Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Super. Ct. No. BC 351083, Reginald Dunn, Judge.
Pircher, Nichols & Meeks and James L. Goldman for Defendant, Cross-complainant and Appellant.
Levinson Arshonsky & Kurtz, Richard I. Arshonsky and Karol H. Ingber for Plaintiffs, Cross-defendants and Respondents.
FLIER, J.
Christopher S. Banning appeals from a judgment quieting title to real property in favor of respondents Jeffrey Stenfors and Marimi Ichikawa, trustees of the Stenfors family trust, and an order denying his motion to vacate the judgment. Appellant contends the judgment must be reversed and remanded with directions to enter a new judgment quieting title in his favor or, alternatively, declaring he has an easement or license to continue to use the property in dispute. Respondents provided undisputed evidence they are the legal owners of the property, for which they hold a recorded grant deed, and they paid all the property taxes on the property, while appellant concededly had no recorded grant deed and provided no corroborative evidence of payment of consideration for the disputed property. We therefore affirm the judgment.
FACTS
This case involves a dispute between adjoining homeowners. Respondents own the Stenfors property, which is located on Gibralter Drive near Mulholland Drive in Los Angeles. Respondents bought their property from a predecessor whose title derived from Mrs. Wagner, a prior owner now deceased, and her daughter. Appellant and his mother, Mrs. Combs, for many years have owned the adjoining property (Banning property). Both properties are located in a hillside canyon community deep in what is known as the “Beverly Hills post office” area of Los Angeles.
Mrs. Combs quitclaimed an undivided one-half interest in the Banning property to her son in 1996 and later created a family trust of which Wells Fargo Bank is the trustee. Appellant and the family trust each are the current owners of an undivided one-half interest in the Banning property. Wells Fargo Bank agreed to be bound by the final judgment in this case and was dismissed as a party to this action.
In November 2005, respondents ordered a survey of their property with the idea of building a turnaround for their driveway or a small guesthouse. The survey showed a chain-link fence and gate that appellant and his mother had erected were actually on the Stenfors property and blocked off about 6,000 square feet of respondents’ land (disputed property).
Mr. Stenfors informed appellant a land survey showed that appellant’s fence and gate were on respondents’ property. Mr. Stenfors asked appellant to remove the fence and gate. Appellant asserted he owned the disputed property, and he would provide documentation to prove his ownership. Appellant later produced some covenant agreements, but he never provided respondents with a grant deed or other evidence he had purchased the disputed property.
After repeatedly requesting appellant to remove the fence and gate, respondents brought the present action.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Respondents filed a verified complaint asking for quiet title to the Stenfors property, including the disputed property, and a declaration that appellant has no interest in such property. Respondents asked for a permanent injunction prohibiting appellant from interfering with their use.
Respondents asked the court to enjoin appellant from using or maintaining any use of the property, entering the property, having any property placed or maintained on the property, and doing any acts inconsistent with respondents’ rights to the property.
Appellant answered and denied the material allegations of the complaint. He invoked the statute of limitations, laches, unclean hands, waiver and estoppel as affirmative defenses.
Appellant also filed an unverified cross-complaint against respondents for breach of an alleged agreement to effectuate a lot line adjustment between Mrs. Wagner and Mrs. Combs in 1990. Appellant alleged that Mrs. Wagner agreed to sell the disputed property to Mrs. Combs for $30,000, and the parties agreed to adjust the boundaries of the Stenfors and Banning properties to effectuate the transfer. Appellant alleged Mrs. Combs paid Mrs. Wagner $30,000, but, due to an “oversight,” a deed or deeds Mrs. Wagner executed to convey title to the disputed property was or were never recorded. Appellant sought damages and specific performance of the alleged agreement and asked the court to require respondents to deliver a deed to the disputed property. Appellant initially claimed a prescriptive easement as well, which he later amended to an “equitable easement” to use the disputed property.
In the trial court, appellant conceded that his cross-complaint technically did not state a cause of action for quiet title because it was not verified as required under Code of Civil Procedure section 761.040. However, appellant argued he was entitled to a declaration of ownership under his claim for declaratory relief.
Respondents answered the cross-complaint and asserted affirmative defenses including the statute of frauds and failure of consideration.
The parties tried the case to the court over the course of four days. After the close of evidence, appellant moved to amend his cross-complaint to conform to proof, seeking a judicial declaration that he was entitled to an “oral easement” to use the disputed property.
The trial court issued a minute order determining respondents were entitled to judgment in their favor and to a declaration that respondents are the undisputed owners of legal title to the disputed property, and appellant’s claim of an oral contract or agreement to convey the disputed property violated the statute of frauds. The court ordered respondents to prepare a judgment incorporating the court’s rulings.
As more specifically set out in the Discussion, post, appellant requested a statement of decision and a ruling on his motion for leave to amend his cross-complaint. He submitted proposed issues and findings. Pursuant to appellant’s request, the court issued a statement of decision and entered a judgment quieting title in favor of respondents. The court concluded that judgment should be entered as prayed for by respondents and appellant should take nothing by his cross-complaint. The court declared that appellant holds no interest of any kind in the Stenfors property, or any part of the property, and it permanently enjoined appellant from interfering in respondents’ use and ownership of the property. The court ordered appellant to remove all encroachments, including gates, fences, electrical devices, landscaping and hardscaping or they could be removed at appellant’s expense.
Appellant moved to set aside and vacate the judgment. The court denied the motion, stating it “heard all of the evidence, considered all applicable law and is satisfied that its ruling is in conformity with all applicable statutes and law.”
