Opinion
Case No. 5:19-cv-00065-TES-CHW
04-28-2020
STEPHON W. SUGGS, Plaintiff, v. MYKENA INGRAM, et al., Defendants.
Proceedings Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Before the U.S. Magistrate Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Before the Court is the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 20). It is RECOMMENDED that this motion be GRANTED. It is further RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. 27) be DENIED.
Plaintiff's "motion for supplies," in which Plaintiff asks the Court for, among other things, ten writing tablets, fifty sheets of carbon paper, and five hundred sheets of white paper, is DENIED. (Doc. 26).
BACKGROUND AND MOTION TO AMEND
On screening review, the Court allowed Plaintiff Stephon W. Suggs, a prisoner, to proceed in this Section 1983 action only on claims of excessive force and failure to intervene relating to a September 22, 2017 incident at Hancock State Prison. During that incident, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Dixion, a correctional officer, held open Plaintiff's cell door while Defendant Ingram, another correctional officer, repeatedly "hit[] me with fist/handcuffs causing severe serious injuries to my left arm/hand, neck [and] head right side." (Doc. 1, p. 6).
The Court dismissed a variety of other possible claims that Plaintiff sought to raise for failure to state a claim, and also for failure to comport with Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which, as the Court explained, permits the joinder of defendants only when the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or occurrence, and some question of fact or law is common to all defendants. See (Doc. 6, p. 7). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2).
In response to this Court's Griffith notice, Plaintiff did not file a response to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Instead, Plaintiff filed letters relating to his 1998 transportation or "kidnapping" for state criminal proceedings. (Docs. 22, 24). Plaintiff also filed an amended complaint, in which he seeks to add "Kenneth Hodges ... District Attorney for Albany, Georgia" as a Defendant in this action. (Doc. 23). Plaintiff appears to allege that his wrongful prosecution led to his "being forced to be held unlawfully all these many years." (Doc. 23, p. 7). Without addressing issues of prosecutorial immunity, the applicable two-year limitation period, the inability of this Court to award habeas relief in a Section 1983 action, and the Court's inability to entertain a Heck-barred Section 1983 claim for malicious prosecution absent the prior invalidation of Plaintiff's criminal conviction, Plaintiff's requested amendment at the least again violates Rule 20, and for that reason it should be raised in a different Section 1983 action. Accordingly, Plaintiff's motion to amend (Doc. 23) is DENIED.
Griffith v. Wainwright, 772 F.2d 822 (11th Cir. 1985).
Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). --------
LEGAL STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of informing the Court of the basis for its motion, and of citing "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any," that support summary judgment. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986). In resolving motions for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Tolan v. Cotton, 134 S.Ct. 1861, 1866 (2014).
Although Plaintiff did not respond to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, summary judgment is not properly awarded by default. See Trustees of the Central Pension Fund v. Wolf Crane Serv., Inc., 374 F.3d 1035, 1039 (11th Cir. 2004). Nevertheless, by failing to respond to the Defendants' motion, Plaintiff has failed to rebut the Defendants' statement of undisputed material facts, triggering potential consequences under both the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and this Court's Local Rules.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(2) provides that if a party "fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c)," then the Court may "consider the fact undisputed for purposes of the motion." Rule 56(e)(2). This Court's Local Rule 56 similarly provides: "All material facts contained in the movant's statement which are not specifically controverted by specific citation to particular parts of materials in the record shall be deemed to have been admitted, unless otherwise inappropriate." Local Rule 56. Finally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(3) provides that the Court may "grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the movant is entitled to" summary judgment. Rule 56(e)(3). See also Urdaneta v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 734 F. App'x 701, 704 (11th Cir. 2018). Accordingly, because the Defendants properly supported their factual assertions with specific citations to the record, and because Plaintiff failed to respond, the Defendants' facts may be accepted by the Court as undisputed.
ANALYSIS
On the record before the Court, no reasonable jury could find for Plaintiff in light of the "wide-ranging deference" owed to correctional officers, particularly when they act in haste, and in response to a confrontation with a prisoner. Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 321-22 (1986). Accordingly, it is recommended that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment be granted.
Facts
The record, when construed in Plaintiff's favor, reveals that on September 22, 2017, Defendant Dixion discovered that Plaintiff's cell door was unexpectedly unlocked, and Plaintiff resisted efforts to close it. See (Pl.'s Dep., Doc. 20-2, p. 17) ("I take a toothbrush, and I jam it in the door"). Defendant Dixion summoned Defendant Ingram for assistance, and Defendant Ingram instructed Plaintiff to "cuff up," meaning to place his hands through an opening in the cell door to be handcuffed. (Id., p. 19). Plaintiff refused (id.) ("She says, cuff up. I said, I'm not cuffing up."), and he physically resisted the closing of his cell door by "leaning on it." (Id., p. 20).
