Opinion
No: 01-2691, SECTION "N"(2)
July 15, 2002
ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiff, Chantell Swift, is a student at the University of New Orleans ("UNO"). She filed this action pro se and in forma pauperis against Dr. Anne Siesel, Executive Director of the Orleans Parish Cluster B Elementary Schools; Bonnie Payton, principal of Mary Church Terrell School ("Terrell School"); and the Orleans Parish School Board. Plaintiff alleges that defendants deprived her of due process when they barred her from student-teaching at Terrell School or any other Orleans Parish school, thus preventing her from completing the requirements to graduate in May 2001 with her undergraduate degree in elementary education. Record Doc. No. 1, Complaint, at p. 1. Swift seeks damages of $45,000 for all costs, losses and mental anguish that she allegedly suffered as the result of being unable to graduate as planned. Id. at pp. # 5-6.
Defendants moved for summary judgment, supported by the complaint and its attachments. Record Doc. No. 18; see Fed.R.Civ.P. 10(c) ("A copy of any written instrument which is an exhibit to a pleading is a part thereof for all purposes."). Plaintiff received a seventeen-day extension of time beyond the two weeks initially given to her to respond to defendants' summary judgment motion. Record Doc. Nos. 19, 20. Her second motion for an extension of time was denied. Record Doc. No. 27.
Swift filed an opposition memorandum, supported by the same documents attached to her complaint and by copies of pages purportedly from the Student Teaching Handbook, UNO, College of Education, Office of Clinical and Field Experiences, Fall/Spring 2000-2001 ("Student Teaching Handbook"). Record Doc. No. 23. The pages from the Student Teaching Handbook are not sworn or certified as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). Nonetheless, I have considered them in connection with plaintiff's opposition. Even if these documents were certified, the outcome of the pending motion for summary judgment would still be in favor of defendants.
Having considered the complaint, the record, the submissions of the parties and the applicable law, IT IS ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The following material facts are accepted as undisputed solely for purposes of the pending summary judgment motion. Although Swift recites additional facts in her opposition memorandum and her statement of material facts, those facts not discussed herein are not material to the issues raised by defendants' summary judgment motion.
In April 2001, Swift was an undergraduate student at UNO. She had completed all requirements for her elementary education degree except her student-teaching requirement. She expected to graduate in May 2001 after spending the spring semester student-teaching in New Orleans public schools. Swift did not receive any wages for being a student teacher.
On April 6, 2001, Swift was involved in an altercation with a substitute teacher, Mary Dowell, at Terrell School, where Swift was student-teaching. As a result, plaintiff was arrested and charged with simple battery. On August 1, 2001, the City Attorney declined to prosecute ("nolle prosequied") the charge. Record Doc. No. 1, unnumbered attachment to Complaint, true copy of order from Municipal Court, City of New Orleans.
Neither defendants nor plaintiff have separately numbered the exhibits attached to their respective memoranda. Instead, the parties refer to the exhibits by the item numbers listed on the attachments to the complaint, and I have done the same.
Dr. Siesel informed Swift by letter dated April 6, 2001 that Dr. Siesel had learned that plaintiff had been charged with simple battery as a result of the incident that day. Dr. Siesel advised Swift that she was not to report to Terrell School or any other New Orleans public school pending the results of investigations by the New Orleans Police Department, Dr. Siesel's office and UNO. Record Doc. No. 1, attachment to Complaint, Item #7.
Terrell School Principal Payton investigated the incident by obtaining statements from (1) the substitute teacher, Dowell; (2) Swift's "cooperating teacher, " Ms. Nelson, who had been out of town on April 6, 2001 but who verified that she had designated Swift to teach her classes in her absence; (3) Ms. Spooner, Terrell School's Middle School Chairperson, who stated that she had directed plaintiff to report to another classroom on April 6, 2001 and had told Swift where she could find Dowell when plaintiff declined to report to another classroom; and (4) Kieva Stanton, who told Payton that she had witnessed and intervened in the altercation. Based on these statements, Payton wrote a memorandum to Dr. Siesel dated April 10, 2001, in which she concluded that Swift had angrily confronted Dowell, the two had argued and Swift had slapped Dowell's face in front of a room full of students. Payton recommended that plaintiff not be allowed to return to Terrell School to complete her student teaching term. Record Doc. No. 1, attachment to Complaint, Item #10.
