Opinion
Case No. 03-10096-BC.
July 9, 2004
OPINION AND ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION AND SUA SPONTE DISMISSING CASE WITH PREJUDICE
The plaintiff, Gregory Trotter, is a state prisoner currently incarcerated by the Michigan Department of Corrections (MDOC) at its Cotton Correctional Facility in Jackson, Michigan. He has filed a pro se civil rights complaint for money damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants, all employees of the MDOC, violated his constitutional rights by treating his serious medical needs with deliberate indifference. Now before the Court is the report of Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder, operating under an order of reference to conduct all pretrial proceedings, recommending that the complaint be dismissed sua sponte because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The plaintiff has filed a "response" to the magistrate judge's report, which the Court will construe as an objection to the report and recommendation.
After conducting a de novo review of the motion papers, the report and recommendation, and the plaintiff's objections, the Court finds that the claims set forth in the plaintiff's complaint are barred by the doctrine described in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Therefore, the Court will adopt the report and recommendation and dismiss the complaint sua sponte because it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and 1915A; 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1).
I.
The plaintiff alleges in his complaint that he suffers from severe pain in his knees and legs and at times is unable to stand or walk. The plaintiff alleges that on April 30, 2003 his legs "gave out" on him while he was standing in front of the "chowhall" at an MDOC correctional facility in St. Louis, Michigan. Prison officials allegedly told the plaintiff to "stand up" and return to his "unit." After the plaintiff remained on the ground, an officer Sprague allegedly placed wrist restraints on the plaintiff and lifted him into a standing position. The plaintiff claims that other officers assisted in this procedure and he was placed in extreme pain as a result of being made to stand
MDOC officials charged the plaintiff with a misconduct for disobeying a direct order from an MDOC officer. The plaintiff claims that "Sprague" wrote a false report regarding the incident. As a result, the plaintiff states that he was found guilty of the misconduct offense of disobeying a direct order and was given five days of detention.
The plaintiff filed the instant complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that the defendants treated his serious medical needs with deliberate indifference in violation of the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment finding that the defendants violated his rights and also seeks to have the misconduct conviction for disobeying a direct order expunged from his prison record. Finally, the plaintiff seeks money damages as a result of the defendants' actions.
The magistrate judge, after screening the pro se complaint, issued his report recommending that this Court dismiss the complaint sua sponte as being barred by the rule in Heck v. Humphrey.
II.
The Court is required to undertake a sua sponte review of the plaintiff's complaint to determine whether the complaint states a claim on which relief may be granted. See Baxter v. Rose, 305 F.3d 486, 488 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(1)). A federal court must dismiss a civil rights action against a governmental entity, officer, or employee if the prisoner's complaint (1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim for which relief may be granted, or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Smith v. Campbell, 250 F.3d 1032, 1036 (6th Cir. 2001). A complaint is frivolous if it contains factual allegations that are "fantastic or delusional" or if it is based on legal theories that are "indisputably meritless." Brown v. Bargery, 207 F.3d 863, 866 (6th Cir. 2000) (citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327-28 (1989)). "Dismissal of a complaint for the failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted is appropriate only if it appears beyond a doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief." Id. at 867.Although the plaintiff's complaint is against prison officials for the alleged violations of his Eighth Amendments rights, the gravamen of the complaint is an attack on his misconduct conviction. Other than the general allegation that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to his medical needs by picking him up and making him stand while he was in pain, the plaintiff does not allege anywhere in the complaint sufficient grounds to support an Eighth Amendment claim, that is, that his medical needs were "sufficiently serious," see Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994), and that the officials being sued subjectively perceived facts from which to infer a substantial risk to the plaintiff if they picked him up and made him stand, the officials did in fact draw the inference, and the officials then disregarded that risk. See Comstock v. McCrary, 273 F.3d 693, 703 (6th Cir. 2001) (citing Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837). Instead, the complaint is premised on the allegation that the defendants fabricated the misconduct charge to cover up their deliberate indifference to the plaintiff's serious medical needs and, as a result, the plaintiff was improperly convicted of the charge. Thus, the complaint is a direct attack on the plaintiff's misconduct conviction.
However, as the magistrate judge stated, because an MDOC hearing officer found him guilty of the misconduct charge, and thereby must have concluded that the defendant officers were not lying and that it was the plaintiff who refused to follow the orders of the officers, this Court would be required to "annul" or "unwind" the judgment of the MDOC in order to grant the plaintiff any of the relief he seeks in this action, which, according to the doctrine in Heck v. Humphrey, is not permitted. See Huey v. Stine, 230 F.3d 226 (6th Cir. 2000) (holding that it is impermissible for a federal court to grant a prisoner-plaintiff relief which would "unwind" or "annul" the judgment of a state agency at a misconduct hearing, unless or until that judgment has been overturned). The Court in Heck stated that "the hoary principle that civil tort actions are not appropriate vehicles for challenging the validity of outstanding criminal judgments applies to § 1983 damages actions that necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement. . . ." Heck, 512 U.S. at 486. Thus, "in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a . . . tribunal . . ., or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). A prisoner "has no cause of action under § 1983 unless and until the conviction or sentence is reversed, expunged, invalidated, or impugned by the grant of a writ of habeas corpus." Id. at 489.
In this case, the plaintiff has not shown that his misconduct conviction was invalidated or otherwise impugned as set forth in Heck. Therefore, the plaintiff's complaint for damages is not cognizable under § 1983.
In his objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, the plaintiff merely reiterates his previous arguments that the defendants violated his constitutional rights. No where in the objections does the plaintiff state that his misconduct conviction has been invalidated.
III.
For the reasons stated, the plaintiff's complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Accordingly,
It is ORDERED that the magistrate judge's report and recommendation is ADOPTED.
It is further ORDERED that the complaint is DISMISSED for failure to state a claim. Any appeal from this order would not be taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 610-11 (6th Cir. 1997).
It is further ORDERED that the plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel [dkt # 32] is DENIED as moot.