Opinion
H048800
04-07-2022
Estate of ROBERT J. STURM, Deceased v. MIRIAM H. BROUMAS, Objector and Appellant. STEPHEN J. STURM, Petitioner and Respondent,
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 17PR181558)
DANNER, J.
Appellant Miriam Broumas appeals a judgment of the probate court after a court trial in an action brought by respondent Stephen J. Sturm (Sturm). Miriam Broumas was the wife of decedent Robert Broumas, Sturm's uncle. Sturm successfully petitioned the court to deem Miriam as having predeceased Robert pursuant to Probate Code section 259 on the ground that she had engaged in financial elder abuse of Robert. The judgment effectively disinherited Miriam from the sale proceeds of Robert's estate's only remaining asset, real property referred to by the parties as the "five-plex." The sole question on appeal is whether the trial court properly applied section 259. For the reasons explained below, we affirm the judgment.
Since respondent shares decedent's last name, we refer to respondent as Sturm and decedent as Robert.
Unspecified statutory references are to the Probate Code.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. The Parties and Decedent's Five-Plex Property
Robert and Miriam married each other twice. They originally married in 1993, separated in 1999, and divorced in 2006. Following the divorce, Miriam resided in Texas, while Robert remained in California. Miriam and Robert remarried in 2015 and remained married until Robert's death in 2017, at the age of 81.
The facts are taken from the verified petition for elder abuse filed on July 21, 2017, the trial court's June 9, 2020 statement of decision, and the reporter's transcript of the court trial, including the stipulation of the parties read into the record during the course of that trial.
Robert had no children. He had three nephews, one of whom is respondent Sturm. Robert owned real property located at 1290 Leigh Avenue in San Jose that included a five-unit building (the five-plex), the asset at issue in this appeal.
The five-plex was part of Miriam and Robert's community property during their first marriage. In 1999, Miriam transferred the five-plex to Robert through an interspousal transfer deed. The five-plex was sold after Robert's death, and Robert's estate at the time of the court trial in 2020 consisted of proceeds from that sale. Robert lived in the owner's unit (which had multiple bedrooms) of the five-plex and at times shared his unit with family members, including Sturm. Additionally, for a period of time, Robert shared his home with Miriam's daughter, Priscilla Olsen, who was later found criminally liable for elder abuse of Robert.
B. Robert's Declining Health and Miriam's Financial Elder Abuse
In 2015, Robert suffered from Alzheimer's dementia and experienced rapidly declining physical and mental health. In the summer of that year, he was hospitalized and, in August, recovered for several weeks in a rehabilitation facility.
In the middle of September, Miriam arrived from Texas and began living with Robert at the five-plex. The morning after her arrival at his home, she brought up the topic of Robert's estate with one of his nephews (Michael Sturm), who was then living at the five-plex. By that time, Robert had left the rehabilitation facility. Respondent Sturm, who had power of attorney over Robert's finances, was assisting Robert with his finances and care.
In the fall of 2015, Miriam made a number of significant changes to Robert's life. The day after Miriam's arrival, Sturm received a call from Bank of America that Miriam was attempting to withdraw cash from Robert's account. Over the following two days, Sturm received additional calls from the bank related to Miriam's attempts to withdraw money from Robert's account. After moving in with Robert, Miriam posted an eviction notice seeking to evict Sturm's brother (Michael Sturm). In response, Michael moved out.
Miriam also caused changes to be made to Robert's estate planning documents. In mid-September 2015, Miriam had Robert sign durable powers of attorney for his finances and health that appointed her as his agent. Robert also executed a revocable living trust and will dated September 19, 2015. The trust favored Miriam, Miriam's children, and Stephen and Michael Sturm.
On October 21, 2015, Robert signed an amended trust document that removed Sturm and his brother Michael from the trust and favored Miriam, her daughter Priscilla Olsen, Miriam's son, and Robert's other nephew. That same day, Robert purportedly executed a pour-over will naming Miriam as the executor of his estate. The will was lodged with the Santa Clara County Superior Court on October 23, 2015.
On October 28, 2015, Miriam and Robert remarried without first informing Robert's family.
B. Conservatorship Proceedings, Elder Abuse Case, and Property Transfer
On October 30, 2015, two days after Miriam and Robert's marriage, Sturm obtained emergency temporary letters of conservatorship appointing him as Robert's temporary conservator. In addition to petitioning for a temporary conservatorship, Sturm also petitioned for a general conservatorship of Robert on the grounds that Robert was unable to provide for his own needs and resist undue influence by others.
