Opinion
No. 97 C 7866
March 22, 2000
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff, Joseph Toussaint, sued his former employer, Defendant, Sheriff of Cook County of Illinois, alleging that he was fired in violation the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101-12117, because of his heart condition. Defendant has moved for summary judgment, contending that Plaintiff was terminated for reasons unrelated to and not because of his disability, and he has offered no evidence to the contrary. For the reasons that follow, Defendant's motion for summary judgment is granted.
I. Background
Mr. Toussaint was hired by the Cook County Sheriff's Office ("Sheriff's Office") in 1981 as a deputy sheriff. (Def.'s 12(M) Statement of Material Facts [hereafter "Def.'s 12(M)"], § 2). He was continuously employed by the Sheriff's Office until his termination on January 31, 1996. ( Id., Ex. B, at 21-22; Ex. K). His job duties as a deputy sheriff included overseeing security, maintaining order in the courtroom, escorting prisoners, and transporting jurors. ( Id., Ex. B, at 25-26; Ex. L).
Former Local Rules 12(M) and 12(N) have been renumbered to Local Rule 56.1. For convenience, the Court shall refer to the parties' Local Rule 56.1 statements by their former designations, Rules 12(M) and 12 (N).
Since 1993, the Sheriff's Office has had in effect a Drug-Free Workplace Policy. ( Id., Ex. D). Mr. Toussaint was familiar with this policy. ( Id., Ex. B, at 33-34). The policy is one of zero tolerance, which means that no amount of illegal drugs (or their metabolites) are allowable in an employee's urine specimen. ( Id., Ex. C, § 20; Pl.'s 12(N), § 9, 10). An employee's violation of this policy, substantiated by a confirmed positive drug test, results in the dismissal of the employee. ( Id., Ex. D). The policy provides for mandatory drug testing under certain circumstances, including when an employee returns from a leave of absence of 30 days or more. ( Id.)
Mr. Toussaint suffered two heart attacks, one in 1991 and another in May of 1995. (Pl.'s 12(N), § 12). After a period of recovery, Plaintiff underwent triple bypass surgery in September of 1995. ( Id.) He sought to return to work on December 4, 1995 (he did not work in the interim period). (Id., § 18). He presented a note from a physician approving his return to work. (Def.'s 12(M), Ex. M). The note did not place any health restrictions on Mr. Toussaint, nor did it indicate that he needed any type of accommodation. ( Id.)
Because Mr. Toussaint was returning from a leave of absence of not less than 30 days, he was sent for a mandatory drug test at the Sheriff's Drug Testing Unit in accordance with the Sheriff Office's Drug-Free Workplace Policy. (Pl.'s 12(N), § 19). At the test site, Mr. Toussaint completed a Chain of Custody Form and a Drug Screen Specimen Affidavit, on which he listed every prescription and over-the-counter drug he was currently taking or had taken in the past four weeks. ( Id., § 21-22).
Mr. Toussaint failed the drug test. ( Id., § 23). His urine specimen contained THC metabolites, a substance which indicates the presence of marijuana. ( Id.; Def's 12(M), Ex. C, § 13 Ex. F). Mr. Toussaint requested that his sample be retested in accordance with the Policy. (Pl.'s 12(N), § 24). The retest by Smith-Kline Laboratories again confirmed the presence of marijuana metabolites in Mr. Toussaint's urine specimen. ( Id.) In addition, Dr. Rahmanian, Toxicology Manager of Corning Clinical Laboratories, confirmed that none of the drugs listed by Mr. Toussaint on his affidavit would cause a positive result for THC metabolites. ( Id., § 25).
Following his return to work, Mr. Toussaint never requested accommodations for his heart condition. (Def.'s 12(M), Ex. B, at 55, 70, 84). He never informed anyone at the Sheriff's Office that he needed any accommodations. ( Id.)
Based on the test results, on January 31, 1996, the Sheriff's Office initiated procedures to terminate Mr. Toussaint from employment. (Pl.'s 12(N), § 27). Mr. Toussaint appeared at a hearing before the Sheriff's Merit Board with his lawyer on November 8, 1996, and testified that he was taking medications to treat his heart condition. ( Id.,§ 28-29). He presented no evidence that any of these medications might have caused the positive results on his drug test, nor did he dispute the validity of the drug-testing procedures. ( Id., § 30-31). On December 5, 1996, the Board entered an order terminating Mr. Toussaint from employment with the Sheriff's Office based on the positive drug test results. ( Id., § 32).
