Opinion
F072291
12-18-2017
TAFT UNION HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT et al., Cross-complainants and Respondents, v. SHERYL O. et al., Cross-defendants and Appellants.
Darling & Wilson, Joshua G. Wilson, Anton H. Labrentz; Thomas Anton & Associates, Thomas J. Anton and Becky Brooks for Cross-defendants and Appellants. Herr Pedersen & Berglund, Leonard C. Herr and Ron Statler for Cross-complainants and Respondents.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. (Super. Ct. No. CV279256)
OPINION
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Kern County. David R. Lampe, Judge. Darling & Wilson, Joshua G. Wilson, Anton H. Labrentz; Thomas Anton & Associates, Thomas J. Anton and Becky Brooks for Cross-defendants and Appellants. Herr Pedersen & Berglund, Leonard C. Herr and Ron Statler for Cross-complainants and Respondents.
-ooOoo-
Cross-defendants and petitioners, Bryan O. and Sheryl O., presented government claims against cross-complainants, a school district and its personnel, arising out of a shooting on a high school campus. The claims were denied as untimely. Petitioners' applications for leave to present late claims were also denied. Petitioners then petitioned the trial court for relief from the government claim presentation requirements, asserting that delayed discovery of their causes of action against cross-complainants made their claims timely; Sheryl also asserted her claim was timely based on estoppel. The trial court found petitioners had sufficient knowledge of the facts giving rise to their claims that their causes of action accrued more than one year before they presented their claims and their applications for leave to present late claims to the public entity; additionally, estoppel did not apply. It concluded the claims were time barred and denied the petition for relief from the claim presentation requirements. We conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court's factual findings, and the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the petition.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On January 10, 2013, Bryan took a gun to the high school where he was a student, and shot another student. The victim sued the school district and three of its personnel (collectively "District") to recover for his injuries. District cross-complained against Bryan and his mother, Sheryl, for indemnity, apportionment of fault, and declaratory relief.
On January 8, 2015, petitioners presented government claims to District, along with an application for leave to present a late claim. The claims alleged that, "after years of being subjected to repeated harassment, bullying, verbal abuse, sexual advances, beatings and other offensive behavior by his fellow students," Bryan "snapped" on January 10, 2013. They alleged Bryan complained to his mother about the ongoing harassment, and she complained to the school, but the students retaliated against Bryan and the school failed to follow applicable rules, regulations, laws and procedures. School officials failed to warn about some of the incidents and led Sheryl to believe Bryan's situation was improving. As a result of District's failure to protect Bryan, and failure to abide by Sheryl's parental rights, Sheryl did not remove Bryan from the school and Bryan retaliated against his attackers, resulting in permanent emotional distress to petitioners. Bryan asserted claims of: failure to prevent student harassment on the basis of sex, gender, or sexual orientation in violation of Title IX of the Education Amendments Act of 1972, violation of rights under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, violation of the Sex Equity in Education Act, violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, § 51.7), negligence (Gov. Code, §§ 815.2, 815.6, 820), and negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Sheryl asserted claims of: violation of First Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment rights to familial relationship and companionship, violation of parental rights under various Education Code sections, negligence (Gov. Code, §§ 815.2, 815.6, 820), negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, and negligent and intentional misrepresentation.
The claims were denied as untimely. The applications to present late claims were also denied. Petitioners then petitioned the trial court for an order relieving them from the requirement of presenting a claim before filing a cross-complaint against District. District opposed the petition. After allowing additional briefs and declarations to be filed, and hearing oral argument, the trial court denied the petitioners' petition for relief. Petitioners appeal from the order denying their petition for relief from the claim presentation requirements.
DISCUSSION
I. Claim Presentation Requirements
Generally, the Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810, et seq.) provides that no suit for money or damages may be brought against a local public entity until a written claim asserting the cause of action has been presented to the public entity and has been rejected or deemed rejected by it. (§§ 905, 945.4.) The term "local public entity" includes a school district. (§ 900.4; Johnson v. San Diego Unified School Dist. (1990) 217 Cal.App.3d 692, 699.) A claim relating to a cause of action for injury to the person or to personal property must be presented not later than six months after accrual of the cause of action. (§ 911.2, subd. (a).) If the injured party fails to present a timely claim, that party may make a written application to the public entity for leave to present a late claim. (§ 911.4, subd. (a).) The written application must be made within a reasonable time, not to exceed one year, after accrual of the cause of action; it must state the reason for the delay in presenting the claim. (§ 911.4, subd. (b).)
