Opinion
8:22-cv-02545-BHH-JDA
07-31-2023
Tori Staton, Plaintiff, v. Andrew Arcer, Officer Sergeant, Defendant.
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF MAGISTRATE JUDGE
Jacquelyn D. Austin, United States Magistrate Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendant's motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 27.] Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2), D.S.C., this magistrate judge is authorized to review all pretrial matters in cases filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and to submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, filed this action on July 28, 2002, asserting claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 [Docs. 1; 1-1], and his Amended Complaint was entered on the docket on September 8, 2022 [Doc. 12]. On November 18, 2022, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. [Doc. 27.] On November 21, 2022, the Court issued an Order pursuant to Roseboro v. Garrison, 528 F.2d 309 (4th Cir. 1975), advising Plaintiff of the summary judgment/dismissal procedure and the possible consequences if he failed to respond adequately. [Doc. 28.] Plaintiff's response in opposition was entered on the docket on December 14, 2022, and Defendant filed a reply on December 21, 2022, and an affidavit in support of the motion for summary judgment on December 29, 2022. [Docs. 30; 32; 34.] The motion is ripe for review.
A prisoner's pleading is considered filed at the moment it is delivered to prison authorities for forwarding to the court. See Houston v. Lack, 487 U.S. 266, 270 (1988). In this case, construing the filing date in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, this action was filed on July 28, 2022. [Doc. 1 at 13 (Complaint, signed by Plaintiff on July 28, 2022).]
The facts included in this Background section are taken directly from Plaintiff's Amended Complaint. [Doc. 12.]
Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee in the Pickens County Detention Center (“PCDC”). [Doc. 12 at 2, 4.] He contends that Defendant engaged in cruel and unusual punishment and excessive force in violation of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights. [Id. at 4.]
On May 23, 2022, Officer Hyatt, who is not a named Defendant, came to take Plaintiff for an x-ray. [Id. at 5.] As Officer Hyatt was escorting Plaintiff out of his cell, Plaintiff and another inmate named T-white got into an altercation. [Id.] Officer Hyatt tried to end the altercation. [Id.] Lt. Hamilton and Defendant came to restrain Plaintiff. [Id. at 5-6.] Defendant placed Plaintiff's arm behind his back “to a point where [Plaintiff's] hand was at the base of [his] neck.” [Id. at 6.] Plaintiff heard a pop in his shoulder. [Id.] He was then moved to a restraint chair for three hours. [Id.] Officer Hyatt had to come to readjust Plaintiff's chains. [Id.]
For his injuries, Plaintiff alleges he hurt his shoulder and developed a cyst on his shoulder after the incident. [Id.] He could not move his arm for one month. [Id.] He put in multiple sick calls and was told to drink more water and to stretch. [Id.] The only treatment he received was an x-ray. [Id.] For his relief, Plaintiff seeks compensation for his current and future medical bills and $500,000 in punitive damages for mental distress. [Id.]
APPLICABLE LAW
Liberal Construction of Pro Se Complaint
Plaintiff brought this action pro se, which requires the Court to liberally construe his pleadings. Estelle, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam); Loe v. Armistead, 582 F.2d 1291, 1295 (4th Cir. 1978); Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. Haines, 404 U.S. at 520. Even under this less stringent standard, however, a pro se complaint is still subject to summary dismissal. Id. at 520-21. The mandated liberal construction means that only if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the complainant could prevail, it should do so. Barnett v. Hargett, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999). A court may not construct the complainant's legal arguments for him. Small v. Endicott, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993). Nor should a court “conjure up questions never squarely presented.” Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985).
Requirements for a Cause of Action Under § 1983
Some of the claims in this action are asserted pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which provides a private cause of action for constitutional violations by persons acting under color of state law. Section 1983 “‘is not itself a source of substantive rights,' but merely provides ‘a method for vindicating federal rights elsewhere conferred.'” Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266, 271 (1994) (quoting Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 144 n.3 (1979)). Accordingly, a civil action under § 1983 allows “a party who has been deprived of a federal right under the color of state law to seek relief.” City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, Ltd., 526 U.S. 687, 707 (1999).
