Opinion
Civil Action No. 3:00-CV-1643-D
March 26, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER
Plaintiff Larry Ray Thomas ("Thomas") sues defendants Timothy Joe Redford ("Officer Redford") and City of Mabank ("the City") under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging civil rights violations arising from his arrest for the offense of driving while intoxicated ("DWI") and Officer Redford's use of force in handcuffing him behind his back at the time of the arrest and returning him to a seated position in his chair during book-in at the police station. Thomas also seeks relief under state law for malicious prosecution. On defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court dismisses Thomas' federal-law claims with prejudice. In its discretion, the court dismisses Thomas' state-law malicious prosecution claim without prejudice.
I
Officer Redford and another officer, Granville Woods ("Officer Woods"), went to the home of Thomas' former wife, Rynell Thomas ("Rynell"), in response to a domestic disturbance call. Rynell accused Thomas of engaging in abusive behavior, taking her pickup truck, and driving away from her residence in a state of intoxication. Based on this information, Officers Redford and Woods departed the house in pursuit of Thomas and soon found the pickup stopped on a public roadway, with the keys in the ignition and the engine running. Officer Redford arrested Thomas for DWI, handcuffed him, and took him to the Mabank Police Department. During the book-in procedure, Thomas was seated in a chair. When he attempted at one point to stand, Officer Redford used force to return him to a seated position. Thomas sustained cuts to his wrists in the area of the handcuffs. He was provided, but refused, medical attention. The DWI charge against him was subsequently dismissed.
Thomas sues Officer Redford and the City under § 1983 for unlawful arrest and excessive force under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. He also brings a Texas state law claim for malicious prosecution against Officer Redford. Officer Redford and the City move for summary judgment. Officer Redford contends he is entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity. The City maintains that it is entitled to such relief on the merits.
Defendants have filed December 21, 2001 objections to Thomas' evidence. Because defendants are entitled to summary judgment even if this evidence is considered, the court overrules the objections as moot.
II
The court considers first whether Officer Redford is entitled to summary judgment based on qualified immunity.
A
"Government officials performing discretionary functions generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known." Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Qualified immunity likewise applies to state officials sued for constitutional violations pursuant to § 1983. See id. at n. 30 (citing Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 504 (1978)); Morris v. Dearborne, 181 F.3d 657, 665 (5th Cir. 1999)). "The Supreme Court has characterized the doctrine as protecting "all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law." Cozzo v. Tangipahoa Parish Council-President Gov't, 279 F.3d 273, 284 (5th Cir. 2002) (quoting Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 341 (1986)).
To decide whether Officer Redford is entitled to qualified immunity, the court must first answer the threshold question whether, taken in the light most favorable to Thomas as the party asserting the injury, the facts he has alleged show that Officer Redford's conduct violated a constitutional right. See Saucier v. Katz, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 2151, 2156 (2001) ("A court required to rule upon the qualified immunity issue must consider, then, this threshold question: Taken in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury, do the facts alleged show the officer's conduct violated a constitutional right? This must be the initial inquiry." (citing Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991))). "If no constitutional right would have been violated were the allegations established, there is no necessity for further inquiries concerning qualified immunity." Id. If a violation could be made out on a favorable view of the party's submissions, "the next, sequential step is to ask whether the right was clearly established." Id. "The objective reasonableness of allegedly illegal conduct is assessed in light of the rules dearly established at the time it was taken." McClendon v. City of Columbia, 258 F.3d 432, 438 (5th Cir. 2001) (footnote omitted). "Even if an official's conduct violates a constitutional right, he is entitled to qualified immunity if the conduct was objectively reasonable." Id. (footnote omitted). "`The defendant's acts are held to be objectively reasonable unless all reasonable officials in the defendant's circumstances would have then known that the defendant's conduct violated the' plaintiff's asserted constitutional or federal statutory right." Cozzo, 279 F.3d at 284 (quoting Thompson v. Upshur County, Tex., 245 F.3d 447, 457 (5th Cir. 2001)).
B
The court holds that Thomas has alleged sufficient facts to state a claim against Officer Redford for false arrest and excessive use of force. Thomas asserts that
Officer Redford lacked probable cause and/or exigent circumstances to support the warrantless arrest of Plaintiff Thomas. Specifically, Plaintiff Thomas did not violate any law in the presence of Defendant Officer Redford, or for that matter outside the presence of Defendant Officer Redford. Plaintiff Thomas did not engage in any suspicious activity and never attempted to flee.
