U.S. ex Rel. James v. Roth

Full title: UNITED STATES of AMERICA, ex rel. HOMER JAMES, Petitioner, vs. THOMAS P…

Court: United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division

Date published: Jul 5, 2001

No. 98 C 7230 (N.D. Ill. Jul. 5, 2001)

Opinion

No. 98 C 7230

July 5, 2001

OPINION AND ORDER

CHARLES RONALD NORGLE, Sr., Judge, United States District Court.

Before the court is Homer James' ("James") petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. For the following reasons, the court denies the petition.

I. BACKGROUND

James was convicted of first degree murder following a jury trial in the Circuit Court of Cook County. James received a sentence of 25 years imprisonment.

The court takes the relevant facts from the Illinois Appellate Court's order affirming James' conviction.¹ On habeas review, the court presumes that the Illinois court's factual findings are correct. See Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 554-46 (1981); 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1); see also Rodriguez v. Peters, 63 F.3d 546, 554 (7^th Cir. 1995) ("Factual findings that have been decided by the state trial or appellate courts are presumptively correct.") (quoting Montgomery v. Greer, 956 F.2d 677, 680 (7^th Cir. 1992)).

1 In a bound volume, Respondent provided copies of the state court proceedings, including the state court opinions. The court refers to these documents by the exhibit designation. The Illinois Appellate Court's order on direct appeal is (Ex. B)

On May 2, 1992, James lived in a first floor apartment at 2325 South Kostner with several other individuals. According to the testimony of the State's key witness, Cedric Anderson ("Cedric"), at approximately 8:30 p.m., Raymond Anderson ("Anderson"), one of the individuals living in the apartment with James, came into the dining room and turned the volume of the television down. James, who had been watching television, immediately turned the volume back up. A verbal and physical altercation ensued between James and Anderson. James stated to Anderson that he was going to "kick his ass." Anderson responded by removing his shirt and stating "come on." At this point Cedric, the brother of Anderson, and Leonard James ("Leonard"), the brother of James, separated the two men.

After this first altercation, James retreated to the front of the apartment to retrieve and load a gun. James then walked into the bathroom where Anderson was and put the gun to Anderson's head and stated "now what you going to do, motherfucker? I kill you." Leonard knocked the gun away from Anderson's head and James walked away. As James walked away, Anderson stated "that is why Lanie left your punk ass and you back home with your mama." James stopped, turned, and fired the gun hitting Anderson in the chest, killing him.

James surrendered to police on May 3, 1992. While in police custody, James gave several statements concerning the events of May 2, 1992. Detective Gene Harris ("Detective Harris") and Assistant State's Attorney Thomas Byrne ("ASA Byrne") were present for the statements. James refused to give a handwritten statement.

James testified at his trial as to his version events on May 2, 1992. James testified that on the day of the incident Anderson came home and accused him of wearing his pants and turned the television down. The two exchanged words, and then Anderson approached James and put his finger in James' face and said he would "fuck him up." James further testified that Anderson then walked around mumbling and challenging him to a fight and eventually Anderson pushed him with both hands against his chest. James also testified that Anderson continued to threaten and curse at him after this physical attack. Finally, James testified that he took a gun out of his pocket, but that Leonard grabbed for the gun and it discharged, hitting Anderson. Lastly, James testified he never intended to fire the gun.

In rebuttal, Detective Harris testified to the statement James gave while in police custody. Detective Harris testified that James stated that after the shooting he put the gun back in a closet where he had retrieved it from. James never stated he had the gun in his jacket pocket. Detective Harris also testified that James stated he pointed the gun at Anderson twice and the second time it had fired. ASA Byrne also testified in rebuttal as to the statement that James gave. ASA Byrne testified that James stated he retrieved the gun from a closet, not from his jacket pocket. James pointed the gun at Anderson once, and then walked away. As James walked away, Anderson continued to curse him so he turned around, pointed the weapon at Anderson and the gun fired. Byrne also testified that when James was confronted with contradictory statements of Leonard and Cedric he changed his story.