All further statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated.
If the public entity denies the application for leave to present a late claim, the injured party may petition the superior court for relief from the claim presentation requirements. (§ 946.6, subd. (a).) The trial court must grant the petition if the petitioner demonstrates by a preponderance of the evidence that the application to the public entity under section 911.4 was made within a reasonable time, not exceeding one year after the accrual of the cause of action, and one of the other four requirements listed in section 946.6, subdivision (c), is met. (§ 946.6, subd. (c); Munoz v. State of California (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1767, 1777 (Munoz).) Petitioners relied on two of the four requirements: (1) "[t]he failure to present the claim was through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" and the public entity would not be prejudiced by the grant of relief, and (2) "[t]he person who sustained the alleged injury, damage or loss was a minor during all of the" initial six month period for presenting a claim. (§ 946.6, subd. (c)(1), (2).)
"In determining whether relief is warranted, the court will consider the petition, any affidavits submitted in support of or in opposition to the petition, and any other evidence presented at the hearing." (Munoz, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1777-1778.) "[A] petitioner has the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the necessary elements for relief." (Id. at p. 1783.) "The determination of the trial court in granting or denying a petition for relief under Government Code section 946.6 will not be disturbed on appeal except for an abuse of discretion. Abuse of discretion is shown where uncontradicted evidence or affidavits of the plaintiff establish adequate cause for relief." (Id. at p. 1778.)
II. Accrual of Cause of Action
Petitioners contend their government claims were timely submitted to District within six months after accrual of their causes of action. The parties disagree about the date on which petitioners' claims accrued.
The accrual date for purposes of presenting a claim under the Government Claims Act is "the date upon which the cause of action would be deemed to have accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations which would be applicable thereto if there were no requirement that a claim be presented." (§ 901.) "The general rule for defining the accrual of a cause of action sets the date as the time 'when, under the substantive law, the wrongful act is done,' or the wrongful result occurs, and the consequent 'liability arises.' [Citation.] In other words, it sets the date as the time when the cause of action is complete with all of its elements." (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 397 (Norgart).)
This basic rule of accrual is modified by the discovery rule. (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1109.) "Under the discovery rule, the statute of limitations begins to run when the plaintiff suspects or should suspect that her injury was caused by wrongdoing, that someone has done something wrong to her. . . . A plaintiff need not be aware of the specific 'facts' necessary to establish the claim; that is a process contemplated by pretrial discovery. Once the plaintiff has a suspicion of wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue, she must decide whether to file suit or sit on her rights. So long as a suspicion exists, it is clear that the plaintiff must go find the facts; she cannot wait for the facts to find her." (Id. at pp. 1110-1111, fn. omitted.)
A plaintiff need not know or suspect that a particular legal theory applies. (Norgart, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 397.) The cause of action is discovered when the plaintiff "at least 'suspects . . . that someone has done something wrong' to him [citation], 'wrong' being used, not in any technical sense, but rather in accordance with its 'lay understanding.' " (Id. at pp. 397-398.) The delayed discovery rule "refers to the 'generic' elements of wrongdoing, causation, and harm and does not require a hypertechnical approach. Instead, 'we look to whether the plaintiffs have reason to at least suspect that a type of wrongdoing has injured them.' " (S.M. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 712, 717 (S.M.).) "Thus, the discovery rule only delays accrual until the plaintiff has, or should have, inquiry notice of the cause of action." (Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of University of California (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 359.)
"[T]he plaintiff may discover, or have reason to discover, the cause of action even if he does not suspect, or have reason to suspect, the identity of the defendant. [Citation.] That is because the identity of the defendant is not an element of any cause of action." (Norgart, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 399, fn. omitted.)
III. Allegations of the Petition
In this case, petitioners' claims were based on allegations that the District failed to take steps to prevent or remedy the harassment by other students that Bryan was experiencing at school, and failed to advise his mother of the nature and extent of the harassment, preventing her from taking appropriate action to protect him. Plaintiffs' claims allege that, as a proximate result of "District's failure to protect, . . . failure to follow policy, and/or abide by parental rights, [Bryan] retaliated against his attackers resulting in permanent emotional damage to" petitioners.
