Opinion
1:20-CR-612
10-20-2022
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA Plaintiff, v. ANSON LAMAR, Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER (REDACTED)
PAMELA A. BARKER, U.S. DISTRICT JUDGE
This matter is before the Court upon Defendant's pro se Emergency Motion for Compassionate Release Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) filed on August 29, 2022 (“Defendant's Motion”). (Doc. No. 29.) On August 30, 2022, the Court sent Defendant's Motion to the Federal Public Defender's Office for review, and on September 6, 2022, the Court appointed Catherine Adinaro Shusky of the Federal Public Defender's Office to represent Defendant. On September 14, 2022, Defendant's Supplement to Defendant's Motion was filed (“Defendant's Supplement”). (Doc. No. 33). On September 28, 2022, the United States of America filed the Government's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion (“the Government's Opposition”). (Doc. No. 37.) On October 4, 2022, Defendant filed a Reply to the Government's Opposition (“Defendant's Reply”) and then on October 17, 2022, after obtaining leave of Court to do so, Defendant filed a Second Supplement to Defendant's Motion (“Defendant's Second Supplement”). (Doc. Nos. 38, 40.) Defendant's Motion is ripe for a decision.
Background
On April 14, 2021, Defendant pled guilty to the sole count of the Indictment charging him with Felon in Possession of Firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2), and was immediately sentenced to 52 months of imprisonment, representing a downward variance of 18 to 35 months from the Advisory Guidelines range of 70 to 87 months. (Doc. Nos. 23, 27; 4/14/21 Minutes of Proceedings.) The charge arose from Defendant's conduct in pulling out a stolen firearm at a Cleveland residence, causing a woman to immediately take her seven-year-old daughter and flee the residence. As they fled, the woman heard gunshots. Defendant was later found by Cleveland Police hidden in the backyard with a firearm loaded with eleven rounds of ammunition in his pocket and suspected PCP. Inside the bedroom of the woman's residence where Defendant had been, police found several spent shell casings, and a small white dog that had been shot in the head. (Doc. No. 23, PageID # 81, ¶¶ 5-9.)
Defendant correctly contends that he has satisfied the exhaustion requirement under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Defendant seeks to reduce his sentence by asserting that his 82-year-old mother, who is caring for his six-year-old son, is no longer able to care for him due to her declining health. (Doc. No. 33, PageID # 215.) Defendant acknowledges that he does have siblings, one brother who is mentally disabled and two sisters who are busy working and taking care of other-family members, making them unable to take on the additional responsibility of caring for his son. (Id.) Thus, Defendant argues that the inability of his mother to continue to care for his minor child, and the inability of his sister Tonja and difficulties it would cause his sister, Angela, to take on this responsibility are “extraordinary and compelling circumstance[s]” warranting his early release. (Id., PageID # 216.) Defendant argues that there is little time left to serve on his sentence,and the Section 3553(a) factors support a reduction in his sentence, as he has made strides towards rehabilitation while incarcerated and has an extremely low risk of recidivating.
Footnote Not Available
Attached as Exhibit D to Defendant's Motion is a letter from Defendant's sister, Angela Lamar that appears to have been written to Defendant providing some information about “Jayden” who was set to start school on August 22, she is awaiting a transfer to the school where he went for day camp because of a “transportation issue now that mom really cannot be driving”, and noting that “[m]om's memory is not good she will not admit it”, and that “she does not like the fact that she needs help day to day.” (Doc. No. 29-4, PageID # 146.) Attached as Exhibit F is a letter from Defendant's sister, Angela, directed to this Court explaining that she is “hopeful that [Defendant's] release is sooner [rather] than later” because she is taking care of two households, and caring for Defendant's 6-year-old son Jayden and their elderly mother. She notes that their brother lives in a veteran home because of his mental health issues and that she works full time and “thankfully, the company that [she] works for has been extremely helpful and understanding through this whole ordeal” but she is “not sure how much more [she] can ask of them.” (Doc. No. 296, PageID # 148.)
Defendant asserts that he has a release date of December 12, 2023, and a halfway house date of June 20, 2023. (Doc. No. 33, PageID # 213, citing https://222.bop.gov/inmateloc/).
Defendant notes that he did not have any incident reports while on pretrial detention, he has not had disciplinary infractions while in the BOP, and he has completed quite a few programs, including behavior modification, emotional intelligence, career exploration, and resume writing. (Doc. No. 33, PageID # 218.) (See, also Doc. No. 40-1, PageID # 260-262.)
Attached as Exhibit A to Defendant's Supplement is a copy of the FSA Recidivism Risk Assessment (PATTERN 01.03.00) relative to Defendant, indicating that he scored a “General Level” of 27 and a “Violent Level” of 19. (Doc. No. 33-1, PageID # 221.) Although Defendant asserts that these numbers indicate a low risk of recidivism, the Court has been unable to verify this assertion based upon the links identified in footnotes 4 and 5 of Defendant's Supplement. (Doc. No. 33, PageID # 218.)