A jury convicted James and he received a sentence of 25 years for first degree murder. James filed a direct appeal arguing that he was denied a fair trial when he was forced to face the jury on the first day of trial in prison attire. The Illinois Appellate Court ruled that James did not preserve this objection because he failed to object for the record. "The record does not adequately establish that defendant in fact appeared in prison attire nor that defense counsel adequately objected to that situation." (Ex. B, pg. 6.) Even if James did appear in prison attire during jury selection and that it was error for the trial court to compel James to appear, the error was harmless. (Ex. B, pg. 6.) James also argued that the trial court erroneously allowed hearsay statements made by Leonard. The Illinois Appellate court held that the account that Leonard gave police and that Detective Harris offered in his testimony was admissible hearsay since it was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted. (Ex. B, pg. 7.) Rather, Leonard's account was relevant to describe for the jury the circumstance of the investigation and was not inadmissible hearsay. (Ex. B, pg. 7.) In any event, any error was harmless where Leonard testified as to the events leading up to the shooting of the victim and James' inculpatory statements about the shooting. (Ex. B, pg. 7.) James sought leave to appeal in the Illinois Supreme Court on the basis of three issues: (1) he was denied a fair trial where he had to spend his first day before the jury in prison attire; (2) the trial court erroneously allowed hearsay statements made by James' brother, Leonard, into evidence; and (3) the Illinois Appellate Court applied an erroneous standard of review for constitutional error. The Illinois Supreme Court denied the leave to appeal.

James continued to attack his conviction with a post-conviction petition to the original trial court. James argued: (1) Detective Harris committed perjury when he testified that he interviewed James; (2) the trial court erroneously allowed Detective Harris to testify to hearsay; and (3) James' Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when he was made to appear before the jury in prison attire. The trial court denied James' post-conviction petition as well as a motion to reconsider. On January 1, 1997, James filed a notice of appeal with the Illinois Appellate Court. Subsequently James' appointed attorney, the Cook County Public Defender, filed a motion to withdraw pursuant toPennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). The Illinois Appellate Court granted counsel's motion to withdraw based on the fact that there were no appealable issues, and affirmed the trial court's denial of James' post-conviction petition.

On August 19, 1997, James filed a petition for leave to appeal to the Illinois Supreme Court. James raised four issues: (1) he was denied the right to a fair trial where the State's witnesses gave false testimony; (2) he was denied a fair trial where he was made to wear his jail uniform on the first day of his jury trial; (3) the Circuit Court should have given James an evidentiary hearing on his petition for post-conviction relief; and (4) post-conviction appellate counsel should not have been allowed to withdraw pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 651(c). The Illinois Supreme Court denied James' petition for leave to appeal on December 3, 1997.

On November 10, 1998, James filed his petition for a writ of habeas corpus in this court, asserting: (1) the trial court erroneously allowed hearsay to be admitted into evidence; (2) he was made to appear before the jury, in prison attire, on the first day of trial; (3) the State knowingly used perjured testimony to convict him; and (4) he was denied effective assistance of counsel on appeal from the denial of his post-conviction petition.

II. DISCUSSION

The court first discusses the general rules of federal habeas review, including procedural default, and then discusses each of James' claims.

A. Standard of Review

James' case is governed by 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d), which sets a high hurdle for habeas relief The statute states:

(d) An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim —

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254 (d).

The Supreme Court recently examined § 2254(d)(1), and held that the "contrary to" clause and the "unreasonable application" clause encompass two types of error that will cause a writ to issue. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 377, 398-411 (2000) (opinion of O'Connor, J.). The "contrary to" clause describes a state court decision that is opposite to the law announced by the Supreme Court, or where the state court "confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from . . . relevant Supreme Court precedent," and reaches a conclusion opposite to that of the Supreme Court. See id. at 404 (also describing "contrary to" as "diametrically different," "opposite in character or nature," or "mutually opposed").