On April 10, 2001, in response to Payton's request, plaintiff submitted a written statement detailing her version of the events leading up to the April 6th incident and the incident itself. It is not clear whether Payton received this statement before completing her written report dated the same day. The report does not refer to it. Swift contended in her statement that Dowell was an inadequate teacher and that Dowell had provoked the final argument, had spoken loudly, had threatened plaintiff verbally, had moved toward plaintiff with balled up fists and "began motioning to strike" plaintiff. Swift stated that she had responded by "motion[ing] to strike in self defense, " but that she never touched Dowell. Record Doc. No. 1, attachment to Complaint, Item #5.
On May 25, 2001, plaintiff wrote to Payton and requested "due process" in connection with her removal from the school. Record Doc. No. 1, attachment to Complaint, Item #15. She received no response from Payton.
After the criminal battery charge against Swift was dismissed, she submitted a certified copy of the dismissal to Dr. Siesel on August 3, 2001. Dr. Siesel notified Swift by telephone on August 29, 2001 that she would not reverse her decision to exclude plaintiff from student teaching at any Orleans Parish public school. Record Doc. No. 1, Complaint at pp. 9-10.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment Standards
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The moving party bears the initial burden of identifying those portions of the pleadings and discovery in the record that it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact, but it is not required to negate elements of the nonmoving party's case. Edwards v. Your Credit. Inc., 148 F.3d 427, 431 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)).
When a moving party alleges that there is an absence of evidence necessary to prove a specific element of a case, the nonmoving party bears the burden of presenting evidence that provides a genuine issue for trial. "[T]here is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the nonmoving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted."
Thomas v. Barton Lodge II. Ltd., 174 F.3d 636, 644 (5th Cir. 1999) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23; quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby. Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50 (1986)).
If the movant bears the burden of proof on an issue, either because it is the plaintiff or is asserting an affirmative defense as a defendant, the movant must establish all of the essential elements of the claim or defense to warrant judgment in its favor. Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986).
A fact is "material" if its resolution in favor of one party might affect the outcome of the action under governing law. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248; Hamilton v. Segue Software Inc., 232 F.3d 473, 477 (5th Cir. 2000). An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is sufficient for a rational trier of fact to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id.
To withstand a properly supported motion, the nonmoving party who bears the burden of proof at trial must come forward with evidence to support the essential elements of its claim. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees v. City Pub. Serv. Bd., 40 F.3d 698, 712 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 321-23). "[A] complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case renders all other facts immaterial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323.
The court must consider all evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. National Ass'n of Gov't Employees, 40 F.3d at 712-13. "Conclusory allegations unsupported by specific facts, however, will not prevent the award of summary judgment; "the plaintiff [can]not rest on his allegations . . . to get to a jury without any "significant probative evidence tending to support the complaint."'" Id. at 713 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249).
"Factual controversies are construed in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, but only if both parties have introduced evidence showing that an actual controversy exists." Edwards, 148 F.3d at 432; accord Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (en banc). "We do not. however, in the absence of any proof. assume that the nonmoving party could or would prove the necessary facts." Id. (emphasis in original). "Moreover, the nonmoving party's burden is not affected by the type of case; summary judgment is appropriate in any case where critical evidence is so weak or tenuous on an essential fact that it could not support a judgment m favor of the nonmovant." Id. (quotation omitted) (emphasis in original).
B. Swift's Procedural Due Process Claim Fails as a Matter of Law
Defendants argue that Swift had no protected interest in continued "employment" as a student teacher because she was not an employee of the Orleans Parish School Board. Although I believe that defendants' arguments focus too narrowly on the employment context when plaintiff asserts that her rights arise in the public education context, I find that Swift has not produced any evidence to create a genuine issue of disputed material fact that she enjoys a property or liberty right in either context. In the absence of such a protected interest, she has no constitutional right to any form of process.