While the Government does concede that Defendant has exhausted his administrative remedies, it opposes Defendant's early release, arguing that Defendant has failed to satisfy his burden of proving that extraordinary and compelling reasons exist warranting a reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). Specifically, the Government acknowledges that the U.S. Sentencing Commission's commentary, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 app. Note 1(C), explains that “[t]he death or incapacitation of the caregiver of the defendant's minor child or minor children” or “[t]he incapacitation of the defendant's spouse or registered partner when the defendant would be the only available caregiver for the spouse or registered partner,” may justify a reduction of a defendant's prison term, but argues that Defendant has not submitted documentation demonstrating that his mother is incapacitated so as to not be able to care for Defendant's minor son. And, according to the Government, even if the Court construed the information submitted as sufficient to demonstrate the mother's incapacitation, since the information submitted by Defendant demonstrates there are relatives other than his elderly mother, specifically his sister, who can care for his son, Defendant's Motion should be denied. The Government also contends that the Section 3353(a) factors weigh against Defendant receiving a reduction in his sentence for compassionate release, and highlights: the nature and circumstances of the offense, i.e., the possession and then discharging of a stolen firearm in a residence where a woman and her daughter were residing and had fled out of fear; and Defendant's history and characteristics, specifically the present case is his fourth firearm conviction and Defendant has been in and out of the criminal justice system since he was a juvenile. According to the Government, Defendant's criminal history demonstrates a lack of respect for the law and for others; Defendant's periods of incarceration have not deterred him from committing additional crimes; and early release would not provide just punishment for the offense, particularly since the Court varied downward from the Guidelines range by 18 to 35 months.
Discussion
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained:
By statute, three substantive requirements must be met before a district court may grant compassionate release. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). First, the court must determine that “extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant” a sentence reduction. Ruffin, 978 F.3d at 1004 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i)). Second, the court must find that such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission, see U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. Ruffin, 978 F.3d at 1005. Third, the court must consider the applicable § 3553(a) factors. Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).... [W]hen a prisoner [brings a motion on his own accord], the First Step Act renders U.S.S.G. §
1B1.13 inapplicable, meaning district courts enjoy “full discretion to define ‘extraordinary and compelling' without consulting the policy statement § 1B1.13.” Jones, 980 F.3d at 1111. That leaves a district court to focus on steps one and three, as it may now “skip step two of the § 3582(c)(1)(A) inquiry.” Id.United States v. Hampton, 985 F.3d 530, 532 (6th Cir. 2021).
However, according to the Sixth Circuit, “a district court may deny compassionate release if it finds that the defendant fails to meet any one of the three steps, and may do so without addressing any of the other criteria.” United States v. Taylor, No. 20-4241, 2021 WL 2182320, at *2 (6th Cir. May 28, 2021) (citing United States v. Elias, 984 F.3d 516, 519 (6th Cir. 2021)). And, as correctly asserted by the Government, while the Sixth Circuit has concluded that as presently written, U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13 is not a policy statement applicable to inmate-filed motions for compassionate release, and does not bind district courts in this context, citing United States v. Elias, No. 20-3654, 2021 WL 51069 at *4 (6th Cir. Jan. 6, 2021), and United States v. Jones, 980 F.3d 1108, 1108-11 (6th Cir. 2020), it has also concluded that courts “may look to § 1B1.13 as relevant, even if no longer binding,” in considering how to define the term, citing United States v. Tomes, 990 F.3d 500, 503 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing with approval United States v. Byrd, 842 Fed.Appx. 915, 918 (5th Cir. 2021).
Those three criteria are: extraordinary and compelling reasons justifying release; the applicable § 3553(a) factors; and any applicable policy statement, such as U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13. United States v. Taylor, No. 20-4241, 2021 WL 2182320, at *2 (6th Cir. May 28, 2021) (citing United States v. Tomes, 990 F.3d 500, 502 (6th Cir. 2021) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 35).
(Doc. No. 37, PageID #s 244-245).
Based upon the evidence submitted by Defendant demonstrating that Defendant's mother is not fully incapacitated and that his sister, Angela, is helping to care for Defendant's son, Jayden, and considering as relevant § 1B1.13 in considering how to define the term “extraordinary and compelling”, the Court finds that Defendant has not shown “extraordinary and compelling” circumstances warranting early release. In so finding, the Court is not deferring to the BOP's decisions regarding home confinement or compassionate release.
Because Defendant has not shown “extraordinary and compelling reasons” warranting his release, the Court need not consider the Section 3553 factors.
Accordingly, Defendant's Motion is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.