P. Compl. ¶ 12. With respect to the excessive use of force claim, Thomas alleges that, after standing up in the patrol room of the Mabank Police Department, "Officer Redford, without warning[,] slammed [Thomas] against the wall and threw [him] down in a big wooden chair." Id. at ¶ 14. He alleges that
Defendant Officer Redford's unprovoked body slams and improper handcuffing proximately caused significant injuries to Plaintiff Thomas' left hand, left wrist, and left elbow.
Defendant Officer Redford's use of force was objectively unreasonable and excessive. Plaintiff Thomas posed absolutely no threat to Defendant Officer Redford. Specifically, Plaintiff Thomas was unarmed and handcuffed and Plaintiff Thomas never struck or attempted to strike Defendant Officer Redford.Id. at ¶ 15, 16.
Thomas asserts his § 1983 claims for unlawful arrest and excessive use of force by reference to clearly established law that a warrantless arrest must, at a minimum, be predicated on probable cause to believe that the arrestee has committed an offense, see Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 310-11 (1959), and the familiar "reasonableness" standard governing claims for excessive use of force during an arrest, see Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989). The elements of an excessive force claim under the reasonableness standard are (1) a more than de minimis injury, which (2) resulted directly and only from the use of force that was clearly excessive to the need; and the excessiveness of which was (3) objectively unreasonable. See Hudson v. McMillan, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992) (overruling "significant injury" requirement in Eighth Amendment excessive force context); cf. Johnson v. Morel, 876 F.2d 477, 480 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (per curiam) (establishing three-prong test for excessive force claims brought by arrestee, and requiring "significant injury"); see also Knight v. Caldwell, 970 F.2d 1430, 1432 (5th Cir. 1992) (recognizing that Hudson overruled Fifth Circuit law requiring significant injury for excessive force claim). The test of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment in this context requires careful attention to the facts and circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by flight. Graham, 490 U.S. at 396. The reasonableness of the use of force is judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight. Id. In cases implicating excessive force, "[n]ot every push or shove, even if it may later seem unnecessary in the peace of a judge's chambers," violates the Fourth Amendment. Id. (quoting Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1033 (2d Cir. 1973)).
C
Although the general rules relating to the legality of an arrest and the use of force by an officer to effect an arrest are clearly established, "the right the official is alleged to have violated must have been `clearly established' in a more particularized, and hence more relevant, sense: The contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987). "The relevant dispositive inquiry in determining whether a right is clearly established is whether it would be clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful in the situation he confronted." Saucier, 121 S.Ct. at 2156; see also Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 615 (1999) ("[A]s we explained in Anderson, the right allegedly violated must be defined at the appropriate level of specificity before a court can determine if it was clearly established"). Therefore, the court must inquire whether, in the situation that Officer Redford confronted, it would have been clear to a reasonable officer that his conduct was unlawful.
1
The court holds that it was not clearly established at the time of the incident that Officer Redford's arrest of Thomas was unsupported by probable cause and thus violative of the Fourth Amendment. The evidence shows that on the afternoon of November 27, 1998, Officer Redford was dispatched to a family violence call. See Ds. App. 116. When he arrived at the scene, Thomas' former wife, Rynell, was in front of her home and ran toward the street to him. See id. at 31, 122. She informed him that Thomas had attempted to kick in the door of her residence, had been drinking, and had just left in her pickup truck, and that she wanted the truck back. See Id. at 27, 32, 40, 116, 122. Rynell expressed the opinion that Thomas was intoxicated. See id. at 32, 113. She advised Officer Redford of the specific direction Thomas was driving when he departed the premises and gave him a description of the truck. See id. at 27, 32, 33, 37, 122.
In his deposition testimony, Thomas admits that he had been drinking beer earlier in the afternoon. See id. at 83, 86. He states that, on the way to Rynell's house, he purchased a twelve pack of beer and began to drink one. See id. at 84-86. He concedes that when he arrived at Rynell's home, he "knocked a little hard" on the door. Id. at 87.
Based on the information Rynell had provided them, Officers Redford and Woods left her house in pursuit of Thomas and soon found the vehicle he was driving stopped on a public roadway, with the keys in the ignition and the engine running. Officer Redford then exited his squad car and approached the driver's side of the truck. See id. at 26-27, 91.
