Opinion
Case No. 17-cv-941-RJD
03-22-2019
JEASON TROUTMAN, Plaintiff, v. JAMES MUTAYOBA, et al., Defendants.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
DALY, Magistrate Judge :
The matter has been referred to United States Magistrate Judge Reona J. Daly by United States District Judge Staci M. Yandle pursuant to 28 U.S. C. § 636(b)(1)(B), Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(b), and SDIL-LR 72.1(a) for a Report and Recommendation on the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 43) filed by Defendants. It is RECOMMENDED that the District Court ADOPT the following findings of fact and conclusions of law, and Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc.43) be DENIED.
FINDINGS OF FACT
Plaintiff Jeason Troutman, an inmate in the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections ("IDOC"), filed this lawsuit pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his constitutional rights were violated while he was incarcerated at Robinson Correctional Center ("Robinson"). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges he was denied a diet that conforms with the tenets of his Native American religion. Following threshold review, Plaintiff proceeds on the following claim:
Count 1: Defendants denied Plaintiff a religious diet in violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and
Institutionalized Persons Act (42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a)).
Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment arguing Plaintiff is not entitled to summary judgment because he admitted he has not practiced the religion or diet of a Native American Indian since the age of six, and since the filing of the lawsuit, Plaintiff resubmitted his request for a kosher diet which was granted. Plaintiff filed a Response (Doc. 48) asserting Defendants are not entitled to summary judgment because he holds sincere Native American religious beliefs and was denied a diet that conforms with those beliefs.
Plaintiff is a Native American who was born on the Chickasaw reservation (Plaintiff's Complaint, Doc. 1 at 5). Plaintiff resided in Chickasha, Oklahoma from the time he was born until he was six years old (Plaintiff's Deposition, Doc. 44-1 at 2). At the age of six, Plaintiff moved from Oklahoma to Tennessee (Id.). At the age of 18, Plaintiff moved to Indiana, and then eventually, to Illinois (Id.). Plaintiff testified that when he lived in Oklahoma as a child, he and his family participated in religious ceremonies and powwows (Id. at 4). Plaintiff participated in sweat lodges, and sat around bonfires to tell stories because the traditions are passed on by word of mouth, rather than in writing (Id.). His diet while in Oklahoma consisted of "stuff we caught and ate" that was indigenous to the country (Id.). Plaintiff testified that after leaving Oklahoma, his family observed a diet that consisted of eating bison, elk, and venison (Id.). His family did not eat beef or pork (Id.). The diet also consisted of corn pemmican, pumpkin, and all types of squash and foods indigenous to the country (Id.). Plaintiff testified that the Native American diet is not "super strict," but that the food has to be prepared a certain way - "slaughter, bled, and blessed" (Id. at 11).
Plaintiff was incarcerated in IDOC in 2007 (Id. at 3). Plaintiff has been housed at the following correctional centers within IDOC: Graham, Big Muddy, Stateville, Lawrence, Taylorville, and Robinson (Id.). Plaintiff was transferred to Robinson in May of 2015 (Id.). Prior to being incarcerated in IDOC, Plaintiff served time in the Indiana Department of Corrections (Id. at 5). Plaintiff did not request a religious diet while serving time in Indiana (Id.). Plaintiff has not requested a religious diet at any institution, in Illinois or Indiana, except Robinson (Id. at 4). Plaintiff requested a religious diet while at Robinson because he learned from another inmate that special diets could be requested based on religious beliefs (Id.). Plaintiff testified that today he eats fish, chicken, turkey, and sometimes beef (Id.).
Plaintiff testified that his religious worship services consist of a group of people sitting around telling stories of the past (Id. at 5). Plaintiff has been unable to participate in any Native American religious ceremonies while incarcerated because none exist (Id.). Plaintiff testified that to find out whether a Native American religion holds a specific belief such as a special diet, the chief would be consulted (Id.). Plaintiff admitted that it has been years since he has been in touch with any chiefs (Id.). Plaintiff testified that his mother who resides in California is a chief so the last contact he had with a chief was when wrote her in 2013 (Id. at 5, 9).
The Illinois Administrative Code provides, "A committed person may submit a written request to the facility chaplain to receive an alternative diet for specific religious reasons. The request must contain written verification that the committed person is a member of a faith group that requires adherence to a particular diet and the specific requirements of the diet. Eligibility to receive an alternative diet for specific religious reasons shall be determined by the facility chaplain who shall ordinarily confer with a religious leader or faith representative of the faith group at issue. The facility chaplain and the religious leader or faith representative may interview the committed person" (Doc. 44-3).
