Opinion
Case Number 00-10433-BC.
July 9, 2004
The plaintiff filed the present action on November 16, 2000 seeking review of the Commissioner's decision denying the plaintiff's claim for a period of disability, disability insurance benefits, and supplemental security income benefits under Titles II and XVI of the Social Security Act. The case was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and E.D. Mich. LR 72.1(b)(3). Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment seeking reversal of the decision of the Commissioner or in the alternative that the claim be remanded for further proceedings. The defendant filed a motion for summary judgment requesting judgment in favor of the Commissioner and that the case be dismissed with prejudice.
Magistrate Judge Binder filed a report and recommendation on June 5, 2001 recommending that the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be denied, the defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted, and the findings of the Commissioner be affirmed. The plaintiff filed timely objections to the recommendation and this matter is now before the Court.
The Court has reviewed the file, the report and recommendation, and the plaintiff's objections, and has made a de novo review of the administrative record in light of the parties' submissions. The plaintiff's objections focus generally on the magistrate judge's conclusion that substantial evidence supports the decision of the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) that the plaintiff had the residual functional capacity to perform a limited range of sedentary work. The plaintiff also contends, accurately, that the magistrate judge utterly failed even to address the plaintiff's arguments that the ALJ did not develop a record pertaining to the plaintiff's transferable skills or the vocational adjustment that might be necessary for the plaintiff to perform one of the semi-skilled occupations listed by the ALJ; or the argument that the hypothetical question posed to the vocational expert did not include any of the individualized limitations by which the plaintiff's ability to work was impaired. Indeed, those arguments were addressed by each of the attorneys in their summary judgment papers, but the magistrate judge ignored them. Those arguments provide the basis for the plaintiff's alternative prayer for relief: that the matter should be remanded to the Commission for further fact finding.
The plaintiff, who is now fifty-three years old, first applied for disability and supplemental security income benefits on January 9, 1996 when he was forty-four years old. He has worked as a certified automobile mechanic, yard worker and wrecker driver, and has completed a ninth grade education. The plaintiff last worked on July 8, 1995, which was the date he alleged his disability began as a result of chronic lower back pain. He testified that he and a co-worker were carrying an automobile transmission across repair bays in a garage when his compatriot slipped and transferred the entire weight of the transmission onto the plaintiff.
The plaintiff filed applications on three separate occasions for Social Security benefits, all listing the same onset date. The first two were denied at the administrative level and not pursued further. The third set of applications, one for disability insurance benefits and the other for supplemental security income, are the subject of this case.
The plaintiff filed the third claims for benefits on February 10, 1999 and February 18, 1999. His claim was initially denied, and the denial was upheld on reconsideration. On this claim, the plaintiff requested a hearing before an ALJ. The plaintiff appeared before ALJ Adrian V. Sannier on May 17, 2000 in Alpena, Michigan when he was forty-nine years old. ALJ Sannier filed a decision on June 9, 2000 denying benefits because the ALJ found that the plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act. The ALJ reached this conclusion by applying the five-step sequential analysis prescribed by the Secretary in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520, 416.920. The ALJ concluded that the plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since July 8, 1995 (step one); the plaintiff suffered from degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine and chronic lower back pain (step two); these impairments did not themselves or in combination meet or equal a listing in the regulations (step three); and the plaintiff could not perform his previous work as an automobile mechanic or yard worker and wrecker driver (step four).
In applying the fifth step, the ALJ concluded that the plaintiff had the residual functional capacity for sedentary work affording a sit/stand option. His limitations included no lifting or carrying over ten pounds at one time and no prolonged sitting, standing, or walking. Relying on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found that such jobs as assembler, inspector, fabricator, machine attendant, sorter, grader, checker, packager, and machine attendant fit within those limitations, and that those jobs existed in significant numbers in the local and regional economies. The ALJ then used the Commissioner's grid rules as a framework and concluded that the plaintiff was not disabled within the meaning of the Social Security Act.
All parties agree with the magistrate judge that the plaintiff has the burden of proving disability in order to qualify for social security disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits, and that "disability" is defined as the "inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity" due to a "physical or mental impairment" that could cause death or might reasonably be expected to last continuously for at least twelve months. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). Of course, a person is not disabled merely because his or her limitation prevents the person from performing previous work, if that person can perform other "substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy." 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). The parties also accept the rule that the authority of this Court to review administrative decisions of the Commissioner is limited to deciding whether the proper legal standards were used and "whether there is substantial evidence in the record to support the findings." Wright v. Massanari, 321 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 2003) (quoting Duncan v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 801 F.2d 847, 851 (6th Cir. 1986)).
To determine disability, the Commissioner has prescribed the five-step process noted above and set forth in 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520 and 416.920. However, if the plaintiff has satisfied his burden through the first four steps of the analytical process, the burden shifts to the Commissioner to establish that the plaintiff possesses the residual functional capacity to perform other substantial gainful activity. Varley v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 820 F.2d 777, 779 (6th Cir. 1987). See also Allen v. Califano, 613 F.2d 139, 145 (6th Cir. 1980). "To meet this burden, there must be a finding supported by substantial evidence that plaintiff has the vocational qualifications to perform specific jobs." Varley, 820 F.2d at 779 (internal quotes and citations omitted). As noted above, the plaintiff believes that the Commissioner failed to meet his step-five burden of proof because there is no evidence in the record that any of the plaintiff's job skills were transferrable to the occupations described by the vocational expert, and the hypothetical question posed to the expert did not individually describe the plaintiff's residual functional capacity.