According to Plaintiff, Defendant Ingram then "opened the door and grabbed me, slung me up [against the wall] and we tussled." (Id., pp. 27-28). Plaintiff claims that he "folded my arms to my chest," but that he "was pushing towards the door" in attempt to exit his cell and "sit down on the range" in order to summon the "OIC," or officer in charge, to protest the repeated, unexplained unlocking of his cell door. (Id.). See also (Id., p. 19) ("I got mad. I got tired of it because ... I knew they wasn't supposed to open the doors"). According to Plaintiff, the tussle lasted "a few minutes." (Id., p. 26).
Plaintiff's deposition testimony suggests that Defendant Ingram struck Plaintiff three times, once in his right eye, once on the side of his head, (id., pp. 22-23), and once in his left hand, resulting in an injury to Plaintiff's left thumb. (Id., p. 63). After the third strike, Plaintiff stated "if you hit me one more time, I'm fixing to take it to you now." (Id., p. 22). Plaintiff acknowledges that Defendant Dixion did not use any force, but Plaintiff claims that Defendant Dixion "didn't stop it or try to stop it." (Id., p. 34). The excessive force incident concluded when Defendant Ingram "racked the cuffs like she was fixing to put the cuffs on me," but Plaintiff grabbed the handcuffs "and slapped [them] on Officer Ingram's wrist." (Id., p. 23). At this point, Defendants Dixion and Ingram exited Plaintiff's cell, and were able to close the cell door.
Plaintiff claims that the excessive force incident, which occurred around 11:30 AM, (id., p. 54), left him "bleeding on the eye." (Id., p. 25). When Plaintiff received medical treatment that same day around 1:30 PM, medical staff noted "no visible injuries," and they instructed Plaintiff to "take Tylenol as needed for pain, and to follow up for [a] referral appointment on September 26, 2017." (Aff. of Nurse Lisa Thomas, Doc. 20-7, ¶ 7). See also (Doc. 20-8, Doc. 20-8). Plaintiff "refused to be seen for [this] scheduled sick call appointment." (Aff. of Nurse Lisa Thomas, Doc. 20-7, ¶ 8). Additionally, while Plaintiff claims that he underwent an x-ray study of his left hand, Plaintiff acknowledges that it revealed "nothing broke," and at most showed that Plaintiff's thumb had "popped out of jointage." (Pl.'s Dep., Doc. 20-2, pp. 65-66).
Discussion
The touchstone of an Eighth Amendment excessive force inquiry is whether force was applied "in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline and not maliciously and sadistically to cause harm." Skrtich v. Thornton, 280 F.3d 1295, 1300 (11th Cir. 2002) (internal brackets omitted). In conducting this inquiry, courts consider factors such as "the need for the application force, the relationship between that need and the amount of force used, the threat reasonably perceived by the responsible officials, and any efforts made to temper the severity of a forceful response." Id.
On the record available to the Court, all of these factors weigh in favor of summary judgment for Defendant Ingram on Plaintiff's claim of excessive force. The record shows a clear need for the use of force because Plaintiff acknowledges that he (a) physically resisted efforts to close his cell door, and then (b) ignored commands to "cuff up," meaning to extend his arms for handcuffing so that the Defendants could safely examine Plaintiff's unlocked cell door. Medical records available to the Court suggest that little force was used, as the three blows Defendant Ingram allegedly employed resulted in no visible injuries to Plaintiff, and in latent injuries and associated pains treated only with Tylenol, as needed. With regard to the third factor, perceived threat, Plaintiff's conduct in attempting to push his way out of his cell posed some degree of threat, even if Plaintiff did not attempt to strike counterblows at the Defendants. Finally, the record shows that the force employed by Defendant Ingram was tempered by medical treatment provided within two hours of the excessive force incident, and by further offers of medical services in the days following.
On this record, even when viewed in Plaintiff's favor, no reasonable jury could find that Defendant Ingram violated Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights by employing force "maliciously and sadistically" to cause harm. Accordingly, with regard to Plaintiff's excessive force claim, Defendant Ingram is entitled to summary judgment. Furthermore, because Defendant Ingram did not employ excessive force, Defendant Dixion had "no attendant obligation to intervene." Crenshaw v. Lister, 556 F.3d 1283, 1294 (11th Cir. 2009). Accordingly, Defendant Dixion is correspondingly entitled to summary judgment.
CONCLUSION
After a careful review of the record, it is RECOMMENDED that Plaintiff's motion for a temporary restraining order (Doc. 27) be DENIED, and that the Defendants' motion for summary judgment (Doc. 20) be GRANTED. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), the parties may serve and file written objections to this Recommendation, or seek an extension of time to file objections, WITHIN FOURTEEN (14) DAYS after being served with a copy thereof. The District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the Recommendation to which objection is made. All other portions of the Recommendation may be reviewed for clear error.
The parties are further notified that, pursuant to Eleventh Circuit Rule 3-1, "[a] party failing to object to a magistrate judge's findings or recommendations contained in a report and recommendation in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) waives the right to challenge on appeal the district court's order based on unobjected-to factual and legal conclusions if the party was informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences on appeal for failing to object. In the absence of a proper objection, however, the court may review on appeal for plain error if necessary in the interests of justice."
SO RECOMMENDED, this 28th day of April, 2020.
s/ Charles H. Weigle
Charles H. Weigle
United States Magistrate Judge