Furthermore, even if plaintiff had a protectable interest, the undisputed material facts establish that she received all the process that was due. Accordingly, her procedural due process claim must be dismissed.
1. Swift Has No Protected Property or Liberty Interest Arising from her "Employment"
To trigger a guarantee of due process, Swift must show that (1) a state actor (2) deprived (3) her [a person] (4) of a protected interest. Texas Faculty Ass'n v. University of Tex., 946 F.2d 379, 383 (5th Cir. 1991). If she had such a protected interest, defendants could not deprive her of it without procedural due process. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538 (1985); McDonald v. City of Corinth, 102 F.3d 152, 155 (5th Cir. 1996) (citations omitted). Defendants do not dispute the first three factors in this case, but they argue that Swift cannot show that she had either a protected property or liberty interest.
As to property rights, "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment's procedural protection of property is a safeguard of the security of interests that a person has already acquired in specific benefits." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972); accord Copsey v. Swearingen, 36 F.3d 1336, 1341 (5th Cir. 1994). "To have a property interest in a benefit, a person must have more than an abstract need or desire for it. He must have more than a unilateral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate claim of entitlement to it." Roth, 408 U.S. at 577; accord Blackburn v. Marshall City of, 42 F.3d 925, 936 (5th Cir. 1995).
State law controls the analysis of whether plaintiff has a property interest sufficient to entitle her to due process protection. McDonald, 102 F.3d at 155 (citations omitted).
[T]o establish either a substantive or a procedural due process violation by claiming denial of a property right, [plaintiff] must first establish a denial of a constitutionally protected property right. . . . Such a showing. . . must be made by reference to state law. "The Constitution does not create property interests; "they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law."
cannot have any greater rights than paid non-tenured employees, and she similarly has no constitutionally protected property interest in continuing her student teaching.
The only public employees with protected property interests in their jobs under Louisiana law are those with contracts stating that they may be fired only for cause and those who are permanent classified employees under the State's civil service system. Wallace v. Shreve Mem. Library, 97 F.3d 746, 747 (5th Cir. 1996). Swift does not allege, and has offered no proof, that she falls into either of these categories
Moreover, even if Swift had a contract that allowed defendants to fire her only for cause (which she has neither alleged nor established), defendants had cause to take disciplinary action against her based on their findings that she provoked the verbal altercation with and physically assaulted Dowell. Harris, 605 So.2d at 612, 616; Bouterie v. Department of Fire, 410 So.2d 340, 341 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1982).
Defendants therefore are correct that Swift, as a non-employee, had no protected property right in "employment" at Orleans Parish public schools as a student teacher. See Dustin v. DHCI Home Health Servs., Inc., 673 So.2d 356, 359-60 (La.App. 1st Cir. 1996)("[F]or an employer-employee relationship to exist, there must be a contract of employment, . . . whereby services are furnished in anticipation of compensation. . [P]laintiff was a student and therefore did not render services to [the school] in anticipation of compensation. Because there exists no employment relationship" between plaintiff and the school, he is neither an employee of the school nor a borrowed employee of the hospital where he undertook his education-related clinical training.) (citation omitted). Similarly, in the absence of a protected property or liberty interest, plaintiff in the instant case has no right to any process.
Defendants argue that plaintiff has no liberty interest in her "employment" as a student-teacher at Orleans Parish public schools because she was not an employee. Citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923), Swift responds that she has liberty interests in engaging in the common occupations of life and in acquiring useful knowledge. Plaintiff' s contentions fail to establish any dispute material fact issue requiring trial as to whether she has a liberty interest in the employment context.
Even if plaintiff were considered an employee, a discharged governmental employee states a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest only in the following circumstances.
To state a claim for deprivation of a liberty interest, the plaintiff must allege more than merely the stigma of discharge. Mere proof that the employment decision might make an individual less attractive to other employers does not, by itself, implicate a liberty interest. Moreover, concern about the impact of the plaintiff' s discharge on his or her general reputation is not, standing alone, sufficient to give rise to the required liberty interest. To the contrary, a constitutionally protected liberty interest is implicated only if an employee is discharged in a manner that creates a false and defamatory impression about him and thus stigmatizes him and forecloses him from other employment opportunities.
