Opinion
IK99-11-0048-R1
March 16, 2001 April 9, 2001
Upon Defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief Pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61
Denise Weeks-Tappen, Esq., Deputy Attorney General, Department of Justice, for the State of Delaware.
Mr. James A. Wilson, pro se.
ORDER
On this 9th day of April, 2001, upon consideration of the defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief, the Commissioner's Report and Recommendation, and the record in this case, it appears that:
(1) The defendant, James A. Wilson ("Wilson") pled guilty on March 22, 2000 to one count of Assault in the Third Degree, 11 Del. C. § 611, as a lesser included offense of Assault in the Second Degree, for which he had been indicted. The plea was part of a Rule 11(e)(1)(C) agreement with the State made the day after his trial began. If Wilson had been convicted of the Assault in the Second Degree charge he faced a substantial period of incarceration including a minimum mandatory sentence of eight years incarceration and the possibility of a sentence of life in prison under Delaware's Habitual Offender Statute, 11 Del. C. § 4214. The Court proceeded to sentence Wilson according to the Rule 11(e)(1)(C) plea agreement to one year incarceration suspended for Level 3 probation. Wilson filed an appeal of his conviction to the Delaware Supreme Court. The appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court for being filed untimely. Next Wilson filed the pending motion for post conviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61.
Wilson v. State, Del. Supr., No. 224, 2000, Berger, J. (May 30, 2000) (ORDER).
(2) The Court referred this motion to Superior Court Commissioner Andrea Maybee Freud pursuant to 10 Del. C. § 512(b) and Superior Court Criminal Rule 62 for proposed findings of facts and conclusions of law. The Commissioner has filed a Report and Recommendation concluding that the motion for postconviction relief should be denied. No objections to the Report have been filed.
NOW THEREFORE, after careful and de novo review of the record in this action, and for the reasons stated in the Commissioner's Report and Recommendation dated March 16, 2001,
IT IS ORDERED that:
(A) The well-reasoned Commissioner's Report and Recommendation is adopted by the Court;
(B) The defendant's Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED.
COMMISSIONER'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
The Defendant, James A. Wilson ("Wilson") pled guilty on March 22, 2000 to one count of Assault in the Third Degree, 11 Del. C. § 611 as a lesser included offense of Assault in the Second Degree, for which he had been indicted. The plea was part of a Rule 11(e)(1)(c) agreement with the State made the day after his trial began. If Wilson had been convicted of the Assault in the Second Degree charge he faced a substantial period of incarceration including a minimum mandatory sentence of eight years incarceration and the possibility of a sentence of life in prison under Delaware's Habitual Offender Statute 11 Del. C. § 4214. The Court proceeded to sentence Wilson according to the Rule 11(e)(1)(c) plea agreement to one year incarceration suspended for Level 3 probation. Wilson filed an appeal of his conviction to the State Supreme Court. The appeal was dismissed by the Supreme Court for being filed untimely. Next Wilson filed the pending motion for post conviction relief pursuant to Superior Court Criminal Rule 61. In his motion, Wilson alleges the following grounds for relief:
Wilson v. State, Del. Supr., No. 244, 200, Berger, J (May 30, 2000) Order.
Ground One: Ineffective Assistance of Counselor. Ms. Sandra Dean knew that the witness was not coming and should have put in a motion for dismissal.
Ground Two: Coerce Confession. I stated to Ms. Dean I did not do it and she stated to me to take the because I could get the habitual offender statute if I got found guilty knewing (sic) the witness wasn't coming.
Ground Three: Ineffective Assistance of Counselor. The day after we did opening arguments the witness was not there the next day and my counselor should of ask (sic) for charges to be dismiss (sic) but fail (sic) to do so. Telling the defendant to take the plea because they would go and get the witness.
Under Delaware Law this Court must first determine whether Wilson has met the procedural requirements of Superior Court Criminal Rule 61(i) before it may consider the merits of his postconviction relief claim. This is Wilson's first motion for postconviction and it was filed within three years of his conviction becoming final, so the requirements of Rule 61(i)(1) — requiring filing within three years — and (2) — requiring that all grounds for relief be presented in initial Rule 61 motion — are met. None of Wilson's claims were raised at the plea, sentencing or on direct appeal, therefore, they are barred by Rule 61(i)(3) absent a demonstration of cause for the default and prejudice. Wilson's first and third contentions are based on ineffective assistance of counsel, therefore, he has alleged cause for his failure to have raised these issues earlier. Rule 61(i)(3) does not bar relief as to these claims at this point should Wilson demonstrate that his counsel was ineffective and that he was prejudiced by counsel's actions.
Bailey v. State, Del. Supr., 588 A.2d 1121, 1127 (1991); Younger v. State, Del. Supr., 580 A.2d 552, 554 (1990).
Wilson's first and third grounds for relief are that his counsel did not represent him effectively. The two claims essentially raise the same issue, that counsel should have moved to dismiss the case due to the failure of a witness to appear. This contention superficially raises the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel. To prevail on his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, Wilson must meet the two prong test of Strickland v. Washington. In the context of a guilty plea challenge, Strickland requires that a defendant show: 1) that counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness; and 2) that counsel's actions were prejudicial to him in that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial and that the result of a trial would have been his acquittal. In addition, Delaware courts have consistently held that in setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk summary dismissal. When examining the representation of counsel pursuant to the first prong of the Strickland test, there is a strong presumption that counsel's conduct was professionally reasonable. This standard is highly demanding. Strickland mandates that when viewing counsel's representation, this Court must endeavor to "eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight."
