Opinion
Court of Appeals No. A-10244.
September 22, 2010.
Appeal from the Superior Court, First Judicial District, Ketchikan, Michael A. Thompson, Judge, Trial Court No. 1KE-07-657 Cr.
David D. Reineke, Assistant Public Defender, and Quinlan Steiner, Public Defender, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Terisia K. Chleborad, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Special Prosecutions and Appeals, Anchorage, and Daniel S. Sullivan, Attorney General, Juneau, for the Appellee.
Before: Coats, Chief Judge, and Mannheimer and Bolger, Judges.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Lonnie D. Taylor appeals his conviction for second-degree theft — that is, theft of property valued at $500 or more. Taylor argues that the evidence presented at his trial was legally insufficient to prove that the value of the stolen property — a specialty bicycle — equaled or exceeded $500. Taylor argues in the alternative that, even if the evidence was minimally sufficient to prove that the bicycle was worth $500 or more, the evidence favoring the State on this point was so questionable or weak that the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence, and the superior court should have granted Taylor a new trial on this basis under Alaska Criminal Rule 33.
AS 11.46.130(a)(1).
When we assess the legal sufficiency of evidence to support a criminal conviction, we view the evidence (and all reasonable inferences that could be drawn from that evidence) in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, and then we ask whether a reasonable and fair-minded juror could have concluded that the State's case was proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
See, e.g., Morrell v. State, 2 1 6 P .3d 574, 5 7 6 (Alaska App. 2009); Phillips v . State, 211 P.3d 1148, 1151 (Alaska App. 2009).
In Taylor's case, the question of the bicycle's value was actively disputed, and we acknowledge that the jury might reasonably have found that the bicycle was not worth $500. It was several years old, and it was not in usable condition when the owner purchased it. However, the evidence also showed that the owner had made repairs to the bicycle, and that the value of these specialty bicycles had risen substantially during the past several years. All in all, the jury might reasonably have concluded that the bicycle's value equaled or exceeded $500. The evidence was therefore legally sufficient to support Taylor's conviction for second-degree theft.
The analysis is different, however, with respect to whether the trial judge should have granted Taylor's motion for a new trial under Criminal Rule 33.
When a defendant asks a trial judge to order a new trial on the basis that the jury's verdict is against the weight of the evidence, the trial judge is not bound by the jury's view of the matter. The trial judge is not required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, nor is the judge required to view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant. Rather, the trial judge is authorized to independently weigh the evidence and determine the credibility of the witnesses. If the judge concludes that the verdict is against the clear weight of the evidence — i.e., that the evidence supporting the jury's decision "was so slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and unjust" — then the judge may order a new trial even though there is sufficient evidence to support the jury's decision. Howell v. State, 917 P.2d 1202, 1212 (Alaska App. 1996).
Hogg v. Raven Contractors, Inc., 134 P.3d 349, 352 (Alaska 2006).
New v. State, 714 P.2d 378, 381-82 (Alaska App. 1986).
Quoting Amidon v. State, 565 P.2d 1248, 1262 n. 44 (Alaska 1977).
In Taylor's case, it appears that the trial judge may have applied the wrong standard when the judge denied Taylor's motion for a new trial. In the judge's written order denying both of Taylor's motions ( i.e., the motion for a judgement of acquittal and the motion for a new trial), the judge declared that "the test for overturning a factual finding by a jury is that the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict". The judge further declared that it was "not [his] role to substitute [his] judgment for the jury's in matters of [witness] credibility . . . or [the] weight of evidence".
This is the wrong analysis for a motion for a new trial. As the Alaska Supreme Court explained in Kava v. American Honda Motor Co., Inc., 48 P.3d 1170, 1177 (Alaska 2002), when trial judges are asked to decide a motion for a new trial, they must not defer to the jury's assessments of witness credibility and the weight of the evidence. Rather, the law requires trial judges to reach their own "personal view of the evidence". Ibid.
In Kava v. American Honda, the supreme court vacated the trial judge's denial of a motion for a new trial because the judge did defer to the jury, basing his decision "on a view of the evidence . . . most favorable to [the prevailing party]". Ibid. In other words, "[t]he trial court applied the wrong standard", thus depriving the moving party "of the right to a decision based on the trial court's independent [assessment]". Ibid. The supreme court remanded the case to the superior court, directing the trial judge to "exercise [his] discretion and [to] independently weigh the evidence in determining if the jury's verdict was against the weight of the evidence". Ibid.
We reach the same conclusion in Taylor's case. Based on the wording of the trial judge's decision, it appears that the judge may have improperly deferred to the jury's verdict when he decided Taylor's motion for a new trial — by viewing the evidence "in the light most favorable to sustaining the jury's verdict", and by refusing to "substitute [his own] judgment for the jury's in matters of [witness] credibility [and] the weight of [the] evidence".
We acknowledge that both the Alaska Supreme Court and this Court have repeatedly declared that a trial judge's decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial is reviewed for "abuse of discretion". But this deferential standard of review assumes that the trial judge applied the proper legal test when reaching their decision, and that the underlying decision being reviewed on appeal is the judge's conclusion, based on their own independent assessment of the evidence, as to whether the jury's verdict departed so far from the weight of the evidence that a new trial should be granted in the interests of justice.
See, e.g., North Slope Borough v. Brower, 215 P.3d 308, 311 (Alaska 2009); Turner v. Anchorage, 171 P.3d 180, 185 (Alaska 2007); Forshee v. Forshee, 145 P.3d 492, 498 (Alaska 2006); Moffitt v. State, 207 P.3d 593, 602 (Alaska App. 2009); Crouse v. Anchorage, 79 P.3d 660, 666 (Alaska App. 2003); Cowles v. State, 961 P.2d 438, 448 (Alaska App. 1998).
Here, the underlying question is whether the trial judge applied the correct legal test when the judge engaged in the decision-making process. The identification or clarification of the governing legal test is a question of law, and an appellate court does not defer to a trial judge's discretion on matters of law. Rather, we review such issues de novo.
For these reasons, we hold that the evidence presented at Taylor's trial is legally sufficient to support his conviction, but we vacate the trial judge's decision on Taylor's motion for a new trial, and we remand this case to the superior court for further proceedings on that motion.
Within 60 days of the date of our decision, the superior court shall re-assess whether the verdict in Taylor's case is so far against the weight of the evidence as to justify a new trial, and shall issue a new decision on Taylor's motion. (The superior court is authorized to seek an extension of this deadline if needed.)
The parties shall then have 30 days to file supplemental briefs addressing the superior court's decision. These briefs can be in memorandum form; that is, they need not comply with all the requirements of Alaska Appellate Rule 212.
After we have received the supplemental briefs of the parties, we shall resume our consideration of this appeal.
We retain jurisdiction of this case.