Hughes v. City of Garland, 204 F.3d 223, 226 (5th Cir. 2000) (citations and quotations omitted).
Thus, to prevail on her claim that defendants infringed upon a cognizable liberty interest, Swift must show:
(1) that she was discharged; (2) that stigmatizing charges were made against her in connection with the discharge; (3) that the charges were false; (4) that she was not provided notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to her discharge; (5) that the charges were made public; (6) that she requested a hearing to clear her name; and (7) that the employer refused her request for a hearing.
Id.
Although Swift denies that she was the aggressor in the April 6, 2001 incident or that she slapped Dowell, "the propriety of summary judgment does not depend upon the resolution of that factual dispute. Rather, the propriety of summary judgment in this case centers around [Swift's] failure to produce any evidence with respect to" several of the elements (1) through (5); "only if she prevailed on . . . element [(5)] would we reach elements (6) and (7)." Id. at 226-27.
At a minimum, plaintiff has submitted nothing in connection with this motion showing that she could meet elements (1), (3) or (5). First, she was not "discharged" because she was not an employee. As to element (3), the initial "charge" against her by defendants was that she had been criminally charged with battery. See Dr. Siesel' s letter dated April 6, 2001, Record Doc. No. 1, attachment to Complaint, Item #7. Swift admittedly was criminally charged. Thus, defendants' initial "charge" against her was not false. Similarly, Swift admits that she was involved in an altercation with Dowell in front of a roomful of students, although she disputes the details of the altercation. Thus, to the extent that defendants relied on plaintiff's participation in an admitted altercation (whether or not the facts were exactly as stated in Payton's report) when they ended her studentteaching assignment, that "charge" also was not false. As to the fifth element, plaintiff's failure to produce any evidence that defendants made public the charges against her precludes a finding that she has any liberty interest at stake in her "employment." Id. at 227-28.
Accordingly, because Swift had neither a property nor a liberty interest in employment, she was not entitled to any particular procedures in connection with termination of her student-teaching "employment, " and her due process claim must fail.
2. Swift Has No Protected Property or Liberty Interest Arising from her Participation in a Public Education
Although defendants focus their arguments on the employment context, Swift alleges an entitlement to receive her college degree from a public university by being allowed to complete her student teaching requirement at a New Orleans public school. It is well established that students have a protectable interest in receiving a public education when state laws provide for such an education and that "suspension from [public] school without some kind of notice and hearing may violate property and liberty interests." Nevares v. San Marcos Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 111 F.3d 25, 26 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 574 (1975)) (emphasis added).
However, the Fifth Circuit has held that no protected property interest is implicated in a school's denial to offer a student a particular curriculum. In Arundar [v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist.], a high school student had claimed that her property right to education was implicated when she was denied enrollment in certain courses of study. We affirmed the district court's dismissal of the case and held that although state law could create a protected interest in a particular kind of education, for example by mandating special education for exceptional children, absent such a basis in state law, there was no cause of action. This court has also rejected arguments that there is any protected interest in the separate components of the educational process, such as participation in interscholastic athletics. The Tenth Circuit has held that a student does not have a constitutional right to particular incidents of education such as sports or advanced placement classes or attending a particular school.
Id. (citing Arundar v. DeKalb County Sch. Dist., 620 F.2d 493 (5th Cir. 1980)) (additional citations omitted).
Thus, although Swift "had a constitutional property interest in a public education, this right applies to the educational process in general, not to any particular component of that process . . . . The facts in this case do not even hint that [Swift] was denied the right to participate in the educational process at [UNO]." Rutherford v. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist., No. H-96-3953, 1998 WL 330527, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 25, 1998) (Rainey, J.) (citing Goss, 419 U.S. at 574; Nevares, 111 F.3d at 27). Swift "is not being denied access to public education, not even temporarily." Nevares, 111 F.3d at 26. Under these authorities, Swift has no protected property interest in being allowed to student-teach at a particular school or in a particular parish as part of her curriculum.