As the plain text of the statute reads, the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1) refers to cases where the state court unreasonably applies Supreme Court precedent to the facts of a particular case. See id. at 405-06 (discussing different scenarios of unreasonable application of facts, but ruling that "[f]or now it is sufficient to hold that when a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of this Court to the facts of a prisoner's case, a federal court applying § 2254(d)(1) may conclude that the state-court decision falls within that provision's `unreasonable application' clause."). Whether the state court's decision was reasonable is an objective question. See id. at 407-09 ("a federal habeas court . . . should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable."). The reasonableness question does not turn on the correctness of the state court's decision. See id. at 410. Put another way, a federal habeas court should uphold a state court's decision that was reasonable, even if it was erroneous. See id. (holding that a federal habeas court should not issue a writ simply because it concludes that the state court erroneously applied federal law, rather, the application must also be unreasonable); cf. Schaff v. Snyder, 190 F.3d 513, 523 (7^th Cir. 1999) (holding that a federal habeas court should uphold a state court ruling that is minimally consistent with the facts and circumstances of the case).

Section 2254(d)(2) involves the state court's determination of the facts, which are presumed correct. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1); see also Rodriguez, 63 F.3d at 554 ("Factual findings that have been decided by the state trial or appellate courts are presumptively correct."). The petitioner has "the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence." 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1).

B. Procedural default

Section 2254 requires a habeas petitioner to exhaust the remedies available in state court prior to pursuing federal habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (b)(1)(A); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842-43 (1999); see also Spreitzer v. Schomig, 219 F.3d 639, 644-45 (7^th Cir. 2000) (discussing exhaustion of habeas claims). In other words, if relief is still available to a habeas petitioner in state court, a federal habeas court cannot rule on the petition.

In addition to exhausting the remedies available in state court, a habeas petitioner is procedurally barred from raising claims in a federal habeas court that he did not raise in the state court proceedings. See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848 (holding that a petitioner's failure to present three claims to the Illinois Supreme Court for discretionary review resulted in a procedural default of those claims). Fair presentment of a constitutional claim requires a habeas petitioner to present both the operative facts and the controlling legal principles to the state court before bringing the claims to a federal habeas court.Cf. Rodriguez v. Scillia, 193 F.3d 913, 916 (7^th Cir. 1999) (discussing exhaustion of claim) (citing Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 277 (1971)). Thus, a habeas petitioner procedurally defaults, or waives, any claim raised for the first time in federal court.

Also, federal habeas courts cannot review claims that the state court has disposed of on state law grounds. See Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 523-24 (1997) (noting that where "the state law determination is sufficient to sustain the decree, any opinion . . . on the federal question would be purely advisory.") (citing Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945)). Put another way, federal habeas relief is not available if the state court decision rests on state law that "is independent of the federal question and adequate to support the judgment." See Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991). "`In the habeas context, the application of the independent and adequate state ground doctrine . . . is grounded in concerns of comity and federalism.'"Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 89 (1997) (quoting Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30). Thus, when a state court determines that a habeas petitioner waives a claim in state court, that waiver is an independent and adequate state ground that bars federal habeas relief See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 258 (1989) (citing Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 86-87 (1977)).

For a habeas court to rely on independent and adequate state grounds for finding procedural default, the last state court rendering an opinion on the matter must clearly state that its decision rests on procedural grounds, as opposed to substantive grounds. See Braun v. Powell, 227 F.3d 908, 912 (7^th Cir. 2000) (citing Harris, 489 U.S. at 263). Another recent Seventh Circuit case discusses procedural default in the context of an Illinois Appellate Court's granting of a motion to withdraw under Pennsylvania v. Finley, and affirmance of the denial of a post-conviction petition. See Wilkinson v. Cowan, 231 F.3d 347 (7^th Cir. 2000) (holding that a summary affirmance of the denial of a post-conviction petition, and the granting of leave to withdraw underPennsylvania v. Finley, is an implicit decision on the merits of claims raised in the post-conviction petition). In this case, on review of the post-conviction petition, the Illinois Appellate Court stated that it had carefully reviewed the record, and agreed with James' counsel that there were no appealable issues. (Ex. G, pg. 2.) Under the analysis employed inWilkinson, such a finding is an implicit ruling on the merits of the issues raised in the post-conviction petition, which means that those issues are not procedurally defaulted. See Wilkinson, 231 F.3d at 351-52.