The court's task in reviewing a Social Security disability determination is a limited one. The ALJ's findings are conclusive if they are supported by substantial evidence, according to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Consequently, the court's review is confined to determining whether the correct legal standard was applied, and whether the findings are supported by substantial evidence on the whole record. See Wright v. Massanari, 321 F.3d 611, 614 (6th Cir. 2003). "`Substantial evidence' means `more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.'" Kirk v. Sec. of Health Human Servs., 667 F.2d 524, 535 (6th Cir. 1981) (quoting Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971)). This Court may not base its decision on a single piece of evidence and disregard other pertinent evidence when evaluating whether substantial evidence exists in the record. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978). Thus, where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be upheld even if the record might support a contrary conclusion. Smith v. Sec. of Health Human Servs., 893 F.2d 106, 108 (6th Cir. 1989). The Sixth Circuit has stated that the role of the court "is not to resolve conflicting evidence in the record or to examine the credibility of the claimant's testimony." Wright, 321 F.3d at 614. Therefore, the court "may not try the case de novo, nor resolve conflicts in evidence, nor decide questions of credibility." Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383, 387 (6th Cir. 1984).
The ALJ concluded that the plaintiff was not disabled in part because he could perform over 18,000 semi-skilled jobs that were available in the regional economy. The plaintiff correctly observes, however, that many of those jobs may involve skill sets that differ from those that the plaintiff acquired as an automobile mechanic. Of course, the contrary may also be true, but there is no evidence in the record either way on the subject, and it is an area on which the Commissioner carries the burden of proof. However, the Court believes that the matter is of no moment because the ALJ also concluded that the plaintiff could perform 16,000 unskilled jobs that were available in the regional economy. The Court agrees with the Commissioner that the later number is significant and sufficient to satisfy the step-five burden without regard to whether any of the plaintiff's skills from his semi-skilled occupation were transferable.
The issue relating to the soundness of the hypothetical question, however, presents a closer question. The plaintiff cites the unpublished Sixth Circuit decision of Butler v. Sullivan, 909 F.2d 1482 (6th Cir. 1990 ( per curiam) (unpublished), in support of the rule that a proper hypothetical question must link the occupational base described by the vocational expert to the claimant's individual impairments (or abilities). Indeed, a hypothetical question posed to a vocational expert must include a "complete assessment of [the claimant's] physical and mental state and should include an accurate portrayal of her individual physical and mental impairments." Howard v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 276 F.3d 235, 239 (6th Cir. 2002) (internal quotes and alterations omitted) (quoting Varley, 820 F.2d at 779).
In this case, the first hypothetical question that the ALJ posed to the vocational expert asked him to assume the existence of a claimant who was the same age as the plaintiff and had the same education and work record, and also assume that he had all of the pain and limitations to which the plaintiff had testified. The second question asked that the vocational expert assume only that the same individual had "a residual functional capacity for sedentary work with a sit/stand option." Tr. at 51. By its terms, this question was not individualized to the plaintiff; it asked only whether there were jobs available within the limitations generally imposed on those who could perform only sedentary work.
Nonetheless, there is evidence from which one may conclude that the vocational expert based his opinion of the plaintiff's specific limitations and not just a person in the abstract. The vocational expert testified that he personally listened to the testimony of the plaintiff at the hearing and he reviewed all of the exhibit files. Tr. at 50. The Sixth Circuit has held such activity sufficient to provide an adequate base for a hypothetical question. In Bradford v. Sec. of Health and Human Serv., 803 F.2d 871 (6th Cir. 1986) ( per curiam), the court was confronted with a similar objection to the hypothetical question answered by the vocational expert. There, "[t]he ALJ asked the vocational expert to assume plaintiff could perform a full range of sedentary work." Id. at 874. There was evidence in the record that the plaintiff, in fact, could perform such work, and the court noted that "the vocational expert had examined plaintiff's file and familiarized himself with the contents of the medical reports and other exhibits." Ibid. The court concluded that the hypothetical question was a proper one since "the vocational expert was basing an opinion on the specific knowledge of this plaintiff, not just on a hypothetical person." Ibid.
Similarly, in this case there is evidence that the plaintiff could perform sedentary work. The medical records are well summarized in the magistrate judge's report and need not be repeated here. For the plaintiff to prevail, the ALJ would have had to accept all of his testimony and rely on the opinions of his doctor, which the ALJ quite properly discounted due to lack of clinical support. See Casey v. Sec'y of Health Human Servs., 987 F.2d 1230, 1234-35 (6th Cir. 1993) (concluding that a court may reject a treating physician's opinion if it is not supported by clinical evidence in the record); Hall v. Bowen, 837 F.2d 272, 276 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that a treating physician's opinion may be rejected if there is good reason to do so). The ALJ acted within his authority when he based his decision on the plaintiff's lack of credibility and chose instead to rely on the records of other physicians. "[A]n ALJ is not required to accept a claimant's subjective complaints and may properly consider the credibility of a claimant when making a determination of disability," and "can present a hypothetical to the [vocational expert] on the basis of his own assessment if he reasonable deems the claimant's testimony to be inaccurate." Jones v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 336 F.3d 469, 476 (6th Cir. 2003).
After a de novo review of the entire record and the materials submitted by the parties, the Court concludes that the magistrate judge properly reviewed the administrative record and applied the correct law in reaching his conclusion insofar as the issues he actually addressed. The issues omitted by the magistrate judge have been decided by the Court in this review, and they do not afford the plaintiff relief.
Accordingly, it is ORDERED that the magistrate judge's report and recommendation is ADOPTED as to the issues actually addressed, and as supplemented by this opinion.
It is further ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment [dkt #11] is DENIED.
It is further ORDERED that the defendant's motion for summary judgment [dkt #12] is GRANTED. The findings of the Commissioner are AFFIRMED, and the complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice.