuff [Barton] or at that point in time place him under arrest, handcuff him, do anything like that. My interpretation was to just continue as we had been doing, what we had been doing, that he was the victim of a carjacking. We were just — let enough time go by that the detectives could come to the scene and go from there. And so that was — my whole interpretation of that was just to ensure that he was there and available for the detectives when they arrived and that he did not leave.
Q: So even though you treated him outwardly as the victim of a crime, that was a ruse; is that correct?
A: That's correct.
(Id. at 38, lns. 9-20.)
Evans returned to Knight and Barton, and, once out of earshot of Barton, told Knight what he had heard. (See id. at 20, lns. 21-25.) Evans then suggested to Knight that Barton be asked to complete a written statement, detailing the events surrounding the purported carjacking. (See id. at 20, ln. 25-21, lns. 7.)
Evans took Barton to his police car and Barton sat down and began filling out a written statement. (See id. at 22, lns. 2-15.) According to Evans, Barton was sitting on the edge of the back seat of the police car, turned so that his feet were outside the car. (See id. at 22, ln. 10-12.) While the car's air conditioning was operating, it is unclear whether the back door was ever shut.
Evans initially testified that the car door was never shut. (See id. at 22, ln. 15, 22; at 23, lns. 4-5.) Later, however, Evans testified that although the door was open whenever he looked at the car, he could not be certain that the car door was open the entire time he was inside Barton's home. (See id. at 35, lns. 10-15; see also id. at 44, lns. 23-25, stating that Evans was inside the house for "about three minutes; just long enough to walk in the door and walk into the rooms to see if there was anyone else in there.") Cheever testified that he could not recall whether the door was ever closed. (See Cheever, Tr. 1 at 46, ln. 25.)
After Barton made a written statement, Cheever arrived at Barton's home. Evans told Cheever what Barton had told them about the alleged carjacking. (See Cheever, Tr. 1 at 12, lns. 5-10.) In addition, Evans informed Cheever that Barton's story was somewhat inconsistent. (See id. at 12, lns. 11-16.) Evans stated that he did not remember telling Cheever that Barton was a potential suspect, but assumed that Cheever knew of the earlier call from dispatch indicating Barton's possible involvement in the crime. (See Evans, Tr. 2 at 33, lns. 11-14.) Cheever and Schmae testified that they had not received any information regarding Barton's possible involvement. (See Cheever, Tr. 1 at 12, lns. 2-9; 42, ln. 21, "I don't recall anyone saying Mr. Barton is the suspect in the bank robbery."; see also Schmae, Tr. 1 at 65, ln. 24.)
According to Cheever, in order to get more information from Barton on what had happened, Cheever asked Barton to accompany him and Schmae to the public safety building for an interview. (See Cheever, Tr. 1 at 12, lns. 19-22.) Barton agreed, and Cheever drove Barton and Schmae to the interview site.
Cheever took Barton to an interview room, where he was left alone for some time. The interview room is approximately eight feet by twelve feet with a small desk with chairs. (See id. at 14, lns. 17-19.) The officers videotaped the entire interview, with a camera not visible by anyone in the room. The interview began with the door open, however, Cheever closed the door soon after the interview began. (See id. at 15, lns. 1-3.) Cheever testified that the door was not locked at that point of the interview. (See id. at 15, ln. 15.)
It is unclear how long Barton was left alone in the interview room. Cheever and Schmae both testified that Barton was left alone for only a few minutes. (See Cheever, Tr. 1 at 52, lns. 2-7; Schmae, Tr. 1 at 64, lns. 4-5.)
After about eighteen minutes, Barton asked to use the restroom. Schmae accompanied Barton into the restroom, while Cheever waited outside the door. (See Schmae, Tr. 1 at 60, lns. 14-21.) Cheever then took Barton back to the interview room and Cheever and Schmae talked privately outside the room. (See Cheever, Tr. 1 at 24, ln. 25-25, ln. 1.) According to Cheever,
[A]t that point [we] had talked to somebody at the scene who had given us information that there was actually three people in the car when they saw [Barton], and there was an inconsistency there. There was an inconsistency of what the witnesses had said about the car moving. Mr. Barton said that the car was moving when the guy came up, put the gun in the window of the moving car, more of less made him stop, then opened the sliding door. A witness said that he had — the car was waiting there with the sliding door open as they watched the bad guy run out from the south doors to the waiting van.
(Id. at 25, lns. 3-13.) According to Schmae, the two spoke privately because there were "some phone calls that were coming in because it was an active investigation going on while we were conducting our interview with Mr. Barton." (Schmae, Tr. 1 at 61, lns. 1-4; see also id. at 64, lns. 9-12, "[W]e had received some information about a witness statement that conflicted with Mr. Barton's statement. At the time of starting the interview, we weren't aware of that.")