Federal courts may review defaulted claims only if (1) the petitioner shows cause for failure to raise the claim, and actual prejudice resulting therefrom; or (2) refusal to consider the defaulted claim would result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice, where a Constitutional violation has resulted in the conviction of one who is actually innocent. See Edwards v. Carpenter, 529 U.S. 446, 450-52 (2000);Spreitzer, 219 F.3d at 647-48; Rodriguez v. Scillia, 193 F.3d at 917. With these principles in mind, the court addresses Anderson's petition.

C. The Merits

1. Admission of Hearsay

James argues that the trial court erroneously allowed Detective Harris to testify to statements made by James' brother, Leonard. Detective Harris testified at trial as to a statement that Leonard gave to him concerning what occurred on May 2, 1992. James alleges this testimony was hearsay, if not double hearsay, and that it was offered and used to prove the truth of the matters before the jury. Respondent argues, and the court agrees, that the testimony given by Detective Harris concerning Leonard's statements is not offered for the truth of the matters asserted but rather to describe the circumstances of the investigation.

Evidentiary rulings of state trial courts are normally not subject to habeas review. Dressler v. McCaughtry, 238 F.3d 908, 918 (7^th Cir. 2001) (citing United States ex rel. Bibbs v. Twomey, 506 F.2d 1220, 1223 (7^th Cir. 1974)). In order to claim a right to relief, a petitioner must establish that the evidentiary ruling was incorrect and so prejudicial that it violated his due process right to a fundamentally fair trial, creating the likelihood that an innocent person was convicted.Dressler, 238 F.3d at 914 (citing Thompkins v. Cohen, 965 F.2d 330, 333 (7^th Cir. 1992)). Generally, however, the admissibility of evidence is a matter of state law and unless there is a resultant denial of specific constitutional right, no constitutional issue is involved. United States ex rel Bibbs, 506 F.2d at 1222. In this area, federal courts must proceed with caution. Id. at 1223 (citing Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967)). To hold otherwise would put the federal courts in the role of reviewing state court decisions even when no constitutional errors have been made. Id. at 1223 (citing Harris v. State of Illinois, 457 F.2d 191, 198 (7^th Cir. 1972)).

The Illinois Appellate Court held that Detective Harris' testimony was not hearsay. (Ex. B, pg. 7.) The Court explained that Detective Harris' statement was not offered for the truth of the matter asserted but was only used to describe the circumstances of the investigation. (Ex. B, pg. 7.) Testimony is not hearsay where it is introduced "for the limited purpose of explaining the reason the police conducted their investigation as they did." United States ex rel Gonzalez v. Detella, 918 F. Supp. 1214, 1223 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (citing United States ex rel White v. O'Leary, 663 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Ill. 1987)). This rule parallels the one used in the federal context, where "an out of court statement is not hearsay if it is offered for the limited purpose of explaining why a government investigation was undertaken." United States ex rel McCoy v. Welborn, 857 F. Supp. 632, 637 (N.D. Ill. 1994) (in general statements offered not for the truth of matter asserted, but to explain context of witness' testimony or to explain reasons for investigation are not hearsay and do not violate confrontation clause); United States v. Linwood, 142 F.3d 418, 424-25 (7^th Cir. 1998) (testimony of daughter of defendant was not hearsay where used to explain conduct of police officers). As such Detective Harris' testimony cannot be considered to cause a violation to the due process right of a fair trial. Moreover, James does not argue that he is innocent nor that a constitutional issue is involved. See Dressler, 238 F.3d at 914. James fails to persuade the court that Habeas relief is appropriate.

