Opinion
Civil Action No. 4:02-CV-049-Y
February 19, 2002
ORDER OF DISMISSAL UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) AND UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2)(B)
On January 22, 2002, plaintiff Michael Taylor an inmate incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division's Jester IV Unit (a mental-health unit) was permitted to proceed in the above-styled and numbered cause pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 by the magistrate judge. The magistrate judge also issued the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA") filing fee assessment order, and then returned the case to the docket of this Court for the screening required under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2) and 1915A(a). Plaintiff Taylor filed this handwritten civil complaint naming as defendants former Tarrant County Sheriff Don Carpenter (out of office since early 1993), Dr. Holbrook, the "Fort Worth County Jail," and William W. Scott, identified as a director of TDCJ. (Compl. at 1.) In a rambling, mostly incoherent narrative, Taylor complains of alleged events that occurred primarily in the late 1980's while he was housed in the Tarrant County Jail, along with other incidents after he was transferred to TDCJ. (Compl. 3-17.) He seeks 150 billion dollars in monetary damages. (Compl. at page 20.)
A complaint filed in-forma-pauperis that lacks an arguable basis in law should be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (e)(2), a district court retains broad discretion in determining at any time whether an in-forma-pauperis claim should be dismissed. Furthermore, as a part of the PLRA, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, which requires the Court to review a complaint from a prisoner seeking relief from a governmental entity or governmental officer or employee as soon as possible after docketing. Consistent with § 1915A is prior case law recognizing that a district court is not required to await a responsive pleading to conduct its § 1915 inquiry. Rather, § 1915 gives judges the power to "dismiss a claim based on an indisputably meritless legal theory." A complaint may also be deemed frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis in fact. To be factually frivolous, the pleaded facts must be clearly baseless, which encompasses factual allegations that are fanciful, fantastic and delusional. A finding of factual frivolousness is appropriate only in those limited cases wherein the allegations rise to the level of the wholly irrational or incredible.
Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328 (1989). Section 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) now requires dismissal not only when an allegation of poverty is untrue or the action is frivolous or malicious, but also when "the action fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief." 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2)(A) and (B) (West Supp. 2001).
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915(e)(2) (West Supp. 2001); Adepegba v. Hammons, 103 F.3d 383, 388 (5th Cir. 1996); see also Wesson v. Oglesby, 910 F.2d 278, 281 (5th Cir. 1990) (discussing authority to dismiss at any time under prior § 1915(d)).
See 28 U.S.C.A. § 1915A(a) (West Supp. 2001).
See Schultea v. Wood, 47 F.3d 1427, 1434 (5th Cir. 1995)
Id., citing Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989).
See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-34 (1992); Hicks v. Garner, 69 F.3d 22, 25 (5th Cir. 1995).
See Denton, 504 U.S. at 32; Hicks, 69 F.3d at 25.
See Booker v. Koonce, 2 F.3d 114, 115-16 (5th Cir. 1993).
The bulk of Plaintiff's claims should be dismissed because they are barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The Supreme Court has held that all § 1983 actions are governed by the statute of limitations for personal injury actions for the state of suit. In Texas the applicable limitations period is two years. The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held in Moore v. McDonald that a district court may dismiss claims sua sponte under § 1915 where it is clear from a review of the complaint that the alleged claims are barred by the applicable statute of limitations.
See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 273-76 (1985) (state statute of limitations period for personal injury actions applies to all claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
See Moore v. McDonald, 30 F.3d 616, 620 (5th Cir. 1994) (noting that district courts in Texas must use Texas's general two-year, personal injury limitations period); see TEX. CIV. PRAC. REM. CODE 16.003(a) (Vernon Supp. 2001) (Texas's two-year personal injury limitations statute).
Moore, 30 F.3d at 620, citing Gartrell v. Gaylor, 981 F.2d 254, 256 (5th Cir. 1993); see also Myers v. Vogal, 960 F.2d 750, 751 (8th Cir. 1992) ("Although the statute of limitations is an affirmative defense, a district court may properly dismiss a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) when it is apparent that the statute of limitations has run.") (citations omitted).
Accrual of a claim under § 1983 is determined by federal law, and generally a claim accrues when a plaintiff knows or has reason to know of the injury giving rise to the cause of action, which in this case would of course be immediately upon the date of the alleged injury. Since Taylor did not file this suit until January 2002, all claims arising from events that occurred prior to 2000 should be dismissed under §§ 1915(e)(2)(b) and 1915A(b) because the applicable two-year statute of limitations already had expired.
Burrell v. Newsome, 883 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1989).
Id., citing Lavellee v. Listi, 611 F.2d 1129, 1131 (5th Cir. 1980) (other citations omitted).
A pro se prisoner litigant's section 1983 complaint is filed as soon as the pleadings are deposited into the prison mail system. Cooper v. Brookshire, 70 F.3d 377, 379 (5th Cir. 1995). Although the court has not been provided with any specific information as to the date of delivery of the complaint to prison officials, Taylor executed the complaint on January 10, 2002, and thus that is the earliest date on which his complaint is deemed filed under the mailbox rule.
Alternatively, a review of all of plaintiff Taylor's allegations, under even a most lenient view, indicates that they fall within the limited class of complaints that can be dismissed for factual frivolousness. Taylor contends that he was: fed some "kind of spiritual substance inslaving [sic] me to confess;" "spiritually made to hang myself and have dope withdrawn to cause me to look as a dope feend [sic] homosexual, and parinoyed [sic];" "left in the cell to die of heroin/cocaine withdraws [sic] that was being feed [sic] to me by county jail officers;" and subjected to the placement of a "big gray gas canister on the ventilation panel behind the control center . . . to have some kind of poisonist (sic] gas in the single cell." (Compl. at 3-7.) Taylor also alleges that jail officials conspired to murder him, that he again "experienced death when I lost all control of my guts and bladder and died," that he "had died twice in the cell and the N tank holdover," and that with regard to another incident in which pesticides and chemicals were allegedly piped through the vents:
I layed [sic] back down just long enough for the deadly chemicals to hit my brain and grind my brain to the death end and thats [sic] how I was for 4 days laying dead in the cell . . . from Sunday till that Thursday night the whole time various officers and so called nurses entered and physically spiritually removed the spiritual remains of my body, but at that same moment I was given back my life by God and took a big deep breath.
(Compl. at 9, at 4-6.)
After review and consideration of the substance of such allegations in Taylor's complaint, the Court finds and determines that the complaint must be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous under the authority of 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (B)(i).
It is therefore ORDERED that all Plaintiff's claims be, and they are hereby, DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) and pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i).