Stopping and temporarily detaining an individual requires "reasonable suspicion" of criminal activity. United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 7 (1989); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968). Reasonable suspicion must be more than an inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or hunch. Sokolow, 490 U.S. at 7. While the level of suspicion required to make a stop is lower than probable cause, the Fourth Amendment requires some minimum level of objective justification for making the stop. Id. The court holds, based on undisputed record evidence, that Officer Redford possessed sufficient objective justification for his stop of the truck and investigative questioning of Thomas to satisfy the reasonable suspicion standard. Officer Redford initiated his pursuit of Thomas based on credible information from Rynell that Thomas was in the process of committing a DWI offense and had taken her truck without her permission. Using information she had provided concerning the direction he was traveling, the officers quickly found the pickup. Based on these objective facts, it was not clearly established that Officer Redford was committing a Fourth Amendment violation by effecting a traffic stop.
Officer Redford states that while standing outside the open window on the driver's door of the pickup, he detected the strong odor of alcohol emanating from Thomas. See Ds. App. 35, 38, 112-13, 122. Officer Woods also states that he detected a strong odor of alcohol. See id. at 117. This testimony is corroborated by Thomas' admission that he had been drinking earlier in the day, see id. at 83, 86, and that, on the way to Rynell's home, he had stopped, purchased a twelve pack of beer, consumed one beer on the way to her home, and then opened another beer following his departure from her residence, see id. at 84-86. Thomas stated that the empty can from the beer he had consumed before arriving at Rynell's home "was under the seat of my truck because I don't throw them out." See id. at 92. He testified that the beer he had been drinking at the time he was stopped was "in the holder in the middle of the dash." Id. Thomas acknowledged that the twelve pack of beer was sitting in plain view in the front floor board on the hump between the seats. See id. at 91-92.
The record evidence shows that Officer Redford asked Thomas to get out of the vehicle. On exiting the truck, Thomas appeared to Officer Redford to be "wobbly" or "stumbling" on his feet. See id. at 15, 38, 113, 117, 122. Officer Redford stated that when he asked Thomas to move to the back of the truck, he ambulated unsteadily. See Ds. App. 15-16, 38. In his affidavit, Thomas states regarding this encounter:
Officer Redford came up to my truck and asked if I was drinking. I told him that I had two cans of beer . . . . I was not driving while drunk. I did not look drunk. I did not act drunk. I was not wobbly on my feet. I had less than two cans of beer. I did not have a strong odor of alcohol, unless less than two twelve ounce cans of beer can cause a strong odor of alcohol.
P. App. 99. While at the rear of the truck, Officer Redford asked Thomas to submit to a field sobriety test, and Thomas declined. See Ds. App. at 39. Officer Redford informed Thomas that he was under rest, and he handcuffed him. See id. at 16, 17, 112-13.
The court holds that, based on the undisputed evidence regarding what Officer Redford knew before he made the stop of Thomas and the observations he made while interacting with him at the scene, it was not clearly established that this information and his observations were insufficient to furnish probable cause to arrest Thomas for the offense of DWI.
D
After being handcuffed behind his back, Thomas was placed in the back seat of Officer Redford's patrol car. Id. at 95, 117. According to Officer Redford, while Thomas was being transported to the Police Department, he cursed Officer Redford and made threats against him, such as, "I am going to kick your f___ing ass when I get out of these cuffs." Id. at 123. In his deposition testimony, Thomas admitted that he "cussed out" Officer Redford while he was being transported to the Police Department. See id. at 97-98. Although Thomas stated that he was "not sure exactly what all I said and exactly how I said it[,]" he specifically admitted having called Officer Redford "a little piece of sh_t." Id. at 97. He admitted that Officer Redford did not respond when Thomas called him "some bad names" and "made fun of his size." Id. at 99. Thomas testified that the reason for his language toward Officer Redford was that "my wrist was hurting, and that's the only way I knew how to retaliate is with my mouth." Id. at 97. He averred that his wrist was hurting because Officer Redford had "put the handcuffs on too tight." P. App. 99. Thomas asserted that Officer Redford refused repeated requests to loosen them. Ds. App. 101.
