Opinion
Case No. EDCV 13-01013-VAP (ANx)
08-15-2014
FERNANDO TRINIDAD, Petitioner, v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, JEH JOHNSON, SECRETARY OF HOMELAND SECURITY, Respondents.
ORDER DENYING PETITIONER'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. NO. 19); GRANTING RESPONDENTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (DOC. NO. 27); AND DENYING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW (DOC. NO. 1)
[Motions filed on April 10, 2014 & June 10, 2014]
Petitioner Fernando Trinidad, appearing pro se, seeks de novo review of the decision to deny him United States citizenship. See 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c) (granting district courts the authority to conduct de novo review of denials of applications for naturalization). In light of the undisputed facts that continue to render Trinidad ineligible for citizenship, the Court GRANTS the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 27) filed by Respondent the United States of America (and by the officials named in Trinidad's Petition, hereafter collectively the "Government"), DENIES the Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 19) filed by Trinidad, and DENIES Trinidad's Petition (Doc. No. 1).
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), Secretary of Homeland Security Jeh Johnson's name is substituted automatically for his predecessor's.
Trinidad styled this document "Briefing Schedule for Motions for Summary Judgment," but it appears to be a motion.
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I. BACKGROUND
On March 24, 1997, Trinidad, a citizen of the Philippines, applied for United States citizenship. (Ex. A to Decl. of Marianne Parada (Doc. No. 27-5) at 39.) An officer of the predecessor of what is now United States Citizenship and Immigration Services ("USCIS") interviewed Trinidad on March 3, 1998, at which time Trinidad was deemed not to possess the "good moral character" necessary to become a United States citizen. (Id.)
Specifically, USCIS noted in an August 26, 2011 letter to Trinidad, on February 7, 1995, a San Bernardino County (California) court convicted Trinidad of committing lewd and lascivious acts on a child. (Id. at 40.) Further, USCIS wrote, Trinidad had another state court conviction, on June 6, 2003, for assault with a deadly weapon by means likely to cause great bodily harm. (Id.) USCIS noted that Trinidad's first conviction resulted in a 312-day prison sentence, and his second in an eight year sentence (id.), thereby rendering him statutorily ineligible to demonstrate good moral character. See 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(2)(ii) ("An applicant shall be found to lack good moral character if . . . the applicant . . . [c]ommitted two or more offenses for which the applicant was convicted and the aggregate sentence actually imposed was five years or more."). Moreover, USCIS classed both of Trinidad's convictions as aggravated felonies under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43) (Ex. A to Parada Decl. at 40), also rendering Trinidad ineligible to naturalize. See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(8) ("No person shall be regarded as . . . a person of good moral character who . . . is, or was . . . at any time . . . convicted for an aggravated felony . . . ."); 8 C.F.R. § 316.10(b)(1)(ii) ("An applicant shall be found to lack good moral character, if the applicant has been . . . convicted of an aggravated felony as defined in [8 U.S.C. § 1101](a)(43) . . . ."). Trinidad sought a hearing to review the denial. (Ex. B to Decl. of Marianne Parada (Doc. No. 27-6) at 41.)
On February 11, 2013, USCIS sent Trinidad a letter reaffirming its decision, and informing him that its decision "constitutes a final administrative denial of [his] naturalization applciation." (Id. at 42.)
Meanwhile, the Government had been attempting to remove Trinidad from the United States. It served a notice to appear for immigration proceedings on Trinidad on April 23, 1999, but those proceedings terminated in June because Trinidad was apparently then an inpatient in a psychiatric facility. (Ex. 3 to Decl. of Marianne Parada (Doc. No. 27-4) at 17.) Proceedings against Trinidad later recommenced, and an immigration court ordered him removed to the Philippines on January 4, 2000. (Id. at 18.)