In their petition for relief, petitioners asserted their January 9, 2015, claims were timely presented because their causes of action accrued on August 27, 2014, Bryan's eighteenth birthday, and the claims were presented within six months of that date. Although they acknowledged "the culminating incident occurred on January 10, 2013," they asserted their causes of action did not arise until Bryan turned 18 because Sheryl, Bryan's mother and legal guardian, was unaware of the events preceding that incident until October 22, 2014, when she learned of them through testimony at Bryan's criminal trial. District disagreed, and denied the claims as untimely. So, "[o]ut of an abundance of caution," petitioners applied for leave to present a late claim within one year of the date of accrual.
The petition also asserted that, if petitioners' claims were presented late, it was because, after January 10, 2013, petitioners were "embroiled" in Bryan's criminal prosecution for attempted murder, Sheryl was unsuccessful in her attempts to find counsel, and Bryan did not tell her about the physical assaults and continued bullying he underwent at school. Petitioners also asserted both District and Bryan failed to inform Sheryl of an incident of "teabagging," a sexual assault that allegedly occurred on March 15, 2011, even though Bryan reported it to the school in a written incident report. Sheryl declared she first learned of the alleged sexual assault on October 22, 2014, from testimony during the criminal trial; she also learned then that Bryan had written a story entitled "Psychopath." She further stated that, until she consulted her current attorneys on December 24, 2014, she was unaware she needed to present a claim to District in order to pursue her rights.
District contends petitioners knew or had reason to suspect the facts underlying their claims, putting them on inquiry about the existence of their cause of action, no later than the day of the shooting, January 10, 2013. Because petitioners presented their claims, sought leave from District to present late claims, and petitioned for relief from the claim presentation requirement, all more than one year after that date, District maintains their claims and their petition for relief were untimely and the trial court properly denied the petition for relief. We must consider whether the claims were timely presented and, if not, whether the requirements for obtaining relief from the claim presentation requirements were met by the petition.
IV. Sheryl's Claim
A. Accrual of cause of action
Petitioners invoke the delayed discovery rule and contend Sheryl's cause of action did not accrue until October 22, 2014, when she learned the nature and extent of the bullying and harassment Bryan had experienced at school. Prior to that time, they assert "[s]he was unaware of the series of incidents that form the basis of the tort claims and was ignorant of the severity of the bullying and of the sexual assault inflicted against" Bryan. Sheryl's claim seems to be based on allegations that the school failed to observe and inform her of incidents or signs warning of Bryan's volatile, potentially dangerous psychological or emotional state. The question then is whether the facts she knew and the incidents she was told about were enough that she suspected or should have suspected she had been injured by someone's wrongdoing by the date of the shooting.
The wrong Sheryl alleges seems to be an injury to some parental right to be informed of her son's conduct and treatment at school, so that she could take steps to remedy any psychological or emotional problems he might display, through changing his school or other means, before he resorted to violence. Sheryl conceded that, before the shooting, she was aware of three incidents, each of which resulted in Bryan's suspension from school.
On March 15, 2011, during his freshman year, Bryan had a fight with other students in his physical education (PE) class. In the fall prior to the fight, Sheryl had called the school and spoken to the assistant principal about the daily harassment Bryan was experiencing at the hands of a group of boys during his PE class. She told the assistant principal that, when Bryan complained to the teacher, the teacher just told him to "man up." The assistant principal said she would look into it and get back to Sheryl, but Sheryl did not hear from her. Sheryl called again in January 2011 and reported the harassment was continuing. The assistant principal again said she would look into it.
After the March 15, 2011, fight, Sheryl spoke with the assistant principal by phone, then met with her in person with Bryan present. Bryan said nothing during the meeting. The assistant principal told Sheryl that Bryan could be expelled, but it was close to the end of the school year, so he was only suspended for three days. Sheryl told the assistant principal they had been reporting the harassment all year. Sheryl was so disgusted with the assistant principal's behavior during the meeting, and mad that there was no resolution of the problem, that afterward she went directly to see the principal. The principal was dismissive and brushed her off.
Sheryl declared she was not aware until Bryan's criminal trial that he was also sexually assaulted on the day of the fight. Bryan used the term "teabagged" in an incident report he wrote for school officials describing the occurrence, but he never defined the term. Another student who witnessed the incident testified at the criminal trial that it meant one person put his crotch area onto another's face. District presented the declaration of the student who allegedly "teabagged" Bryan; he denied the allegation.
