Opinion
No. 23865-2-III.
Filed: April 18, 2006.
Appeal from Superior Court of Franklin County. Docket No: 04-2-50238-4. Judgment or order under review. Date filed: 02/14/2005. Judge signing: Hon. Dennis D. Yule.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Wayne L. Williams, Williams Wyckoff Ostrander PLLC, PO Box 316, Olympia, WA 98507-0316.
Counsel for Defendant(s), Mark Steven Northcraft, Northcraft Bigby Owada PC, 720 Olive Way Ste 1905, Seattle, WA 98101-1871.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Deborah Lynn Carstens, Bullivant Houser Bailey PC, 1601 5th Ave Ste 2300, Seattle, WA 98101-1618.
Donna M. Chamberlin, Bullivant Houser Bailey, 1601 5th Ave Ste 2300, Seattle, WA 98101-1618.
E. Pennock III Gheen, Bullivant Houser Bailey PC, 1601 5th Ave Ste 2300, Seattle, WA 98101-1618.
Jerret E. Sale, Bullivant Houser Bailey PC, 1601 5th Ave Ste 2300, Seattle, WA 98101-1618.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
William Stutz slipped and fell in the waiting area of the Tri-Cities Airport outside of, but near the security screening area. He sued the Port of Pasco and Olympic Security Services, Inc., an independent airlines security screener, for injuries he allegedly incurred. The court summarily dismissed Mr. Stutz's claims against Olympic, holding Olympic owed no legal duty to protect Mr. Stutz under the facts. Mr. Stutz appealed. Because Olympic did not control the waiting area and held no specific duty of care to prevent harm against Mr. Stutz under the airport's rules and regulations, we affirm.
FACTS
In May 2001, William Stutz slipped and fell in a wet spot on the floor of the Tri-Cities Airport, allegedly injuring his ankle. Horizon Air Industries had contracted with Olympic Security Services, Inc., to provide security and screening services at the Airport. Two on duty Olympic security guards reportedly observed the wet spot. One Olympic employee testified she called a custodian on the intercom to clean up the spill about five minutes before Mr. Stutz fell. The other Olympic employee did not remember an intercom call.
Mr. Stutz sued the Port of Pasco (the governing authority of the Airport) and Olympic for negligence. Olympic filed for summary judgment dismissal, contending it did not owe a duty to Mr. Stutz to protect him from injury.
In response, Mr. Stutz alleged a duty arising from airport regulations because contractually its `use of the Airport is subject to any rules and regulations of the Airport Authority. . . . [and Olympic] will observe and obey all such rules and regulations.' Clerk's Papers (CP) at 190. Specifically, Mr. Stutz contended Resolution 675.28.020 created a duty of care owed by Olympic to Mr. Stutz: `Any person observing a condition or hazard that would jeopardize life, health, public safety, or damage to property, shall report same to the Airport Manager's Office or Airport Law Enforcement Officers immediately.' CP at 211.
The court granted Olympic's motion for summary judgment dismissal. Mr. Stutz appeals.
ANALYSIS
The issue is whether the court erred in granting summary judgment dismissal and concluding Olympic owed no duty of care under these facts. Summary judgment is appropriate when `the pleadings, affidavits, depositions, and admissions on file demonstrate there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' CR 56(c); Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 663, 958 P.2d 301 (1998). We engage in the same inquiry as the trial court. Id. The facts and reasonable inferences from the facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Mountain Park Homeowners Ass'n v. Tydings, 125 Wn.2d 337, 341, 883 P.2d 1383 (1994). All questions of law are reviewed de novo. Id.
In an action for negligence, the plaintiff must first prove that the defendant owed a duty. Laymon v. Dep't of Natural Res., 99 Wn. App. 518, 994 P.2d 232 (2000). Duty is defined as `an obligation, to which the law will give recognition and effect, to conform to a particular standard of conduct toward another.' Transamerica Title Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 103 Wn.2d 409, 413, 693 P.2d 697 (1985) (citing W. Prosser on Torts, sec. 53, at 311 (3d ed. 1964)). Whether or not a duty is owed is a question of law. Hansen v. Friend, 118 Wn.2d 476, 479, 824 P.2d 483 (1992).
Here, Mr. Stutz contends Olympic's duty arose from it's contractual obligation to obey all airport rules and regulations, inconclusive with Resolution 675.28.020. That requires, `[a]ny person observing a condition or hazard that would jeopardize life, health, public safety, or damage to property, shall report same to the Airport Manager's Office or Airport Law Enforcement Officers immediately.' CP at 211. He argues a jury might make the factual determination that Olympic employees breached this duty by failing to report the spill to the proper authorities. Olympic responds that Resolution 675.28.020 did not create a duty owed to Mr. Stutz because it is meant to protect the public in general. Like the trial court, we agree with Olympic.
The standard of conduct required of a reasonable person may be prescribed by a statute or regulation. Samuelson v. Commty. College Dist. No. 2, 75 Wn. App. 340, 349, 877 P.2d 734 (1994) (citing Hansen, 118 Wn.2d at 479). However, this duty only extends to persons who: (1) are in the class of persons the statute or regulation was intended to protect, and (2) suffered the type of injury the statute or regulation was intended to address. Samuelson, 75 Wn. App. at 349 .
However, Resolution 675.28.020 was adopted to prevent general conditions or hazards jeopardizing life, health, or public safety. It did not create a specific duty to Mr. Stutz. According to the introduction to the rules and regulations, they are, in part, `structured to provide the public with maximum safety.' CP at 197 (emphasis added). While Olympic was contractually obligated to comply with all airport rules and regulations, its duty did not extend to specific members of the general public. Olympic correctly argues Resolution 675.28.020 cannot form the basis of a duty of care to Mr. Stutz because it is meant to protect the public generally, rather than any individual. In order to be actionable, a duty deriving from a statute or regulation must be one owed to the injured plaintiff, as opposed to the public in general. J B Dev. Co. v. King County, 100 Wn.2d 299, 304, 669 P.2d 468 (1983). This basic principle is expressed in the `public duty doctrine.' Id. The public duty doctrine is generally applied to limit the liability of State entities. See, e.g., Phillips v. King County, 87 Wn. App. 468, 943 P.2d 306 (1997); Dorsch v. City of Tacoma, 92 Wn. App. 131, 960 P.2d 489 (1998); Lester v. Town of Winthrop, 87 Wn. App. 17, 939 P.2d 1237 (1997); Ravencroft v. Washington Water Power Co., 136 Wn.2d 911, 969 P.2d 75 (1998).
Olympic did not own or operate the specific premises where Mr. Stutz was allegedly injured. The court did not err in granting summary judgment dismissal of Mr. Stutz's claims against Olympic.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040 .
SWEENEY, C.J. and KATO, J., concur.