After years of litigation, owing chiefly to due process concerns raised by Trinidad's serious mental illness (see id.; see also Ex. C. to Decl. of Marianne Parada (Doc. No. 27-7) at 44-71), an immigration court found Trinidad removable for having been convicted of an aggravated felony, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii), and for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude, 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(I). The court concluded, however, that "it is more likely than not that, due to his mental health condition, [Trinidad] will be imprisoned if he is returned to the Philippines, and he will be subjected to torture by detention officials." (Ex. C to Parada Decl. at 68.) Thus, on April 11, 2012, the immigration court ordered Trinidad removed to the Philippines, but deferred his removal pursuant to the Convention Against Torture - which, in line with the court's findings, would have forbidden Trinidad's deportation to the Philippines. (Id. at 71.) The court's order was appealable to the Board of Immigration Appeals, but the Government represents that no appeal was taken by either party. (Decl. of Marianne Parada (Doc. No. 27-1) ¶ 6.) Trinidad's removal order is therefore final. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(47)(B)(ii); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.39.
On June 6, 2013, Trinidad filed the instant petition. In it, he does not seek review of his removal order, which is, in any event, beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(5) ("[A] petition for review filed with an appropriate court of appeals in accordance with this section shall be the sole and exclusive means for judicial review of an order of removal . . . ."). Rather, Trinidad seeks only review of USCIS's decision to deny him United States citizenship. The Court conducts that review under the following standard.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1421(c), a district court may conduct a de novo review of a denied application for naturalization, making its own findings of fact and conclusions of law. A court may order a person naturalized if the person meets various statutory criteria, including those set forth 8 U.S.C. § 1427. United States v. Hovsepian, 359 F.3d 1144, 1165 (9th Cir. 2004) (en banc). The statutory criteria must be applied strictly, as "Congress alone has the constitutional authority to prescribe rules for naturalization, and the courts' task is to assure compliance with the particular prerequisites to the acquisition of United States citizenship . . . to safeguard the integrity of this 'priceless treasure.'" Fedorekno v. United States, 449 U.S. 490, 506-07 (1981) (quoting Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 791 (1950) (Black, J., dissenting)).
The burden is ultimately on an applicant to show that he meets all of the statutory criteria. See Berenyi v. Dist. Dir., Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 385 U.S. 630, 637 (1967) ("[I]t has been universally accepted that the burden is on the alien applicant to show his eligibility for citizenship in every respect."). Any doubts about an applicant's eligibility are resolved against the applicant. Id.
III. DISCUSSION
Mindful of Trinidad's efforts to overcome his mental illness, and his attempts to clear his record of his felony convictions, the Court nevertheless must apply the law - and do so with the utmost punctiliousness when it comes to conferring United States citizenship on an applicant. Fedorenko, 449 U.S. at 506-07.
In this case, that mandate requires the Court to enter summary judgment in favor of the Government, and against Trinidad, because there is at least one undisputed barrier to Trinidad's naturalization. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ("The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."). Specifically, the Court is forbidden to naturalize anyone "against whom there is an outstanding . . . final finding of deportability," 8 U.S.C. § 1429, and it is undisputed that an immigration court entered such a finding against Trinidad (see Ex. C to Parada Decl. at 71; Parada Decl. ¶ 6). See De Lara Bellajaro v. Schiltgen, 378 F.3d 1042, 1044-46 (9th Cir. 2004) (explaining the purpose of section 1429 is preventing a race between the Government to remove an alien, and the alien to naturalize); Perdomo-Padilla v. Ashcroft, 333 F.3d 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2003) (noting the "natural reading" of section 1429 "is that . . . final removal orders are to take precedence over naturalization applications"). It is of no moment that the immigration court simultaneously deferred Trinidad's removal; indeed, that the immigration court could order Trinidad's removal deferred means that Trinidad was ordered removed in the first place. See Alali-Amin v. Mukasey, 523 F.3d 1039, 1041-42 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture does not effect the finality of the underlying, deferred order of removal).
The Government offers another reason why it should prevail at summary judgment: Trinidad is statutorily ineligible to naturalize because he was convicted of aggravated felonies. (Gov't's Mot. for Summ. J. at 6.) As the finality of an order of removal against Trinidad is dispositive of his Petition, the Court need not and does not reach the Government's additional argument.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court is precluded by law from granting Trinidad United States citizenship, because he is the subject of a final order of removal from the United States. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS the Government's Motion for Summary Judgment, DENIES Trinidad's Motion for Summary Judgment, and DENIES Trinidad's Petition. Dated: August 15, 2014
/s/_________
VIRGINIA A. PHILLIPS
United States District Judge