Appellant timely appealed the judgment and order denying his motion to vacate the judgment.
EVIDENCE AND FINDINGS AT TRIAL
1. Respondents’ Evidence
At trial, Mr. Stenfors testified as follows. He and his wife purchased their property in 2003, and, when he compared them, their grant deed had the same legal description as the property sold by Mrs. Wagner to his predecessor. Mr. Stenfors learned for the first time that the neighboring fence and gate encroached upon the Stenfors property in November 2005, when he had a survey performed. Mr. Stenfors asked appellant to remove the encroachments. Appellant refused and claimed he was the owner of the disputed property. Mr. Stenfors and his wife paid all the taxes on their property, including the taxes for the disputed property. He produced certified tax assessors records that included their remittance checks paying the taxes. He received no discount for any encroachment when he purchased the property, and no agent advised him of any encroachment. Mr. Stenfors testified that if the fence and gate were removed, appellant would still have access to his own property.
On cross-examination, Mr. Stenfors indicated he viewed his property about four times before purchasing it. He saw the fence and gate, but he was unaware at the time whether they were on disputed property. He did not discuss disputed property with the real estate agents and thus was never told the disputed property was part of the property he would be purchasing. He read a preliminary title report that referred to a covenant and agreement, but he did not look into them before purchasing his property.
Respondents’ expert, general contractor Lewis Terry Lynn, testified it would cost less than $10,000 and take no more than three days to remove the fence and gate. Mr. Lynn confirmed appellant would still have access to his property if the fence and gate were removed. He testified all 6,000 square feet of the disputed property was flat land usable for landscaping, patios, swimming pools or a residential structure. Mr. Lynn indicated an application for a building permit appellant submitted to the city in July 1994 included a diagram of the Banning property, and the diagram did not include the disputed property.
Surveyor Michael J. Amoroso testified he performed an architectural survey for respondents that showed an encroachment upon their property. Mr. Amoroso based his survey on the lot shown by respondents’ deed and the property upon which respondents had paid taxes as shown by the tax assessor’s records. In conducting property surveys, Mr. Amoroso examines the title report, the legal description and the grant deed to verify they are the same. In this case, the legal descriptions in those documents were all the same, and they showed the disputed property fell within the legal description of respondents’ property. Mr. Amoroso also checks city records for maps and documents applicable to a boundary research. He testified a covenant is not a document upon which a surveyor would rely to establish property lines.
In the present case, a zoning map indicated that, before respondents acquired the Stenfors property, the then owners of the two adjoining properties had started the process for doing a lot line adjustment in years past. Mr. Amoroso’s research, however, showed that no actual lot line adjustment was ever effectuated or completed for the disputed property. The parties obtained approval from the zoning department but never obtained approval from all the necessary departments, and the adjustment was never actuated. Mr. Amoroso testified that a grant deed is necessary to transfer or convey real property, and the recording of the grant deed is the final step in that process.
In his search of the public records, Mr. Amoroso found no deeds reflecting a conveyance of the disputed property. The records showed the city also had specifically informed the property owners by letter that the lot line adjustment would not be effective without the recording of grant deeds.
City records indicated that in September 1990, the city informed Mrs. Combs and Mrs. Wagner by letter that a lot line adjustment “will not become effective, nor will a building permit be issued on the new parcels until: (1) grant deeds are recorded between owners, with the new legal descriptions to coincide with new parcel boundaries; (2) each owner takes the: (a) determination letter, (b) new deeds, (c) the approved plot plan stamped by the City Planning Department and (d) a completed and notarized ‘Covenant and Agreement to Hold Property as One Parcel’... for review and approval by the Drafting Services Section of the Planning Department..., and then records the Covenant and Agreement with the Los Angeles County Registrar-Recorder’s Office....” (Original underscoring.) Mr. Amoroso testified he found no evidence these additional steps to complete the lot line adjustment were ever completed.
Mark Herman, an expert appraiser for respondents, testified that the disputed property was primarily a level piece of land suitable for building and worth $100 per square foot, i.e., $600,000.
2. Appellant’s Evidence
Mrs. Wagner’s son-in-law, attorney Andrew Mauthe, testified that he was involved in discussions with appellant and his mother in approximately 1990 about a transfer of the disputed property. Appellant and his mother had already built a fence enclosing the disputed property. They offered to buy the disputed property from Mrs. Wagner and to pay for a lot line adjustment. Mr. Mauthe recalled the purchase price was $30,000. However, he testified he did not personally receive the payment and stated only that someone on “that [Mrs. Wagner’s] side of the table” received the money.
On cross-examination, Mr. Mauthe testified he could not recall seeing any purchase agreement between Mrs. Combs and Mrs. Wagner and did not think he saw Mrs. Wagner sign a grant deed transferring the disputed property to Mrs. Combs. Mr. Mauthe did not represent Mrs. Wagner in the transaction and had no records reflecting the payment or receipt of the $30,000 purchase price.
Mrs. Combs testified she had an oral agreement with Mrs. Wagner in the “early ’90s” to buy the disputed property for $30,000. Before that, in the late 1980s, she and appellant, purportedly with Mrs. Wagner’s permission, fenced off the disputed property, built a gate and related structures on it, paved a portion to use as a driveway and planted landscaping. Mrs. Combs claimed she mailed a check for $30,000 to Mr. Mauthe. She could not obtain a copy of the check from the bank because they said their records did not go that back far.