In early November 2015, Sturm initiated a restraining order proceeding in Santa Clara County Superior Court, Broumas v. Broumas (case No. 2015-1-CH006658), citing Robert's inability to care for himself and Miriam's actions in taking over his financial accounts and home. Adopting the usage of the trial court, we refer to this proceeding as the "elder abuse case."
On November 5, 2015, the trial court in the elder abuse case ordered Miriam to return Robert's property to him. According to the verified petition filed in the probate proceeding before us, a temporary restraining order dated November 5, 2015, was issued in the elder abuse case that ordered Miriam to move out of Robert's residence and to return all of his property immediately. The presiding judicial officer reissued the temporary restraining order on November 19, 2015, and extended the order through January 22, 2016.
The record in this appeal does not contain a copy of this order or any other orders issued in the elder abuse case or in the conservatorship proceedings.
While the elder abuse case was pending, Miriam caused a deed and a corrected deed to be executed that granted her the five-plex as her sole and separate property. A quitclaim deed was recorded in early November 2015 that deeded the property from Robert to Miriam.
In January 2016, the court appointed professional fiduciary Dusty White as the successor temporary conservator for Robert's person and estate. Following this temporary appointment, White worked to marshal Robert's assets and helped to secure the return of the five-plex property from Miriam to Robert's conservatorship, in accordance with the trial court's order in the elder abuse case. Pursuant to the court's
The court later appointed White as the general conservator of Robert's person and estate.
November 5, 2015 order, Miriam executed a deed on January 20, 2016, that returned the five-plex to Robert's name.
In the spring of 2016, a trial occurred in the elder abuse case before Judge Scott, at which witnesses testified, including Miriam. In May 2016, Judge Scott ruled against Miriam and issued a permanent restraining order prohibiting Miriam from contacting Robert for three years. The court found Miriam had committed financial elder abuse against Robert. As summarized by the trial court in its statement of decision in the proceeding at issue here, "Judge Stuart Scott in connection with the elder abuse trial, found that [Miriam] engaged in a 'full court press' to take control of Robert Broumas's property during his lifetime."
A different bench officer had issued the prior restraining orders in the elder abuse case.
The probate proceeding at issue was conducted by a different bench officer than the bench officers who presided over the elder abuse case.
Following the decision by Judge Scott in the elder abuse case, Miriam and Robert appear to have had no further contact. In April 2017, Miriam was ordered to pay attorney fees to Robert.
Robert died in May 2017 and was married to Miriam at the time of his death.
C. Current Probate Proceeding
Following Robert's death, Sturm initiated the probate proceeding at issue in this appeal (the probate proceeding). On July 20, 2017, Sturm filed a petition for probate that requested letters of administration and alleged Robert died intestate. The petition for probate stated Robert was survived by his spouse Miriam and three nephews, including Sturm.
The following day, Sturm filed a verified petition for elder abuse alleging that Miriam committed financial elder abuse against Robert (Welf. & Inst. Code, §§ 15610.30, 15657.5) and, as a consequence, pursuant to section 259, Miriam should be deemed to have predeceased Robert.
On November 20, 2017, Miriam in turn filed a petition for probate attempting to probate Robert's will dated October 21, 2015.
A court trial in the probate proceeding occurred over two days in January 2020. Four witnesses testified on behalf of Sturm: Sturm, his brother Michael Sturm, Dusty White (Robert's former conservator and then special administrator of his estate), and Rebecca Weisman, the court-appointed attorney for Robert in the conservatorship proceedings.
Weisman testified that she had met with Robert several times, including in December 2015. During her December 2015 visit, Weisman had attempted to show him the deeds from November 2015 that conveyed the five-plex from himself to Miriam. Robert had great difficulty focusing because of his dementia and expressed to her the belief that he was still the owner of the five-plex. Weisman concluded from her visits that Robert did not know the nature and extent of his property, had very poor short-term memory, and, in her opinion and based on her investigation, Robert could not have comprehended the estate planning documents he signed in the fall of 2015. Weisman believed that Robert's free will had been subverted by Miriam.
Former conservator White testified that, after receiving her temporary letters of conservatorship for Robert in January 2016, she investigated and marshalled Robert's assets, including the five-plex. By that time, the trial court in the elder abuse case had ordered that the five-plex be placed into the conservatorship from Miriam's name. However, White discovered that the five-plex was still in Miriam's name. White contacted her attorney, who initiated a demand that Miriam transfer the five-plex back to Robert. Ultimately, Miriam returned the five-plex to the conservatorship estate.
Following a recess after White's direct testimony, the parties informed the trial court that they had reached "a stipulation to conclude the evidentiary phase of this trial." Sturm's attorney recited the following stipulation into the record: "The Court finds, in this action, that the October 21, 2015 will of Robert Broumas and the October 21, 2015 trust amendment of Robert Broumas are null and void; and that the September 19th, 2015 will of Robert Broumas and the September 19th, 2015 trust of Robert Broumas are likewise null and void. [¶] Due to the findings of elder abuse in the restraining order proceedings, Case No. 2015-1-CH-006658, Probate Code section 259 applies to Miriam Broumas in this proceeding. Everything that is now in the estate is in the form of proceeds from the sale of the five-plex at 1290 Leigh Avenue in San Jose."
The stipulation concluded with the statement that "[t]he matter left for the Court to decide is to determine what the consequences are of the application of Probate Code Section 259." Miriam personally stated on the record that she understood and had discussed the proposed stipulation with her attorney. Finding both parties had knowingly and voluntarily entered into the stipulation, the trial court accepted the stipulation and requested briefing on section 259's application.
The parties submitted posttrial briefing on the question of the application of section 259. Sturm's posttrial brief cited to, inter alia, the temporary restraining order issued in early November 2015 in the elder abuse case that ordered Miriam to return all of Robert's property.
Sturm's posttrial brief referred to and cited to the November 5, 2015 order as "Exhibit 3" and this exhibit appears, based on the reporter's transcript, to have been admitted into evidence during the court trial. None of the trial exhibits appear in the record on appeal.
On June 9, 2020, the trial court in the probate proceeding issued a written statement of decision. It stated the five-plex was sold pursuant to a court order dated March 7, 2018, and the special administrator of Robert's estate (Dusty White) continued to hold the sale proceeds in trust.
The trial court's decision referenced the prior elder abuse case and the stipulation in the current probate proceeding in its conclusion that the estate planning documents at issue were null and void and that section 259 "applied to the instant case based on the finding [Miriam] committed elder abuse in the matter of Broumas v Broumas 2015-1-CH006658" (italics added and some capitalization omitted). The court accepted Miriam's concession that the "September-November 2015 Wills and Trusts" were void and unenforceable. In light of that concession, the court concluded that "whatever cloud that was placed over the legal right to claim the [five-]plex or its proceeds by way of the September-November 2015 Will and Trusts is lifted." It therefore found that the five-plex was the property of Robert's estate and was not subject to any claim based on those purported testamentary documents. The trial court concluded it "considers this finding to be tantamount to an award of property to the estate."
We understand the trial court's reference to November 2015 when it stated "September-November 2015 Will and Trusts" to refer to the deeds in November 2015 by which Miriam purported to transfer the five-plex property to herself. Miriam did not appear to attempt to probate any November 2015 will and the record does not contain such a document. The trial court further noted in its statement of decision that the parties had discussed a 1994 will but that the 1994 will was "not before the Court or part of the evidence in these proceedings."
With respect to the question of whether Miriam committed elder abuse against Robert within the meaning of section 259, the trial court found that the "evidence in the instant case supported and the stipulation regarding the finding in the prior matter [of case No. 2015-1-CH-006658] confirms, that all of the criteria under Probate Code [section] 259[, subdivision] (a) 1-4 were established by clear and convincing evidence." The court noted that, while it believed there was clear and convincing evidence of elder abuse by Miriam based on the "unimpeached testimony" of the witnesses it had heard in the first two days of trial, it was not obligated to make a finding of elder abuse under section 259 "in light of [Miriam's] stipulation that the finding of elder abuse in the matter of Broumas v. Broumas 2015-1-CH006658 was a finding of elder abuse in the instant case." (Italics added and some capitalization omitted.)
With respect to the five-plex, the court found "the acts of [Miriam] in creating title transfer documents and the September-November 2015 Will and Trusts were directly focused [on] attempting to lay claim to that specific property" and "the property [Miriam] tried to lay claim to in this action was the same property or rights to property that [Miriam] was ordered to return to Robert Broumas in the elder abuse case." The trial court therefore ordered pursuant to section 259, subdivision (c), that Miriam be deemed to have predeceased Broumas for the purpose of making any claim against the five-plex or the proceeds of its sale.
The trial court entered judgment, and Miriam timely appealed.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
"In reviewing a judgment based upon a statement of decision following a bench trial, we review questions of law de novo, and we review the trial court's findings of fact for substantial evidence. 'Under this deferential standard of review, findings of fact are liberally construed to support the judgment and we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, drawing all reasonable inferences in support of the findings.'" (Durante v. County of Santa Clara (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 839, 842.)