Section 1983 provides, in relevant part,
“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or any person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress . . .”42 U.S.C. § 1983. To establish a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must prove two elements:
(1) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States” and (2) that the defendant “deprived [the plaintiff] of this constitutional right under color of [State] statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage.” Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4th Cir. 2001) (third alteration in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The under-color-of-state-law element, which is equivalent to the “state action” requirement under the Fourteenth Amendment,
reflects judicial recognition of the fact that most rights secured by the Constitution are protected only against infringement by governments. This fundamental limitation on the scope of constitutional guarantees preserves an area of individual freedom by limiting the reach of federal law and avoids imposing on the State, its agencies or officials, responsibility for conduct for which they cannot fairly be blamed.Id. (quoting Dowe v. Total Action Against Poverty in Roanoke Valley, 145 F.3d 653, 658 (4th Cir. 1998)) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). Nevertheless, “the deed of an ostensibly private organization or individual” may at times be treated “as if a State has caused it to be performed.” Brentwood Acad. v. Tenn. Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 295 (2001). Specifically, “state action may be found if, though only if, there is such a close nexus between the State and the challenged action that seemingly private behavior may be fairly treated as that of the State itself.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). State action requires both an alleged constitutional deprivation “caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the State . . . or by a person for whom the State is responsible” and that “the party charged with the deprivation [is] a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor.” Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S. 922, 937 (1982). A determination of whether a private party's allegedly unconstitutional conduct is fairly attributable to the State requires the court to “begin[ ] by identifying the specific conduct of which the plaintiff complains.” Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Summary Judgment Standard
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states, as to a party who has moved for summary judgment:
The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A fact is “material” if proof of its existence or non-existence would affect disposition of the case under applicable law. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). An issue of material fact is “genuine” if the evidence offered is such that a reasonable jury might return a verdict for the non-movant. Id. at 257. When determining whether a genuine issue has been raised, the court must construe all inferences and ambiguities against the movant and in favor of the non-moving party. United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654, 655 (1962).
The party seeking summary judgment shoulders the initial burden of demonstrating to the court that there is no genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the movant has made this threshold demonstration, the non-moving party, to survive the motion for summary judgment, may not rest on the allegations averred in his pleadings. Id. at 324. Rather, the non-moving party must demonstrate specific, material facts exist that give rise to a genuine issue. Id. Under this standard, the existence of a mere scintilla of evidence in support of the non-movant's position is insufficient to withstand the summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252. Likewise, conclusory allegations or denials, without more, are insufficient to preclude granting the summary judgment motion. Id. at 248. “Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment. Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted.” Id. Further, Rule 56 provides in pertinent part:
A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion by:
(A) citing to particular parts of materials in the record, including depositions, documents, electronically stored information, affidavits or declarations, stipulations (including those made for purposes of the motion only), admissions, interrogatory answers, or other materials; or
(B) showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact.Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1). Accordingly, when Rule 56(c) has shifted the burden of proof to the non-movant, he must produce existence of a factual dispute on every element essential to his action that he bears the burden of adducing at a trial on the merits.
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues he is entitled to summary judgment because there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Defendant had the requisite state of mind for an excessive force claim; Plaintiff has failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding his deliberate indifference to medical needs claim; Defendant is entitled to qualified immunity; Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies; Defendant is entitled to Eleventh Amendment Immunity in his official capacity; and Defendant is not a “person” under § 1983 in his official capacity. [Doc. 27-1 at 8-19.] The Court addresses these arguments seriatim.
Official Capacity Claims
Plaintiff has brought his claims against Defendant in both his individual and official capacities. [Doc. 12 at 2.] Defendant argues that, in his official capacity, he is not a “person” amenable to suit under § 1983 and he is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity. [Doc. 27-1 at 18-19.] The Court agrees.
“Obviously, state officials literally are persons. But a suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office. As such, it is no different from a suit against the State itself.” Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) (internal citation omitted). Thus, an official acting in his official capacity is not a “person” under § 1983. Id.
Moreover, the Eleventh Amendment prohibits federal courts from entertaining an action against a state. See, e.g., Alabama v. Pugh, 438 U.S. 781, 782 (1978) (per curiam); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 10-11 (1890). Further, Eleventh Amendment immunity “extends to ‘arm[s] of the State,' including state agencies and state officers acting in their official capacity.” Cromer v. Brown, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (alteration in original) (internal citations omitted). Therefore, Eleventh Amendment immunity protects state agencies and state officials sued in their official capacities from liability for monetary damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Id. As a result, Plaintiff's claims against Defendant in his official capacity must be dismissed because Defendant is entitled to immunity pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment.