When Plaintiff requested a Native American diet, he was told IDOC did not have any dietary requirements for Native American people (Id. at 6). Plaintiff then went to the chaplain and asked if he could compromise to have a kosher diet (Id.). Plaintiff's understanding of a kosher diet is that it is blessed food (Id. at 6). Plaintiff does not know who blesses the food, but assumes it is a rabbi (Id.). The chaplain told him he was not eligible for a kosher diet because he was not Jewish (Id. at 6, 7). On May 21, 2017, Plaintiff filled out an Offender Request form asking for a blank copy of Doc. 0388 (Doc. 44-4). Plaintiff stated that due to his spiritual beliefs on the slaughter preparation and blessing of foods to the Great Spirit, his beliefs compel him to eat a kosher diet since he cannot prepare his food personally (Id.).
On May 23, 2017, Chaplain Mutayoba met with Plaintiff regarding his request for a kosher diet and Mutayoba noted that Plaintiff "could not explain how Kosher Diet is related to his Native American religion. He only mentioned the merciful slaughter of animals. Nothing in reference to ceremonial clean/unclean animals/foods or their preparation was mentioned" (Doc. 44-5). Mutayoba, however, provided Plaintiff a form so that he could formally request the kosher diet from Chaplain Keim (Id. at 8, Doc. 44-4 at 1). On May 22, 2017, Plaintiff filled out an official "Offender Request for Religious Diet" form and the DOC Chaplain's Worksheet for Assessing Offender Sincerity ("sincerity test") form (Doc. 44-6). Plaintiff filled out the "sincerity test" for a kosher diet with answers regarding his Native American religion (Doc. 44-1 at 8-9). On May 30, 2017, the chief chaplain denied Plaintiff's request for a kosher diet stating, "Sincerity responses given mention nothing pertaining to ceremonially clean/unclean classifications or how kosher is related to Native American religion at all" (Doc. 44-6 at 1).
On September 1, 2017, Plaintiff filed suit in this case and requested injunctive relief regarding his diet (Doc. 1). On February 27, 2018, the Court held a Preliminary Injunction Hearing (Doc. 31). Following the hearing, staff at IDOC and Plaintiff discussed his requested relief (Doc. 33). On March 4, 2018, Plaintiff again filled out the Offender Request for Religious Diet and the Chaplains Worksheet for Assessing Offender Sincerity forms and listed his religious affiliation as Native American and requested a kosher diet (Doc. 44-9). A note on the form initialed by Stephen Keim states, "A religious dietary accommodation that is close to the Native American religious practice of Natural food items that have been slaughtered humanely and fully bleed, blessed close to Native American religion kosher is the closest diet there is" (Id.). Plaintiff was approved for a kosher diet on March 7, 2018. Upon notification that Plaintiff was receiving the requested diet, the Court found moot Plaintiff's motion for injunctive relief (Doc. 34). Plaintiff has continually received a kosher diet since that time (Doc. 44-1 at 10).
Plaintiff testified that there are items on his diet that he can buy from commissary such as turkey, chicken, and fish (Id. at 6). Plaintiff testified that it has been years since he bought turkey, chicken, or fish from commissary because he does not have the money to purchase items (Id.). Plaintiff testified that he has never spent money on foods from the commissary that would have been on his Native American diet (Id. at 7). Plaintiff testified that he now has what he wants with regard to his diet, that he is happy with the kosher diet and has no problems with it (Id.).
LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate only if the moving party can demonstrate "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322(1986); see also Ruffin- Thompkins v. Experian Information Solutions, Inc., 422 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir. 2005). The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the lack of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. Once a properly supported motion for summary judgment is made, the adverse party "must set forth specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986). A genuine issue of material fact exists when "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Estate of Simpson v. Gorbett, 863 F.3d 740, 745 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248). In determining a summary judgment motion, the Court views the facts in the light most favorable to, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of, the nonmoving party. Apex Digital, Inc. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 735 F.3d 962, 965 (7th Cir. 2013) (citation omitted).