Mrs. Combs produced a copy of a 1996 tax return with an attached schedule dated June 25, 1997, listing a payment of $30,000 next to the notation, “purchased.47 acres from [Mrs.] Wagner in 1987.”
We take judicial notice that an acre of land amounts to 43,560 square feet. (Webster’s Collegiate Dict. (10th ed. 1993) p. 10; see Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (h), 459, subd. (a).) The product of 43,560 square feet multiplied by 0.47 of an acre is 20,473.2 square feet, significantly more than 6,000 square feet (the size of the disputed property), which is only 0.14 of an acre.
On cross-examination, Mrs. Combs had no recollection whether she made the purchase check out to Mrs. Wagner or Mr. Mauthe. She had no documents to evidence the payment. She admitted she and appellant signed a master termination of covenant and agreement as owners of the Banning property that terminated prior covenants and agreements. After the Northridge earthquake in 1994, Mrs. Combs authorized appellant to obtain permits from the city to rebuild their home, and the diagram of their property did not include the disputed property.
Mrs. Combs testified she did not ask Mrs. Wagner for a grant deed in exchange for the check she sent Mr. Mauthe, and she never saw one for the disputed property. She retained a specialist to do the lot line adjustment. She now knows it was never done, and the disputed property was sold to respondents’ predecessor. She never asked the Wagner family to refund the money allegedly paid Mrs. Wagner.
Appellant testified he built the fence and gate in approximately 1986 at a cost between $3,000 and $10,000. He used the disputed property for over 20 years for drainage, landscaping, business, fire protection and brush clearance purposes, as well as for access. He operates a business selling cactus, and some of his inventory is planted on the disputed property.
Appellant stated that he applied for a building permit to rebuild the family home after it was destroyed in 1994. In August 1994, he was told by the head of the city planning department that a more accurate legal description of the Banning property was required before a building permit could be issued. The city cartographer determined the map did not match the property description, and the city needed a copy of the “newest” grant deed before the building permit could be approved. Appellant provided the city with the “latest” grant deed. After that, the city advised appellant the legal description now matched the map and he could continue with the building permit process. The problem arose again in 1998 when appellant applied for a permit to build a carport.
Appellant testified he had a grant deed “at some point” but did not know what happened to it. Appellant acknowledged signing a master termination of covenant agreement, but asserted he never filled in all the requested information and never delivered the master termination to anyone.
On cross-examination, appellant stated he found a grant deed for the disputed property among his mother’s papers in 1994. Neither he nor his mother paid taxes on the disputed property, and the tax assessor’s maps showed the taxes were assessed against respondents. He admittedly never recorded a grant deed reflecting the disputed property as belonging to him or his mother. He had no canceled checks or bank statements reflecting that $30,000 was paid for the disputed property. To his knowledge, a lot line adjustment as to the disputed property was never effectuated.
Appellant admitted that the drawings attached to his 1994 and 1998 building permit applications did not include the disputed property.
3. Findings of Fact
The court’s minute order issuing a statement of decision among other things found the following:
Respondents acquired title to the Stenfors property through a grant deed that included the disputed property within its legal description. Appellant erected a fence and gate that effectively blocked respondents’ access to approximately 6,000 square feet of their property. While in the process of developing plans to improve their property, respondents discovered appellant had completely blocked respondents’ access to their property. Mr. Stenfors asked appellant to remove the fence and gate and appellant refused to do so. Appellant failed to produce any documents demonstrating his ownership of the disputed property by purchase or transfer, and in fact no lot lines were effectuated or deeds recorded showing a transfer of any portion of the disputed property to appellant.
Appellant admittedly had no purchase agreement or any other evidence of a sale or transfer of the disputed property and conceded that respondents paid taxes regularly on the disputed property. Respondents became aware of appellant’s encroachments on the disputed property, consisting of a chain-link fence, a gate and a portion of a driveway, all built by appellant. Mr. Stenfors informed appellant the gate and fence appellant erected were on respondents’ property and requested that appellant remove them to no avail. Appellant asserted he owned the disputed property. Mr. Amoroso, a licensed land surveyor, testified he conducted a survey of the disputed property and determined that appellant had encroached upon the Stenfors property. Mr. Amoroso looked but could not find in the city records any documents indicating a lot line adjustment had been effectuated as to the disputed property.
Appellant claimed he paid “$3,000.00 [sic]” for the disputed property, but he offered no evidence he had paid “$3,000.00 [sic] or any other amount” for its ownership. Appellant produced no evidence he holds title to the disputed property or any portion of that property.
Appellant has not alleged an action for quiet title. Respondents, on the other hand, provided proof in form of certified assessors tax records that they have been paying property taxes regularly on the disputed property. Respondents also proved they own legal title to the disputed property by producing a grant deed. There were no grant deed documents exchanged or recorded regarding the disputed property.
