Summary
holding that where defendant instituted summary judgment proceedings prior to any substantial discovery in the case, and plaintiff informed the court in his memorandum opposing summary judgment that no substantial discovery had been conducted, summary judgment was inappropriate even though plaintiff did not avail himself of Civ. R. 56(F)
Summary of this case from STEELE v. MARA ENTS., INC.Opinion
No. 82-547
Decided April 13, 1983.
Civil procedure — Motion for summary judgment filed prior to institution of substantial discovery — Non-moving party allocated insufficient time to discover essential facts — Allegation of liability of successor corporation for defective products — Remand for further discovery — Civ. R. 56(F).
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County.
On June 19, 1980, plaintiff-appellant, Jerome L. Tucker, filed a complaint in the Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, alleging that certain of the named defendants designed and manufactured a pinch-type bending roll machine which, on June 20, 1978, caused severe injuries to plaintiff while he was operating the machine at his place of employment. The Webb Corporation was listed as a defendant along with several others, including the Reed Engineering Co. Webb's liability to plaintiff was alleged to arise as the successor corporation to the other named defendants.
On April 15, 1954, Webb entered into a contract with Lloyd H. Knost, owner of Reed Engineering Co., whereby Webb was granted for sufficient consideration, the right to manufacture certain machines previously designed, produced and marketed by the Reed Engineering Co. A part of this contract provided that Knost would remain responsible for any products liability claims greater than $100 arising from injuries caused by machines manufactured prior to the closing date. Claims under $100 were assumed by Webb as a matter of everyday business routine. Approximately one year thereafter, the record indicates that Reed Engineering Co. was dissolved.
On February 10, 1959, a second contract was entered into between Knost and Webb whereby Webb purchased outright a portion of the defunct Reed Engineering Co. assets (which were owned personally by Knost) including the use of the trade name, patents and good will. This contract left undisturbed the original products liability arrangement.
Prior to trial, and after Tucker filed an amended complaint, the defendant Webb Corporation moved the trial court for summary judgment on its behalf. Plaintiff then filed his motion in opposition to summary judgment noting initially that defendant's motion was filed prior to the institutionof any substantial discovery involving, inter alia, issues surrounding the transaction between Knost and Webb. Plaintiff also moved the trial court for summary judgment on his behalf.
On April 3, 1981, the trial court granted Webb's motion for summary judgment and at the same time denied the motion made by Tucker. Upon appeal, the trial court's decision was affirmed.
The cause is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Messrs. Keating, Muething Klekamp and Mr. William A. Posey, for appellant.
Clark Eyrich Co., L.P.A., Mr. Steven T. MacConnell and Mr. David S. Levine, for appellee.
In determining the appropriateness of granting a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Civ. R. 56, we noted in Harless v. Willis Day Warehousing Co. (1978), 54 Ohio St.2d 64, at page 66 [8 O.O.3d 73]:
"The appositeness of rendering a summary judgment hinges upon the tripartite demonstration: (1) that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact; (2) that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law;and (3) that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, who is entitled to have the evidence construed most strongly in his favor."
While taking these factors into account, the courts below found that the evidence compelled a summary adjudication in favor of the appellee Webb Corporation, as a matter of law. We do not agree.
While we hold that summary judgment here was improper, our focus turns on the preliminary inquiry of whether the trial court had sufficient evidence before it in order to make a just and proper decision. As the United States Supreme Court noted with respect to the corresponding federal rule in Associated Press v. United States (1945), 326 U.S. 1, at page 6:
"* * * Rule 56 should be cautiously invoked to the end that parties may always be afforded a trial where there is a bona fide dispute of facts between them. Sartor v. Arkansas Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620."
In the instant case, we find that appellant Tucker was allotted insufficient time to discover the essential facts surrounding the transactions that took place between Knost, Reed Engineering Co. and the Webb Corporation. These undiscovered facts could not only assist appellant in supporting his cause of action, but could also reveal whether there exist any genuine issues of material fact to be determined. Although the appellant did not cite Civ.R. 56(F) specifically, he did in effect ask the trial court for more discovery in attempting to justify his opposition to Webb's motion for summary judgment.
Civ. R. 56(F) reads as follows:
"When affidavits unavailable. Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion for summary judgment that he cannot for sufficient reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just."
Tucker's memorandum in opposition to Webb's summary judgment motion states, in part, as follows:
"Initially, the Court should be aware that defendant has filed this motion for summary judgment prior to the institution of any substantial discovery against it thus far which would determine certain issues present in the case surrounding the sale of the right to manufacture the `Reed product line' by Lloyd K. Knost [ sic] (hereinafter sometimes referred to as Knost), or the other defendants herein, to the Webb Corporation."
Hence, this cause presents a different situation than that which was found to exist in Benjamin v. Deffet Rentals (1981), 66 Ohio St.2d 86 [20 O.O.3d 71]. In Benjamin, we noted that the plaintiffs involved chosenot to avail themselves of the procedure afforded by Civ. R. 56(F) in order to obtain the necessary discovery, supra, at page 92. However, in the case sub judice, the appellant stated initially that he needed more discovery, but he chose not to rest his opposition to appellee's summary judgment motion on that theory alone. Faced with the task of opposing appellee's motion, appellant attempted to include all possible theories contra to appellee's motion, as well as proposing his own motion for summary judgment. Taking into account the ramifications of a summary disposition, we believe that the courts below should have been more cautious in determining whether any genuine issues of material fact existed that could potentially impose liability on the appellee for the injuries sustained by appellant. One cannot weigh evidence most strongly in favor of one opposing a motion for summary judgment when there is a dearth of evidence available in the first place.
Therefore, we find that the trial court should have at least given the appellant more time in order to discover the facts surrounding the transactions between Knost, Reed Engineering Co. and the Webb Corporation, and on remand the trial court should do so accordingly.
Therefore, we reverse the decision of the court of appeals and remand the cause to the trial court for further proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
CELEBREZZE, C.J., W. BROWN, SWEENEY, LOCHER, HOLMES, C. BROWN and J.P. CELEBREZZE, JJ., concur.