Opinion
No. C97-0125.
December 6, 1999.
ORDER
This matter comes before the court pursuant to plaintiff's July 21, 1999, motion for recusal (docket number 47), and an order from the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals remanding the issue of damages. See Trobaugh v. Hall, 176 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1999).
Background
While detained at the Linn County Correctional Center (LCCC), the plaintiff filed a grievance to contest being transported to court too early; the defendant denied the grievance. Plaintiff filed a second grievance to appeal the defendant's decision; this grievance was denied. Plaintiff filed a third grievance to protest the lack of apparent appellate process; the defendant also denied this grievance. The next day, the plaintiff was placed in an isolation cell, and the defendant told him he had been placed in administrative segregation for filing repeated grievances. The plaintiff remained in segregation for three days. The plaintiff filed suit against the LCCC administrator (Michael Carr) and a deputy (Sergeant Hall) demanding compensatory and punitive damages for the time he spent in isolation.
Defendant Hall conceded that the plaintiff's First Amendment right to petition for redress of grievances had been violated. Summary judgment was granted in favor of defendant Carr because there was insufficient evidence to show he was involved in the plaintiff's segregation. After a trial on the issue of damages, this Court found in favor of the plaintiff, awarding him $1 in nominal damages. On appeal to the Eighth Circuit, the court affirmed summary judgment for defendant Carr, and remanded the issue of the damage award, calling the $1 in nominal damages patently insufficient to compensate the plaintiff for his injury.
Recusal
The plaintiff has filed a motion for recusal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), because the plaintiff contends that this court is prejudiced and biased, and cannot render a fair judgment. The plaintiff claims the court's statements denying the punitive damages, and the court's remarks concerning plaintiff's criminal history show an appearance of partiality.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge must disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which his or her impartiality might reasonably be questioned. A.J. by L.B. v. Kierst, 56 F.3d 849, 861 (8th Cir. 1995). The test for determining whether a judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned is an objective one. Id. The relevant inquiry thus is whether the "average person on the street" would have a factual basis to doubt the impartiality of the judge under the circumstances. Id. See Lunde v. Helms, 29 F.3d 367, 370 (8th Cir. 1994) (finding no reasonable basis for recusal when judge graduated and contributed to law school which was a party to the suit).
A judge is presumed to be impartial, and the proponent of recusal bears the substantial burden of proving otherwise. In Re Larson, 43 F.3d 410, 414 (8th Cir. 1994). A party is entitled to recusal only if the judge's remarks reveal such a high degree of favoritism or antagonism as to make a fair judgment impossible. Id. See Litesky v. United States, __ U.S. __, 114 S. Ct. 1147,127 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1994) (opinions formed by the judge on the basis of facts introduced or events occurring in the course of proceedings, do not constitute a basis for a bias or partiality motion unless they display a deep-seated favoritism or antagonism that would make a fair judgment impossible). A party is not entitled to recusal merely because the judge may have an opinion about them. Larson, supra, at 413. As long as a fair judgment is possible, a judge is permitted to form opinions about litigants; disinterestedness does not mean a child-like innocence. Id. See Gilbert v. Little Rock, Ark., 722 F.2d 1390, 1399 (8th Cir. 1983) (controversy between trial judge and attorney does not require disqualification absent proof of bias or personal prejudice to the parties); Ouachita Nat. Bank v. Tosco Corp., 686 F.2d 1291, 1300 (8th Cir. 1982) (unfavorable ruling toward the plaintiff is not, by itself, grounds for disqualification); People Helpers Found, Inc., v. City of Richmond, Va., 12 F.3d 1321, 1325-26 (4th Cir. 1993) (judge's comments, while perhaps caustic, are not indicative of personal bias against the defendant).
In the October 28, 1998, bench trial of Trobaugh v. Hall Carr, (civil case number 97-125), the plaintiff appeared pro se, by telephone, asking the judge to reconsider the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment that had earlier denied against defendant Michael Carr; and to proceed on the issue of damages. The plaintiff claims the following exchange shows the judge's bias and partiality toward the plaintiff based on his criminal history.
From the trial transcript by Kellee R. Cortez, certified shorthand reporter for the State of Iowa (pp. 9-10):
The Court. Well, what were — what charge was pending against you?
Mr. Trobaugh. It was a distribution of 2.7 grams of cocaine.
The Court. Okay; and how long had you been in the Linn County Jail prior to, say, January 5th of 1996?
Mr. Trobaugh. I was arrested on November 7th and place in the jail, and then I was placed in isolation on the 8th.
The Court. Prior to November of '95, had you been in any jails or prisons before?
Mr. Trobaugh. Yes, I had, sure.
The Court. For approximately how long or what periods of time?
Mr. Trobaugh. I've been in and out of jail for 20 years, Your Honor. Is that relevant to the issue of damages?
The Court. Well, I was just curious as to —
Mr. Trobaugh. I've been in jail before, yeah, but this shouldn't happen regardless of my prior record or anything. I've been in on probation violations. I've been in State prison before. I've never been in Federal prison, but I had never been incarcerated at the Linn County Jail before except I think on a violation like five or six years ago. I don't even remember. I'd have to look that up.
The Court. Well, and I guess the reason I asked is that you had said you couldn't eat or sleep for three days.
Mr. Trobaugh. Oh, yeah.
The Court. Wait to listen to the rest of my question, and I was just curious about that. In light of the fact that you'd been in jails and prisons before as to what it was about being placed in administrative segregation on this occasion that was so traumatic for you.
In this case, the court asked the plaintiff permissible, relevant questions regarding his criminal history in an effort to assist the court in rendering a fair judgment regarding the harm plaintiff has suffered. The questions showed neither antagonism nor favoritism toward the plaintiff.