The court concluded respondents were entitled to judgment in that respondents are the undisputed owners of legal title to the disputed property and appellant’s defense that there was a purported oral agreement to convey the property violates the statute of frauds. The court further found that all public records disclose respondents are the legal title owners of the disputed property pursuant to a recorded July 2003 grant deed conveying the Stenfors property, including the disputed property, to respondents. Respondents’ land surveyor confirmed they are the legal owners of the disputed property, and they or their predecessors paid all property taxes regarding the disputed property. As owners of legal title to the disputed property, respondents are also owners of all its beneficial title.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Appellant contends that all of the trial court’s errors stemmed from a misunderstanding of the applicable law and therefore our review is de novo. To the extent appellant’s contentions comprise issues of law, our review is de novo. (Harustak v. Wilkins (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 208, 212-213.) We review the trial court’s equitable determinations for abuse of discretion. (Hartford Casualty Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indemnity Co. (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 710, 724.) However, “[a]s a reviewing court, we do not reweigh evidence or reassess the credibility of witnesses.” (Peak-Las Positas Partners v. Bollag (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 101, 108; see also Estate of Young (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 62, 76.) To the extent appellant takes issue with factual determinations of the trial court, our power begins and ends with the determination whether, based on the entire record, substantial evidence, contradicted or uncontradicted, supports the court’s findings, and, when two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts, we are without power to substitute our deductions for those of the trial court. (Bowers v. Bernards (1984) 150 Cal.App.3d 870, 873-874.) We review a trial court’s determination of laches for substantial evidence. (Bono v. Clark (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1417.)
DISCUSSION
1. Appellant’s Entitlement to Quiet Title
Appellant contends he was entitled to quiet title of the disputed property as a matter of law because Evidence Code section 622 bars respondents from claiming title to the disputed property under the covenants and agreements entered into by Mrs. Combs and Mrs. Wagner. We disagree.
Evidence Code section 622 provides that “[t]he facts recited in a written instrument are conclusively presumed to be true as between the parties thereto, or their successors in interest; but this rule does not apply to the recital of consideration.” The statute is based upon the doctrine of estoppel by contract; i.e., a party to a contract is generally estopped to deny essential facts recited in the contract. (In re Marriage of Brooks & Robinson (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 176, 184.) It applies “‘as between the parties’” to written instruments and does not apply to persons who are not parties to the instrument. (Ibid.; Henneberry v. Henneberry (1958) 164 Cal.App.2d 125, 132 [discussing predecessor statute].)
Respondents were not parties to the covenants and agreements purportedly entered between Mrs. Combs and Mrs. Wagner on the one hand, and the city on the other. Hence, respondents are not bound by the “facts” recited in those documents. In any case, Evidence Code section 622 “does not apply to the recital of consideration,” and the trial court properly gave no credence to the assertions of Mrs. Combs, appellant and Mr. Mauthe that consideration was given to Mrs. Wagner for the disputed property.
Moreover, the covenants and agreements on their face do not constitute a conveyance of, or a promise by Mrs. Wagner to sell, the disputed property to Mrs. Combs. In the recorded July 1990 covenant and agreement regarding plot plan, Mrs. Combs and Mrs. Wagner merely certify they are the owners of the “legally described real property” and that they “covenant and agree” with the city “to submit four copies of a plot plan.” In the recorded August 1990 covenant and agreement regarding fire sprinkler protection, the two owners certify they are the owners of the “legally described real property” and they covenant and agree with the city only “to provide and maintain automatic fire sprinkler protection throughout all structures[] which may be built” upon the property. In yet a third covenant and agreement, recorded in October 1990, Mrs. Wagner certifies simply that she is the owner of the “legally described real property,” and she agrees and covenants with the city that the “legally described real property shall be held as one parcel and no portion shall be sold separately.”
The “legally described real property” in all three documents includes a legal description of Mrs. Wagner’s property that simply omits the disputed property in a “Proposed Parcel A” and includes the disputed property as part of the Banning property in “Proposed Parcel B.” Although the covenants and agreements indicate an intent to hold both the Banning and Stenfors property “as one,” and they attach a legal description of the Stenfors property not including the disputed property, none of the documents purports to be a grant deed conveying, or even a promise to convey, title to the disputed property.
The trial court found that no lot lines were effectuated or any deeds were recorded showing a transfer of any portion of the disputed property to appellant or Mrs. Combs. This conclusion is supported by the execution by appellant and his mother of a master termination of covenant and agreement indicating they themselves had abandoned any such understandings.
This case is distinguishable from Estate of Wilson, on which appellant relies. (Estate of Wilson (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 786.) Wilson held the factual recitations in a husband’s will were conclusively presumed under the statute to be true against the wife, because she signed a consent form expressly declaring she had read her husband’s will, fully understood it and elected to accept and acquiesce in its provisions. (Id. at pp. 799-802.) The court stated, “when a person with a capacity of reading and understanding an instrument signs it, in the absence of fraud or imposition he is bound by its contents, and he is estopped from saying that its provisions are contrary to his intentions or understanding.” (Id. at p. 802.) Unlike the wife in Wilson, respondents did not read, understand and sign the covenants and agreements in question and, in any case, the covenants did not convey any interest in property, as noted above.
B. Statute of Frauds
Appellant further contends there was an oral agreement in 1990 between Mrs. Combs and Mrs. Wagner to purchase and sell the disputed property for $30,000. We disagree. Substantial evidence supported the trial court’s implied finding that there was no “note or memorandum” signed by Mrs. Wagner that would have taken the oral agreement out of the statute of frauds.
With limited exceptions, the sale of real property or an interest in real property is subject to the statute of frauds, which requires to be enforceable an agreement for sale of real property must be in writing, and any such agreement must be signed by the party against whom it is being enforced or by a duly authorized agent. (Civ. Code, § 1624, subd. (a)(3); see also Civ. Code, § 1091; Code Civ. Proc., § 1971.) The trial court in the instant case found that appellant’s “defense [and claim] of a purported oral agreement to convey the [disputed] property is in violation of the statute of frauds.”
Civil Code section 1624 provides that “(a) [t]he following contracts are invalid, unless they, or some note or memorandum thereof, are in writing and subscribed by the party to be charged or by the party’s agent: [¶]... [¶] (3) An agreement for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for the sale of real property, or of an interest therein; such an agreement, if made by an agent of the party sought to be charged, is invalid, unless the authority of the agent is in writing, subscribed by the party sought to be charged.”