466 U.S. 668 (1984) (" Strickland"); Larson v. State, Del. Supr., No. 200, 1994, Hartnett, J. (June 23, 1995) (ORDER); Albury v. State, Del. Supr., 551 A.2d 53 (1988), Skinner v. State, Del. Supr., 607 A.2d 1170, 1172 (1992).
Hill V. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 57, 59 (1985); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, 694; Accord Larson v. State, supra, at 3-4; Blanchfield v. State, Del. Supr., No. 97, 1994, Veasey, C.J. (October 18, 1994) (ORDER); Skinner v. State, 607 A.2d at 1172; Albury v. State, 551 A.2d at 58.
Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 556; Skinner v. State, Del. Supr., No. 318, 1993, Holland, J. (March 31, 1994)(ORDER).
Albury v. State, 551 A.2d at 59 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. 689); see also Larson v. State, supra, at 4; Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736 at 753 (1990).
Id. at 754.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 639.
Following a complete review of the record in this matter, including the affidavit of Wilson's former counsel, it is abundantly clear that Wilson has failed to allege any facts sufficient to substantiate his claim that his attorney was ineffective. I find counsel's affidavit, in conjunction with the record, more credible than Wilson's contention that counsel did not effectively represent him. Wilson was facing trial on a felony Assault charge and faced the possibility of life in prison if convicted of the offense. Wilson's counsel was able to negotiate a plea bargain with the State which limited the amount of his sentence to probation. Wilson and his attorney discussed the case prior to the entry of the plea. The plea bargain was clearly advantageous to Wilson. Counsel's representation was certainly well within the range required by Strickland. Additionally, when Wilson entered his guilty plea, he stated he was satisfied with defense counsel's performance. He is bound by his statement unless he presents clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Consequently, Wilson has failed to establish that his counsel's representation was ineffective under the Strickland test.
Blanchfield v. State, Del. Supr., No. 97, 1994, Veasey, C .J. (October 18, 1994)(ORDER); Mapps v. State, Del. Supr., No. 3, 1994, Holland, J. (March 17, 1994)(ORDER) (citing Sullivan v. State, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 931, 937-938 (1994)).
Even assuming, arguendo that counsel's representation of Wilson was somehow deficient, Wilson must satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, prejudice. In setting forth a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must make concrete allegations of actual prejudice and substantiate them or risk dismissal. Wilson simply asserts that his counsel didn't move to dismiss the claim in an attempt to show prejudice. Wilson does not suggest what more counsel could have done. Given that the State was prepared to proceed with trial and to obtain the presence of the missing witness, this claim is meritless. Wilson has failed to demonstrate any prejudice stemming from counsel's representation.
Larson v. State, supra, at 5; Younger v. State, 580 A.2d at 556.
In his second ground for relief, Wilson alleges his plea was involuntary. The record clearly contradicts Wilson's allegation. When addressing the question of whether a plea was constitutionally knowing and voluntary, the Court looks to the plea colloquy to determine if the waiver of constitutional rights was knowing and voluntary. At the guilty plea hearing, the Court asked Wilson whether he understood the nature of the charges, the consequences of his pleading guilty and whether he was voluntarily pleading guilty. The Court asked Wilson if he understood he would waive his constitutional rights if he pled guilty, if he understood each of the constitutional rights listed on the guilty plea form and whether he gave truthful answers to all the questions on the form. The Court asked Wilson if he had discussed the guilty plea and its consequences fully with his attorney. The Court asked Wilson if he was giving the plea of his own free will because he was in fact guilty. The Court asked Wilson if he understood the maximum sentence he could receive by pleading guilty was eight years incarceration. The Court also asked Wilson if he was satisfied with his counsel's representation. Finally, the Court asked Wilson if he was in fact, guilty of the charge. Wilson answered each of these questions clearly and affirmatively.
Godinez v. Moran, 113 S.C-1 2680, 2687 (1993).
Transcript of guilty plea at 7-11.
Furthermore, prior to entering his guilty plea, Wilson filled out a Guilty Plea Form and signed it. Wilson wrote that he understood the constitutional rights he was relinquishing by pleading guilty and that he freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty to the charge listed in the plea agreement. Wilson is bound by the statements he made on the signed Guilty Plea Form unless he proves otherwise by clear and convincing evidence. Consequently, I confidently find that Wilson entered his guilty plea knowingly and voluntarily and that these grounds for relief are completely meritless.
Hickman v. State, Del. Supr., No. 298, 1994, Veasey, C.J. (October 11, 1994) (ORDER); Smith v. State, Del. Supr., No. 465, 1989, Walsh, J. (January 4, 1990)(ORDER). See also Sullivan v. State, Del. Supr., 636 A.2d 931, 938 (1994) (ruling the fact that defendant filled out Truth In Sentencing Guilty Plea Form in defendant's own handwriting supported the Superior Court's conclusion that defendant's decision to plead guilty was knowing and voluntary).
I find that Wilson's counsel represented him in a competent and effective manner and that Wilson has failed to demonstrate any prejudice stemming from the representation. I also find that Wilson's guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. I recommend that the Court deny Wilson's motion for postconviction relief.