B. Parties' Contentions
Miriam's sole contention on appeal is that the trial court erred by applying section 259, subdivision (c) (hereafter section 259(c)), to disinherit her from receiving the five-plex or its proceeds. Focusing on the language in section 259(c) that restricts a person from inheriting "any property . . . that [is] awarded to the decedent's estate," Miriam contends that section 259(c) is inapplicable. She argues the five-plex was not "awarded" to Robert's estate because by the time of the probate proceeding, she had already reconveyed the five-plex back to Robert and the nullification of the 2015 wills and trusts in the probate proceeding could not constitute an award to the estate.
Sturm disputes her contentions and asserts the successful nullification of the testamentary documents in the probate proceeding constitutes an "award" to the estate. In the alternative, Sturm contends that section 259(c) applies because, as found by the trial court in the probate proceeding, Miriam had been ordered in the elder abuse case to return to Robert the five-plex at issue in the probate proceeding, and she eventually did so. Sturm asserts that these facts satisfy section 259(c).
Miriam replies that the prior order in the elder abuse case was legally insufficient to constitute an award under section 259(c), as it was a temporary and nonfinal order.
Although the record on appeal does not contain any of the court orders from the elder abuse case, it is undisputed that on November 5, 2015, the court in the elder abuse case issued a temporary restraining order that ordered Miriam to move out of Robert's residence and to immediately return all of his property. It is also undisputed that, in early November 2015, Miriam caused deeds to be executed that granted her the five-plex as her sole and separate property. Miriam on appeal also does not contest that she ultimately returned the five-plex to Robert in the course of the elder abuse case pursuant to court order.
Miriam argues in her reply brief that Sturm may not rely on this order for the return of Robert's property because it is not part of the record on appeal. Miriam does not support that conclusory assertion with any authority, nor does she assert the trial court was not presented with the order in the probate proceeding. As appellant, Miriam has the burden "to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal of the judgment." (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.) Because the record indicates that the order was admitted into evidence in the trial court and Miriam does not point to anything evincing the contrary, we reject her contention that we may not consider the substance or effect of that order in deciding her appeal of a decision that relied on that order. Moreover, we note that Miriam stipulated in the trial court to the application of section 259, "[d]ue to the findings of elder abuse in the restraining order proceedings."
We review de novo whether the trial court erred in its application of section 259 to these undisputed facts. (See Swift v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 878, 882); Lintz v. Lintz (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1354 [probate proceeding].)
C. Section 259 and Principles of Statutory Interpretation
Section 259 acts to disinherit elder abusers by deeming the abusers "predeceased" for purposes of their right to benefit from the estate if its conditions are fulfilled. The legislative purpose of section 259 is "to deter the abuse of elders by prohibiting abusers from benefiting from the abuse." (Estate of Lowrie (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 220, 229 (Lowrie).) "Probate Code section 259 was enacted, like other forfeiture statutes, to produce a fair and just result. By enacting this statute, the Legislature hoped that the threat of extinguishing inheritance rights, and the financial incentive to others to report abuse, would deter abuse." (Ibid.)
Section 259 sets forth the circumstances under which a person shall be deemed to have predeceased a decedent. Subdivision (a) of section 259 provides, in pertinent part: "[a]ny person shall be deemed to have predeceased a decedent to the extent provided in subdivision (c) where all of the following apply: [¶] (1) It has been proven by clear and convincing evidence that the person is liable for . . . financial abuse of the decedent, who was an elder or dependent adult. [¶] (2) The person is found to have acted in bad faith. [¶] (3) The person has been found to have been reckless, oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious in the commission of any of these acts upon the decedent. [¶] (4) The decedent, at the time those acts occurred and thereafter until the time of his or her death, has been found to have been substantially unable to manage his or her financial resources or to resist fraud or undue influence." (§ 259, subd. (a).)
In the provision at issue in this appeal, section 259(c) states that "[a]ny person found liable under subdivision (a) . . . shall not (1) receive any property, damages, or costs that are awarded to the decedent's estate in an action described in subdivision (a)." (§ 259(c).)
Section 259(c) "does not necessarily disinherit an abuser entirely but rather restricts the abuser's right to benefit from his or her abusive conduct." (Estate of Dito (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 791, 803 (Dito).) Instead of disinheriting the abuser entirely, by prohibiting the abuser from taking property, damages, or costs that were awarded to the decedent's estate in an action for elder abuse, section 259 merely "restricts the value of the estate to which the abuser's percentage share is applied and prevents that person from benefiting from his or her own wrongful conduct." (Dito, at pp. 803-804.)