II. Discussion A. Summary Judgment Standard
Summary judgment is proper only when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). In ascertaining whether summary judgment is appropriate, the Court must view the evidence, and draw all reasonable inferences therefrom, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986); Kennedy v. United States, 965 F.2d 413, 417 (7th Cir. 1992). If the non-movant bears the burden of proof on an issue, however, he or she may not simply rest on the pleadings, but rather, must affirmatively set forth specific facts establishing the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-26.
Summary judgment is appropriate where the non-moving party "fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. at 322. Consequently, motions for summary judgment must be analyzed in light of both the applicable substantive law and the question of whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict in the non-movant's favor. See Checkers, Simon Rosner v. Lurie Corp., 864 F.2d 1338, 1344 (7th Cir. 1988). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-movant party, there is no genuine issue for trial," and summary judgment must be granted. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986).
B. Plaintiff Has Failed To Meet His Burden of Establishing a Prima Facie Case of "Failure-to-Accommodate" Discrimination.
The ADA protects against two distinct categories of disability discrimination: failure to accommodate and discriminatory discharge. See Foster v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 168 F.3d 1029, 1032 (7th Cir. 1999). To state a prima facie case of "failure to accommodate" disability discrimination, a plaintiff who has suffered an adverse employment action must show that: (1) he was or is disabled as defined by the ADA; (2) the employer was aware of his disability; (3) he is otherwise qualified for the job; and (4) the disability caused the adverse employment action. Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112 (a), 12112(b)(5)(A). An employee cannot state a cause of action if or disability discrimination where his employer terminated him for reasons unrelated to (i.e., not because of) his disability. Id. The proscription against discrimination "because of" a disability means that the disability must have been a (not necessarily the) "motivating" or "significant" factor for the detrimental job action. See Foster, 168 F.3d at 1033.
Under the ADA, an individual is disabled if he has: (1) a physical or mental impairment which substantially limits one or more of his major life activities; (2) a record of such an impairment; or (3) is regarded as having such an impairment. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2). "Major life activities" include "functions such as caring for oneself, performing manual tasks, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, breathing, learning, and working." Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 638-39 (1998). Whether an activity is a major life activity does not depend on the individual's subjective assessment of the importance of the activity — a major life activity is one "that the average person in the general population can perform with little or no difficulty." 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(i); see also Knapp v. Northwestern Univ., 101 F.3d 473, 479 (7th Cir. 1996) (rejecting student-basketball player's contention that playing intercollegiate basketball is a major life activity for basketball players). A major life activity is "substantially limited" by the impairment "if [the impairment] significantly restricts the duration, manner or condition under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to the average person in the general population's ability to perform that same major life activity." 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630 app. § 1630.2(j). This assessment involves a more individualized analysis of the individual's particular ability to perform a particular function. See Knapp, 101 F.3d at 481.
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he is disabled under the ADA. Plaintiff claims he became disabled "as a result of heart problems, and resulting bypass surgery and weakness thereafter." (Pl.'s Resp., at 3 (citing Pl.'s 12(N), § 38, 40)). He submits that he "was weak but able to do his job," and that "[t]here was nothing about his job he could not do," (Pl.'s 12(N), § 40), which eliminates the functions of working, walking, seeing, hearing, speaking, performing manual tasks, and the like from consideration, because Plaintiff's job duties included tasks which would normally require the performance of these functions.
In fact, other than complaining about suffering from some vague "weakness," plaintiff offers absolutely no specifics as to which impairment rendered him disabled. Defendant points to Plaintiff's deposition testimony as a possible source of such specifics, but plaintiff has not seen fit to point out the portions of his 87-page deposition testimony which he believes establishes his disability. In short, Plaintiff's general assertion of a "weakness" is woefully inadequate to meet his burden of establishing that he is disabled under the ADA.
Even assuming that Plaintiff has adequately demonstrated that he was disabled, he has utterly failed to provide "a record of such impairment" or show that he is "regarded as having such impairment," 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2). Plaintiff simply "claims he is a member of the protected class," (Pl.'s Resp., at 4), but provides no evidence of a disabling impairment. Therefore, Plaintiff cannot make out a prima facie case of disability discrimination because he has failed to demonstrate that he is disabled under the ADA.