Excessive Force Claim
Although Defendant acknowledges that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to Plaintiff's claims [Doc. 27-1 at 1 & n.2], his argument for summary judgment relies on case law applying the Eighth Amendment standard-having both an objective and subjective component- to excessive force claims [Id. at 8-10]. And, Defendant's argument is that “there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding [Plaintiff's] failure to meet the ‘demanding standard' of the subjective component of an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim” because “[t]here is no indication that [Defendant's] state of mind was remotely ‘wanton.'” [Id. at 10; see Doc. 32 at 4-6.] Understandably, because Defendant argues that there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the subjective component, in his response in opposition, Plaintiff also focuses on the subjective component. [Doc. 30-1 at 1.]
The Amended Complaint alleges violations of Plaintiff's Eighth Amendment rights. [Doc. 12 at 4.] However, a pretrial detainee's claims are evaluated under the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Eighth Amendment is used to evaluate conditions of confinement for those convicted of crimes. See City of Revere v. Mass. Gen. Hosp., 463 U.S. 239, 244 (1983). Unlike convicted inmates, pretrial detainees have not been adjudicated guilty of a crime and may not be subjected to any form of “punishment.” Martin v. Gentile, 849 F.2d 863, 870 (4th Cir. 1988). Accordingly, the Court evaluates the merits of Plaintiff's claims under the Fourteenth Amendment.
However, to prevail on a Fourteenth Amendment excessive force claim, “a pretrial detainee must show only that the force purposely or knowingly used against him was objectively unreasonable.” Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389, 396-97 (2015) (emphasis added); see id. at 395 (concluding “that the relevant standard is objective not subjective” and that a “defendant's state of mind is not a matter that a plaintiff is required to prove”). Accordingly, because the parties have not addressed the Fourteenth Amendment standard for an excessive force claim by a pretrial detainee, the Court recommends that Defendant's motion for summary judgment be denied without prejudice and with leave to refile as to Plaintiff's excessive force claim against Defendant in his individual capacity.
Although Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this action [Doc. 27-1 at 17-18], Defendant's only argument is that Plaintiff filed grievances “regarding the alleged injury to his left shoulder” that he did not appeal. [Id.] Thus, Defendant does not make any exhaustion argument with respect to Plaintiff's excessive force claim.
Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs Claim
It is not entirely clear whether Plaintiff intends to bring a claim for deliberate indifference to his medical needs. In the section of his Amended Complaint asking what rights he alleges have been violated, Plaintiff lists only “cru[el and] excessive punishment,” and in the section asking how Defendant acted under color of state law, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant “engaged in cru[el] and unus[u]al punis[h]ment” and “used excessive force.” [Doc. 12 at 4.] However, because in the injuries section of his Amended Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he “was told to drink water and stre[t]ch” and that he “only rec[ei]ved an x-ray” [Id. at 6], the Court liberally construes Plaintiff's Amended Complaint as asserting a deliberate indifference to medical needs claim.
Deliberate indifference to a prisoner's serious medical needs violates the Eighth Amendment and states a cause of action under § 1983 because deliberate indifference constitutes “the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.'” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 104-05 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976) (joint opinion of Stewart, Powell, and Stevens, JJ.)). Deliberate indifference exists when prison officials know of a substantial risk to a prisoner's health or safety and consciously disregard that risk. See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 836; Miltier v. Beorn, 896 F.2d 848, 851-52 (4th Cir. 1990) (“Deliberate indifference may be demonstrated by either actual intent or reckless disregard. A defendant acts recklessly by disregarding a substantial risk of danger that is either known to the defendant or which would be apparent to a reasonable person in the defendant's position.” (internal citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Fidrych v. Marriott Int'l, Inc., 952 F.3d 124 (4th Cir. 2020)). Within the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, “the treatment must be so grossly incompetent, inadequate, or excessive as to shock the conscience or to be intolerable to fundamental fairness” to violate a prisoner's constitutional rights. Miltier, 896 F.2d at 851.
Although, as stated, Plaintiff's claims are analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment, case law interpreting the standard of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment is instructive. Moss v. Harwood, 19 F.4th 614, 624 (4th Cir. 2021) (noting that courts “traditionally apply Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference precedents to” Fourteenth Amendment deliberate indifference to medical needs claims brought by pretrial detainees); see also Stevens v. Holler, 68 F.4th 921, 930-33 (4th Cir. 2023) (applying Eighth Amendment deliberate indifference case law to a pretrial detainee's deliberate indifference claim).