Just as in the employment context, the liberty interest arising from the State's establishment of a public education system is a liberty interest in one's reputation. Goss, 419 U.S. at 576.
Where a person's good name, reputation, honor, or integrity is at stake because of what the government is doing to him, the minimal requirements of the [Due Process] Clause must be satisfied. School authorities here suspended appellees from school . . . based on charges of misconduct. If sustained and recorded, those charges could seriously damage the students' standing with their fellow pupils and their teachers as well as interfere with later opportunities for higher education and employment. It is apparent that the claimed right of the State to determine unilaterally and without process whether that misconduct has occurred immediately collides with the requirements of the Constitution.
Goss, 419 U.S. at 574-75 (quotation and citations omitted).
In the Fifth Circuit's most recent consideration of due process claims by a student at the university level, the court evaluated a medical resident's claims that she enjoyed both liberty and property interests in her medical residency program and in the clinical privileges that she had at cooperating hospitals as part of her program. The appeals court held that
students' due process rights are evaluated on a scale commensurate with the nature of their academic program and the type of discipline involved. In particular, "[i]t is well-known that the primary purpose of a residency program is not employment or a stipend, but the academic training and academic certification for successful completion of the program."
Shaboon v. Duncan, 252 F.3d 722, 729 (5th Cir. 2001) (quoting Davis v. Mann, 882 F.2d 967, 974 (5th Cir. 1989)). Similarly, it cannot be disputed that the primary purpose of the student-teaching component of Swift's degree program, for which she (unlike Shaboon) was not paid, is to receive the academic training and certification for successful completion of the program.
The Fifth Circuit's decision in Shaboon controls the instant case. The court approvingly quoted Davis, a case in which a dental school resident had been dismissed for performance deficiencies, as follows.
"Courts overwhelmingly agree that students. whether dismissed for academic or disciplinary reasons. are not entitled to as much procedural protection under the Fourteenth Amendment as employees who are terminated from their jobs." And, pursuant to [Board of Curators v. ]Horowitz, "Davis was not entitled to any hearing — much less the full-blown post-termination hearing he received."
Id. (quoting Davis, 882 F.2d at 973-74, 975; citing Board of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978), in which a medical resident had been dismissed for academic reasons) (emphasis added). The Fifth Circuit held that Shaboon, who, like Davis, had been dismissed for academic deficiencies, had no right to any hearing at all and thus could not claim that defendant had violated any liberty interest.
Moreover, the court held, even if Shaboon had been dismissed for disciplinary rather than academic reasons, "[a]ll that Goss required [for disciplinary actions against students] was an informal give-and-take between the student and the administrative body dismissing [her] that would, at least, give the student the opportunity to characterize [her] conduct and put it in what [she] deems the proper context." Id. (quotations omitted) (citing Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 85-86; Goss, 419 U.S. at 584).
Pursuant to the holdings in Davis and Shaboon, Swift had no right to any hearing before or after she was barred from the Orleans Parish public schools, and therefore she has no claim for a deprivation of her due process interests.
However, Swift alleges that she was entitled not just to an education, but to the right to student-teach at the parish public schools. Shaboon again negates this argument. The Fifth Circuit held that, as with other forms of public employment, medical staff privileges can constitute a liberty or property interest entitling the employee to procedural due process before termination. Id. at 731-32. Shaboon had written contracts with the two hospitals where she had medical privileges. However, the court held that Shaboon's contracts with the hospitals did not establish a liberty interest in her clinical privileges because "[t]hese privileges were part of her educational program and were not distinct from her residency. She lost the privileges for the same academic problems that caused her to lose her residency, and so she had no right to a hearing." Id. at 731.
Furthermore, Shaboon had no property interest because she had no implicit agreement that the Hospital District could terminate her only for cause. Shaboon did not have a license to practice medicine, and was working under an institutional permit, a permit issued by the Texas Board of Medical Examiners to unlicensed doctors contingent on their participation in a residency program. Likewise, Shaboon's contract [with the Veterans Administration hospital] was contingent on her continuing satisfactory performance in the residency program. Thus, Shaboon has failed to show that these agreements created any property interest in her clinical privileges.
