Opinion
Case No. 2:00-CV-231 DAK
November 20, 2003
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court in this pro se civil rights action are the following motions filed by the parties in this case: (1) a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Lamar Guyman, Gayle Jensen, Ray Jeffs, John Spinney, Richard Graham, David Blackwell, and Brent Langston (hereafter referred to as the "Emery County Defendants") (File Entry #34); (2) a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Emery Town Council, Judy Mortensen, and Cassi Lake (hereafter referred to as the "Emery Town Defendants") (File Entry #42); and (3) a Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings filed by Defendant Glennis Sitterud requesting that Sitterud be dismissed from this action (File Entry #40). Having carefully considered the parties' memoranda and oral arguments, the Court hereby makes this Report and Recommendation.
BACKGROUND
Plaintiff, acting pro se, filed his original complaint in this action on April 3, 2000, after his motion to proceed in forma pauperis was denied, and the case was assigned to United States District Judge Dale A. Kimball. (File Entries #1-3.) On September 8, 2000, Judge Kimball referred this case to United States Magistrate Judge Samuel Alba pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B). (File Entries #5, 7.) On July 15, 2002, Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. (File Entry #12.)
The Emery Town Defendants and Defendant Sitterud filed their joint answer on September 16, 2002. (File Entry #14.) That same day, the Emery County Defendants filed their answer. (File Entry #15.) Defendant Randy Lake filed his answer on September 17, 2002. (File Entry #16.)
On April 23, 2003, the Emery County Defendants filed a motion to dismiss. (File Entry #34.) They also filed a motion for a protective order, requesting a stay of discovery until their motion to dismiss was ruled upon. (File Entry #33.) Also on April 23, 2003, Plaintiff filed a motion for an evidentiary hearing, a protective order, and to compel discovery, with an accompanying memorandum. (File Entries #35, 36.) On May 7, 2003, Defendant Sitterud filed a memorandum opposing Plaintiff's request for an evidentiary hearing. (File Entry #37.) On May 21, 2003, Defendant Sitterud also filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, requesting that Plaintiff's claims against her be dismissed, and an accompanying memorandum. (File Entries #40, 41.) On May 26, 2003, the Emery Town Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff's claims against them, with an accompanying memorandum. (File Entries #42, 43.)
The Court held a hearing on the motions to dismiss on June 26, 2003. (6-26-03 Transcript in Court file.) At the conclusion of that hearing, the Court granted the motion to stay discovery and took the other outstanding motions under advisement. (6-26-03 Transcript at 42-43.)
ANALYSIS
In considering a motion for judgment on the pleadings under Rule 12(c) and motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court accepts the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint as true and construes them in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1187 (10th Cir. 2003); Ramirez v. Department of Corrections, 222 F.3d 1238, 1240 (10th Cir. 2000). Dismissal is appropriate if Plaintiff cannot prove any facts that would support his claim. See Ramirez, 222 F.3d at 1240.
Furthermore, Plaintiff is acting pro se in this action. As such, his pleadings "are to be construed liberally and held to a less stringent standard than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers." Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991).
A. Emery County Defendants
The Court first examines the Emery County Defendants' motion to dismiss. The Emery County Defendants argue that they are protected by absolute and qualified immunity.
The Court agrees with the Emery County Defendants and adopts the arguments advanced by them at oral arguments and as further advanced in their motion and memorandum. As the Emery County Defendants argue, Plaintiff has not stated facts that overcome the defenses of absolute and qualified immunity. First, in regards to the absolute immunity defense asserted by Defendants Blackwell and Langston, Plaintiff has not made a valid argument that overcomes the absolute immunity accorded prosecutors under the facts asserted by Plaintiff. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427, 96 S.Ct. 984, 993 (1976). Second, in regards to the qualified immunity defense, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that the Emery County Defendants' actions violated a constitutional or statutory right, nor has he shown that the constitutional or statutory rights allegedly violated were clearly established at the time of the conduct at issue.See Ramirez, 222 F.3d at 1241; Albright v. Rodriguez, 51 F.3d 1531, 1534 (10th Cir. 1995). As a result, the Court recommends that the Emery County Defendants' motion to dismiss be granted.