To prevail on deliberate indifference to medical needs claim, the prisoner must demonstrate (1) his medical condition was a sufficiently serious one and (2) subjectively, the prison officials acted with a sufficiently culpable state of mind, which is satisfied by showing deliberate indifference by the prison officials. Goodman v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., No. 09-6996, 2011 WL 1594915, at *1 (4th Cir. Apr. 28, 2011). As the United States Supreme Court has explained,
“A medical need is ‘serious' if it is one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment, or one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Gaudreault v. Municipality of Salem, Mass., 923 F.2d 203, 208 (1st Cir. 1990); Hendrix v. Faulkner, 525 F.Supp. 435, 454 (N.D. Ind.1981)).
Since, we said, only the “‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain'” implicates the Eighth Amendment, a prisoner advancing such a claim must, at a minimum, allege “deliberate indifference” to his “serious” medical needs. “It is only such indifference” that can violate the Eighth Amendment; allegations of “inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care,” or of a “negligent . . . diagnos[is],” simply fail to establish the requisite culpable state of mind.Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
Further, in the context of prisoner medical care, the Constitution requires only that prisoners receive adequate medical care; a prisoner is not guaranteed his choice of treatment. Jackson v. Fair, 846 F.2d 811, 817 (1st Cir. 1988); see Russell v. Sheffer, 528 F.2d 318, 318 (4th Cir. 1975) (“Prisoners are entitled to reasonable medical care.”); see also, e.g., Barton v. Dorriety, No. 9:10-cv-1362, 2011 WL 1049510, at *2 (D.S.C. Mar. 21, 2011).
To establish a claim for denial of medical care against non-medical personnel, a prisoner must show that the non-medical personnel failed to promptly provide needed medical treatment, deliberately interfered with prison doctors' treatment, or tacitly authorized or were indifferent to the prison physicians' misconduct. See Miltier, 896 F.2d at 854. Moreover, because most prison officials are not trained medical personnel, they are entitled to rely on the opinions, judgment, and expertise of medical personnel concerning the course of treatment that the medical personnel deemed necessary and appropriate for the prisoner. See id.; see also Iko v. Shreve, 535 F.3d 225, 242 (4th Cir. 2008) (“If a prisoner is under the care of medical experts, a nonmedical prison official will generally be justified in believing that the prisoner is in capable hands.” (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff has made no showing that Defendant engaged in the type of conduct required by controlling case law to establish a claim of deliberate indifference to medical needs against a non-medical defendant. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be granted as to Plaintiff's deliberate indifference to medical needs claim.
Moreover, as noted by Defendant [Doc. 32 at 8], in his response in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff does not address Defendant's argument that Plaintiff has failed to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding his deliberate indifference to medical needs claim. Plaintiff's failure to respond to this argument also justifies dismissal of this claim. See Waiters v. Sci. Applications Int'l Corp., No. 2:17-3227-BHH-BM, 2019 WL 5874132, at *8, 10 (D.S.C. May 10, 2019) (concluding that a plaintiff abandoned claims by failing to address in his opposition to a motion to dismiss an argument raised in the motion to dismiss), Report and Recommendation adopted by 2019 WL 4462810 (D.S.C. Sept. 18, 2019); Jones v. Family Health Ctr., Inc., 323 F.Supp.2d 681, 690 (D.S.C. 2003) (noting that a claim not addressed in the plaintiff's opposition memorandum had been abandoned).
Additionally, because Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that Defendant violated Plaintiff's constitutional rights with respect to any deliberate indifference claim, Defendant is also entitled to qualified immunity from liability for damages on that claim. See Tolan v. Cotton, 572 U.S. 650, 655-66 (2014) (stating that for qualified immunity to attach to a defendant, either the facts viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff fail to demonstrate the violation of a constitutional right and/or the right was not clearly established at the time of the violation). Because the Court recommends that Defendant's motion for summary judgment be granted on Plaintiff's deliberate indifference claim for these reasons, the Court declines to address Defendant's alternative arguments.
RECOMMENDATION
Wherefore, based upon the foregoing, the Court recommends that Defendant's motion for summary judgment [Doc. 27] be GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART without prejudice and with leave to refile. The Court recommends that the motion be granted as to all claims against Defendant in his official capacity and as to the deliberate indifference to medical needs claim but recommends that the motion be denied without prejudice and with leave to refile as to the excessive force claim against Defendant in his individual capacity.
IT IS SO RECOMMENDED.