Even assuming Plaintiff could demonstrate that he is disabled, he has not shown that his former employer was aware of his alleged disability. The only "evidence" plaintiff offers is his self-serving assertion that he "protested to Sgt. Malonzo on the lack of help." (Pl.'s 12(N), § 42). However, Defendant points to portions of plaintiff's own deposition testimony, reproduced below, which completely belie this assertion.
Q. Did you request any type of accommodation for your heart condition from the Sheriff's office?
A. No, ma'am, I didn't. * * *
Q. [W] hat did you tell Sergeants Malonzo and Delaney were your recovery needs? A. Nothing really, you know. * * *
Q. Mr. Toussaint, did you ever tell anyone that you couldn't work overtime because of your heart condition? A. No, ma'am.
(Def.'s 12(M), § 36 Ex. B, at 55, 70, 84). Plaintiff's self-serving statement to the contrary does not create an issue of fact. His own deposition testimony shows the statement to be untrue. Finally, the mere fact that Plaintiff was returning from a medical leave of absence is not sufficient to place his employer on notice that Plaintiff may have needed an accommodation. See, e.g., Jovanovic v. In-Sink-Erator Div. of Emerson Elec. Co., 201 F.3d 894, 898-99 (7th Cir. 2000); Hunt-Golliday v. Metropolitan Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater Chicago, 104 F.3d 1004, 1013 (7th Cir. 1997). The physician's note approving Plaintiff "s return to work did not indicate that Plaintiff was under any health restrictions or needed any accommodation to return to work. (Def.'s 12(M), Ex. M). Plaintiff's concession that he did nothing to inform his employer about his alleged disability is fatal to his ADA claim.
Even assuming the Sheriff's Office was aware of Plaintiff's alleged disability, Plaintiff offers no evidence that he was terminated because of his alleged disability. The undisputed evidence is that Plaintiff was fired in accordance with the Sheriff's Office's zero-tolerance anti-drug policy for testing positive on the presence of THC metabolites in his urine. Plaintiff contends that his claim that he passed another drug test creates an issue of fact as to whether he used drugs. Whether Plaintiff in fact used drugs is completely irrelevant. It is undisputed that Plaintiff failed a drug test, twice. He was fired because he failed the drug test, not because he may have used drugs. Still, Plaintiff offers no documentation that he actually took this drug test or that he passed it. For all these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination, and therefore summary judgment in Defendant's favor is clearly appropriate.
C. Plaintiff Has Failed To Establish a Prima Facie Case of Discriminatory Discharge.
The second category of disability discrimination proscribed by the ADA is discriminatory discharge. To establish a prima facie case for discriminatory discharge, a plaintiff must show that: (1) he is disabled within the meaning of the ADA; (2) his work performance met his employer's legitimate expectations; (3) he suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) the circumstances indicate that "it is more likely than not that his disability was the reason for these adverse actions." Leffel v. Valley Fin. Servs., 113 F.3d 787, 794 (7th Cir. 1997). When there is no direct evidence of discrimination, once the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, the burden shifts to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-.discriminatory reason for the adverse employment action. See Weigel v. Target Stores, 122 F.3d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1997); McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 13.5. 792, 802-03 (1973). Once the defendant articulates a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the stated reason was a pretext for discrimination. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 803.
The discriminatory-discharge claims suffers from the same shortcomings as does the failure-to-accommodate claim. Plaintiff argues that his alleged complaining to two sergeants about his need for accommodations is direct evidence of a violation of the ADA. However, as previously noted, Plaintiff admitted in his deposition that he never requested any type of accommodation from the Sheriff's Office, and that he never discussed the need for accommodations with the sergeants. Plaintiff also contends that he met the employer's legitimate expectations because "he was a long time employee of the Sheriff's Police — fifteen (15) years." (Pl.'s Resp., at 4). However, the evidence is undisputed that despite his fifteen-year tenure, he failed a drug test. Once he failed the drug test, he no longer met his employer's legitimate expectations because he violated his employer's zero-tolerance anti-drug policy. Plaintiff offers no evidence that this policy was implemented as a pretext to discriminate against disabled employees. In short, summary judgment is appropriate on the discriminatory discharge claim.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant's motion for summary judgment [18-1]n is granted.