On October 14, 2011, the school informed Sheryl that Bryan had stolen another student's class work and tried to copy it and turn it in as his own work. He was suspended for five days.
On February 27, 2012, Sheryl admits she was told that, while Bryan was on a field trip two days earlier, he "had been involved in a conversation on the bus where he discussed a story or dream that made students and teachers uncomfortable," but she claims she was not told all the details. School incident reports indicate Bryan admitted discussing a "vivid and violent" dream he had had. Other students and teachers stated he also talked about killing his brother, punching a baby for crying, pushing a "crippled kid" in a wheelchair down and stealing his Halloween candy, and bringing guns and bombs and killing people at school. Bryan was suspended for five days; the suspension notice stated he "[c]aused, attempted to cause, or threatened to cause physical injury to another person" and he was suspended for "making threats to others." Sheryl voluntarily agreed to have her house searched for weapons or other threatening items.
It is undisputed that, on January 10, 2013, Bryan took a shotgun to school and shot another student. According to petitioners, on that date, Bryan "snapped under the pressure of years of unresolved harassment, torture, ridicule and unwarranted sexual advances made by fellow students."
Sheryl claims that, in addition to being unaware of the alleged sexual component of the March 15, 2011, altercation, she was also unaware of other incidents that occurred prior to the shooting. She mentions a story called "Psychopath" that Bryan wrote and posted on a poetry Web site, a report that Bryan drew pictures of shooting little kids, and testimony from the criminal trial that Bryan was bullied frequently.
The trial court found petitioners' cause of action accrued on January 10, 2013, because they "possessed sufficient information on January 10, 2013, to trigger the statutory limitations imposed on a claimant's time to file a claim." We conclude substantial evidence supports that finding and the trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion by denying relief from the requirement of complying with the claims presentation statutes. Sheryl admitted she knew Bryan was being bullied and harassed at school on an ongoing basis; complaints to the school brought no resolution. Further, she knew Bryan was suspended three times within a one-year period, once for making threats to cause physical injury. Sheryl denied she was told the details of what was said during the February 27, 2012, bus conversation; the details she denied knowing presumably included Brian's comments about bringing a gun to school and shooting the mean students, and about setting off a bomb in the auditorium. The suspension notice itself advised that Bryan made threats of physical harm; the five-day suspension was long enough to indicate the seriousness of the misconduct. Sheryl also consented to a search of her home "for weapons and other alleged threatening items." In light of these facts, the trial court was not required to believe that Sheryl was unaware of the nature of the threats Bryan made during the bus conversation.
Most importantly, Sheryl knew, on January 10, 2013, that her son had taken a gun to school and shot another student. We conclude Sheryl knew sufficient facts by that date to cause her to suspect that some wrong had been done that caused Bryan to "snap" and take that action. If her claim is that the District failed to remedy the harassment and protect her child, she was aware of sufficient facts concerning the harassment that her cause of action accrued at that time. If she claims her injury arose because the school and District failed to inform her of other incidents that would have alerted her to Bryan's psychological state and the need to take action to protect him, we also find substantial evidence supports accrual at that time. Sheryl seems to contend the incidents about which she had knowledge did not adequately warn her of Bryan's potential for violence; under those circumstances, however, a reasonable person would have questioned whether there were other reasons or events, unknown to her, that caused or contributed to Bryan's actions on the day of the shooting. Thus, she knew sufficient facts to put her on inquiry regarding whether she had been fully informed of what had happened to Bryan at his school prior to the date of the shooting. Further, because the shooting occurred at school and the victim was a classmate, it would be reasonable to question whether the school or District was responsible in any way for Bryan's emotional state or his actions. Consequently, we find substantial evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that Sheryl had sufficient knowledge of circumstances by the date of the shooting to cause a reasonable person to suspect wrongdoing and to have an incentive to sue. Accordingly, as the trial court found, her cause of action accrued by that date.
We note that Sheryl had additional notice of possible wrongdoing or liability of District when the shooting victim sued District, alleging it was responsible for the injuries he sustained as a result of the shooting. Sheryl had notice of the litigation no later than July 21, 2013, when she was served with District's cross-complaint against her, which had attached a copy of the victim's complaint. That date was also more than one year before Sheryl presented her claim and application for leave to present a late claim to District.
