Summary
In Stephenson, plaintiff filed two successive actions alleging disability discrimination, both against the same defendants.
Summary of this case from Rivers v. County of MarinOpinion
No. C 02-2922 MJJ
November 29, 2002
ORDER
INTRODUCTION
Before the Court is defendant United Airlines's ("United") Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim, based on the identity of issues with a case in this Court that had previously come to final judgment: No. C 97-4476 VRW. Because the doctrine of res judicata applies to the claims, the motion to dismiss is GRANTED.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
The present case is a lawsuit alleging disability discrimination and retaliation based on plaintiff Keith Stephenson's ("Stephenson") efforts to secure adequate accommodation for his physical condition. Plaintiff is afflicted with ankylosing spondylitis, a severe and progressive form of arthritis. (Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss ("Opp.") at 1:1-3.) Among its other deleterious effects, it has required plaintiff, a relatively young man, to undergo replacement of both hips, and it will eventually result in the fusing of plaintiffs spine throughout his back and neck. ( See Judge Vaughn Walker's Order granting defendant's motion for summary judgement in case No. 97-4476 VRW at pp. 4-6, found at United Air Lines, Inc.'s Request for Judicial Notice ("Notice"), Ex.D.)
On December 9, 1997, plaintiff filed suit against defendant, alleging disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and failure to engage in an interactive process, among other causes of action. ( See Notice, Ex. B, Complaint in No. 97-4476 ("Stephenson 1").) On November 11, 1999, Judge Charles Legge granted defendant's motion for summary judgment in Stephenson I. ( See Notice, Ex. A.) Plaintiff appealed this decision to the Ninth Circuit, which affirmed in part' reversed in part, and remanded the case. ( Id., Ex. H.) On remand, the case was transferred to the Hon. Vaughn Walker, who permitted additional discovery and also heard motions for summary judgment. ( See Id., Ex. A.) In an order dated April 17, 2002, Judge Walker issued the Order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, which has also been appealed. ( See Id., Ex. D, G.)
While the remanded case of Stephenson I was on appeal, plaintiff filed a second action in this Court on June 18, 2002, case 02-2922 MJJ (" Stephenson II"). This complaint similarly alleges disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, and failure to engage in an interactive process, but it adds an allegation of retaliation. ( See Complaint in No. C 02-2922 MJJ, ("Complaint") at 2.) The specific claims made by plaintiff in Stephenson flare the following.
1) The Work Chair: In September 1999, defendants provided plaintiff with a work chair that was not sufficiently comfortable and ergonomic to accommodate his disability. After he complained about the chair and requested another, he received no response from defendant, and the chair he had been provided was taken away. He was never issued a chair that would allow him to work comfortably and accommodate his disability. (Complaint, ¶ 5.)
2) Stretching Breaks: After returning from an extended leave of absence, plaintiff was informed by defendant that he would no longer be able to stretch has he had done before. (Complaint, ¶ 5.)
3) Shift Change: Beginning in December 2000, plaintiff requested several times that he be permitted to work four 10 hour days to accommodate his disability. Defendant refused this request. (Complaint, ¶ 6.)
4) Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process: Defendant has failed to engage in an interactive process and has neither explored nor proposed any options to accommodate plaintiff. (Complaint, ¶ 6.)
5) Retaliation: These actions were taken by defendant in retaliation for plaintiffs efforts to hold defendant accountable for its failure to accommodate plaintiffs disability, notably a lawsuit plaintiff filed in December 1997. (Complaint, ¶ 8.)
On October 6, 2002, defendant filed a motion to dismiss Stephenson II on the basis that maintenance of a separate action to litigate these issues is barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Defendant argues that Stephenson I has already decided these claims, as they were either brought before the Court in the previous lawsuit, or could have been brought, and thus, cannot be re-litigated.
LEGAL STANDARD
A Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss tests the legal sufficiency of the claims asserted in the complaint. See Cahill v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 337 (9th Cir. 1996). Dismissal of an action pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is appropriate only where it "appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Levine v. Diamanthuset, Inc., 950 F.2d 1478, 1482 (9th Cir. 1991) ( quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). In reviewing such a motion, the Court must assume all factual allegations to be true and must construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See North Star v. Arizona Corp. Comm., 720 F.2d 578, 580 (9th Cir. 1983). Therefore, the Court will dismiss the complaint or any claim in it without leave to amend only if "it is absolutely clear that the deficiencies of the complaint could not be cured by amendment." Noll v. Carlson, 809 F.2d 1446, 1448 (9th Cir. 1987).
