Opinion
20-6635
03-05-2024
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. KIERON MATTHEW WILLIAMS, Defendant-Appellant.
Kieron Matthew Williams, Appellant Pro Se. Jason Daniel Medinger, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED
Submitted: February 8, 2024
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore. George L. Russell, III, District Judge. (1:14-cr-00596-GLR-1; 1:17-cv-00440-GLR)
ON REHEARING
Kieron Matthew Williams, Appellant Pro Se.
Jason Daniel Medinger, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Before GREGORY and AGEE, Circuit Judges, and FLOYD, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM.
Kieron Matthew Williams appeals the district court's order (1) denying his motion to compel plea counsel to produce his case file and (2) denying relief on certain ineffective assistance of counsel claims Williams raised in his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. We previously vacated the district court's order; the Government petitioned for rehearing because our decision was issued without the benefit of a Government response. We granted the petition, vacated our prior opinion, granted a partial certificate of appealability, and entered a final informal briefing order. The Government has filed an informal response brief, to which Williams has replied. We now affirm the district court's order.
First, we consider Williams' challenge to the district court's denial of his motion to compel. We review for abuse of discretion the denial of a motion to compel. See Horne v. WTVR, LLC, 893 F.3d 201, 212 (4th Cir. 2018). Under the Maryland Attorneys' Rules of Professional Conduct, "[u]pon termination of representation, an attorney shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's interests, such as . . . surrendering papers and property to which the client is entitled." Md. Att'ys' R. of Pro. Conduct 19-301.16(d). However, the applicable rules also provide that "[a]n attorney shall not . . . knowingly disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal . . . ." Md. Att'ys' R. of Pro. Conduct 19-303.4(c). The Government argues that compelling counsel to provide Williams with his entire case file would contravene several standing orders that the District of Maryland has implemented to curtail violence that can arise from allowing incarcerated individuals to maintain criminal discovery materials. See D. Md. Standing Order 2012-10; D. Md. Standing Order 2015-04; D. Md. Standing Order 2019-06; D. Md. Standing Order 2020-01. The Government also argues that Williams was not entitled to discovery because he failed to show good cause. See Rules Governing § 2255 Proc., R. 6(a) (noting leave of court is required for discovery in § 2255 proceedings and that discovery will only be granted on showing of good cause); see also United States v. Roane, 378 F.3d 382, 39293, 402-03 (4th Cir. 2004) (discerning no abuse of discretion in district court's decision denying discovery requests).
Williams does not need a certificate of appealability to challenge the district court's denial of the motion to compel. Cf. Harbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 183 (2009).
There is no binding authority stating that a court must, upon request, order an attorney to provide an incarcerated client with the client's case file, and the District of Maryland's standing orders specifically prohibit access to many of the documents Williams sought to secure. Moreover, in the § 2255 context, "good cause for discovery exists . . . where specific allegations before the court show reason to believe that the petitioner may, if the facts are fully developed, be able to demonstrate that he is entitled to relief." Roane, 378 F.3d at 403 (cleaned up). As we explain below, the record before us clearly refutes the claims of ineffective assistance of counsel that Williams sought to substantiate with the requested file. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its discretion by determining that Williams failed to establish good cause for his request.
Next, we consider the issue on which we granted a certificate of appealability: whether the district court erred by denying, without an evidentiary hearing, Williams' claims that plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to review discovery with him, discuss potential defenses to the indictment, or properly investigate and explain his sentencing exposure before he pled guilty.
To succeed on his ineffective assistance claims, Williams was required to establish that (1) his counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient, and (2) this deficient performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). With respect to the performance prong, we "apply a strong presumption that counsel's representation was within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Williams bore the burden to establish "that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed [him] by the Sixth Amendment." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
To demonstrate prejudice, Williams was required to show "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. In the guilty plea context, a defendant establishes prejudice by demonstrating "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial," and "that such a decision would have been rational under the circumstances." United States v. Fugit, 703 F.3d 248, 259-60 (4th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, "when deficient performance causes a defendant to accept a plea bargain he might not have otherwise, the defendant must point to evidence that demonstrates a reasonable probability that, with an accurate understanding of the implications of pleading guilty, he would have rejected the deal." United States v. Murillo, 927 F.3d 808, 816 (4th Cir. 2019).
In § 2255 proceedings, "[u]nless the motion and the files and records of the case conclusively show that the prisoner is entitled to no relief, the court shall . . . grant a prompt hearing thereon [and] determine the issues and make findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect thereto." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). An evidentiary hearing is required when a § 2255 movant presents a colorable Sixth Amendment claim showing disputed facts beyond the record or when a credibility determination is necessary to resolve the issue. See United States v. Witherspoon, 231 F.3d 923, 926-27 (4th Cir. 2000); Raines v. United States, 423 F.2d 526, 530 (4th Cir. 1970).
Nevertheless, it is well-established that "[c]ourts should not upset a plea solely because of post hoc assertions from a defendant about how he would have pleaded but for his attorney's deficiencies[,]" but "should instead look to contemporaneous evidence to substantiate a defendant's expressed preferences." Lee v. United States, 582 U.S. 357, 369 (2017). Importantly, a criminal defendant's "[s]olemn declarations in open court [during a plea hearing] carry a strong presumption of verity." Blackledge v. Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 74 (1977). "Thus, in the absence of extraordinary circumstances, allegations in a § 2255 motion that directly contradict the petitioner's sworn statements made during a properly conducted Rule 11 colloquy are always palpably incredible and patently frivolous or false." United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216, 221 (4th Cir. 2005) (cleaned up). Put otherwise, a district court may "summarily dismiss allegations of a [movant] who attempts to challenge statements made during his plea colloquy or in his plea agreement." United States v. White, 366 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2004).
The transcript of Williams' Rule 11 hearing was not initially part of the record before this Court. However, the Government provided the transcript in its petition for rehearing. Our review of that transcript confirms that Williams' sworn statements "directly contradict" his ineffective assistance of counsel claims. See Lemaster, 403 F.3d at 221. In his § 2255 motion, Williams alleged that defense counsel failed to independently investigate or calculate his criminal history category. Williams contended that if counsel had properly informed him of his criminal history category-and of his sentencing exposure more generally-he would have pursued further plea negotiations or exercised his constitutional right to a trial. However, at the Rule 11 hearing, Williams confirmed under oath that he had spoken with his attorneys about the applicability of the advisory Sentencing Guidelines to his case, understood the statutory maximum penalties associated with his charges, affirmatively agreed to the 156-month sentence, and was completely satisfied with counsel's representation. Moreover, as the Government emphasizes, the estimated Guidelines range the parties used during plea negotiations was lower than the range the district court ultimately established at sentencing, such that any error in that regard would have inured to Williams' benefit.
We note that "the proper setting for developing the record is in the district court, not this Court in the first instance." United States v. Redd, 85 F.4th 153, 168 n.13 (4th Cir. 2023).
According to Williams, based on his criminal history score of 9, his correct criminal history category was IV, rather than VI. However, the district court found Williams was a career offender, which automatically yielded a criminal history category of VI. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 4B1.1(b) (2014). In any event, the parties expressly agreed that 156 months' imprisonment was the appropriate sentence regardless of whether the district court applied the career offender enhancement.
Despite the late production of the Rule 11 transcript, we conclude there are no "extraordinary circumstances" to overcome Williams' sworn statements from his plea colloquy. Id. And we conclude that "[Williams'] ineffective assistance claim[s] may be disposed of solely on the basis of that legal judgment." United States v. Morris, 917 F.3d 818, 826 (4th Cir. 2019). Accordingly, regardless of whether the district court abused its discretion by failing to hold an evidentiary hearing, it did not err by denying Williams' § 2255 motion.
We therefore affirm the district court's order. United States v. Williams, No. 1:14-cr-00596-GLR-1 (D. Md. Mar. 13, 2020). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED.