Opinion
Civil Action No. 04-712 Section T(4).
November 3, 2004
Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment (Document 9) filed on behalf of Defendant AMF Bowling Centers, Inc. ("AMF"). The parties waived oral argument and the matter was taken under submission on October 20, 2004. The Court, having considered the arguments of the parties, the Court record, the law and applicable jurisprudence, is fully advised in the premises and ready to rule.
ORDER AND REASONS
I. BACKGROUND
On September 24, 2003, Plaintiff, James Thompson ("Thompson"), was injured when the wooden stool upon which he was sitting collapsed. Thompson was participating in a bowling tournament at the AMF facility at the time of his alleged injury. An employee of AMF discarded the stool immediately after its collapse. Thereafter, Thompson instituted this action.
II. LAW AND ANALYSIS OF THE COURT
A. LAW ON RULE 56 SUMMARY JUDGMENT
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that summary judgment should be granted only "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The party moving for summary judgment bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of the record which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. When the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts. The nonmoving party must come forward with "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc., 953 F.2d 909, 912-13 (5th Cir.) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 832 (1992)).
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986) (emphasis supplied); Tubacex, Inc. v. M/V RISAN, 45 F.3d 951, 954 (5th Cir. 1995).
Thus, where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no "genuine issue for trial." Finally, the Court notes that substantive law determines the materiality of facts and only "facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment."
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 475 U.S. at 588.
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986).
B. LAW AND ANALYSIS OF THE COURT
The owner or custodian of a thing is answerable for damage occasioned by its ruin, vice, or defect, only upon a showing that he knew, or in the exercise of reasonable care, should have known of the ruin, vice, or defect which caused the damage, that the damage could have been prevented by the exercise of reasonable care, and that he failed to exercise such reasonable care.
In Harper v. Advantage Gaming Company, the Court outlined the negligence standard for injuries caused by defective things. The plaintiff must show:
Harper v. Advantage Gaming Company, 2004 WL 1837573 (La.App. 2nd Cir. 8/18/04).
1. That the defendant had custody of the thing that caused the plaintiff's damages;
2. That the thing was defective because it had a condition that created an unreasonable risk of harm;
3. That this defective condition caused the damage; and
4. That defendant knew or should have know of the defect.
Id. see also Johnson v. Entergy Corp., 36-323 (La.App. 2 Cir. 9/20/02) 827 So.2d 1234; citing Netecke v. State, DOTD, 98-1182 (La. 10/19/99) 747 So.2d 489.
Because the defendant does not bear the burden of proof at trial, it can obtain summary judgment by demonstrating the absence of factual support regarding one of the elements. In the case at bar, the defendant contends that the plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to prove that the barstool presented an unreasonable risk of harm, and he lacks sufficient evidence to prove that AMF had actual or constructive knowledge of the injury causing defect in same. Accordingly, the defendant argues that failure to satisfy either of these elements is fatal to the plaintiff's case.
Id.
1. Unreasonable Risk of Harm
The plaintiff contends that, because the condition of the stool was such that it collapsed when sat upon, it contained unreasonable risk of harm.
To refute this argument, the defendant relies on Vigh v. State Farm Fire Cas. Inc. Co., in which the Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal held that the plaintiff has the burden of proving that the subject barstool presented an unreasonable risk of harm, and cannot rely on the mere fact that the barstool collapsed as proof that it contained an unreasonable risk of harm. The Vigh court ruled that to determine whether a risk is unreasonable, the probability and magnitude of the risk must be balanced against the utility of the thing.
Vigh v. State Farm Fire Cas. Inc. Co., 1997-0381 (La.App. 4 Cir. 11/19/97). 706 So.2d 480, opinion vacated in part on rehearing.
Id at 484.
To determine whether the barstool at issue contained an unreasonable risk of harm, this Court looks to the Louisiana Second Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in Harper v. Advantage Gaming Company. In Harper, the plaintiff filed suit for injuries sustained at a restaurant when a wooden stool collapsed under his weight. The plaintiff testified that prior to the stool's collapse, there were no visible indications of any problem with the stool. Similarly in this case, neither the plaintiff nor his witnesses, Mr. Ippolito and Mr. Bienvenue, witnessed or experienced any problems with the wooden barstool before the collapse. Because the risk of harm presented by a barstool that does not exhibit any signs of problems is extremely low, and the utility of providing seats to patrons of a bowling alley is high, the defendant contends, and this Court finds, that plaintiff has failed to provide any factual support that the barstool presented an unreasonable risk of harm.
Harper, 2004 WL 1837573.
2. Actual or Constructive Knowledge of the Defect
The plaintiff has the burden of proving that AMF had actual or constructive knowledge of the injury causing defect prior to its collapse. The plaintiff contends that the concept of constructive knowledge imposes a reasonable duty to discover apparent defects in things under the control of the defendant. The plaintiff relies heavily on Saulney v. The Tricou House in support of his contention that AMF had a duty to discover a defect in the stool. The Saulney Court, in finding that a restaurant was liable for injuries that a patron sustained when the leg of her chair bent, causing her to fall, emphasized three very important facts. First, the Court noted that the chairs used by the defendant restaurant would often break and have to be replaced. Second, the Court found that the employees, managers, and owners of the restaurant had constructive notice that the chairs would break and/or were defective and needed to be replaced on a regular basis. And finally, pursuant to the previous two factors, the Court found that there was no formal, routine inspection process in place to determine if the chairs were damaged or defective.
Johnson, 827 So.2d 1234.
Saulney v. Tricou House, LLC, 2002-1424 (La.App. 4th Cir. 12/9/03), 839 So.2d 392.
Id. at 394.
Id. at 395.
Id. at 395.
This Court, however, finds that Saulney is distinguishable from the case at bar. Approximately twenty to twenty-four new barstools were purchased for the bowling alley between 1994 and 1997, including the barstool that is at issue. AMF's Center Manager, Gary Alberado, testified that prior to the September 24, 2003 incident, none of the barstools had collapsed. In addition, according to Alberada, employees of AMF check the condition of the furniture at the facility several times a day and are instructed to remove any damaged items, and no one discovered any defects in the barstool prior to its collapse. Therefore, this Court finds that the plaintiff lacks sufficient evidence to prove that the defect in the barstool as apparent and/or should have been discovered by AMF.
Depo. of Gary Alberado at p. 8.
Id. at 9-10.
4. Res Ipsa Loquitur
The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of circumstantial evidence that applies when the facts suggest that the negligence of the defendant is the most plausible explanation of the injury. The plaintiff asserts that the doctrine applies because the stool would not have collapsed had it not been for its ruin, vice, or defect.
See Harper, supra, citing Martinez v. Schumpert Medical Center, 27-000 (La.App. 2 Cir. 5/10/95) 655 So. 2d 649.
Relying on Harper, supra, the defendant contends that the plaintiff has failed to produce evidence which would satisfy his burden of proving that the negligence of the defendant was the most plausible explanation for his injury. In Harper, the Court found that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate factual circumstances showing that the only reasonable conclusion was that defendant's breach of duty caused the accident. The Court noted that the defendant's employees regularly checked the condition of the furniture during their daily cleaning and that other patrons used the stools without complaints. Similarly in this case, the AMF employees checked the barstools daily during their cleaning procedures and patrons, including the plaintiff, used the barstools without any complaints before the subject stool suddenly collapsed.
Accordingly, the defendant argues, and this Court agrees, that AMF's negligence cannot be inferred simply because the barstool suddenly, and without warning, collapsed.
The plaintiff has failed to provide any factual support to prove that the barstool at issue presented an unreasonable risk of harm or that AMF had constructive or actual knowledge of the defect before the stool suddenly collapsed. Failure to satisfy these inquiries is fatal to the plaintiff's case. Therefore, as the defendant has clearly shown that there are no genuine issues of material fact in this matter, the defendant is entitled to summary judgment.
Accordingly,
IT IS ORDERED that the Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of the Defendant, AMF BOWLING CENTERS, INC., be and the same is hereby GRANTED.