2. Appearance Before the Jury in Prison Attire

Next, James argues that his appearance before the jury in his prison clothes violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Respondent argues, and the court agrees, that James failed to object to being tried in prison attire, and has waived any argument that he was compelled to appear dressed in such a manner.

The Seventh Circuit has stated that the controlling case in this situation is Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501 (1976). See United States v. Arellano, 137 F.3d 982, 985 (7^th Cir. 1998). In Estelle the Court determined, with few exceptions, that an accused should not be compelled to go to trial in prison or jail clothing because of the possible impairment of the presumption of innocence so basic to the adversary system. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 504. This is a recognition that the constant reminder of the accused's condition implicit in such distinctive, identifiable, attire may affect a juror's judgment. Id. at 504-505. Although the State cannot, consistently with the Fourteenth Amendment, compel an accused to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable prison clothes, the failure to make an objection to the court as to being tried in such clothes, for whatever reason, is sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion to establish a constitutional violation. Estelle, 425 U.S. at 513; Arellano, 137 F.3d at 986. A trial in prison garb violates the Constitution only if the defendant wants to be tried in civilian clothes. Arellano, 137 F.3d at 986 (citing Duarte v. United States, 81 F.3d 75, 76 (7^th Cir. 1996)).

The record indicates that on the day of James' trial, defense counsel asked for a continuation, without providing any basis, and the court stated:

I believe [James] was unaware on the last court date today was actually a trial date. He is not prepared, and he is not dressed for a jury trial. In any event you can get him back over and get clothes for him. The matter has been set two times previously for jury trial.

(Ex. B, pg. 5.) Further the court stated:

It is hereby ordered that the Sheriff of Cook County allow Louise James, mother of the defendant, to bring dress pants and a dress shirt into the court building for the defendant to wear during a jury trial beginning today.

(Ex. B, pg. 5.) Not at that time, nor at any point thereafter, did James object about his appearance in prison attire. In fact, after the court's initial statements, it is unclear if James was attired in civilian clothes or prison attire, because there is no further mention of the issue. The failure to make an objection to being tried in prison clothes is "sufficient to negate the presence of compulsion necessary to establish a Constitutional violation." Arellano, 137 F.3d at 986. More significantly, as the Illinois Appellate Court noted, it is entirely unclear whether he actually did appear before the jury in prison attire. As mentioned before, the trial court granted an order to provide James with clothing. The record does not mention if James then appeared in civilian clothing or in prison attire. On this record, the court finds that James fails to demonstrate that habeas relief is warranted.

3. Perjured Testimony

The court also rejects James claim that his conviction was based on perjured testimony. A petitioner can establish a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by demonstrating that the prosecution knowingly used perjured testimony to obtain a conviction. See Schaff, 190 F.3d at 530 (citing United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 n. 3 (1976)). "Mere inconsistencies in testimony by government witnesses do not establish the government's knowing use of false testimony." United States v. Saadeh, 61 F.3d 510, 523 (7^th Cir. 1995) (quoting United States v. Verser, 916 F.2d 1268, 1271 (7^th Cir. 1990)). Rather, a petitioner must demonstrate "palpable testimonial contradiction or untruth" to establish perjury. See Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dept. of Correction, 31 F.3d 1363, 1387 (7^th Cir. 1994). As noted above, under § 2254, the State court's factual determination are presumed correct, and James must provide clear and convincing evidence to rebut this presumption. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1).