Appellant asserts the statute of frauds does not prevent enforcement of an oral agreement when there is a “note or memorandum thereof” (Civ. Code, § 1624, subds. (a)(3), (b)(3)(D) [evidence sufficient as to contracts not to be performed within a year]) or there is part performance by the party seeking enforcement (Code Civ. Proc., § 1972, subd. (a) [statute of frauds does not abridge court’s power to compel performance of agreement when there is part performance]). Appellant argues the agreement is enforceable and the statute of frauds does not bar appellant’s claim to entitlement of the disputed property because (1) the covenants signed by Mrs. Wagner constitute sufficient documentary evidence to establish a contract between Mrs. Combs and Mrs. Wagner, (2) Mrs. Combs paid for the disputed property, (3) Mrs. Wagner and her daughter permitted appellant and Mrs. Combs to occupy the disputed property for many years after they constructed the fence and gate, and (4) appellant has otherwise relied on the agreement.
Mrs. Combs claimed she entered into an oral agreement with Mrs. Wagner in the “early ’90s” to buy the disputed property for $30,000. Appellant asserts the covenants and agreements signed by Mrs. Combs and Mrs. Wagner sufficiently memorialized the oral agreement to take it out of the statute of frauds. As we have explained, the covenants and agreements do not establish a purchase or sale of the disputed property. The covenants do not contain any essential terms of the alleged oral agreement and were meaningless without grant deeds having been recorded. Appellant and Mrs. Combs further signed a master termination of covenant and agreement after the covenants were executed, an admission the covenants were never effectuated. Mrs. Wagner, a purported party to the agreement, specifically contradicted such an agreement by her acts, as soon after the covenants she gave a recorded grant deed to respondents’ predecessor transferring title to the disputed property.
Substantial evidence also supports the trial court’s finding that Mrs. Combs never paid for the disputed property. Although Mr. Mauthe and Mrs. Combs testified she paid Mrs. Wagner $30,000 to purchase the disputed property, there was no documentary evidence at trial that such payment was ever made. Mrs. Combs testified she sent a check to Mr. Mauthe, Mrs. Wagner’s son-in-law, for the $30,000 in payment. Yet Mr. Mauthe denied receiving a check from Mrs. Combs, had no records reflecting the money was paid or received and did not recall ever seeing Mrs. Combs giving Mrs. Wagner a check or cash in payment. Based on this record, the trial court reasonably could have found the $30,000 was not paid.
Appellant asserts his occupation of the disputed property and reliance on the oral agreement is sufficient to fall within the part performance exception to the statute of frauds. Appellant argues that Mrs. Wagner and her daughter permitted appellant and Mrs. Combs to occupy the disputed property for many years after the fence and gate were erected. However, there was no evidence that appellant’s occupation of the disputed property was with the Wagners’ knowledge or consent. Mrs. Wagner simply certified in the covenants and agreements that she would abide by the provisions of the covenants, none of which required her to sell or transfer the disputed property. The covenants contain exhibits that refer only to a “proposed” legal description. The legal description for the disputed property never actually changed, and a lot line adjustment was never effectuated. Mr. Amoroso testified the covenants simply related to zoning issues and the zoning department does not determine boundaries.
As to appellant’s claimed reliance, appellant’s improvements to the disputed property merely consisted of a chain-link fence and inexpensive gate, as well as some cacti that appellant planted for his business. Neither appellant nor Mrs. Combs took any further action to have the disputed property reassessed in their names or to pay the taxes levied upon the property. The trial court properly could find such acts, without more, insufficient to take the oral agreement outside the statute of frauds. (Wood v. Anderson (1926) 199 Cal. 440, 445 [possession alone insufficient to take contract out of the statute of frauds when claimant merely hauled a few loads of gravel onto disputed lot, planted some trees and claimed property as his own on occasion before third persons, but failed to pay or offer to pay property taxes or to have property reassessed in his name].) As the courts have long ago observed, “‘[t]o allow a mere technical possession, not open to the observation of the neighborhood, and capable of being proved only by select and confidential witnesses, to be sufficient for obtaining a decree to enforce the contract, would manifestly afford an opportunity for and an encouragement to dishonest testimony.’” (Ibid.)
Appellant’s claim that he relied on the oral agreement when he rebuilt his home is additionally refuted by substantial evidence. At the time appellant rebuilt his home, Mrs. Wagner and her daughter had already sold and transferred the entire Stenfors property, including the disputed property, to a predecessor of respondents. Appellant did not include the disputed property in the drawings he submitted to the city and admitted he was aware the city required plans that conformed to the existing legal description of the Banning property, not any “proposed” legal description.
C. Actual or Constructive Notice to Respondents
Appellant asserts that respondents were not bona fide purchasers as they took title to the disputed property subject to appellant’s claim.
“‘[A] bona fide purchaser for value who acquires his [or her] interest in real property without notice of another’s asserted rights in the property takes the property free of such unknown rights. [Citations.]’ [Citations.]” (Melendrez v. D & I Investment, Inc. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th 1238, 1251.) To be a bona fide purchaser, the buyer must (1) purchase the property in good faith for value, and (2) have no knowledge or notice of the claimed rights of another. (Ibid.)