In petitioning for relief from the claim presentation requirements, Sheryl bore the burden of proving by a preponderance of the evidence that her application for leave to present a late claim to the public entity was made within a reasonable time, not exceeding one year, after accrual of her cause of action. (§ 946.6, subds. (b), (c); Munoz, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1777.) Her cause of action accrued no later than January 10, 2013; her application for leave to present a late claim was not submitted until January 9, 2015. Because Sheryl's application was not timely presented within the one-year period after accrual, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sheryl's petition for relief from the claim presentation requirements.
B. Estoppel
Sheryl also contends District is estopped from asserting the untimeliness of her claim because it prevented or deterred her from presenting a timely claim.
"It is well settled that a public entity may be estopped from asserting the limitations of the claims statute where its agents or employees have prevented or deterred the filing of a timely claim by some affirmative act." (John R. v. Oakland Unified School Dist. (1989) 48 Cal.3d 438, 445.) "The required elements for an equitable estoppel are: (1) the party to be estopped must be apprised of the facts; (2) the party to be estopped must intend his or her conduct shall be acted upon, or must so act that the party asserting the estoppel had a right to believe it was so intended; (3) the other party must be ignorant of the true state of facts; and (4) the other party must rely upon the conduct to his or her injury." (Munoz, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1785.) "Estoppel most commonly results from misleading statements about the need for or advisability of a claim; actual fraud or the intent to mislead is not essential. [Citation.] A fortiori, estoppel may certainly be invoked when there are acts of violence or intimidation that are intended to prevent the filing of a claim." (John R., at p. 445, italics omitted.) "Claims of estoppel have been rejected, however, where the plaintiff cannot show calculated conduct or representations by the public entity or its agents that induced the plaintiff to remain inactive and not to comply with the claims-presentation requirements." (Ortega v. Pajaro Valley Unified School Dist. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 1023, 1045 (Ortega).) " ' "[T]he existence of an estoppel is generally a question of fact for the trier of fact, and ordinarily the [fact finder's] determination is binding on appeal unless the contrary conclusion is the only one to be reasonably drawn from the facts." ' " (Ortega, supra, 64 Cal.App.4th at p. 1043.)
Sheryl bases her claim of estoppel on the same alleged failure to disclose school-related incidents involving Bryan that formed the basis for her delayed discovery theory. She declared in support of her petition for relief that, between the date of the shooting and the date she first presented her claim to District, she was focused on Bryan's criminal trial and unable to pay for the services of an attorney for the civil action. She has not identified any affirmative act by District, or its agents or employees, during that time period that prevented or deterred her from presenting a timely claim. She submitted no evidence that District made misrepresentations about the need to present a claim or the time within which a claim was required to be presented. She submitted no evidence that District threatened or intimidated her to deter her from presenting a claim, or engaged in other calculated conduct that induced her to remain inactive rather than comply with the claims presentation requirements.
Sheryl argues: "If there is no duty to inform then a failure to advise a party of facts that would lead to a claim do [sic] not establish an estoppel. But if the public entity has a duty to speak an estoppel will, nevertheless arise." In support, she quotes from Castaneda v. Department of Corrections & Rehabilitation (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 1051 (Castaneda), which stated that silence will not give rise to an estoppel unless the silent party had a duty to speak. (Id. at p. 1066.) Sheryl then argues at length that District owed her various duties that required it to inform her of Bryan's threatening behavior, including the incidents reported to it, such as his threats to kill students or blow up the auditorium.
The quote from Castaneda, however, is taken out of context and does not support her argument. The court in Castaneda stated: "The trial court also concluded the State was estopped from asserting noncompliance with the Act because the State waited until after the statutory time to present a late claim expired to move for judgment on the pleadings. Effectively, the court found by remaining silent about [the claimant's] obligation to comply with the Act until the deadline to file a late claim passed, the State snared [the claimant] into noncompliance. However, ' " '[m]ere silence will not create estoppel unless the silent party was under some obligation to speak, and a party invoking such estoppel must show that it was the duty of the other to speak . . . .' " [Citation.]' [Citations.] As we have explained, the State, as opposing party in litigation, had no affirmative duty to remind [the claimant's] lawyers about their obligation to file a tort claim, particularly where the [Government Claims] Act was never discussed. [Citations.] Therefore, the State's silence is not grounds for estoppel." (Castaneda, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1066.)