Thomas' testimony shows that, when he arrived at the Police Department, he sat down and began answering administrative questions from Officer Redford. See id at 101-02. After he answered a few questions, he stood up. Id. at 102. According to Thomas, when he did so, "and before I could explain to him that standing didn't hurt as bad as sitting, that's when he nailed me against the wall and throwed me back down in the chair." Id. Thomas states that Officer Redford told him "[d]on't get back up again" and that Thomas "told him he just broke my hand." Id. at 103-04. In deposition testimony, and in a contemporaneous police report, Officer Redford stated that before standing up, Thomas stated to Officer Redford, "I'll kick your little f___ing ass even with these f___ing cuffs on." Id. at 123; see also id. at 19, 23-24, 48. Thomas admits resuming "cussing" Officer Redford after he was returned to a seated position. Id. at 104-05. According to Thomas, "[a] few minutes later the ambulance came." P. App. 101. Thomas states that he "refused treatment because the only evidence that I had that [Officer Redford] had assaulted me was my bleeding wrists, injured fingers, and injured elbow." Id. Thomas states in his affidavit that "[m]y elbow cleared up within two months, but I still have problems with my fingers. They get sore and stiff. I also have an approximately one inch scar on my left wrist." Id.
The court holds that it was not clearly established on the date of this incident that Officer Redford's use of force against Thomas was objectively unreasonable and thus violative of the Fourth Amendment. At the time Thomas attempted to stand up in his chair during book-in. Officer Redford suspected him of being intoxicated, and Thomas had cursed and threatened him during the ride to the station from the scene of the arrest. Thomas did not ask Officer Redford's permission to stand in the chair or explain why he was attempting to stand. His decision to do so occurred in the context of belligerent and threatening behavior that Thomas had exhibited toward Officer Redford before arriving at the station. Officer Redford's use of force was directed at returning Thomas to a seated position in a custodial setting, and ceased when Thomas returned to his seat. Such an application of force was not clearly established as objectively unreasonable on November 27, 1998. Moreover, it was not clearly established at the time of Thomas' arrest that Officer Redford's method of handcuffing Thomas was objectively unreasonable.
E
To prevail against Officer Redford's defense of qualified immunity with respect to the § 1983 claims, Thomas must also demonstrate that Officer Redford was objectively unreasonable (1) in his belief that his arrest of Thomas was supported by probable cause or (2) in his belief that his use of force against Thomas was objectively reasonable. This would entail proof that all reasonable officers in his circumstances would have known that such conduct violated Thomas' constitutional rights. See Cozzo, 279 F.3d at 284. Because the court has held that it was not clearly established at the time of the arrest that any of Officer Redford's conduct violated Thomas' constitutional rights, it follows that all reasonable officers would not have known of any violation associated with such conduct. The court therefore holds that Officer Redford is entitled to qualified immunity on the ground that his actions during Thomas' arrest and detention were objectively reasonable.
III
Thomas seeks to hold the City liable under § 1983 for the constitutional violations allegedly committed by Officer Redford. Based on its examination of the record evidence regarding Officer Redford's conduct in arresting and detaining Thomas, see supra § II, the court holds, viewing all evidence in the light most favorable to Thomas as the nonmovant, that a reasonable trier of fact could not conclude that Officer Redford committed a constitutional violation. Because the court concludes that there is no genuine issue of material fact that Officer Redford committed a constitutional violation, it holds that the City is entitled to summary judgment. See City of Los Angeles v. Heller, 475 U.S. 796, 799 (1986) (per curiam). Even if Thomas could overcome this basis for granting summary judgment in the City's favor, he has failed to demonstrate that Officer Thomas' conduct is attributable to the City via a custom, policy, or practice, which is necessary to render the City liable under § 1983. See Monell v. N.Y. City Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).
IV
"[W]hen all federal claims are dismissed or otherwise eliminated from a case prior to trial, [the Fifth Circuit has] stated that [its] `general rule' is to decline to exercise jurisdiction over the pendent state law claims." McClelland v. Gronwaldt, 155 F.3d 507, 519 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Wong v. Stripling, 881 F.2d 200, 204 (5th Cir. 1989)). Accordingly, the court dismisses without prejudice Thomas' state-law malicious prosecution claim against Officer Redford.
* * *
Defendants' motion for summary judgment is granted as to Thomas' federal-law claims. The court dismisses his state-law malicious prosecution claim without prejudice. This action is dismissed by judgment filed today.
SO ORDERED.