Opinion
No. CV 05-4017734
April 18, 2008
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION
The plaintiff, Susan A. Taylor, the former co-habitating, domestic partner of Thomas J. Macura, brings this action against defendant Karen S. Moffat, individually and as Administratrix of the estate of Thomas J. Macura and against George Macura in four counts of replevin, entry and detainer, promissory estoppel, and unjust enrichment. The plaintiff alleges her causes of action were subjects of claims presented to the Administratrix which were rejected. She is bringing this action pursuant to Conn. Gen. Stat. § 45a-363. The facts are as follows: In or about 1995, plaintiff started living with Thomas J. Macura (hereinafter "Thomas") in Thomas' home at 260 Town Hill Road, Goshen, Connecticut. Although they did not marry, they were domestic partners.
Plaintiff also alleged a count in breach of contract which was withdrawn.
Section 45a-363(a):
No person who has presented a claim shall be entitled to commence suit unless and until such claim has been rejected in whole or in part, as provided in Section 45a-360.
Before plaintiff moved in with Thomas, she sold her house in South Windsor to her sister for $135,000.00. She claims that was less than fair market value. She retained that sales price for herself. Plaintiff also gave her furniture to her sister. After plaintiff moved in, she helped with the maintenance and repairs of the Goshen property, helped Thomas in a pharmaceutical business he had started, did the cooking, cleaning and usual tasks of a spouse. Although she earned a salary of approximately $59,000.00 a year, she paid nothing as rent to Thomas, paid nothing for town taxes, the mortgage, heat and utility bills. In 1998 plaintiff and defendant chose certain Stickley furniture for the home. Thomas purchased it, and paid for it approximately $70,000.00. From time to time plaintiff and Thomas made other purchases, with plaintiff not keeping track of what each paid for.
On March 15, 2004, Thomas suddenly died. At Thomas' wake on March 18, 2004, plaintiff told the defendant Karen Moffat (hereinafter "Karen") that she was not going back to Thomas' house in Goshen. At Thomas' burial on March 19, 2004, plaintiff told Karen she was going to stay with her daughter in South Windsor, but that night she went to Goshen to sleep in her bed.
On March 20, 2004, Karen and George Macura came to the Goshen home and found plaintiff there. George wanted the plaintiff to sign certain papers and also wanted her to give him the key to the safe where Thomas kept his guns. The plaintiff refused. Because of George's gruff manner and fearing for her safety, the next day plaintiff changed the locks on the doors of the Goshen house.
On March 26, 2004, Karen Moffat was appointed Administratrix of the Estate of Thomas Macura by the Probate Court of Torrington. On March 27, 2004, Karen and George went to the Goshen home and obtained entrance. Later that day, plaintiff came and an altercation ensued between plaintiff and George. The police were called. Karen showed the police her certificate of appointment as Administratrix of Thomas' estate and the police told plaintiff to leave.
On May 5, 2004, plaintiff filed a lockout complaint against Karen, individually and as Administratrix, seeking a temporary injunction. On May 13, 2004, plaintiff filed an entry and detainer proceeding in the Superior Court at Bantam. On May 20th the parties entered into a stipulation providing that plaintiff would withdraw the lockout complaint and Karen would allow plaintiff to enter the Goshen home on four weekends in a row, commencing June 5, 2004, to remove her belongings. The stipulation further provided that it should not be construed as a waiver of any claims that the plaintiff had or may assert in the Torrington Probate Court against the Estate of Thomas Macura. During the four weekends, plaintiff availed herself of the opportunity to take her belongings from the Goshen home
The complaint alleges as to each of the counts that claims "were presented for demand to the Administratrix and were unjustly denied and are now due and owed." Those allegations were denied by the defendants. At the trial plaintiff produced no evidence of the claims presented to the Administratrix or of their rejection by the Administratrix.
Before turning to the merits of the specific causes of action, the Court sua sponte raises a jurisdictional question relating to the counts against Karen as Administratrix.
Section 45a-363(a) provides that no person who has presented a claim shall be entitled to commence suit unless and until such claim has been rejected, in whole or in part. Subsection 45a-363(b) provides that a person whose claim has been rejected and who commences suit more than 120 days from the date of the rejection of his claim "shall be barred from asserting or recovering on such claim from the fiduciary, the estate of the decedent . . . "These two sections clearly provide that a suit cannot be brought against an administratrix unless the claim has been presented and rejected.
In the instant case, the plaintiff has failed to prove that the claims supporting each of the causes of action in this case were presented to the Administratrix and were denied. Blewett v. Estate of Petrokubi, No. CV 93-303303-S, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport (August 2, 1994, Maiocco, J.) [12 Conn. L. Rptr. 290]holds that the failure of plaintiff to file a claim with the executor of the estate, which is rejected, results in the court losing jurisdiction in a suit brought on the subject matter of the claim in the Superior Court. See also Hartford Accident Indemnity Co. v. Doyle, 7 Conn. L. Rptr. 490 (November 16, 1992, Spear, J.).
Furthermore, many Connecticut cases hold that where a statute prescribes the requirements for bringing a cause of action, failure to comply with the statutory requirements defeats the cause of action. As stated in Hiller v. East Hartford, 167 Conn. 100, 106 (1974), "The conclusion that the existence of a statutory right is conditioned upon compliance with the terms of the statute creating it is entirely consistent with the views we have expressed with relation to other types of rights created by statute." See also Ecker v. West Hartford, 205 Conn. 219, 232 (1987); Kronberg Bros. v. Steele, 72 Conn.App. 53 (2002).