In finding respondents to be the undisputed owners of legal title to the disputed property, the trial court implicitly found they were bona fide purchasers of the property. It was undisputed that respondents paid fair market value for their property and the record shows substantial evidence to support a finding that respondents purchased their property without knowledge of the disputed claims. Mr. Stenfors testified he visited the property about four times before purchasing it. Although he saw the fence and gate, he did not know at the time whether they were on disputed property. No real estate agent informed him about any disputed property, and he was never told ownership of part of the property he would be purchasing was in dispute. That covenants and agreement between Mrs. Wagner and Mrs. Combs on the one hand, and the city on the other, were recorded did not divest respondents of their bona fide purchaser status. Mr. Amoroso testified the lot line adjustment contemplated by the covenants and agreements was never completed; i.e., in any case, covenants and agreements are not the type of documents a surveyor would take into account in researching a boundary. The evidence was sufficient to establish respondents had no knowledge of circumstances that, upon reasonable inquiry, would lead one to conclude at the time of sale they were purchasing disputed property.
The trial court determined under all the circumstances that respondents did not have actual or constructive notice of appellant’s conflicting claims, and we cannot say that mere installation of a chain-link fence and gate upon adjoining property placed respondents on notice as a matter of law.
2. Easement or License
Appellant maintains that even if he is not entitled to quiet title, he has a right to the continued use of the disputed property through an oral easement, license or equitable easement. We disagree.
A. Oral Easement
Appellant argues that Mrs. Combs’s testimony that Mrs. Wagner consented to the construction and use of the fence and gate on the disputed property was uncontradicted. He implies that such uncontradicted evidence required the trial court to find an oral easement was created.
However, the trial court as trier of fact is not required to believe even uncontradicted testimony. (Sprague v. Equifax, Inc. (1985) 166 Cal.App.3d 1012, 1028; Rodney F. v. Karen M. (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 233, 241.) In this case, the trial court largely discounted the testimony of appellant and his mother. The court could, and obviously did, disbelieve Mrs. Combs’s testimony that Mrs. Wagner granted an oral easement allowing the building and use of a fence and gate on her property.
Rose v. Peters (1943) 59 Cal.App.2d 833, 835, which appellant cites, does not compel a different result. In Rose, the trial court found the plaintiff and defendants had entered into an oral agreement for plaintiff to fence both sides of a ditch and the defendant agreed to improve and maintain it. The defendants fully performed, but several years later the plaintiff sought to repudiate the agreement. The court found the parties had entered into a contract that carried mutual considerations, and appellant could not repudiate the contract having accepted its benefits. (Id. at pp. 834-835.) The factual predicate is different here, as the trial court found no oral contract for an easement.
B. License
Appellant further contends he is entitled to a judicial declaration that he has an irrevocable license to maintain his fence, gate and driveway, and to continue to use the disputed property as he has been using it for the last 20 years.
A licensee has express or implied authority from the owner to carry out an act or acts upon property. As with an easement, it is an interest in property that is less than an estate. (Golden West Baseball Co. v. City of Anaheim (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 11, 36.) A license ordinarily is revocable at will. (Ibid.) However, “where a party has made substantial expenditures in reliance on a license, the license acts, for all purposes, as an easement, estopping the grantor and his successor from revoking it.” (Noronha v. Stewart (1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 485, 490 (Noronha).) Appellant argues he has an irrevocable license under this theory because “[o]nce [the licensee has] expended substantial effort in execution of the license, ‘the license will continue for so long a time as the nature of it calls for.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p. 491.) Appellant argues that he called the trial court’s attention repeatedly to Noronha, yet the court “ignored” this authority.
Appellant’s argument that he had an irrevocable license is not persuasive. A license does not create or convey any interest in real property--it merely makes lawful what would otherwise constitute a trespass. Assuming there was a license, it is freely revocable unless the licensee has made substantial expenditures in reasonable reliance on a license. Whether appellant had made a “substantial” expenditure of time or money and whether he did so under a reasonable reliance on a license were issues of fact for determination by the trial court. The court disbelieved the testimony of appellant and Mrs. Combs that Mrs. Wagner granted them a license to build the fence and gate, thus undermining the claim there was a reasonable reliance on a license. In rejecting appellant’s argument, we presume the trial court also rejected his argument that the encroachments here, involving little more than a chain-link fence and gate, were a “substantial” expenditure of the type contemplated by Noronha assuming there was even a license. (Noronha, supra, 199 Cal.App.3d 485, 488, 490 [specially reinforced wall, gazebo, trellises, large slats and heavy foliage].)
C. Equitable Easement
Appellant claims there was sufficient evidence for the trial court to find an equitable easement based on the fact that (1) he and his mother constructed the fence and gate 20 years ago, occupying the property on their side continuously since; (2) they reconfigured and reconstructed their home with a circular driveway based on a belief they had an exclusive right to use the disputed property; (3) they maintained the disputed property, clearing brush yearly; and (4) respondents had no “compelling need” for the disputed property.
In Hirshfield v. Schwartz (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 749, 759, the court explained the relative hardship doctrine used in determining whether to grant an injunction to enjoin a trespass by encroachment on another’s land. Under the doctrine, once the court determines that a trespass has occurred, the court performs an equitable balancing to determine whether to grant an injunction prohibiting the trespass, or whether to award damages instead. (Ibid.) “Overarching the analysis is the principle that since the defendant is the trespasser, he or she is the wrongdoer; therefore, ‘doubtful cases should be decided in favor of the plaintiff.’” (Ibid.) For the court to deny an injunction, the defendant must prove three factors. First, the defendant must be innocent, i.e., his or her encroachment must not be willful or negligent. Second, unless the rights of the public would be harmed, the injunction should be granted “if the plaintiff ‘will suffer irreparable injury... regardless of the injury to defendant.’” (Ibid.) Third, the hardship to the defendant if the injunction is granted “‘must be greatly disproportionate to the hardship caused plaintiff by the continuance of the encroachment and this fact must clearly appear in the evidence and must be proved by the defendant....’” (Ibid.)
