Opinion
Case No. 03-2648-JWL
April 12, 2004
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Plaintiff filed suit against defendant, her former employer, alleging violations of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. This matter is presently before the court on defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint (doc. #10). For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion is granted and plaintiff's case is dismissed in its entirety.
On February 26, 2004, defendant filed a motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiff did not file a response to defendant's motion to dismiss within the time period provided in Local Rule 6.1(e)(2). Thus, the court could have considered and decided defendant's motion as an uncontested motion and could have granted the motion without further notice to plaintiff. See. Kan. R. 7.4. Nonetheless, in an abundance of caution, the court issued an order directing plaintiff to show good cause in writing to the court, on or before Wednesday, April 7, 2004, why she failed to respond to defendant's motion to dismiss in a timely fashion. The court further directed plaintiff to respond to the motion to dismiss on or before Wednesday, April 7, 2004. The court's order was sent to plaintiff via certified mail and the certified mail receipt filed with the clerk's office indicates that plaintiff signed for and received such mail on April 2, 2004. As of the date of this order, plaintiff has not filed a response to the show cause order and has not filed a response to defendant's motion to dismiss. Thus, defendant's motion is uncontested and, as explained below, the court grants the motion on two independent grounds-because plaintiff's claims are time-barred and because the motion is uncontested.
As an initial matter, the court notes that dismissal of plaintiff's complaint is appropriate regardless of the uncontested nature of the motion. As defendant urges in its motion to dismiss, plaintiff's Title VII claims are time-barred. In that regard, plaintiff states in her charge of discrimination (attached to her complaint) that she resigned her employment on September 8, 2002. Even assuming that the alleged unlawful employment practice occurred on the last day of plaintiff's employment, plaintiff would have had to file her charge of discrimination on or before July 5, 2003-300 days after the last day of her employment. See Davidson v. America Online, Inc., 337 F.3d 1179, 1183 n. 1 (10th Cir. 2003) (Title VII requires claimants to file a charge of discrimination within 300 days of the alleged unlawful employment practice) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1)). The charge of discrimination that plaintiff has attached to her complaint indicates that it was not filed until July 16, 2003-more than 300 days after the last alleged unlawful employment practice (again, even assuming the alleged discriminatory act took place on the last day of plaintiff's employment). Because plaintiff's charge of discrimination was not filed within the requisite time limit, her Title VII claims are time-barred and dismissal is appropriate. See id.
While plaintiff alleges in her complaint that she filed her charge of discrimination on March 5, 2003, the documents attached to her complaint clearly indicate otherwise. In fact, plaintiff attaches a March 5, 2003 letter written to her by an EEOC representative in which the representative cautions plaintiff that the information that she had submitted to the EEOC at that point did not constitute a charge of discrimination and that plaintiff needed to take further action if she desired to file a charge of discrimination. The only charge of discrimination attached to the complaint bears a filing date of July 16, 2003.
The court also concludes that dismissal of plaintiff's complaint is appropriate on the grounds that plaintiff has not responded to the motion to dismiss despite having ample opportunity to do so. In so holding, the court specifically concludes that certain aggravating factors present in this case outweigh the judicial system's strong predisposition to resolve cases on their merits. See Murray v. Archambo, 132 F.3d 609, 611 (10th Cir. 1998) (prior to outright dismissal for failure to comply with local court rules, court must consider the degree of actual prejudice to the defendant; the amount of interference with the judicial process; and the culpability of the litigant).
Specifically, the court notes that plaintiff, as of the date of this order, has still not responded to defendant's motion to dismiss nor has she contacted the court in any way regarding this case. plaintiff's failure to respond to defendant's motion in any way and her failure to contact the court in any way demonstrates that her culpability is quite high. Compare id. (reversing district court's dismissal on uncontested motion where plaintiff mailed his response more than three days prior to the deadline, demonstrating "little or no culpability on his part in causing the delay") and Hancock v. City of Oklahoma City, 857 F.2d 1394, 1396 (10th Cir. 1988) (plaintiff herself was not guilty of any dereliction where plaintiff's counsel overlooked motion and therefore failed to respond, resulting in delay of almost two weeks but, once discovered, responded promptly). Moreover, in such circumstances, denying defendant's motion would prejudice defendant in terms of continued time spent and expenses incurred on a case in which the plaintiff has shown no interest even after ample notice from the court. Similarly, denying defendant's motion would interfere with the judicial process in terms of docket management and the need for a finality to litigation. In other words, the court should not have to continue to manage this case on its docket when plaintiff herself has taken no initiative to keep the case on the court's docket. Compare Murray, 132 F.3d at 611 (reversing district court's dismissal on uncontested motion where plaintiff's response to motion was received one day after the fifteen-day deadline and no prejudice to defendants could have resulted from this delay, nor could it have caused interference with the judicial process) and Hancock, 857 F.2d at 1396 (where plaintiff's counsel overlooked motion and therefore failed to respond, resulting in delay of almost two weeks but, once discovered, responded promptly, defendant would not have been prejudiced in any legal or equitable sense by court's consideration of response and any inconvenience to the court was not so severe a burden as to justify dismissal).
For the foregoing reasons, the court grants defendant's motion to dismiss.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED BY THE COURT THAT defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint (doc.#10) is granted and plaintiff's complaint is dismissed in its entirety.
IT IS SO ORDERED.