Thus, the asserted basis for estoppel was silence about the claimant's obligation to comply with the claim presentation statutes by presenting a timely claim. (Castaneda, supra, 212 Cal.App.4th at p. 1066.) Sheryl has presented no legal authority imposing on District an obligation to inform her that a claim was required or that there was a time limit for presenting one, especially where, as here, she gave District no indication during the claim presentation period that she intended to make an affirmative claim against District for her own alleged injuries. Accordingly, she failed to establish that District's silence, or failure to inform her of incidents that allegedly form the basis of her substantive cause of action, gave rise to an estoppel that precluded District from relying on the claims presentation requirements to bar her claim.
Substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Sheryl did not establish estoppel. The trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying relief from the claim presentation requirements on the ground of estoppel.
V. Bryan's Claim
Petitioners invoke the delayed discovery rule as to Bryan's claim as well. They contend Bryan's cause of action against District did not accrue until he reached the age of majority, August 27, 2014; accordingly, the claim he presented on January 9, 2015, was presented within six months and was therefore timely.
Petitioners do not contend Bryan's minority per se postponed accrual of his cause of action. Instead, they contend that, under the delayed discovery doctrine, a cause of action does not accrue until the injured party discovers it; when the injured party is a minor, and the minor lacks the ability to understand that a wrong has been done to him, it is the knowledge of the parent that determines when the cause of action accrues. Bryan's mother was unaware of the facts giving rise to the cause of action while he was a minor. Petitioners apparently concede that, once Bryan reached the age of majority, he was charged with knowledge of the facts of which he was aware, so his cause of action accrued when he turned eighteen.
The minority of the claimant during the entire six-month period for presenting a claim is a mandatory ground for the public entity to grant an application to present a late claim, if the application is timely presented. (§ 911.6, subd. (b)(2).) Minority during the initial six-month period for presenting a claim is also a ground for the court to grant relief from the claim presentation requirement, but only if an application for leave to present a late claim was submitted to the public entity within the applicable one-year period. (§ 946.6, subd. (c).)
Minority, however, does not excuse the claimant's failure to submit an application to the public entity for leave to present a late claim within the one-year period for applying for such leave. (§ 911.4, subd. (c)(1); Wall v. Sonora Union High School Dist. (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 870, 871-872.) Section 911.4 provides that, in computing the one-year period for applying for leave to present a late claim, "[t]he time during which the person who sustained the alleged injury, damage, or loss as a minor shall be counted." (§ 911.4, subd. (c)(1).) "Filing a late-claim application within one year after the accrual of a cause of action is a jurisdictional prerequisite to a claim-relief petition. [Citation.] When the underlying application to file a late claim is filed more than one year after the accrual of the cause of action, the court is without jurisdiction to grant relief under Government Code section 946.6." (Munoz, supra, 33 Cal.App.4th at p. 1779.) Thus, if Bryan's cause of action accrued on the day of the shooting, his application for leave to present a late claim was not made within one year of accrual, and section 946.6 did not permit the trial court to grant relief from the claim presentation requirements, even on the ground of his minority during the initial six-month claim presentation period.
The claimant's minority, however, may affect accrual of the cause of action. In Curtis T. v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 1405 (Curtis T.), a minor was allegedly molested between the ages of five and eight by another child while he lived in a foster home; the foster parent allegedly saw the molestation but did nothing to stop it. (Id. at p. 1408.) The minor's mother allegedly learned of the molestation three years later; the minor's claim was presented to the county within six months after the mother's discovery. (Id. at p. 1409.) The trial court sustained the county's demurrer to the minor's complaint without leave to amend, on the ground the action was barred by failure to present a timely claim. (Id. at p. 1413.)