In this case, although James alleges that the State knowingly used perjured testimony to convict him, he does not specify which witness allegedly committed perjury. James in his habeas petition refers to the State's "key witness" but does not provide their identity. (Ex. J, pg. 12.) Based on inferences, the court assumes that James is referring to Detective Harris. But what is not clear is what aspect of Detective Harris' testimony James is alleging is perjury. Regardless of the aspect of the testimony that James takes issue with, Detective Harris testified at James' trial, where he was available for cross-examination. At trial, the jury heard Harris testify, observed his demeanor, and believed his testimony. The court presumes Detective Harris' testimony to be correct, and finds that James fails to present clear and convincing evidence to rebut the conclusion. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (e)(1); see also Kines v. Godinez, 7 F.3d 674, 678 (7^th Cir. 1993) (noting that, in habeas review, federal courts are in no position to redetermine the credibility of witnesses observed by state trial courts).

Further, even if James did establish that Detective Harris committed perjury, his petition would fail. James must also demonstrate that the prosecution knew, or should have known, that Detective Harris' testimony was false. See Schaff, 190 F.3d at 530 (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 103 n. 3 (1976)); Reddick v. Haws, 120 F.3d 714, 718 (7^th Cir. 1997); Del Vecchio, 31 F.3d at 1387. Here, James fails to present any such evidence. James merely speculates that the prosecution's case against him was weak, and that the prosecution needed perjured testimony from Detective Harris in order to obtain a conviction. (Ex J pg. 7.) James, however, fails to present any facts to support this argument. Therefore, the court rejects James' claim.

4. Ineffective Assistance of Appellate Counsel

James' final claim for relief is based on ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. James argues that post-conviction appellate counsel was ineffective due to the fact that the Illinois Appellate Court allowed appellate counsel to withdraw. Respondent argues that James procedurally defaulted this claim for failing to raise it in state court, and that even if the claim is considered no evidence was presented to substantiate it. The court does not agree that the claim is procedurally defaulted, but does agree that James fails to present any evidence to substantiate it.

First and foremost, there is no federal right to effective assistance of post-conviction appellate counsel. Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551 (1987). As stated before, a habeas petitioner is procedurally barred from raising claims in a federal habeas court that were not raised in state court proceedings. See O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 848. This procedural bar is not applicable in a situation where appellate counsel was granted leave to withdraw under Pennsylvania v. Finley. See Wilkinson, 231 F.3d 347 (holding that a summary affirmance of a post-conviction petition, and the granting of leave to withdraw under Pennsylvania v. Finley, is an implicit decision on the merits of claims raised in a post-conviction petition). In this case, on review of the post-conviction petition, the Illinois Appellate Court stated it had carefully reviewed the record, and in granting the leave to withdraw, agreed with James' counsel that there were no appealable issues. Under the analysis employed in Wilkinson, such a finding is an implicit ruling on the merits of the issues raised in the post-conviction petition, which means that those issues are not procedurally defaulted. See Id.

James' claim thus becomes governed by the familiar two-part test ofStrickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984): "The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result." Id. at 686. This standard is met only when it is established that counsel's performance was so deficient that it can be said that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed to the criminal defendant by the Sixth Amendment. Schaff, 190 F.3d at 526. Furthermore, it must be established that such deficient performance prejudiced the defendant by depriving him of a fair trial, one whose result is reliable. Schaff, 190 F.3d at 526-27 (referring to Mason v. Hanks, 97 F.3d 887, 892-93 (7^th Cir. 1996) (concluding that one demonstration of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel is a showing that appellate counsel did not present significant and obvious issues on appeal). The question of ineffective assistance of counsel is a mixed question of law and fact. See United States ex rel Simmons v. Gramley, 915 F.2d 1128, 1137 (7^th Cir. 1990). Therefore, the court gives reasonable deference to the state court's decision. See Schaff, 190 F.3d at 522-23 (noting that a state court ruling will stand if it is one of several equally plausible rulings). In this case, James does not raise any specific instances of misconduct by appellate counsel nor does he allege that there was any. As respondent states, James simply takes issue with the Illinois Appellate Court for allowing post-conviction appellate counsel to withdraw. (Response pg. 10.) James fails to show that appellate counsel's conduct fell below a standard of objective reasonableness and that he was prejudiced by appellate counsel's conduct.

III. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, James' petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.

IT IS SO ORDERED.