The parties dispute whether the five-plex constituted property that was "awarded to" Robert's estate within the meaning of section 259(c). "Since this is an issue of statutory construction, we follow 'the oft-repeated rule that when interpreting a statute we must discover the intent of the Legislature to give effect to its purpose, being careful to give the statute's words their plain, commonsense meaning. [Citation.] If the language of the statute is not ambiguous, the plain meaning controls.'" (Keading v. Keading (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 1115, 1128.)" '" 'If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute's purpose, legislative history, and public policy.'" '" (Smith v. LoanMe, Inc. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 183, 190 (LoanMe).)
D. Application of Section 259
We turn first to the order in the elder abuse case requiring Miriam to return Robert's property. Miriam contends this order does not fulfill the requirement of section 259(c) that the property was "awarded to" the estate, because the order was not a final, dispositive award but rather a "temporary, preliminary order." Miriam concedes that if the prior order had been a "final, dispositive award of the five-plex property from Miriam to Robert, that would have been a slam-dunk" but asserts that the prior temporary restraining order in the elder abuse case was not such an award.
Section 259(c) states that "[a]ny person found liable under subdivision (a) . . . shall not (1) receive any property, damages, or costs that are awarded to the decedent's estate in an action described in subdivision (a)." (§ 259(c).) In light of the parties' stipulation in the probate proceeding, there is no dispute that the elder abuse case constitutes "an action described in subdivision (a)." (Ibid.) The parties focus on whether the five-plex was "awarded" to the estate in the elder abuse case.
Section 259 does not define "awarded." Miriam argues that the order for the return of Robert's property in the elder abuse case was not a final judgment and therefore nothing was "awarded to" Robert. Although she cites no authority for her argument, we note that Black's Law Dictionary defines an award as "[a] final judgment or decision, esp[ecially] one by an arbitrator or by a jury assessing damages." (See Black's Law Dict. (11th ed. 2019) p. 169, col. 2.) We agree that the court order ordering Miriam to return Robert's property (including the five-plex) to Robert, was not a final judgment or decision.
However, section 259(c) uses the phrase "awarded to," rather than award. "Awarded" is defined as "to give by judicial decree or after careful consideration" or to "confer or bestow as being deserved or merited or needed." (Merriam-Webster Dict. Online 2022.) The court's temporary order in the elder abuse case, albeit not a final judgment, falls within this common understanding of "awarded."
<https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/awarded> [as of Apr. 6, 2022], archived at <https://perma.cc/ADW6-5S7Y>.
We further are mindful that "[a]lthough the surest guide to legislative intent will almost always be the language actually used by the Legislature, it may also be useful to consider language not used, particularly when it appears that the Legislature could have easily expressed the intention for which a party contends." (County of Santa Clara v. Escobar (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 555, 572.) Here, the Legislature declined to define "awarded to" in a more restrictive sense or to ascribe a technical meaning to the phrase.
Moreover, even assuming the language permits the interpretations advanced both by Miriam and Sturm and is therefore ambiguous, our task is to effectuate the legislative purpose of section 259. (LoanMe, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 190.) The purpose of section 259 is to "deter the abuse of elders by prohibiting abusers from benefiting from the abuse." (Lowrie, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p. 229.) It is undisputed Miriam committed financial elder abuse, wrongfully deeded the five-plex to herself and then returned the five-plex only pursuant to court order and after a demand by Robert's conservator's attorney that she had failed to comply with that order. As the five-plex was the asset Miriam sought to gain through her abuse of Robert, and as it was returned to the estate only as a result of a court order in the elder abuse case, construing it as having been "awarded to" the estate under these circumstances fits comfortably within the legislative intent of section 259(c).
In arguing that the five-plex does not fall within section 259(c), Miriam relies on Dito, but that decision does not assist her. The court in Dito addressed the apparent assumption of the parties and the trial court in that case that under section 259, "a person found liable for elder abuse is deemed to have predeceased the decedent for purposes of any entitlement to property, interests, and benefits the abuser would otherwise receive by reason of the decedent's death." (Dito, supra, 198 Cal.App.4th at p. 803.) In this case, the trial court made no such assumption. Rather, as reflected in its statement of decision, the trial court based its decision in part on the finding that Miriam had been ordered to return the property to Robert in the elder abuse proceeding. We conclude that the trial court did not err as a matter of law in applying section 259(c) to disinherit Miriam from receipt of the five-plex property or its proceeds.
In light of our conclusion regarding the prior order in the elder abuse case, we need not address Miriam's and Sturm's arguments focused on whether the successful nullification of the September and October 2015 wills and trusts in the probate proceeding independently constituted a form of award to the estate. As our review is de novo, the trial court's primary reliance on this theory justifying the application of section 259(c) is irrelevant.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent is awarded costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1) & (2).)
WE CONCUR: Grover, Acting P.J., Wilson, J.