Opinion
Case No. 01-4052-RDR.
May 10, 2001.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This is an action brought by plaintiff, proceeding pro se, against the "Kansas Judicial Branch." Plaintiff alleges that jurisdiction is based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 1343(a)(3). This matter is presently before the court upon plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order. Plaintiff seeks to prevent his incarceration as a result of some state court proceedings that are now occurring. Having carefully reviewed plaintiff's complaint and motion, the court is now prepared to rule.
The nature of the proceedings occurring in state court and the claims made by the plaintiff in this court are unclear. Plaintiff's complaint is an enigma wrapped in a mystery tied to a riddle. Apparently, a state court action is proceeding in Lamed, Kansas against the plaintiff. In that action, plaintiff may be held in contempt of court and incarcerated. In this action, plaintiff seeks an order of the court (1) directing the defendant to move the state court proceeding to Topeka, Kansas, and (2) preventing his incarceration in the state court proceeding. In the instant motion, plaintiff asks only that this court prevent his incarceration in the state court action.
The court notes a number of problems with the plaintiff's complaint and the instant motion. We note initially that it appears that plaintiff's claims are barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The Anti-Injunction Act prohibits a federal court from granting an injunction to stay proceedings in a state court "except as expressly authorized by an Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments." 28 U.S.C. § 2283. The exceptions to § 2283 are narrowly construed and doubts as to the propriety of a federal injunction against a state court proceeding should be resolved in favor of permitting the state court action to proceed. Vendo Co. v. Lektro-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623, 630 (1977). Plaintiff has not shown that the relief sought comes within any of the exceptions set forth in § 2283. Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiff's motion is barred by the Anti-Injunction Act.
Even if plaintiff's motion were not barred by the Anti-Injunction Act, the court would find that this case is an appropriate one for abstention. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Supreme Court held that, absent unusual circumstances, a federal court should not interfere with a pending state court action. "Younger abstention dictates that federal courts not interfere with state court proceedings by granting equitable relief — such as injunctions of important state proceedings or declaratory judgments regarding constitutional issues in those proceedings — when such relief could adequately be sought before the state court." Rienhardt v. Kelly, 164 F.3d 1296, 1302 (10th Cir. 1999). A federal court must abstain from exercising jurisdiction when: (1) there is an ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative proceeding, (2) the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the claims raised in the federal complaint, and (3) the state proceedings "involve important state interests, matters which traditionally look to state law for their resolution or implicate separately articulated state policies." Amanatullah v. Colorado Board of Medical Examiners, 187 F.3d 1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Taylor v. Jaquez, 126 F.3d 1294, 1296 (10th Cir. 1997)).
Younger abstention is non-discretionary; it must be invoked once the three conditions are met, absent extraordinary circumstances. See Seneca-Cayuga Tribe of Okla. v. State of Oklahoma ex rel. Thompson, 874 F.2d 709, 711 (10th Cir. 1989). A plaintiff has a heavy burden to overcome the bar of Younger abstention. In order to overcome Younger abstention, a plaintiff must show that (1) the state law being enforced is flagrantly and patently violative of express constitutional prohibitions, (2) the prosecution is being undertaken in bad faith or for the purpose of harassing the plaintiff, or (3) other "extraordinary circumstances" exist that justify granting injunctive relief. Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 230 (1972). Here, plaintiff's allegations are insufficient to overcome Younger.
Finally, the court finds that plaintiff's claims in this case are barred by the Eleventh Amendment. Under the Eleventh Amendment, a state and its agencies are immune from an action for damages and injunctive relief unless immunity is validly abrogated by Congress or expressly waived by a state. See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54-55 (1996). Here, the court does not find that immunity has been abrogated by Congress or expressly waived by the state. Moreover, it is clear that the "Kansas Judicial Branch" is an arm of the state entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. Accordingly, the court shall dismiss this action based on Eleventh Amendment immunity.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for temporary restraining order (Doc. # 2) be hereby denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that this action be hereby dismissed for the reasons stated in the foregoing memorandum.