On appeal, the court determined that "courts may equitably apply the delayed discovery rule in appropriate child molestation cases." (Curtis T., supra, 123 Cal.App.4th at p. 1418.) It stated: "One of the '[t]wo common themes run[ning] through the cases applying the discovery rule of accrual' is that 'the rule is applied to types of actions in which it will generally be difficult for plaintiffs to immediately detect or comprehend the breach or the resulting injuries. . . . Even when the breach and damage are not physically hidden, they may be beyond what the plaintiff could reasonably be expected to comprehend.' " (Id. at p. 1420.) The court noted the minor was five to eight years old at the time of the alleged molestation, and was living in foster care with no parent legally able to represent his interests. (Ibid.) Under these circumstances, it was "reasonably possible for a 12- or 13-year-old child such as plaintiff to allege he was unaware that the acts done to him between the ages of five and eight were wrongful, particularly when he also alleges that his foster parent saw the alleged molestation but failed to stop it. If '[b]y law and for sound social policies the child must place his trust in the [foster] parent and submit to parental authority' [citation], it is reasonable to believe this minor plaintiff can amend to allege that due to his youth, ignorance, and inexperience, coupled with his foster parent's alleged complicity in the abuse, he was unaware that what was done to him was wrongful prior to his mother's discovery of the abuse." (Id. at p. 1422.) The court directed the trial court to grant leave to amend, so the minor could allege, "if he is able to do so truthfully—given his youth, ignorance, and inexperience, as well as his foster parent's alleged complicity in the abuse—that he lacked a real awareness, until his mother's discovery of the alleged molestation, that what happened to him between the ages of five and eight was wrong." (Id. at pp. 1422-1423.)
In S.M., the minor's fourth grade teacher allegedly fondled her repeatedly during the 2002-2003 school year. (S.M., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 715.) He also fondled several other girls, and the girls all agreed to keep quiet and not tell their parents what had happened. (Ibid.) When the teacher was arrested, the minor's mother asked her about him, and the minor told her mother what the teacher had done to her. (Ibid.) The minor's claim was presented to the school district in April 2005, within six months after the mother learned of the molestation. (Id. at pp. 715-716.) The trial court granted the school district's motion for summary judgment, which was based on the untimeliness of the claim presentation. (Ibid.)
In its motion, the district relied on the minor's deposition testimony that she felt at the time that what the teacher was doing was wrong, she tried to avoid his advances, and his actions made her scared and nervous. (S.M., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at pp. 715, 717, 720.) In opposition, the minor "argued that because of her age and inexperience, her knowledge of wrongfulness was irrelevant, and her cause of action did not accrue until . . . her mother learned what happened." (Id. at p. 718.) The court stated: "To the extent S.M. contends Curtis T. holds that a minor's sexual molestation cause of action does not accrue until a parent learns of the molestation, she has misread that decision." (Ibid.) Curtis T. rejected a "blanket delayed discovery rule applicable to all causes of action by . . . minors." (S.M., at p. 719.) It "did not hold that a minor's cause of action for sex abuse accrues only when a parent learns what happened. Instead, it adopted a circumstance-heavy approach, pegged to the unique facts of each case, and held that, given the right circumstances, a minor suing for sexual abuse is entitled to show that the cause of action did not accrue until a parent learned what happened or some other date after the abuse occurred." (Id. at pp. 719-720.)
The court concluded summary judgment was proper. (S.M., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 720.) The minor's complaint did not allege delayed discovery; it did not allege facts that might have prevented her from becoming aware that she had been wronged, or the facts of her mother's discovery of the abuse. The minor offered no evidence in opposition to the motion for summary judgment to show that she lacked a real awareness of the wrongfulness of the teacher's conduct; therefore, she failed to raise a triable issue of material fact and summary judgment was properly granted. (Id. at pp. 720-721.)
In J.J. v. County of San Diego (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1214 (J.J.), the minor was allegedly sexually molested by her foster father, R.L., in 2009. (Id. at p. 1218.) In May 2012, she presented a claim to the county, alleging it was liable in negligence for the placement, lack of supervision, and failure to investigate or prevent sexual abuse in the minor's foster home. (Id. at pp. 1219, 1222.) The county contended the minor's cause of action accrued at the time of the molestation, because she knew it was wrong, or at the latest, in March 2011, when the minor's parents spoke at R.L.'s criminal sentencing. The minor alleged her cause of action against the county did not accrue until March 2012, when she first obtained the investigator's follow-up report from the police department; she contended the report "for the first time showed the County's negligence was the cause of her personal injury." (Id. at p. 1218.) The trial court denied the minor's petition for relief from the claim presentation requirement, and the minor appealed. (Ibid.)