B. Emery Town Defendants
The Court next addresses the motion to dismiss brought by the Emery Town Defendants. Pursuant to Rule 12(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the Emery Town Defendants argue that Plaintiff's claims against them should be dismissed because Plaintiff has failed to state a federal claim upon which relief can be granted. The Emery Town Defendants also argue that they are entitled to qualified immunity and that the Emery Town Council is not even a proper defendant because it is not a person under Section 1983.
The Court adopts the arguments advanced by the Emery Town Defendants at oral arguments and as further explained in their memorandum supporting their motion to dismiss. As the Emery Town Defendants argue, Plaintiff has failed to allege specific facts that support specific federal claims. Instead, Plaintiff has made general conclusory allegations that do not form the basis of a recognizable federal claim. In addition, even if Plaintiff had stated a federal claim, he has not advanced an argument adequate enough to overcome the Emery Town Defendants' defense of qualified immunity. Plaintiff has not shown that the Emery Town Defendants' alleged conduct violated clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known. See Ramirez, 222 F.3d at 1240-41.
C. Defendant Sitterud
Defendant Sitterud has also filed a motion with the Court requesting that she be dismissed with prejudice from this action. Having carefully reviewed the arguments made by both Defendant Sitterud in favor of his motion and by Plaintiff in opposition to that motion, the Court agrees with the arguments advanced by Defendant Sitterud in both her memorandum and at oral arguments and recommends that Defendant Sitterud's motion to be dismissed with prejudice from this action be granted.The Court adopts the arguments advanced by Defendant Sitterud at oral arguments and in her brief as the basis for granting Sitterud's motion. As Defendant Sitterud argues, even if the allegations made by Plaintiff against Defendant Sitterud are accepted as true, Plaintiff has still failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The factual allegations advanced against Defendant Sitterud as a member of the town council do not support a civil rights claim, even when read very broadly. Plaintiff has not alleged that he was discriminated against as a member of a class, thus failing to state a traditional equal protection claim, and he has not alleged that the Town Council applied its policies differently to him, thus failing to state a class-of-one equal protection claim. In addition, in regards to his assertion that his rights to hold a motorcycle rally were violated, Plaintiff has not identified any policy, ordinance, or rule that purportedly violated his First Amendment rights. Plaintiff has not alleged that he was prevented from holding the rally, nor has he identified any offending law.
Furthermore, as Defendant Sitterud argues, this Court does not have supplemental jurisdiction over the claims asserted against Sitterud as a bus driver because the bus driver claims are factually unrelated to the alleged federal claims. See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367 (1993); Signature Properties Int'l v. City of Edmond, 310 F.3d 1258, 1260-61 n.l (10th Cir. 2002), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 123 S.Ct. 2273 (2003).
The Court adopts the arguments advanced by Defendant Sitterud at oral arguments and in her memorandum showing that Plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted as to Defendant Sitterud. As a result, the Court recommends that Defendant Sitterud's motion for judgment on the pleadings be granted and the claims against Defendant Sitterud be dismissed with prejudice.
D. Defendant Randy Lake
The Court has also carefully reviewed Plaintiff's allegations regarding Defendant Randy Lake and concludes that, as with the other defendants in this action, Plaintiff has failed to allege facts constituting a recognizable federal claim as to Defendant Randy Lake. As a result, the Court also recommends that the claims against Defendant Randy Lake be dismissed.
CONCLUSION
Based on the above analysis, IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Emery County Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ( File Entry #34) be GRANTED, that the Emery Town Defendants' Motion to Dismiss ( File Entry #42) be GRANTED, and that Defendant Glennis Sitterud's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings (File Entry #40) be GRANTED. The Court bases these recommendations on the arguments Defendants made in their memoranda and at the hearing on June 26, 2003, and is therefore attaching a copy of the transcript of that proceeding to this Report and Recommendation. Furthermore IT IS ALSO RECOMMENDED that the claims against Randy Lake be DISMISSED. Given that the recommendations leave no defendants or claims in this case, IT IS ALSO RECOMMENDED that this case be DISMISSED.Copies of the foregoing Report and Recommendation are being mailed to the parties who are hereby notified of their right to object to the same. The parties are further notified that they must file any objections to the Report and Recommendation, with the clerk of the district court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b), within ten (10) days after receiving it. Failure to file objections may constitute a waiver of those objections on subsequent appellate review.