Under the First Amendment, prisoners enjoy a right to the free exercise of their religion. Vinning-El v. Evans, 657 F.3d 591, 592-93 (7th Cir. 2011). However, a prison may impose restrictions on the exercise of religion that are reasonably related to the legitimate penological objectives of the state. Tarpley v. Allen County, Ind., 312 F.3d 895, 898 (7th Cir. 2002) (citations omitted). In determining whether an asserted justification is rationally related to a legitimate penological objective, courts consider whether there are alternative means of exercising the right that remain open to the inmate, the impact an accommodation of the asserted right would have on guards and other inmates, and whether there are "obvious alternatives" to the restriction. Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 669 (7th Cir. 2009).
Inmates are afforded broader religious protections under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act ("RLUIPA"), which prohibits prisons receiving federal funds from imposing a substantial burden on an inmate's religious exercise unless prison officials can demonstrate that imposition of the burden on that person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and (2) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling governmental interest. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1(a). Unlike cases arising under the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, RLUIPA applies even where the burden on the prisoner "results from a rule of general applicability." Koger v. Bryan, 523 F.3d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 2008). In establishing a claim under RLUIPA, the plaintiff bears the initial burden of showing (1) that he seeks to engage in an exercise of religion, and (2) that the challenged practice substantially burdens that exercise of religion. 42 U.S.C. §2000cc-1. Once the plaintiff establishes his prima facie case, the defendants "bear the burden of persuasion on any [other] element of the claim," Id., namely, whether their practice "is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest." Koger, 523 F.3d at 796.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Defendants contend that Plaintiff's religious beliefs were not substantially burdened when his request for a kosher diet was initially denied because he did not provide a proper justification for how a kosher diet would meet his Native American religious beliefs, he had not practiced or adhered to either Native American religion practices or a specific diet since the age of six, and he testified that his religious beliefs did not contain strict dietary requirements. Plaintiff, however, argues that while a Native American diet does not contain strict requirements regarding the types of food, it does require that food be prepared in a certain manner. Plaintiff disputes that he had not practiced the Native American religion and asserts that prior to entering IDOC he participated and practiced Native American observances on a daily basis. Plaintiff testified that he had not requested a religious diet at any other correctional facility because he was not aware religious diets could be requested until he was informed by an inmate at Robinson. Plaintiff asserts the kosher diet is a compromise that suits his religious beliefs because the kosher diet requires food be prepared in a certain manner and that it be blessed.
To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must submit evidence from which a jury could reasonably find that a defendant personally and unjustifiably placed a substantial burden on his religious practices. Thompson v. Holm, 809 F.3d 376, 379 (7th Cir. 2016) (citing Hernandez v. Comm'n of Internal Revenue, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989), Vinning-El, 657 F.3d at 592 (other citations omitted)). A substantial burden "put[s] substantial pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs." Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981). In the context of RLUIPA, a "regulation that imposes a substantial burden on religious exercise is one that necessarily bears direct, primary, and fundamental responsibility for rendering religious exercise ... effectively impracticable." Koger, 523 F.3d at 799. In the specific context of dietary restrictions, the Seventh Circuit has held that "a prisoner's dietary practice is substantially burdened when the prison forces him to choose between his religious practice and adequate nutrition." Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 869 (7th Cir. 2009) (holding that inmate's free exercise rights were substantially burdened when the prison forced him to choose between his religious practice and adequate nutrition by denying his request for meatless meals on Friday); see also Hunafa v. Murphy, 907 F.2d 46, 47 (7th Cir. 1990) (finding that failure of prison to ensure that preparation of Muslim prisoner's meals kept pork separate from other food substantially burdened his religious practice).
The Court rejects Defendants' assertion that Plaintiff's religion was not substantially burdened by the denial of a kosher diet. First, the assertion that Plaintiff was not substantially burdened because he was eventually provided a kosher diet is not well founded. Plaintiff requested the kosher diet in May 2017 and was not approved to receive the kosher diet until March 2018, notably after Plaintiff filed suit and the Court held a hearing on a motion for injunctive relief. Plaintiff was denied the requested religious diet for ten months. During that ten-month period Plaintiff was forced to choose between his religious beliefs and adequate nutrition. Because Plaintiff chose not to forego adequate nutrition does not make his burden any less. Second, the Court finds disingenuous the assertion that Plaintiff was not substantially burdened because the Native American diet does not contain strict requirements regarding types of food. Plaintiff repeatedly stated in his request for the kosher diet that his religious beliefs required that food be prepared in a certain manner and that the manner in which the kosher diet was prepared adhered to his beliefs. Accordingly, the Court finds that the denial of Plaintiff's request for a kosher diet substantially burdened his religious practice.
Plaintiff asserts he is satisfied with receiving a kosher diet and does not argue IDOC should make further accommodations regarding a Native American diet, therefore, the Court will address only the denial of the kosher diet.
The Court further finds that Defendants have not provided sufficient evidence to establish the denial of the kosher diet was justified because they doubted Plaintiff's religious beliefs were sincerely held. Although the Court recognizes that a prison is entitled to ensure that a prisoner's request for a particular diet reflects a sincere religious belief, rather than a personal preference for the way a given diet tastes or a prisoner's desire to make a pest of himself and cause trouble for his captors, such a holding implicitly entails some investigation by the prison that the inmate's religious belief is not sincere. Vinning-El, 657 F.3d 591 at 594.
First, Defendants argue that they doubted the sincerity of Plaintiff's religious beliefs because Plaintiff admitted he was Native American but requested a kosher diet. Defendants denied Plaintiff's request for a kosher diet noting that he only mentioned the kosher diet included the merciful slaughter of animals, and that he made no reference to ceremonial clean/unclean animals/foods. The evidence suggests Defendants only reviewed Plaintiff's request for a kosher diet based upon Jewish beliefs. There is no evidence before the Court that Defendants considered at the time of the initial denial whether the requested kosher diet would in fact meet Plaintiff's sincerely held Native American religious beliefs. The record is devoid of any evidence that Defendants questioned the sincerity of Plaintiff's Native American beliefs. Based on the record before the Court, there is insufficient evidence to establish that Plaintiff's religious beliefs were insincere to justify the denial of his request for a kosher diet.
Finding that Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence for a jury to conclude his sincere religious belief was substantially burdened by Defendants' denial of his kosher diet, the burden shifts to Defendants to provide an adequate justification for the action that is premised on legitimate penological interests, such as safety or security concerns. Kaufman v. McCaughtry, 419 F.3d 678, 682-83 (7th Cir. 2005) (citations and quotations omitted). Under RLUIPA, Defendants must satisfy an even higher burden by showing that the challenged action was the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. Koger, 523 F.3d at 800.
Here, Defendants offer little in the way of specific justifications for their action; however, they generally assert that kosher diets are more labor intensive and that prison officials have a legitimate penological interest in a simplified and efficient food service. Defendants argue Plaintiff's request for a kosher diet was denied because Plaintiff failed to provide "justification or basis" for the request and the facility chaplain determined Plaintiff could not show a kosher diet was requested for specific religious reasons. The Court is not persuaded by Defendants arguments. While the Court acknowledges that kosher diets are more labor intensive for the prison, other inmates, including those adhering to the tenants of Judaism and African Hebrew Israelites, receive kosher meals. Defendants fail to address how providing a kosher diet to Plaintiff would further burden prison resources when the diet is generally available to inmates at Robinson. For these reasons, the Court finds that Defendants failed to satisfy their burden and establish the refusal to provide Plaintiff with a kosher diet was justified. Accordingly, Defendants are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
The Court notes that Defendants have also asserted that they are entitled to qualified immunity. For the reasons set forth above, Defendants are not entitled to qualified immunity in this case. It is clearly established law that "a prisoner's religious dietary practice is substantially burdened when the prison forces him to choose between his religious practice and adequate nutrition." Nelson, 570 F.3d at 879. Because the evidence supports an inference that Plaintiff was denied a kosher diet, forcing him to choose between adequate nutrition and his religious beliefs, without some legitimate penological purpose, qualified immunity is unavailable to Defendants.
RECOMMENDATIONS
For the foregoing reasons, it is RECOMMENDED that the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 43) be DENIED, and that the Court adopt the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law.
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and SDIL-LR 73.1(b), the parties shall have fourteen (14) days after service of this Report and Recommendation to file written objection thereto. The failure to file a timely objection may result in the waiver of the right to challenge this Report and Recommendation before either the District Court or the Court of Appeals. See, e.g., Snyder v. Nolen, 380 F.3d 279, 284 (7th Cir. 2004).
DATED: March 22, 2019
/s/ _________
Hon. Reona J. Daly
United States Magistrate Judge