Appellant did not meet this burden. Respondents showed at trial that appellant and Mrs. Combs were aware at the time they installed the fence and gate that legal title of the enclosed property rested with their neighbor. Afterwards, they attempted to do a lot line adjustment, but Mrs. Combs was informed by the city as early as 1990 that grant deeds had to be recorded for the adjustment to be effectuated. Neither Mrs. Combs nor appellant took the necessary steps to do so. Appellant also was aware in the mid-1990s, when he submitted a permit application on his mother’s behalf to rebuild the family home, that the city did not consider the disputed property to be part of the Banning property, for he submitted an application that did not include the disputed property. Hence, appellant and his mother were not innocent occupiers of the disputed property.
Further, respondents provided evidence they would suffer “irreparable” injury if the equitable easement were granted, because they would be denied any use of the disputed property whatsoever as appellant has enclosed and gated the property. (Silacci v. Abramson (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 558, 564 [encroaching fenced-in landscaping “as a practical matter completely prohibits the true owner from using his land”]; see also Harrison v. Welch (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1084, 1093-1094 (Harrison).) Respondents would be unable to make any use of the land, which Mr. Stenfors testified they require for a turnaround for their driveway. While being denied use of their land, respondents would be obliged to continue paying the taxes and insurance on property they are unable to use and enjoy.
Finally, appellant has not shown the hardship he would suffer from the injunction is greatly disproportionate to that caused respondents by the continuance of the encroachment. Appellant’s claim that he relied on the disputed property in reconfiguring and building the family home is disingenuous at best, given that his applications for building permits did not include the disputed property. Mrs. Combs testified she never saw, asked for or received a grant deed from Mrs. Wagner. Both Mrs. Combs and appellant admit they never recorded any grant deed between Mrs. Wagner and Mrs. Combs.
In that respect, Mrs. Combs’s testimony sharply contradicted that of her son. Appellant claimed to have found a grant deed for the disputed property in his mother’s papers when the house “fell down,” i.e., in the mid-1990s. The trial court obviously believed Mrs. Combs and disbelieved appellant on that score.
In weighing hardships, the trial court could properly discount appellant’s professed reliance upon property he had no reason to believe he owned. Respondents established that appellant still would have access to his home through a driveway easement even with the grant of the injunction. Appellant offered no evidence regarding the cost of removal of the encroachments, but respondents proved removal would cost no more than $10,000 and take no more than three days to accomplish. Appellant thus failed to meet his burden of showing he would bear a disproportionate burden as a result of an order to remove the encroachments.
In balancing the hardships, the trial court could not have reasonably weighed the balance in appellant’s favor.
3. Statute of Limitations or Laches
Appellant contends respondents are barred by the statute of limitations and laches from seeking quiet title, and the evidence would have permitted, if not required, resolution in appellant’s favor had the trial court not failed to make findings on these issues. We disagree.
A. Statute of Limitations
Appellant relies on Cocking v. Fulwider (1928) 95 Cal.App. 745, which appellant contends contained facts similar to those in this case. Cocking involved a boundary dispute between two owners of adjoining land. Unlike the present case, the owners’ predecessors had agreed to a common boundary line defining the ownership of the two properties. The trial court found upon conflicting evidence that the agreed upon boundary line was the true boundary and the appellate court found substantial evidence to uphold this finding. (Id. at p. 747.) The appellate court agreed that “the finding that appellant was not in possession for more than thirty years is a bar to [the] action under the provisions of section 318 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that no such action shall be maintained unless the plaintiff, or his predecessors, have been seised or possessed of the property within five years before the commencement of the action.” (Id. at pp. 747-748.) This language in Cocking does not establish that respondents’ present action is barred by the statute of limitations as appellant maintains.
In Harrison, the court explained that “[t]he basic limitations period for bringing an action to recover real property is prescribed by [Code of Civil Procedure] section 318, which provides: ‘No action for the recovery of real property, or for the recovery of the possession thereof, can be maintained, unless it appear that the plaintiff, his ancestor, predecessor, or grantor, was seized or possessed of the property in question, within five years before the commencement of the action.’ This statute must be read in conjunction with [Code of Civil Procedure] section 321 [citation], which provides: ‘In every action for the recovery of real property, or the possession thereof, the person establishing a legal title to the property is presumed to have been possessed thereof within the time required by law, and the occupation of the property by any other person is deemed to have been under and in subordination to the legal title, unless it appear that the property has been held and possessed adversely to such legal title, for five years before the commencement of the action.’ (§ 321.) Thus, ‘“[s]ection 321... establishes the presumption of possession in the legal owner, unless such presumption is rebutted by the actual adverse possession... of another....”’ [Citation.]” (Harrison, supra, 116 Cal.App.4th at p. 1095, quoting Schoenfeld v. Pritzker (1967) 257 Cal.App.2d 117, 123.) Accordingly, “unless and until the encroacher’s use of the property ripens into title by adverse possession or a valid prescriptive easement, the legal title holder’s right to bring an action to recover his or her property from the encroacher never expires. This must be so, ‘otherwise, the record owner would be unable to recover possession, and a possessor would be unable to establish title’ or a prescriptive easement.” (Harrison, supra, at p. 1096; see 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Real Property, § 233, p. 287.) As in Harrison, because appellant’s encroachment on respondents’ property never ripened into either title by adverse possession or a prescriptive easement, the limitations period for respondents to bring an action to recover their property from appellant had not run when they brought their complaint for quiet title.