When the officers returned to the room, they asked Barton additional details about where he had been that morning. (See Cheever, Tr. 1 at 25, lns. 16-21.) After receiving some answers they believed to be inconsistent with previous answers and statements of other witnesses, Cheever patted Barton down and told Barton what inconsistencies he and Schmae had noticed. (See id. at 27, lns. 3-11.) Schmae read Barton his Miranda rights. Barton stated that he wanted an attorney and told the officers that he did not want to talk further. (See id. at 28, lns. 11-13.)
Standard
Miranda warnings are required when an individual is in custody and subject to interrogation. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444; United States v. Hudson, 210 F.3d 1184, 1190 (10th Cir. 2000); United States v. Griffin, 7 F.3d 1512, 1517-18 (10th Cir. 1993). In order to determine whether or not a person is in custody for purposes of Miranda, a court must examine all relevant facts, "the only relevant inquiry being how a reasonable person in the suspect's position would have understood his situation." Griffin, 7 F.3d at 1518; see also Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984). If, from an objective viewpoint, someone in the suspect's position would reasonably believe his freedom curtailed to a "degree associated with a formal arrest," then he was in custody during the interrogation. California v. Beheler, 463 U.S. 1121, 1125 (1983); see also Hudson, 210 F.3d at 1190; Griffin, 7 F.3d at 1518. The ultimate inquiry is "simply whether there was a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with formal arrest." Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 321 (1984).
"The determination of custody, from an examination of the totality of the circumstances, is necessarily fact intensive." Griffin, 7 F.3d at 1518. The Tenth Circuit has articulated certain factors relevant to a determination of custody: "First, the extent to which the suspect is made aware that he or she is free to refrain from answering questions or to end the interview at will often defines the custodial setting." Id. Second, the nature of the questioning is also important: "Where the nature of the police/citizen encounter progresses beyond a short investigatory stop, a custodial environment is more likely." Id. Third, whether the situation is "police dominated" is important:
Where police are in full control of the questioning environment, custody is more easily found. Circumstances might include: separation of the suspect from family or colleagues who could offer moral support; isolation in nonpublic questioning rooms; threatening presence of several officers; display of a weapon by an officer; physical contact with the subject; and an officer's use of language or tone of voice in a manner implying that compliance with the request might be compelled.
Id. at 1518-19. With these factors in mind, the court considers Barton's motion.
Analysis
The facts of this case present three separate and discrete police/citizen encounters. The first involved the initial interview with Evans and Knight outside Barton's residence. During this encounter, Barton made certain oral statements to Evans and Knight. The second encounter began after the police dispatcher notified Evans that Barton was a potential suspect and instructed Evans to detain Barton without letting him know that something was wrong. During this encounter, Barton sat in a police car and made a written statement. The final encounter began when Cheever and Schmae drove Barton to the public safety building for an interview. During this encounter, Barton made certain oral statements that were preserved on videotape.
A. Statements Made During the Initial Interview with Knight and Evans
Knight and Evans initially interviewed Barton at his home only after Barton summoned the officers by reporting that he was the victim of a carjacking. During this short interview, the officers did not restrict Barton's movement around his yard, they did not search Barton for weapons, and they did not handcuff Barton. No guns were drawn, no threats were made, and no voices were raised. The interview took place in Barton's front yard, and there is no evidence that Barton was separated from his wife. Throughout the interview, Knight and Evans treated Barton as a victim of a reported carjacking.
A reasonable person in Barton's situation would not consider himself to be in custody during this encounter. Therefore, Barton was not in custody throughout the initial interview with Knight and Evans, and Miranda warnings were therefore not required.
B. Written Statement
Knight and Evans requested that Barton make a written statement after receiving information about Barton's possible involvement in the crime. At the time of the request, the officers had been told to detain Barton, but not let him know that they were aware of his possible involvement in the bank robbery. It is likely, then, that the officers planned to use the written statement as a means to obtain evidence of Barton's wrongdoing. The subjective intent of Evans and Knight, however, is irrelevant to whether Barton was in custody. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442 ("A policeman's unarticulated plan has no bearing on the question whether a suspect was `in custody' at a particular time; the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation."); Griffin, 7 F.3d at 1518, n. 7 ("Subjective intent of an officer to arrest or place the suspect in formal custody is irrelevant, however. Miranda's procedural requirements are not so easily avoided by an officer's assertion that, despite the coercive nature of the investigatory detention, a suspect was not intended to be placed in custody. Neither will an officer's unarticulated plan to arrest an individual initiate `custody' if a reasonable person would not be aware of a custodial detention.").