ANALYSIS
The essence of defendant's motion is that plaintiffs cause of action is barred by res judicata, and therefore he cannot state a claim. The doctrine of res judicata is typically divided into two separate, yet related, concepts: claim preclusion and issue preclusion. See Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 321-22 (9th Cir. 1988). "Claim preclusion prevents litigation of all grounds for, or defenses to, recovery that were previously available to the parties, regardless of whether they were asserted or determined in the prior proceeding. The doctrine of issue preclusion prevents relitigation of all issues of fact or law that were actually litigated and necessarily decided in a prior proceeding." Id. at 322 (quotations omitted). The critical issue to determine for this motion is whether or not the claims of Stephenson II were actually litigated in Stephenson I, or, if not, whether they could have brought in the earlier action.
1) The Procedural Posture of Stephenson I Did Not Prevent Addition of the Present Claims
Stephenson I concerned defendant's accommodation to plaintiffs disability, and the claims brought by plaintiff in the present case could easily have been brought in the earlier action. The fact that the case had been subject to summary judgment, appeal, and remand was no bar to an amendment of the complaint adding the allegations of failure to accommodate and retaliation that took place after 1999. See Engle v. CBS Inc., 981 F.2d 1076, 1083 (9th Cir. 1993) (directing the district court to allow amendment after remand in order to state a claim under the law of a different jurisdiction); Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743, 747 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding that on remand, plaintiff should be allowed to seek leave to amend his complaint to add a defendant); and Richardson v. United States, 841 F.2d 993, 999-1000 (9th Cir. 1988). The latter case, Richardson v. United States, is especially illuminating on the issue of amendment of a complaint after remand. Repeating the oft-cited proposition that Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 15(a) and 15(b) direct that amendment of a pleading be freely granted absent a showing of prejudice to the defendant, the Ninth Circuit directed the district court to consider whether the government would be prejudiced by allowing an amendment to a complaint "at this late date." Richardson, 841 F.2d at 999. The date in question in the case was indeed "late, " as the case had gone to trial, been appealed, reversed and remanded, consolidated with a second case, subject to a second trial on the issue of damages, and appealed, reversed, and remanded once again.
2) The Claims In Stephenson I Were Amenable To Amendment
In addition to Rule 15's liberal permission to amend pleadings, even after remand, the course of the litigation in Stevenson I gave ample notice to the plaintiff that the allegations in the present case could have been added to it. As Judge Walker observed in the April 17, 2002 Order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment, the facts and allegations at issue in Stevenson I were subject to considerable flux over time. "Although plaintiffs original complaint remains the operative pleading, plaintiffs claims have markedly changed over the course of this litigation." (Notice, Ex. D at 2:4-16.) While specific details of the allegations may have changed since plaintiff first filed the case in 1997, the central claim of the case before Judge Legge, the Ninth Circuit, Judge Walker, and now this Court, has always concerned defendant's accommodation of plaintiffs physical needs. As Judge Walker explained, the core claim adjudicated in Stevenson I was discrimination due to disability — specifically, a failure to engage in an interactive process to determine a reasonable accommodation for plaintiff when he returned from work due after his hip surgeries. ( See Order at 8:20-9:16.) The parallel to the claims in the present case is manifestly clear: the disability from which plaintiff suffers is the same; and the present complaint addresses failure to accommodate the disability. The only differences between the factual basis for Stevenson I and the present case are the dates (pre-1999 versus post-September 1999) and the claim of retaliation.
3) The Legal Test For Preclusion Is Met In This Case
The test for claim preclusion can be found in Communications Telesystems International v. Calfornia PUC, 196 F.3d 1011, 1017 (9th Cir. 1999): "Generally, a claim is barred under [ res judicata] if the earlier litigation: (1) concerned the same claim as the current action, (2) reached final judgment on the merits, and (3) involved the same parties." Stephenson I reached final judgment on the merits through its disposition in summary judgment, and it involved exactly the same parties as the present case, so the issue is whether the same claim is implicated in the present action.
See Cinquini v. Donohoe, No. 95-4168 FMS, 1996 WL 79822 *5 (N.D.Cal. 1996) ("For purposes of res judicata, judgment entered on a motion to dismiss or for summary judgment is just as binding as a judgment entered after a trial of the facts.") (citing Ruple v. City of Vermillion, 714 F.2d 860, 862 (8th Cir. 1983); see also Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 1838 F.2d.318, 327 (9th Cir. 1988) (preclusive effect of district court judgment not affected by appeal).
Both parties cite Costantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1982), for the test to determine whether an action involves the same claim. ( See United's Motion to Dismiss ("Motion") at 8:12-20; Opp. at 3:4-11.)
This circuit approaches that crucial question by applying several criteria to determine whether successive lawsuits involve a single cause of action:
(1) whether rights or interests established in the prior judgment would be destroyed or impaired by prosecution of the second action; (2) whether substantially the same evidence is presented in the two actions; (3) whether the two suits involve infringement of the same right; and (4) whether the two suits arise out of the same transactional nucleus of facts.
The last of these criteria is the most important.
Costantini, 681 F.2d at 1201-1202 (citations omitted). In the present case, the same rights are implicated as in Stephenson I, and the case will feature virtually the same evidence, despite plaintiffs assertions to the contrary. ( See Opp. at 4-5.) Regardless of the fact that the allegations of failure to accommodate plaintiffs disability and engage in an interactive process in the current case involve actions after 1999, the issues will be the same as in Stephenson I. The Court would have to consider plaintiffs disability, defendant's knowledge of the disability and its consequent limitations on plaintiff, defendant's efforts to accommodate plaintiff, and defendant's participation in an interactive process to assess plaintiffs needs and ways to address them. The only new factual issue is whether or not defendant engaged in retaliatory conduct since 1999. The addition of this sole issue is not sufficient to overcome a determination that the claims in Stephenson land II are the same, especially when it could have been added to the first action.
The issue of different dates for the allegations of discrimination will be discussed below.
The fact that some different evidence may be presented in this action to recover accurate payments, however, does not defeat the bar of res judicata. We have emphasized that the factors cited in Costantini are "tools of analysis, not requirements.' We have previously applied the doctrine of res judicata on the ground that the two claims arose out of the same transaction, without reaching other factors cited in Costantini.International Union of Operating Engineers Trust Funds v. Karr, 994 F.2d 1426, 1430 (9th Cir. 1993) (citations omitted). Further, the addition of new facts, new allegations, or new legal theories does not avoid the bar of res judicata; rather, the critical question is whether the cause of action in the second suit is the same as in the first. Costantini, 681 F.2d. at 1201.
As Costantini instructs, the question of whether the claim in a subsequent action arises from the same transactional nucleus of facts is the most important factor in determining if application of a res judicata bar is appropriate. See id. at 1202. In making this determination, the Court can consider "whether they are related to the same set of facts and whether they could convemently be tried together." Western Systems, Inc. v. Ulloa, 958 F.2d 864, 871 (9th Cir. 1992). Plaintiff has offered no adequate justification for his failure to include the claims at issue in the present suit in Stephenson I, especially as there was no impediment to do so. The prior case was remanded and assigned to Judge Walker on June 28, 2001, and the dates at issue in the present suit are from September 1999 through the year 2000. Nothing prevented plaintiff from adding these claims to the prior lawsuit, including the allegation of retaliation, especially considering the fact that they concerned the same set of facts and could quite easily be tried with the other discrimination claims.
To counter the patent similarity of the claims in the two cases, plaintiff argues that the dates of the actions were different, and that defendants acquiesced in splitting the claims. ( See Opposition to Motion to Dismiss ("Opp.") at 2, 7.) From the text of Judge Walker's Order granting summary judgment, it is clear that the factual issues in Stephenson I revolved around defendant's treatment of plaintiff when he returned from his hip surgeries in 1995. ( See Notice, Ex. D at 8-9.) The case was confined to incidents before 1999, as the Court and the parties agreed in the hearing for the final summary judgment motion in Stephenson I:
THE COURT: All right. The two periods of time we're talking about — the first begins March 1995.
STEPHENSON: — through August `95.
Plaintiff is represented by Matthew Stephenson, who shares his same last name. The Stephenson referred to here is counsel, not plaintiff.
THE COURT: Five-month period.
MR. STEPHENSON: Correct.
THE COURT: And the second period —
MR. STEPHENSON: — begins in December 1995 and extends through the end of August 1999.
THE COURT: Okay. And there's no — essentially, in your view, we have to worry about nothing after 1999.
MR. STEPHENSON: Those — there — may be some issues related to that, depending on the presentation of evidence. But in terms of a claim in this case, there is no claim for failure to accommodate after that point.
(Declaration of Matthew Stephenson in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss ("Stephenson Decl."), Ex. C. at 11-12.) However, the fact that he is basing a claim in the new action on later dates does not prevent the application of preclusion to his case, for claims that should have been brought in the first action are barred from subsequent litigation regardless of whether they actually were. See Communications Telesystems, 196 F.3d at 1015-16. The rationale behind this rule is to prevent a party from fragmenting "a single cause of action and to litigate piecemeal the issues which could have been resolved in one action." Flynn v. State Board of Chiropractic Examiners, 418 F.2d 668 (9th Cir. 1969). The application of res judicata to claims that could have been brought in an earlier litigation is "grounded in the policy of encouraging litigants to raise all of the claims arising out of one transaction in a single suit and precludes them from splitting causes of action." Adolph Coors Co. v. Sickler, 608 F. Supp. 1417, 1431 (C.D.Cal. 1985). The division of plaintiffs claims into pre-1999 claims and post-1999 claims is precisely the type of claim splitting that case law forbids.