Shaboon's limited clinical privileges only entitled her to treat patients under the supervision of Hospital District doctors, and her stipend was only payable while she remained a student. These privileges were not distinct from the performance of her residency. Thus, Shaboon had no clearly established economic or noneconomic property interest in the limited privileges.
Id. at 732.
Again, the Fifth Circuit relied on its prior holding in Davis that there was no support in the case law for Davis's claim that he is entitled to the duties and responsibilities of his employment [as a dental resident] as specified under the contract. While there is some authority for the proposition that an employee may have a protected property interest in noneconomic benefits of his work, there is no authority for such a claim where the noneconomic benefits are identical to the academic performance required of the resident employee under the same contract. We have stated that unless the state specifically creates a property interest in a noneconomic benefit — such as a particular work assignment — a property interest in employment generally does not create due process property protection for such benefits.
Davis, 882 F.2d at 973 n. 16 (quotation and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
Like Shaboon and Davis, Swift had no liberty or property interest in the performance of the duties of a student teacher when that task was a requirement of her academic program. Accordingly, Swift has neither a protectable liberty or property interest in fulfilling her student-teaching requirement at the Orleans Parish public schools and defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor as a matter of law.
Swift alleges that the Student Teaching Handbook created a contract between the Orleans Parish School Board and UNO, and that defendants did not follow the procedures for removal of student teachers contained in the handbook. Plaintiff does not allege that she was a party to the contract or even that she was a third-party beneficiary of the contract. Third-party beneficiary status (or, in Louisiana civil law parlance, a stipulation pour autrui) is never presumed. The intent of the contracting parties to stipulate a benefit in favor of a third party must be made manifestly clear, and the party who demands performance of an obligation pursuant to a stipulation pour autrui (in this case, Swift) bears the burden of proving the existence of this obligation. Stadtlander v. Ryan's Family Steakhouses. Inc., 794 So.2d 881, 886-87 (La.App. 2d Cir.), writ denied, 794 So.2d 790 (La. 2001). Having failed to show any of these required elements, Swift has no standing to complain of any alleged breaches of the alleged contract between UNO and the School Board. Id.; Grabert v. Greco, 670 So.2d 571, 573 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1996); State in re Adoption of S.R.P., 555 So.2d 612, 618 (La.App. 4th Cir. 1989).
However, even if Swift can claim some entitlement arising from the Student Teaching Handbook and even if UNO and the School Board did not comply literally with the handbook's terms, a school' s
failure to comport with its internal pretermination procedures does not by itself amount to a violation of the Due Process Clause. The failure of a state agency to comply with its internal regulations is insufficient as a matter of law to establish a violation of Due Process, because constitutional minima nevertheless may have been met. There is not a violation of due process every time a university . . . violates its own rules. Such action may constitute a breach of contract or violation of state law, but unless the conduct trespasses on federal constitutional safeguards, there is no constitutional deprivation.
Brown v. Texas A M Univ., 804 F.2d 327, 335 (5th Cir. 1986) (citations and quotation omitted). In this case, there was no due process violation so long as plaintiff received constitutionally adequate process, which, as explained in the following section, she did.
3. Swift Received All the Process That Was Due
"Once it is determined that due process applies, the question remains what process is due." Goss, 419 U.S. at 576 (quotation omitted); accord Hoover v. Johnson, 193 F.3d 366, 371 n. 6 (5th Cir 1999). Even if Swift had a protected interest in continuing to student-teach at New Orleans public schools, procedural due process requires only that she be afforded notice and an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time before negative action is taken. McDonald, 102 F.3d at 155 (citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 546-47). The required "hearing" may be informal and may consist of less than a full evidentiary hearing. Notice may be oral or written, and plaintiff must have the opportunity to present a response to the charges either in person or in writing. Brown, 804 F.2d at 335-36 (quoting Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 545-46). The undisputed material facts establish that Swift received constitutionally adequate process.