There is no evidence that the officers treated Barton differently after they received information that Barton might have been involved in the bank robbery. There was, for example, no evidence that Barton's movements were restricted after Evans received the report from the dispatch officer. Although Barton sat in a police car while he filled out his written report, the officers testified that the door was open most of the time (and possibly the entire time) that he sat in the back seat. Additionally, every indication is that the demeanor of the officers remained calm and non-accusatory throughout this encounter. The nature of the questioning remained the same, focused on Barton's reported carjacking, not on his possible involvement in the bank robbery.
A reasonable person in Barton's situation would have believed himself free to leave. Barton was, therefore, not in custody and Miranda warnings were not required during this encounter.
Barton urges this court to follow State v. Sosinski, 331 N.J. Super. 11 (N.J. 2000), and suppress Barton's written statements because they were the product of a police ruse. Sosinski, however, is inapposite to the facts at hand. In that case, the New Jersey court suppressed a defendant's statements made after police officers questioned him while he was in custody at police headquarters after he had requested an attorney. The court in Sosinksi presupposes that the defendant was in custody at the time of the interrogation, and focuses on the police officers' acts in the context of a custodial interrogation. The issue here, however, is whether Barton was in custody during this episode. The decision in Sosinski is not contrary to the well-established rule that an officer's non-apparent plan, intent, or knowledge is irrelevant to the issue of custody. See Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 442.
C. Statements Made During the Interview with Cheever and Schmae
The uncontroverted testimony was that Cheever and Schmae asked Barton to accompany them to the police station to continue the interview. Both Cheever and Schmae testified that Barton willingly agreed to go to the interview site with the officers.
Barton argues that the facts presented in this case are similar to those considered by the Tenth Circuit in Griffin. In that case, the Tenth Circuit held that officers had violated a suspect's Miranda rights after a Terry stop at an airport ripened into a custodial situation. After the suspect in Griffin was stopped pursuant to Terry, she was separated from a friend and agreed to accompany an officer to a small police-restricted office at the airport. See Griffin, 7 F.3d at 1519. The officers did not tell the suspect that she could refuse to answer the officer's questions or leave the room. See id. The officers then asked the suspect case-specific questions, and continued asking questions after she had incriminated herself. According to the Tenth Circuit, Miranda warnings were required once the suspect was taken to the police room because a "reasonable person under the same circumstances would believe she had no choice but to continue to answer the incriminating questions." Id.
The facts of this case are similar in many respects: Barton agreed to be driven to a police station and was taken away from his wife and his house; Cheever and Schmae did not tell Barton he was free to leave or refuse to answer questions; the officers continued to ask Barton questions after he began to incriminate himself. The instant case is different in one important respect, however. Here, Barton had contacted the police himself to report a carjacking. By calling the police and reporting a serious crime, Barton should have expected that he would be questioned about his day's events. In contrast, the suspect in Griffin did not claim to be a witness or a victim of a crime — she was at all times nothing more than a suspect of a crime.
The defendant's situation in Griffin was entirely different than Barton's situation. The suspect in Griffin was in a police-dominated situation with questions focused on her participation in a serious crime. Barton, however, had made a report that he was the victim of a carjacking and he was brought into a police station to answer questions about the carjacking. Significantly, the questions posed by the officers throughout the interview focused on the alleged carjacking, not on Barton's knowledge of or involvement in the bank robbery. Although the time-frame is unclear, it appears that the length of the interview was not extensive. There is no evidence that the officers' manner and demeanor were anything other than civil, calm and respectful, and the videotape shows that the officers did not reveal that they were concerned about Barton's involvement in the bank robbery. Despite the fact that the officers may have identified Barton as a possible suspect and that the interview took place in a police station, Barton was treated as the victim of a carjacking and there was no reason for Barton to believe that he was not free to leave at any time during the interview. Accord Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977) (holding that Miranda warnings are not required "simply because the questioning takes place in the station house, or because the questioned person is one whom the police suspect"). Barton was, therefore, not in custody and Miranda warnings were not required during this encounter.
Once Cheever and Schmae identified inconsistencies in Barton's story to Barton and read him his rights, Barton stated that he wished to remain silent and requested an attorney. The government agreed that at that point, the officers could not ask any more questions and any statements made by Barton (if any) after exercise of his rights are not admissible. (See Resp. to Def. Barton's Mot. to Suppress Statements at 10 n. 2.)
Defendant's motion to suppress is DENIED in its entirety.