Thus, in the instant case, all the counts against Karen as Administratrix must fail.
The court now turns to the counts against defendant Karen, individually and against George Macura.
I. REPLEVIN
Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-515 provides:
The action of replevin may be maintained to recover any goods or chattels in which the plaintiff has a general or special property interest with the right to immediate possession and which are wrongfully detained from him in any manner, together with damages for such wrongful detention.
Damages in such an action can be the depreciation in value of the property wrongfully detained, Staub v. Anderson, 152 Conn. 694, 695 (1965) and loss of use of the property during wrongful detention, CT Page 5988 Commercial Credit Corp. v. Miron, 108 Conn. 524, 526 (1928).
Plaintiff claims she lost the use of her personal property at the time she was forced to leave the house on March 26, 2004 until she regained the opportunity to take back her personal possessions in June 2004.
The evidence clearly establishes that Karen acted as an administratrix when she showed the certificate of her appointment to the police officer who asked the plaintiff to leave the house. Thus, Karen cannot be held personally responsible for plaintiff's loss of use of her personal property during the period from the end of March to June 2004.
There was evidence that George Macura took some guns and other items that clearly belonged to Thomas. There was no evidence he took any of plaintiff's property. Thus, plaintiff failed to prove that George deprived plaintiff of the use of her personal property.
In four weekends in June, Plaintiff had the fullest opportunity to take back all of her personal property. She, nevertheless, claims some of that property was missing. She did not prove that either of the defendants were responsible. As for the main item, the Stickley furniture, plaintiff testified that although Thomas paid for that furniture, he gave it all to her. The court does not believe plaintiff on this score. It is more likely that Thomas intended that the furniture could be used by both of them as long as they lived together in the house. If the plaintiff had moved out during Thomas' lifetime, this court does not believe that she would have had the right to take the furniture with her.
Finally, plaintiff presented no evidence of the damages she allegedly sustained as a result of the loss of use of the personal property from the end of March until she had the opportunity to reclaim her personal possessions in June. Even as to the Stickley furniture that was purchased in 1998, there was no evidence of its value in 2008. Proof of damages is an essential element of a cause of action. Carrano v. Yale New Haven Hospital, 279 Conn. 622, 646 (2006); Sullivan v. Thorndike, 104, Conn.App. 297, 304 (2007). This is another ground upon which plaintiff must fail on this count.
II. FORCIBLE ENTRY AND DETAINER
In this count plaintiff claims that defendants Karen and George made forcible and unlawful entry into the dwelling unit occupied by the plaintiff, held and detained the home with force, and thus violated Section 47a-43 (the forcible entry and detainer statute).
The evidence at the trial was that plaintiff told Karen at the wake that she did not want to live in the Goshen home. Later she apparently changed her mind and went there to spend the night. Karen was entitled to take plaintiff at her word.
Moreover, when Karen had plaintiff removed from the house, she did so as an Administratrix and to protect the property belonging to the estate. Because there were guns in the house, Karen had the locks changed in order that they could not be stolen. Thus, whatever Karen did to lock out the plaintiff, she did in her role as Administratrix and she cannot be held personably responsible.
Although George was present when plaintiff was told to leave, no evidence connected him to plaintiff's removal and so plaintiff failed to prove this count against him.
III. THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY/PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL
In this count plaintiff alleges that Thomas promised plaintiff to become a cohabitant at the premises in Goshen, Connecticut and she relied upon those promises to liquidate her household furnishings, and to sell her house in South Windsor and other assets at an economic loss.
If plaintiff sold her assets and her South Windsor home at a loss in reliance upon the promise of Thomas that she would live with him, Thomas kept that promise because plaintiff lived in the Goshen house for eight years. Moreover, plaintiff failed to prove the amount of her economic loss.
More significantly, whatever promises Thomas may have made to the plaintiff, gave rise to an action against the estate of Thomas. Since the plaintiff has failed to prove that she made such a claim and it was rejected by the Administratrix, as stated above, this count must fail.
IV. UNJUST ENRICHMENT
In this count plaintiff alleges that she improved the value of real estate owned by Thomas over a period of nine years by contributing labor, materials and economic investment to the joint domicile of her and Thomas. These services, she testified, included work on the land, repairing of the premises, and working with Thomas in his pharmaceutical business. She also alleges that based upon the common-law doctrine of quantum meruit, plaintiff is equitably entitled to an interest in the appreciated value of the real property of the decedent. As to the latter claim, there was absolutely no evidence as to any increase in the value of the real property.
To support recovery in quantum merit or unjust enrichment for services rendered, it must be showed that services were rendered under circumstances indicating that the plaintiff expected to be paid and that the defendant knew or reasonably could have known that the plaintiff expected payment. Janusauskas v. Fichman, 264 Conn. 796, 804-05 (2003); Commissioner of Transportation v. Textron, Inc., 40 Conn.Sup. 202, 205-06 (1984). There is not a shred of evidence to suggest that Thomas had reason to know that plaintiff expected to be paid for her services, much less that she expected to be paid beyond the free bed, board and luxury lifestyle she was already receiving.
But more fundamentally, this count is against Karen as Administratrix of the estate of Thomas, not against Karen individually or against George. Since there is no proof plaintiff filed any claim on this count which was rejected by the Administratrix, she cannot recover.
Based on the foregoing, the court renders judgment for the defendants and against the plaintiff on all counts of the complaint.