Opinion
No. C 01-3186 MMC
November 15, 2001
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS; VACATING HEARING
Before the Court is defendants' motion to dismiss plaintiffs complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. On October 10, 2001, the Court issued an order directing the parties to submit additional briefing. Having reviewed the papers submitted in support of and in opposition to the motion, and the supplemental memoranda, the Court deems the motion appropriate for decision on said submissions, VACATES the hearing scheduled for November 16, 2001, and rules as follows.
In his complaint, plaintiff alleges that he applied for peace officer positions with the State of California and the City of Piedmont, and that he received an offer from the City of Piedmont. (See Compl. at ¶¶ 12, 40.) Plaintiff further alleges that defendant, his then-current employer, thereafter published false information to the State of California and the City of Piedmont, and that as a result he lost employment opportunities with those entities. (See id. at ¶¶ 12, 29.) Plaintiff continued working for defendant City of Antioch for one year after the alleged defamation. (See id. at ¶¶ 9, 12-13.) Plaintiff alleges that defendants' actions violated his federal right to due process (First Cause of Action), violated public policy of the State of California (Second Cause of Action), and constituted both invasion of privacy (Third Cause of Action) and intentional interference with economic advantage (Fourth Cause of Action).
With respect to plaintiffs federal claim, the Court directed the parties to "address the question of whether plaintiff has alleged, or could amend to allege, the deprivation of a protectible liberty or property interest." (See Order Continuing Hearing on Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss at 4.) In his supplemental opposition, plaintiff contends that he has alleged, or could allege, the existence of a property right. According to plaintiff, the protectible property right he is asserting in the instant action arises from his acceptance of a conditional job offer from the City of Piedmont. That offer was "contingent upon successful completion of medical/psychological examinations." (See Ex A to Pl.'s Supplemental Memorandum Ex. 1.)
Plaintiff recently filed a separate action in state court, alleging a breach of contract claim against the City of Piedmont based on its withdrawal of the job offer after plaintiff had accepted that offer. (See Pl.'s Supplemental Memorandum Ex. 1.)
As the Court previously observed, plaintiffs allegation that defendants' publication of false information resulted in his loss of employment with other entities is insufficient to allege a deprivation of a constitutionally protected right. See Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226 (1991). In Siegert, a psychologist filed suit against his former supervisor at a government hospital after the supervisor, in a letter written in response to inquiries from a subsequent employer, made unfavorable remarks regarding Siegert's performance. Siegert alleged that, as a result of defendant's conduct, he lost his position with the subsequent employer as a result of the defendant's letter, and that he was unable to find similar employment thereafter. Siegert's Bivens claim alleged that his former supervisor's conduct deprived him of a federally protected liberty interest. The Supreme Court disagreed, holding that Siegert's allegations "cannot . . . be held to state a claim for denial of a constitutional right." See id. at 233-34.
The material factual allegations in the instant action are nearly identical to those presented in Siegert. Plaintiff has not sought to distinguish, or even discuss, Siegert in his supplemental memorandum. In light of the holding in Siegert, plaintiff cannot prevail on a federal claim based on violation of his right to due process. See id.; see also Pelletier v. Federal Home Loan Bank, 130 F.3d 429, 430-32 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding where employment was subject to approval by federal banking agency, plaintiff could not bring Bivens action against federal agency based on defendant's writing defamatory letter to plaintiffs employer, who then terminated plaintiff).
Because plaintiff has failed to allege, and cannot amend to allege, the existence of a protectible liberty or property interest, plaintiffs First Cause of Action (violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983) is hereby DISMISSED without leave to amend.
Plaintiffs remaining claims arise under state law. As both plaintiff and defendants are California citizens, the only basis for jurisdiction over these remaining claims is supplemental in nature. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367. A district court "may decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over a claim" when "the district court has dismissed all claims over which it has original jurisdiction." See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). "[W]hen the federal-law claims have dropped out of the lawsuit in its early stages and only state-law claims remain, the federal court should decline the exercise of jurisdiction by dismissing the case without prejudice." See Carnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 (1988). Here, the Court has dismissed the only federal claim raised in the complaint at an early stage of this litigation.
Accordingly, the Court hereby DISMISSES plaintiffs state law claims without prejudice pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3).
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED and the complaint is hereby DISMISSED.
The Clerk shall close the file.
IT IS SO ORDERED