The minor conceded she was aware she had been molested in 2009; she reported the details to her parents and county social workers in December 2010. (J.J., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p. 1224.) An investigation followed, and R.L. pled guilty to criminal charges. (Ibid.) The court stated: "Even if we assume there was evidence in the record showing J.J. at the time of the molestations . . . lacked a real awareness that R.L.'s sexual abuse was 'wrong' [citation] and thus that she had been 'injured' [citation], and even if we conclude the delayed discovery rule applies to her situation, we nonetheless are constrained to conclude that J.J.'s cause of action for personal injuries accrued at the latest in early March 2011, when her parents appeared and spoke at the sentencing hearing of R.L. [Citation.] At that point in time, J.J.'s parents clearly were aware of the ' "generic" elements of wrongdoing, causation, and harm' [citation] resulting from R.L.'s molestation of their daughter while in foster care." (Id. at pp. 1224-1225.)
The court also reviewed the police investigator's report, which the minor contended gave notice of the county's potential liability for her injury. (J.J., supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1225-1226.) It noted the minor had not specifically addressed how any additional facts the report contained "support[ed] her contention that she was not aware, or could not reasonably have become aware (before she obtained a copy of that report in Mar. 2012), that the County was potentially liable for placing her, supervising her, and/or preventing sexual abuse in the foster home of R.L. and his family." (Id. at p. 1226.) The contents of the report did not change the court's conclusion that the minor's action against the county accrued, at the latest, when her parents spoke at R.L.'s sentencing hearing. (Id. at pp. 1226-1227.)
The rule set out by these cases is that the time when a minor's cause of action accrues, for purposes of commencing the time period within which a government claim must be presented to the public entity allegedly responsible for the minor's injury, depends upon the circumstances of the particular case. In order for the delayed discovery rule to apply, the minor claimant must present facts showing that, due to his youth, ignorance, and inexperience, the claimant lacked a real awareness that what was done to him was wrongful. If he makes such a showing, accrual may be postponed until he understands that he has been wronged, or until his parent or guardian is aware of facts sufficient to cause the parent or guardian to suspect the minor was injured by someone's wrongdoing.
Bryan's claim appears to be based on allegations that District failed to prevent the harassment and violence allegedly committed against him by other students at his school. In his claim, he alleged that, "after years of being subjected to repeated harassment, bullying, verbal abuse, sexual advances, beatings and other offensive behavior by his fellow students, [he] snapped." He had complained to his mother about the alleged harassment and abuse multiple times, but each time she reported it to the school and District, certain students retaliated against him. He had reported the March 15, 2011, incident, but school officials allegedly ignored the report. In support of the petition for relief, petitioners asserted Bryan "was bullied, harassed, verbally and physically assaulted, etc. from his freshman year to very shortly before the culminating event on January 10, 2013, a period of almost two and one half years." He allegedly did not report the full extent of the harassment to his mother, but he did report various incidents of harassment to the school and one or more of his teachers.
Bryan did not submit a declaration in support of his petition. He did not state under oath that, at the time of the alleged incidents of harassment or at any time after January 10, 2013, he was too young, ignorant, or inexperienced to understand that the harassment and bullying he allegedly underwent were wrongful. In fact, his complaints to his teachers and school administrators demonstrate his understanding of the wrongfulness of the treatment he was subjected to by other students and his expectation that complaints to teachers and administrators at the school would result in resolution of the situation. Bryan's allegations that the harassment continued unabated despite his complaints to school officials suggest he also knew the school or District was not adequately responding to his complaints. Knowledge of the legal basis for his claim against District—for example knowledge that the school owed its students, including Bryan, a duty to protect them from harassment or abuse by other students—was not necessary in order for his cause of action to accrue. Delayed discovery requires only knowledge of the " 'generic' elements of wrongdoing, causation, and harm.' " (S.M., supra, 184 Cal.App.4th at p. 717.) The evidence indicates Bryan had knowledge of those elements at least by the date of the shooting. Accordingly, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court's finding that Bryan had sufficient knowledge, at least by the date of the shooting, to cause his claim to accrue and trigger the limitations period for presentation of a claim to District.
Because Bryan's claim, like his mother's, accrued no later than January 10, 2013, and his application to present a late claim was not presented within one year of that date, he did not meet his burden of establishing the conditions necessary for relief from the claim presentation requirements under section 946.6. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Bryan's petition for relief from the claims presentation requirements.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their costs on appeal.
/s/_________
HILL, P.J. WE CONCUR: /s/_________
PEÑA, J. /s/_________
BLACK, J.
Judge of the Fresno Superior Court assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.