4) Defendant Did Not Agree or Acquiesce To Splitting Claims
To counter this fact, plaintiff argues that defendant agreed to, or at least acquiesced to, a division of claims into pre-1999 and post-1999 claims. ( See Opp. at 7.) Plaintiff relies on a footnote in Clements v. Airport Authority of Washoe County, 69 F.3d 321, 328, n. 5 (9th Cir. 1995), for the proposition that "[The general rule against splitting claims] does not apply to extinguish the claim, and a part or all of the claim subsists as a possible basis for a second action . . . [where] [t]he parties have agreed in terms or in effect that the plaintiff may split his claim, or the defendant has acquiesced therein." Id. (quoting the Restatement (Second) Judgments § 26(1)(a)). There are two problems with plaintiffs reliance on this authority. The first problem is that the division of claims permitted in Clements was a division between simultaneous actions in state and federal court, and the second is that defendant never agreed or acquiesced to a splitting of claims.
Unlike the successive suits in this case, the claims sought to be precluded in Clements were progressing simultaneously in state and federal court. "Similarly, they [defendants] never objected to the splitting of any claim or to the prosecution of the two cases at the same time in the state and federal courts." Id. at 329. In fact, the footnote immediately following the one cited by plaintiff offers an explanation of the Restatement's position on splitting of claims.
As the Restatement commentators explain:
Where the plaintiff is simultaneously maintaining separate actions based upon parts of the same claim, and in neither action does the defendant make the objection that another action is pending based on the same claim, judgment in one of the actions does not preclude the plaintiff from proceeding and obtaining judgment in the other action. The failure of the defendant to object to the splitting of the plaintiffs claim is effective as an acquiescence in the splitting of the claim.
Restatement (Second) Judgments § 26, comment a.
Id. at 328, n6. The holding of Clements upon which plaintiff relies is therefore inapplicable to the present case. Rather, the interests underlying res judicata, as expressed by the court in Clements itself, mandate precluding the present claims.
Preclusion doctrine encompasses vindication of both public and private interests. The private values protected include shielding litigants from the burden of re-litigating identical issues with the same party, and vindicating the parties' interest in repose. The public interests served include avoiding inconsistent results and preserving judicial economy.Id. at 330. Thus, while Clements is applicable to the present case, it points in the opposite direction than plaintiff intends.
A further problem with plaintiffs splitting argument is that defendant never agreed or acquiesced to any division of claims. As evidence to support his acquiescence argument, plaintiff directs the Court to the transcript of plaintiffs January 10, 2002 deposition, a letter written by plaintiffs counsel to defendant's counsel, and the transcript of the April 4, 2002 hearing on parties' motions for summary judgment in Stephenson I (Stephenson Decl., Ex. A, B, C.) Plaintiff correctly notes that this evidence indicates that the focus of Stephenson I would be confined to the time period from 1995 to 1999. (Opp. at 8.) However, plaintiff attempts to forge the fact that defendant knew the case would only address 1995 to 1999 into an acquiescence that prevents it from raising a res judicata defense to the present lawsuit. ( See id.)
The reason the Restatement and Clements consider failure to object to simultaneous suits as a waiver of the claim or issue preclusion defense is that the defendant is aware of the pendency of the two actions. In the present case, while Stephenson I was being adjudicated there was no indication that a second action would be brought. For the closest indication of a future action, see Stephenson Del., Ex. A [deposition transcript] at 907:7-9: "The refusal to let him stretch may become the subject of a future complaint, but it is not at issue in this lawsuit, the fact that it was taken away from him in early 2001." Even if plaintiff directed the Court to authority holding that an agreement to file a later lawsuit can serve as a waiver of any res judicata defense, and he does not, the facts of the present case do not support plaintiffs argument that defendant agreed or acquiesced to the splitting of claims.
CONCLUSION
Because plaintiffs claims in the present lawsuit are part of the same claim at issue in Stephenson land could have been adjudicated in that action, the summary judgment entered in that case has a preclusive effect on this cause of action. For this reason, plaintiff has failed to state a claim, and defendant's motion to dismiss is GRANTED. The Clerk is directed to close the file.