First, plaintiff received a letter from Dr. Siesel explaining why she would not be permitted to return to the Orleans Parish public schools. This letter was sufficient notice. Davis, 882 F.2d at 975. Second, Swift was asked to provide, and did provide, to Payton a written statement of her version of the events. This statement satisfied the requirements of procedural due process.
Plaintiff thus received all of the process that was due under Goss, Loudermill, Brown, Davis and Shaboon, and defendants are entitled to summary judgment in their favor as a matter of law on her procedural due process claim.
C. Swift's Substantive Due Process Claim Fails as a Matter of Law
Swift's written statement on April 10, 2001 and the dismissal of the criminal charge against her in August 2001 did not convince defendants to reinstate her student-teaching privileges. She contends that their decision was arbitrary and violated her substantive due process rights. Assuming that plaintiff had a protected property or liberty interest (which, as discussed above, she did not), the Due Process Clause grants her a substantive right to be free from arbitrary state action. Ewing, 474 U.S. at 223; Bryan, 213 F.3d at 274.
Swift's argument is not supported by the law. Defendants' decision to bar her from student teaching in their schools was supported by evidence in the record, as recited by Payton in her memorandum to Dr. Siesel. That is all that is required.
The Constitution . . . does not require evidence that logically precludes any conclusion but the one reached after a disciplinary hearing. Instead, due process requires only that there be some evidence to support the findings made. In this case, while Plaintiff has alleged that [the employer's] findings ignored much of what had been presented in her favor and were arbitrary and capricious, she does not claim that there was no evidence to support his findings. For these reasons, the Court agrees with Defendant's that Plaintiff's due process claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim.
Washington v. Davis, No. 01-1863, 2001 WL 1287125, at *7 (E.D. La. Oct. 23, 2001) (Barbier, J.) (citing Superintendent. Mass. Corr. Inst. v. Hill, 472 U.S. 445, 457 (1985) (emphasis added); see Hill, 472 U.S. at 455 ("the requirements of due process are satisfied if some evidence supports the decision").
Defendants apparently did not believe Swift's statement or did not believe that she should be reinstated, even if her version of the facts were true. It was constitutionally permissible for defendants to discredit her statement based on their knowledge of her and the statements they received from other witnesses, which contradicted her version of the facts. They were also constitutionally permitted to decide that disciplinary action was warranted, even if they believed her version, which revealed an admitted dislike of Dowell and an admitted altercation.
Furthermore, a prosecutor's decision not to pursue a particular charge can be based on any number or combination of factors, not necessarily limited to falsity of the charge. Thus, the mere dismissal of the criminal charge against Swift does not prove either that the charge itself was false or that the conclusions and recommendations reached by defendants were unsupported by evidence.
In addition, to the extent that defendants' decision to bar plaintiff from studentteaching at Orleans Parish schools can be characterized as an academic decision, the courts "should show great respect for the faculty's professional judgment. Plainly, [the courts] may not override it unless it is such a substantial departure from accepted academic norms as to demonstrate that the person or committee responsible did not actually exercise professional judgment." Ewing, 474 U.S. at 225 (citing Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 323 (1982)). The courts are "far less . . . suited to evaluate the substance of the multitude of academic decisions that are made daily by faculty members of public educational institutions — decisions that require "an expert evaluation of cumulative information and [are] not readily adapted to the procedural tools of judicial or administrative decisionmaking.'" Id. at 226 (quoting Horowitz, 435 U.S. at 89-90); see also id. at 230 ("Judicial review of academic decisions, including those with respect to the admission or dismissal of students, is rarely appropriate, particularly where orderly administrative procedures are followed . . . .") (Powell, J., concurring).
Swift has presented no evidence that defendants failed to exercise their professional judgment in her case. To the contrary, Payton's memorandum to Dr. Siesel indicates that defendants carefully gathered available information concerning the incident and evaluated that information before making a final decision. This is all that the Constitution requires.
Because there is no material fact issue in dispute that plaintiff's substantive due process rights were not violated, defendants are entitled to summary judgment on this claim as a matter of law.
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, IT IS ORDERED that defendants' motion for summary judgment is GRANTED, and plaintiff's complaint is dismissed with prejudice. Plaintiff must bear all costs of these proceedings.