Appellant could not prevail on a claim for adverse possession, because neither he nor Mrs. Combs ever paid the taxes on the disputed property. (Code Civ. Proc., § 325; Mann v. Mann (1907) 152 Cal. 23, 29.) He also could not assert a prescriptive easement because he enclosed and possessed the land in question. (Kapner v. Meadowlark Ranch Assn. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 1182, 1186-1187.)
The trial court therefore was not barred by the statute of limitations from granting respondents the requested injunctive relief to require appellant to remove all encroachments.
B. Laches
“‘The defense of laches requires unreasonable delay plus either acquiescence in the act about which plaintiff complains or prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay.’” (Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 68.) In general, whether a claim is barred by laches is a question of fact to be determined by the trial court in light of all the applicable circumstances, and a reviewing court will sustain the court’s determination absent manifest injustice or a lack of substantial evidence to support that determination. (Bono v. Clark, supra, 103 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1417.)
For all the reasons we have discussed, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s refusal to find respondents’ action barred by laches. To hold otherwise would require this court to reweigh the evidence, which we decline to do.
4. Failure to Address Issues
Appellant asserts the trial court committed reversible error by failing to address “material issues” in its statement of decision. If timely requested by one of the parties in a nonjury trial, a trial court is required to render a statement of decision addressing the factual and legal bases for its decision as to each of the principal controverted issues of the case. (Code Civ. Proc, § 632.) Section 632 does not require that the statement of decision address every issue listed in the request for statement of decision. (Peak-Las Positas Partners v. Bollag, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th 101, 112; Muzquiz v. City of Emeryville (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1124-1125.) The statement of decision “need do no more than state the grounds upon which the judgment rests, without necessarily specifying the particular evidence considered by the trial court in reaching its decision.” (Muzquiz, at p. 1125.) A trial court rendering a statement of decision is required to set out only ultimate findings rather than merely evidentiary facts. (In re Cheryl E. (1984) 161 Cal.App.3d 587, 599.) Moreover, “it is for the trial court to determine what are the ‘principal controverted issues’--those on which the outcome of the case turns.” (Vukovich v. Radulovich (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 281, 295.)
In the present case, appellant had ample opportunity to object to the trial court’s proposed statement of decision, and the court plainly took account of those objections in issuing its statement of decision. The trial court took the matter under submission on January 25, 2008, following the trial. The court issued a minute order about two weeks later, on February 11, 2008, indicating it would grant a judgment for respondents as prayed for in the verified complaint and that appellant was to take nothing on his cross-complaint. The court set forth the factual and legal basis for its decision as to the principal controverted issues presented at trial. It directed respondents to submit a proposed judgment in 10 days. A little over a week later, on February 19, 2008, respondents lodged a proposed judgment. One day afterward, on February 20, 2008, appellant filed a request for statement of decision, which included lengthy proposals for the content of the statement of decision and objections to the court’s February 11 minute order. On February 27, 2008, in response to appellant’s request, the court issued a statement of decision virtually identical to its prior minute order. The following day, February 28, 2008, appellant filed objections to the proposed judgment. The court entered a judgment on February 29, 2008. After entry of judgment, appellant filed objections to the statement of decision and judgment. He also moved for the court to set aside and vacate the judgment and enter another and different judgment raising the same objections. Appellant therefore had numerous opportunities to raise objections to the court’s findings and, equally important, the court had abundant opportunity to take account of appellant’s objections.
The court denied appellant’s motion to vacate, stating that it “heard all of the evidence, considered all applicable law and is satisfied that its ruling is in conformity with all applicable statutes and law.” From this chronology, we must conclude that the trial court fairly considered appellant’s objections in issuing its statement of decision and judgment.
5. Removal of Encroachment
Appellant contends the trial court should not have ordered him to remove the encroachments from the disputed property because it was not specifically requested in respondents’ complaint. This contention is made without citation to authority and contrary to the record. The complaint expressly requests that appellant be enjoined from interfering with respondents’ use of their property, including the disputed property, having any property placed or maintained upon such property and doing any acts inconsistent with respondents’ rights to the property. Removal of the offending encroachments was well within the requested relief. (See Fairrington v. Dyke Water Co. (1958) 50 Cal.2d 198, 201; Allen v. Stowell (1905) 145 Cal. 666, 669.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents are to recover costs on appeal.
We concur: RUBIN, Acting P. J., MOHR, J.
Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
The same tax return also contains a 1996 appraisal of the Banning property, which includes a map of the Banning property that does not encompass the disputed property.
Civil Code section 1091 provides that “[a]n estate in real property, other than an estate at will or for a term not exceeding one year, can be transferred only by operation of law, or by an instrument in writing, subscribed by the party disposing of the same, or by his agent thereunto authorized by writing.”
Code of Civil Procedure section 1971 provides: “No estate or interest in real property, other than for leases for a term not exceeding one year, nor any power over or concerning it, or in any manner relating thereto, can be created, granted, assigned, surrendered, or declared, otherwise than by operation of law, or a conveyance or other instrument in writing, subscribed by the party creating, granting, assigning, surrendering, or declaring the same, or by the party’s lawful agent thereunto authorized by writing.”