Opinion
February 20, 1951. Rehearing Denied April 9, 1951.
Petition for review from the Circuit Court for Dade County, George E. Holt, J.
Cushman, Woodard Gotthardt, Miami, and Watkins Cohen, Tallahassee, for petitioner.
J.F. Gordon and L.G. Egert, Miami, for respondent.
The judgment which we here review was entered by the Circuit Court of Dade County in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction over the judgments of the Civil Court of Record of that County. The cause was heard on appeal by only one Circuit Judge, and it is here contended that such procedure is contrary to the provisions of Section 33.11, Florida Statutes, same F.S.A.
This particular section of our laws, dealing with appeals from civil courts of record to circuit courts, as originally enacted, provided that "The Circuit Courts shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases decided by the Civil Courts of Record, in the same manner and with the same limitations as now or hereafter prescribed as to appellate jurisdiction of cases in the County Court." Ch. 6904, Acts 1915, Sec. 12; Ch. 8521, Acts 1921, Sec. 11. By Section 11 of Chapter 11357, Extraordinary Session, Acts of 1925, Laws of Florida, this section was changed to read as follows: "The circuit courts shall have appellate jurisdiction in all cases decided by such civil courts of record in the same manner and with the same limitations as in writs of error from the circuit to the Supreme Court."
In 1931, the Legislature enacted Chapter 15666 and, without expressly repealing the 1925 Act, therein specifically provided that in those circuits where there was more than one circuit judge, the judges of the circuit court should hear appeals from the civil court of record en banc. The 1931 Act also delineated the entire procedure to be followed on such appeals. Subsequently, in 1941, by Chapter 20361, the Legislature expressly repealed the 1931 Act, Chapter 15666, and revived and amended Section 11 of the 1925 Act, Chapter 11357. This section, as amended in 1941, and now appearing as Section 33.11, Florida Statutes, same F.S.A., provides that "The circuit court of the county wherein any such civil court of record shall be established, shall have appellate jurisdiction to review judgments or orders of such civil court of record in the same manner and with like powers as the supreme court shall have jurisdiction to review in like actions the judgments and orders of such circuit court; * * *." It is argued by petitioner that, insofar as appeals from the civil court of record are concerned, the appellate jurisdiction of the circuit court must be exercised by at least a majority of the judges of such court, in accordance with the provisions of Article 5, Section 4, of the Constitution, F.S.A., which provides that "a majority of the members of the [Supreme] Court shall constitute a quorum for the dispatch of business; * * *."
We do not conceive that such was the legislative intent. The phrase "in the same manner" has a well-understood meaning in legislation, and that meaning is not one of restriction or limitation, but of procedure. It means by similar proceedings, so far as such proceedings are applicable. Wilder's S.S. Co. v. Low, 9 Cir., 112 F. 161, 164; Commonwealth v. Hildebrand, 139 Pa. Super. 304, 11 A.2d 688, 689; Grand Junction Sugar Co. v. Fellows, 74 Colo. 242, 220 P. 992; Phillips v. County Commissioners, 122 Mass. 258; Durousseau v. United States, 6 Cranch 307, 317, 3 L.Ed. 232. As stated in Commonwealth v. Hildebrand, supra, "* * * its restrictive or limiting force applies not to substance, but to procedure only".
Thus, in construing Section 11 of Chapter 11357, Acts of 1925, quoted supra, which, as heretofore noted, was expressly revived and amended by the 1941 Act, and which is similar, although not identical, thereto, this court held, in Meyer v. Nator Holding Co., 102 Fla. 689, 136 So. 636, 638, that one of the circuit judges of Dade County was authorized to adjudicate an appeal from the civil court of record of such county, as against the contention that the appeal should have been adjudicated by all the circuit judges of such county en banc. It was stated in the Meyer case that "there is nothing in the statute as above quoted to indicate an intent to require that circuit courts for the purpose of disposing of writs of error from the civil courts of record shall be composed of more than one circuit judge or of all the circuit judges of said counties en banc."
We think that such language is equally applicable to the statute, as amended. In accordance with the authorities above quoted, the phrase "in the same manner" should be construed as applying only to the procedural manner in which such appeals are brought from the civil court of record to the circuit court, and not to the substantive manner in which the circuit court exercises its appellate jurisdiction. Moreover, under our law one circuit judge constitutes a circuit court; and where there is more than one circuit judge in a county, each of such circuit judges is vested with the power to exercise all the authority of a circuit judge in that county. Meyer v. Nator Holding Co., supra; United American Ins. Co. v. Oak, 123 Fla. 159, 166 So. 547; City of Coral Gables v. Blount, 131 Fla. 36, 178 So. 554. A legislative intent to restrict and limit such vested power and authority must be expressed in clear and unequivocal language, since we do not feel authorized to do so by judicial interpretation of a statute.
We are cognizant that what we have here said is contrary to our opinion in Provident Life Accident Ins. Co. of Chattanooga, Tenn. v. Mathers, 157 Fla. 661, 26 So.2d 814, and to dictum in the opinion in Goodkind v. Wolkowsky, 151 Fla. 62, 9 So.2d 553; and we hereby recede from the opinions in those cases, insofar as they are inconsistent with the views herein expressed.
The other questions presented have been considered, but we find nothing to authorize the issuance of the writ and the quashing of the judgment here reviewed.
For the reasons stated, the petition for the writ is denied.
It is so ordered.
CHAPMAN, ADAMS and HOBSON, JJ., concur.
SEBRING, C.J., and TERRELL and THOMAS, JJ., dissent.