Opinion
Civil No. Action No. 3:01-CV-0893-L
February 5, 2003
FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Pursuant to the provisions of Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1)(B), and an Order of the Court in implementation thereof, this case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge. Plaintiff's "Motion to Amend Complaint," filed January 21, 2003; Defendant's "Motion to Dismiss," filed February 4, 2002; Plaintiff's "Motion for Summary Judgment," filed December 3, 2001; and Defendant's "Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment," filed February 4, 2002, are before this Court for hearing, if necessary, and for recommendation. Having reviewed the evidence of the parties in connection with the motions, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint be GRANTED, that Defendant's motion to dismiss be DENIED, that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be DENIED without prejudice, and that Defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment be DENIED without prejudice.
I. Background
This is a social security case. On May 11, 2001, Kay J.M. Troupe filed the instant action in the Northern District of Texas on behalf of her adult son, Robert F. Troupe III, seeking judicial review of the final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner") that Robert Troupe is not disabled for purposes of Title XVI Supplemental Security Income benefits. The Commissioner subsequently moved to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) Robert Troupe did not sign the complaint in accordance with Rule 11(a), (2) Kay Troupe does not have "independent standing" to bring this suit on Robert Troupe's behalf, and (3) the real party in interest — Robert Troupe — has neglected to seek judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision within the statutory appeal period. (D.'s Br. at 3-4, 5.) In an attempt to cure these deficiencies, Robert Troupe now seeks to amend the complaint and substitute himself as the plaintiff in this case. Because the Court concludes that such a substitution must be allowed under Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court does not reach the remaining contentions raised by the parties.
The Court now turns to discuss the legal standards that will guide its analysis.
II. Legal Standards
Rule 17(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[e]very action shall be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest." FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a). See also Rogers v. Samedan Oil Corp., 308 F.3d 477, 483 (5th Cir. 2002). However, Rule 17(a) also provides that:
No action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest.
FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a). See Wieburg v. GTE Southwest, Inc., 272 F.3d 302, 308-09 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding that it was abuse of discretion under Rule 17(a) for the district court to dismiss for lack of standing "without explaining why the less drastic alternatives of either allowing an opportunity for ratification . . . or joinder . . . were inappropriate"). See also Wieburg v. GTE Southwest, Inc., No. 3:98-CV-2057-R, 2002 WL 31156431, at *3-4 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 26, 2002) (dismissing the case on remand because, among other reasons, ratification or joinder had not been obtained within the reasonable time of seven months). Nonetheless, ratification, joinder, or substitution is only appropriate under Rule 17(a) where "the plaintiff brought the action in her own name as the result of an understandable mistake, because determination of the correct party to bring the action is difficult." Wieburg, 272 F.3d at 308 (citing Advanced Magnetics, Inc. v. Bayfront Partners, Inc., 106 F.3d 11, 20 (2d Cir. 1997)). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 17, Advisory Committee Notes, 1966 Amendment (recognizing that the purpose of Rule 17(a) is "to prevent forfeiture when determination of the proper party to sue is difficult or when an understandable mistake has been made."). Finally, any ratification, joinder, or substitution under Rule 17(a) "shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest." FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a). See Ratner v. Sioux Natural Gas Corp., 770 F.2d 512, 520 (5th Cir. 1985).
III. Analysis
In the instant case, the Commissioner does not dispute that Robert Troupe is the real party in interest. (D.'s Br. at 5, 8.) Accordingly, Rule 17(a) prohibits dismissal of the case "until a reasonable time has been allowed after objection for . . . substitution of . . . the real party in interest." FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a). See Wieburg, 2002 WL 31156431, at *3-4. The Court concludes that Robert Troupe has moved to amend the complaint and substitute himself as the plaintiff within a reasonable time after the Commissioner's objection. Although the Commissioner lodged her objection to the "party in interest" on February 4, 2002 — one year ago — the Commissioner's objection was not sufficiently clear to notify the pro se plaintiff that a specific rule governed the objection or that the rule provided remedies for curing the objection. See In re Humphries, 469 F.2d 643, 644 (5th Cir. 1972) ("The general rule is that objections must be specific."). For example, the Commissioners's objection did not refer to Rule 17(a), nor did it refer to "real party in interest." (D.'s Br. at 5, 8.) Because the Court now recognizes for the first time that an objection has been lodged under Rule 17(a), the Court must conclude that Robert Troupe moved to amend the complaint and substitute himself as the plaintiff within a "reasonable time" after the objection for purposes of satisfying Rule 17(a).
It is not entirely clear what motivates Robert Troupe, at this juncture, to move to amend the complaint and substitute himself as the plaintiff. However, the Court suspects that he is motivated by recent events in a closely related case involving his adult sister, Kime-Ya Troupe. In that case, Cause Number 3:00-CV-2565-L, District Judge Sam Lindsay adopted the recommendation of Magistrate Judge Jeff Kaplan that Kime-Ya Troupe be allowed to file an amended complaint under Rule 11(a). In light of important differences in the procedural and factual history of the instant case, the Court concludes that Rule 17(a) provides a more appropriate analysis than Rule 11(a). One important procedural difference between the cases is that Robert Troupe has moved to amend the complaint and substitute himself as the plaintiff whereas Kime-Ya Troupe only filed an amended complaint after being ordered to do so. An important factual difference between the cases is that the record in Robert Troupe's case fails to document his involvement in prosecuting his case, whereas the record in Kime-Ya Troupe's case clearly documents her involvement in prosecuting her case. Finally, regardless of Robert Troupe's motivation in moving to amend the complaint and substitute himself as the plaintiff, the Court's only concern is whether Rule 17(a) permits him to do so.