The plaintiff here claims that the Court denied punitive damages to the plaintiff and doing so precluded the court from rendering a fair judgment.
At trial, the court explained the basis for its ruling (Tr. 25):
The Court has heard the plaintiff's evidence concerning his inability to eat or sleep for three days and frankly finds that it is exaggerated in light of the plaintiff's testimony that he has been in prison on and off for 20 years. Further, the Prison Litigation Reform Act signed April 26th, 1996, does prohibit relief for emotional distress damages where the plaintiff has not shown corresponding physical injury which wasn't present here. Regardless of that — whether that provision of the PLRA should be applied retroactively nor not, the court believes that the plaintiff has established only the right to nominal damages in this case.
When considering whether a judge must recuse himself, the presumption is that the judge is impartial, and able to render a fair judgment, and the plaintiff bears the substantial burden of proving otherwise. Here, the plaintiff has not met his substantial burden. As a result, the motion for recusal is denied.
Compensatory Damages
The Eighth Circuit remanded Trobaugh v. Hall, 176 F.3d 1087 (8th Cir. 1999), determining that the District Court abused its discretion in awarding only $1 in compensatory damages for the violation of the plaintiff's First Amendment right to redress grievances. The Eighth Circuit said that $1 was patently insufficient to compensate the plaintiff for the injury he suffered by being placed in segregation at the Linn County Jail in retaliation for exercising his constitutional rights, citing Simmons v. Cook, 154 F.3d 805, 809 (8th Cir. 1998) (upholding $2,000 damage award for paraplegic inmate placed in solitary confinement for thirty-two hours); Stevens v. McHan, 3 F.3d 1204, 1207 (8th Cir. 1993) (suggesting appropriate damages range for unconstitutional segregation between $25 and $129 per day); Maxwell v. Mason, 668 F.2d 361, 365-66 (8th Cir. 1981) (compensatory damages of $100 per day for solitary confinement is not excessive or arbitrary); see also Saxner v. Benson, 727 F.2d 669, 672-73 (7th Cir. 1984) ($129 per day for unconstitutional administrative segregation); Larkins v. Oswald, 510 F.2d 583, 584 (2d Cir. 1975) ($80 per day to a segregated prisoner subjected to strip-search and probing of his anal cavity).
Upon reconsideration of this case, the District Court believes that $100 per day for the three days he was placed in administrative segregation, totaling $300, adequately compensates plaintiff for the isolation that he suffered. The Court does not believe that plaintiff suffered significantly from this brief deprivation and cannot award additional damages for the mere fact that his rights were infringed. Memphis Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
Punitive Damages
In the light of the Eighth Circuit's ruling that the original $1 in compensatory damages in Trobaugh was insufficient, the Court was asked to reconsider its denial of punitive damages. This Court has reconsidered the matter anew and respectfully declines to award punitive damages. Compensatory damages are mandatory; once liability is found, the jury is required to award compensatory damages in an amount appropriate to compensate the plaintiff for his loss. Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 52, 103 S. Ct. 1625, 1636, 75 L. Ed. 2d 632 (1983). In contrast, punitive damages are never awarded as a matter of right, no matter how egregious the defendant's conduct. Id.
Smith v. Wade set the standard for punitive damage awards in Section 1983 cases. In that case, the Court held that "a jury may be permitted to assess punitive damages in an action under Section 1983 when the defendant's conduct is shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous indifference to the federally protected rights of others." Smith, supra, at 56. The jury must also make the discretionary moral judgment that punishment or deterrence would be served by an award of punitive damages. Id.
In this case, there is no evidence that the defendant deputy was motivated by evil motive or intent. Punitive damages are awarded for two reasons: to punish wrongdoers and to deter future wrongdoing. In this case, the court pointed out that the defendant never tried to cover up or hide the wrongdoing. In fact, the defendant quickly admitted the violation of the plaintiff's First Amendment rights. As a result, the court concluded that punitive damages were neither necessary nor appropriate in this case.
The Court does not believe that punishment by way of punitive damages or deterrence by way of punitive damages is either necessary or appropriate under these circumstances, but rather would amount to no more than a windfall for the plaintiff. (Tr. 25).
Also, as a result of this lawsuit, the LCCC made necessary changes in procedure and personnel which were set in place to prevent future constitutional violations of the same kind. From the testimony of jail Administrator Michael Carr (Tr. 13):
Q. Since the time of this incident, has the grievance procedure been modified?
A. Yes, it has.
Q. Would you explain how?
A. At the time of the complaint by Mr. Trobaugh, there was not one specific person assigned to handle grievances within the correctional center. Since that time, a lieutenant's position has been added to my staffing pattern, and a lieutenant reviews all grievances that are filed by inmates.
Q. Is part of the purpose of that that you always have someone independent of the incident reviewing the grievance procedures?
A. That's correct.
Q. In 1996, certainly in January, Harvey Hall was obviously working at the correctional center.
A. Yes.
Q. Is he still a member of the sheriff's department?
A. He is still a member of the sheriff's department, yes.
Q. Has he been transferred to another division?
A. Yes.
The conduct here cannot be condoned. Hall was wrong and put plaintiff in administrative segregation for an impermissible reason. Fortunately, the plaintiff did not suffer significantly and the problem was corrected quickly at least to the extent that it is unlikely to happen again.
Summary
The court will not recuse itself from this case; the court awards the plaintiff a total of $300 in compensatory damages for his constitutional violation, and, after reconsideration, respectfully declines to award punitive damages.
Upon the foregoing,
IT IS ORDERED
The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favor of plaintiff and against defendant Hall in the total amount of Three Hundred Dollars ($300).