Having concluding that Robert Troupe's motion is timely under Rule 17(a), the Court must now consider whether his motion is proper under Rule 17(a). As noted above, ratification, joinder, or substitution is only appropriate under Rule 17(a) where "the plaintiff brought the action in her own name as the result of an understandable mistake, because determination of the correct party to bring the action is difficult." Wieburg, 272 F.3d at 308 (citing Advanced Magnetics, Inc. v. Bayfront Partners, Inc., 106 F.3d 11, 20 (2d Cir. 1997)). See also FED. R. CIV. P. 17, Advisory Committee Notes, 1966 Amendment (recognizing that the purpose of Rule 17(a) is "to prevent forfeiture when determination of the proper party to sue is difficult or when an understandable mistake has been made."). The Court concludes that Kay Troupe understandably filed the instant action in her own name on behalf of Robert Troupe. As detailed in "Plaintiff's Reply Brief in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment," filed March 1, 2002, Robert Troupe appointed Kay Troupe to represent him in all social security matters via a power of attorney and via form SSA-1696-U4 ("Appointment of Representative"). (P.'s Reply at 2-3, 14, 15.) Although neither document is sufficient to confer real party in interest status on Kay Troupe in the instant case, the existence of both documents provides a basis for the "understandable mistake" that Kay Troupe was the proper person to bring suit on behalf of Robert Troupe. As such, it is proper to allow Robert Troupe to be substituted as the plaintiff in this case under Rule 17(a).
For the foregoing reasons, Robert Troupe's motion to amend the complaint should be GRANTED. Because this action cures the defects raised in Defendant's motion to dismiss, the motion to dismiss should be DENIED. Finally, for the reasons stated in Magistrate Judge Kaplan's "Findings and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge," entered September 16, 2002, in Cause Number 3:00-CV-2565-L, the cross-motions for summary judgment should be DENIED without prejudice:
As noted above, the Commissioner moves to dismiss on the grounds that: (1) Robert Troupe did not sign the complaint in accordance with Rule 11(a), (2) Kay Troupe does not have "independent standing" to bring this suit on Robert Troupe's behalf, and (3) the real party in interest — Robert Troupe — has neglected to seek judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision within the statutory appeal period. (D.'s Br. at 3-4, 5.) With respect to Rule 11(a), any lack of Robert Troupe's signature on the original complaint will be cured with the filing of his amended complaint. With respect to standing, any lack of standing on the part of Kay Troupe will be cured with the substitution of Robert Troupe as the plaintiff in this action. Finally, with respect to the statutory appeal period, it is well established that a substitution under Rule 17(a) "shall have the same effect as if the action had been commenced in the name of the real party in interest." FED. R. CIV. P. 17(a). See Ratner v. Sioux Natural Gas Corp., 770 F.2d 512, 520 (5th Cir. 1985).
The Court notes numerous deficiencies in the summary judgment briefs submitted by the parties. Although long on argument, plaintiff's brief contains no citations to controlling legal authorities as required by Local Rules 7.1(d) and 56.5. Plaintiff is not excused from this requirement merely because she is a pro se litigant. Similarly, defendant provides almost no authority in support of the Commissioner's decision denying SSI benefits. In fact, defendant's entire argument on the merits of this appeal is less than three-pages long. The woefully inadequate briefing by both parties makes it impossible to undertake a meaningful review of the [532]-page hearing record to determine whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence.
Local Rule 56.5 provides, in pertinent part:
A summary judgment motion and a response must be accompanied by a brief that sets forth the argument and authorities on which the party relies in support of or opposition to a motion
LR 56.5. Local Rule 7.1(d), which governs briefs generally, has a similar requirement. See LR 7.1(d). A brief in excess of 10 pages must contain: (1) a table of contents with page references; and (2) an alphabetically arranged table of cases, statutes, and other authorities cited, with page references to the location of all citations. See LR 7.2(d).
The same deficiencies exist in the briefing before this Court. As such, the Court would be aided by a proper briefing on the merits following the filing of the Commissioner's amended answer.
IV. Recommendation
For the foregoing reasons, the Court RECOMMENDS that Plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint be GRANTED, that Defendant's motion to dismiss be DENIED, that Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment be DENIED without prejudice, and that Defendant's cross-motion for summary judgment be DENIED without prejudice. Furthermore, in accordance with the amended complaint, the Court RECOMMENDS that Robert E. Troupe III be substituted as the plaintiff in this action. Finally, the Court RECOMMENDS that, following the filing of Defendant's amended answer, the District Court refer the case back to the United States Magistrate Judge to: (1) establish a schedule for the briefing of the merits of the case; and (2) issue proposed findings of fact and recommendations for disposition on the merits of the case.
SO RECOMMENDED.
INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT
Pursuant to Title 28, United States Code, Section 636(b)(1), any party who desires to object to these findings, conclusions and recommendation must file and serve written objections within ten (10) days after being served with a copy. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings, conclusions or recommendation to which objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusory or general objections. A party's failure to file such written objections to these proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation shall bar that party from a de novo determination by the District Court. Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150 (1985); Perales v. Casillas, 950 F.2d 1066, 1070 (5th Cir. 1992). Additionally, any failure to file written objections to the proposed findings, conclusions and recommendation within ten (10) days after being served with a copy shall bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual and legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge that are accepted by the District Court, except upon grounds of plain error. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 79 F.3d 1415, 1428-29 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc).