Opinion
DOCKET NO. A-5853-12T3
02-27-2015
STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. KEITH WILSON, Defendant-Appellant.
William Strazza, attorney for appellant. Geoffrey D. Soriano, Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (William A. Guhl, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION Before Judges Ostrer and Hayden. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, Municipal Appeal No. 14-12-A. William Strazza, attorney for appellant. Geoffrey D. Soriano, Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (William A. Guhl, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief). PER CURIAM
Around 3:00 a.m. on June 26, 2010, defendant engaged in a race with an Acura westbound on Route 22 in the Borough of Watchung. The female driver lost control of her vehicle and crashed into a telephone pole near the Blue Star Mall. She and her passenger died. Defendant made several incriminating statements to police investigating the crash at the scene. After the municipal court denied his Miranda motion following a testimonial hearing, defendant entered a conditional guilty plea to racing on a highway, N.J.S.A. 39:4-52, and reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96. On appeal to the Law Division, Judge Julie Marino reviewed the record de novo and denied anew the motion to suppress. Judge Marino rejected defendant's argument that he was in custody. Defendant appeals, renewing the argument he presented to the trial court. Having reviewed defendant's argument in light of the record and the applicable principles of law, we affirm.
The facts are undisputed. The sole witnesses at the Miranda hearing were Watchung police officer Brian Emerick, and Watchung detective-sergeant William Kelly. On the scene first, Emerick separately interviewed defendant, as well as his passenger. Kelly also interviewed the occupants of a third vehicle, who witnessed the accident after the Acura and defendant's vehicle passed it. When Kelly arrived, he took over the witness interviews, and spoke again to defendant and others.
Emerick and Kelly conducted their interviews amid a loud and chaotic scene. The passenger-victim was trapped in the Acura and initially was alive but in great distress. The driver-victim apparently was thrown from the vehicle and had already expired. Present were a fire engine, ambulance, multiple police cars, and a Somerset County Prosecutor's Office (SCPO) truck which contained a small mobile office. Police had closed the highway. Investigators other than Emerick and Kelly were examining the physical scene.
In his initial interviews with Emerick and Kelly, defendant stated that the Acura pulled in front of his Volkswagen Jetta, turned perpendicular to the roadway as the driver lost control, and then struck the pole. Defendant did not incriminate himself. Both Emerick and Kelly suspected that defendant was more involved in the crash than he admitted, although neither conveyed their suspicions to defendant.
About ten to fifteen minutes after his first conversation with Kelly, defendant approached the detective-sergeant, who was standing roughly sixty feet away. Defendant stated that he remembered additional details of the incident, and volunteered that the victims had engaged him in conversation on the highway, and asked him if he wanted to race.
In response, Kelly advised defendant that he wanted "to conduct more followup and get a taped statement from him." He explained that he wanted to record the statement because of the serious nature of the incident, and his interest in avoiding an error in reporting defendant's statement. Kelly stated that he chose to interview defendant in the truck because it would be quiet, and free from the noise and distractions of the accident scene. Defendant was agreeable, and stood by while Kelly and an assisting officer obtained an audio recorder. They then entered the SCPO mobile office, where Kelly interrogated defendant. At no point did Kelly advise defendant of his right to remain silent, or to counsel, as directed by Miranda.
During the recorded interview, defendant asserted that while he and the victims were stopped at a traffic light, the victim-passenger asked him if he wanted to race. He stated he "just laughed," and then they "did a couple of pulls real quick." He explained that a "pull" occurred when one driver passes the second, slows down, and is passed by the second driver. Defendant asserted that the victim-driver encroached slightly into his lane, after which he decided to cease racing. However, the victim-driver passed him once more, and then lost control.
Emerick and Kelly both stated that while they were conducting their rounds of interviews, none of the witnesses, including defendant, were permitted to leave the scene. After each interview, the officers asked the witnesses to remain in or near their vehicles. On the other hand, none of the witnesses protested, or asked to leave. The recorded interview took place about two hours after the crash, and lasted approximately eleven minutes.
Judge Marino recognized that in determining whether a person is in custody for purposes of triggering the delivery of Miranda warnings, "courts should consider the totality of the circumstances including 'the time and place of the interrogation, the length of the interrogation, the nature of the questions, the conduct of the police, the status of the interrogator, the status of the suspect, and other such factors.'" (quoting State v. Pearson, 318 N.J. Super. 123, 133 (App. Div. 1999).
The court also noted that the officers' unexpressed suspicions about defendant's involvement were not relevant to determining whether defendant was in custody.
The United States Supreme Court has held that "an officer's subjective and undisclosed view concerning whether the person being interrogated is a suspect is irrelevant to the assessment of whether the person is in custody," and thus entitled to Miranda warnings. Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 319 (1994). It is "'the compulsive aspect of custodial interrogation, and not the strength or content of the government's suspicions at the time the questioning [is] conducted, which [has] led the Court to impose Miranda requirements with regard to custodial questioning.'" Id. at 323 (quoting Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341, 345 (1976)). It is well
settled, then, that a police officer's subjective view that the individual under questioning is a suspect, if undisclosed, does not bear upon the question whether the individual is in custody for the purposes of Miranda. Id. at 324.
Judge Marino determined that defendant was not in custody. She noted that defendant was treated no differently from the other witnesses. They were asked to remain because the officers were conducting an investigation into an accident, and were trying to ascertain what happened. Although the witnesses were all asked to remain as the investigation proceeded, no one asked to leave or protested. Despite the officers' suspicions, they did not say or do anything to "lead defendant to believe they viewed him as a suspect." The court rejected defendant's argument that he was led into the truck because he was a suspect, finding, "He was asked to give a recorded statement and agreed to do so, and no form of coercion is apparent from the record or the arguments of Defendant."
Judge Marino concluded:
In evaluating the totality of the circumstances as presented by Defendant, it is this Court's finding that Defendant was not in custody when being questioned on June 26, 2010, and therefore was not entitled to Miranda warnings. The accident scene was described as expected, especially an accident involving multiple fatalities. Moreover, Defendant was not completely trapped in the parking lot, as there was a back exit to an open road. Both officers,
having asked Defendant to remain in or near his car, adequately explained their actions as part of their investigation, and there were multiple occasions when both officers confirmed that neither told Defendant he could not leave, and at no time did he request to do so. Finally, Defendant's claim that he was viewed as a suspect and therefore felt he could not leave while being interrogated remains unsupported by the evidence. There is also no evidence that law enforcement, at any time during the investigation, used coercive force or influence over Defendant. Specifically, Defendant spoke to both officers for very short periods of time — a matter of minutes with each. When Defendant gave his recorded statement it was to two (2) plain-clothes officers inside a van that offered a quieter environment for recording purposes, and his statement lasted approximately eleven (11) minutes. During all statements given by Defendant, the questions posed by the officers were open-ended and investigatory in nature, and were not reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating response.
The questions were not harassing, overbearing or accusatory, and no evidence reveals that the officer exerted any excessive police pressure on Defendant. At no point did Defendant claim to be unwilling to answer questions, nor did he request to leave, and we are convinced that the information given by Defendant was voluntary.
On appeal, defendant presents the following point for our review:
POINT I - THE LAW DIVISION ERRED BY AFFIRMING THE MUNICIPAL COURT'S DENIAL OF DEFENDANT'S MOTION.
We review the order of the Law Division on a municipal appeal. State v. Adubato, 420 N.J. Super. 167, 175-76 (App. Div. 2011), certif. denied, 209 N.J. 430 (2012). We do not independently assess the facts, but determine instead whether there was sufficient credible evidence to support the Law Division's findings. State v. Robertson, 438 N.J. Super. 47, 64 (App. Div. 2014). However, in reviewing denial of a motion to suppress for an alleged violation of Miranda, we use a "searching and critical" standard of review to protect a defendant's constitutional rights. State v. Patton, 362 N.J. Super. 16, 43 (App. Div.) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted), certif. denied, 178 N.J. 35 (2003). We review de novo the trial court's legal conclusions that flow from established facts. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995) .
The familiar Miranda warnings were required to combat the inherent coerciveness of custodial interrogation. "[A] custodial interrogation by law enforcement officers is inherently coercive" in part because of the "inherent psychological pressure on a suspect in custody." State v. P.Z., 152 N.J. 86, 102 (1997). "Miranda turns on the potentially inquisitorial nature of police questioning and the inherent psychological pressure on a suspect in custody." Ibid.
A court must consider the totality of the circumstances in determining whether an interrogation is custodial. Id. at 102, 113. For example, an interrogation is not rendered custodial simply because it occurs in a police station. Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495, 97 S. Ct. 711, 714, 50 L. Ed. 2d 714, 719 (1977); see also State v. Downey, 206 N.J. Super. 382, 396-97 (App. Div. 1986) (finding initial rounds of questioning at police station were not custodial because the defendant retained freedom of action). On the other hand, an interrogation may be considered custodial, despite the absence of a formal arrest or physical restraints. P.Z., supra, 152 N.J. at 103. "The critical determinant of custody is whether there has been a significant deprivation of the suspect's freedom of action based on the objective circumstances, including the time and place of the interrogation, the status of the interrogator, the status of the suspect, and other such factors." Ibid. A court must consider how a reasonable person under the circumstances would have perceived his or her situation. State v. Carlucci, 217 N.J. 129, 144 (2014).
"General on-the-scene questioning as to facts surrounding a crime or other general questioning of citizens in the fact-finding process" does not require Miranda warnings. Miranda, supra, 384 U.S. at 477, 86 S. Ct. at 1629, 16 L. Ed. 2d at 725. The United States Supreme Court, as well as our courts, have distinguished between detaining a citizen in the course of an investigatory stop, pursuant to Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1880, 20 L. Ed. 2d 889, 906 (1968), and placing a citizen in custody so as to trigger Miranda requirements. See Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 435-442, 104 S. Ct. 3138, 3147-52, 82 L. Ed. 2d 317, 331-336 (1984); State v. Smith, 374 N.J. Super. 425 (App. Div. 2005).
In Berkemer, Justice Marshall noted that features of an ordinary traffic stop generally did not implicate the concerns that underlie adoption of the Miranda warning. The traffic stop is ordinarily brief. "[Q]uestioning incident to an ordinary traffic stop is quite different from stationhouse interrogation, which frequently is prolonged, and in which the detainee often is aware that questioning will continue until he provides his interrogators the answers they seek." Id. at 437-38, 104 S. Ct. at 3149, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 333. Also, in a typical traffic stop, the motorist does not "feel[] completely at the mercy of the police." Id. at 438, 104 S. Ct. at 3149, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 333. "[T]he atmosphere surrounding an ordinary traffic stop is substantially less 'police dominated' than that surrounding the kinds of interrogation at issue in Miranda itself . . . ." Id. at 438-39, 104 S. Ct. at 3149, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 334.
As we explained in Smith:
Despite the restraint on freedom of action involved in Terry and traffic stops, an officer is not required to give Miranda warnings before asking questions reasonably related to dispelling or confirming suspicions that justify the detention. Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. [at] 439-40, 104 S. Ct. at 3150, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 334. Miranda warnings are required only if the stop, due to its duration or other attendant circumstances, "is fairly characterized as the functional equivalent of an arrest." Berkemer, supra, 468 U.S. at 442, 104 S. Ct. at 3150, 82 L. Ed. 2d at 336. . . . State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 478 (1998) (Terry stop becomes a de facto arrest when officer's conduct is unreasonably intrusive). Minimally intrusive curtailments of freedom of action reasonably related to securing the safety of the officer and others present at the scene during the investigation do not convert a proper Terry stop into a formal arrest.See also State v. Pierson, 223 N.J. Super. 62, 65-68 (App. Div. 1988) (finding that interrogation was not custodial, so as to trigger Miranda, where officer conducted traffic stop, and questioned the defendant while he was in his car, and accompanied him into a building to confirm his assertion that he was there to see his girlfriend).
Because Terry and traffic stops necessarily involve some restraint on freedom of action, the question is not whether a reasonable person would feel free to leave at the inception of the questioning. The question is whether a reasonable person, considering the objective circumstances, would understand the situation as a de facto arrest or would recognize that after brief questioning he or she would be free to leave.
[Smith, supra, 374 N.J. Super. at 431-32.]
Applying these principles, the only aspect of defendant's statements worthy of extended discussion pertains to the interrogation in the SCPO truck. Under Berkemer and Smith, we discern no merit to defendant's contention that he was in custody when he was questioned as he waited in or near his car, because he was not free to leave. Although the police conducted a prolonged investigatory stop, the atmosphere was not custodial in nature. Defendant was treated no differently from the other eyewitnesses. The police were investigating the crash, and placed no one in custody.
Moreover, defendant's initial disclosure to Kelly that the victims asked him if he wanted to race was unprompted by any questioning at all. Voluntary statements not elicited through interrogation or a functional equivalent are not subject to Miranda, even if the defendant is in custody. See, e.g., State v. Bohuk, 269 N.J. Super. 581, 594 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 136 N.J. 29, cert. denied, 513 U.S. 865, 115 S. Ct. 183, 130 L. Ed. 2d 117 (1994); cf. State v. Ward, 240 N.J. Super. 412, 417-19 (App. Div. 1990).
We recognize that the interrogation in the SCPO truck presents a closer issue. However, the location of the questioning in the truck and the attendant circumstances do not render the interrogation custodial. As we noted, questioning that occurs in a police station is not necessarily custodial. In several cases, our courts have declined to hold that an interrogation was custodial, notwithstanding its location in a prosecutor's office, or police headquarters. It has done so because of the totality of circumstances, including significantly, the defendant's voluntary participation, and the absence of an arrest or threat of arrest.
In State v. Seefeldt, 51 N.J. 472 (1968), a defendant was questioned at the prosecutor's office "not as a suspect but rather in the role of a grieving widow attempting to aid in the solution of her husband's murder." Id. at 482. Police conducted the interrogation in the law library in the prosecutor's office. Ibid. The defendant was free to leave, and did so after the interview ended. Ibid. The Court noted that the defendant was motivated to speak to the police, to divert suspicion from herself. Ibid. The Court concluded the defendant was not in custody when questioned. Id. at 482-83.
In Downey, we found that the defendant, who was ultimately charged with her husband's murder, was not in custody during the initial phase of the police investigation. Downey, supra, 206 N.J. Super. at 396. Downey reported her husband's gruesome killing. Id. at 384. After initially observing the murder scene, a police detective asked defendant to accompany him to police headquarters. Id. at 385. Downey followed the detective in her friend's private automobile. Ibid. She provided the officer with a statement of her whereabouts the evening before, and the morning of the discovery of her husband's body, claiming that she was not at the house during those times, and explaining that a cut to her hand was received when she discovered her husband. Id. at 386. Downey was then permitted to leave, but was later invited to return to the police headquarters for further questioning. Ibid. She arrived at 4:00 p.m. Ibid. She gave a formal statement at 5:00 p.m., repeating her previous account. Id. at 386-87. At 7:35 p.m., officers reviewed the results of their investigation and determined that she was not free to leave, at which point they advised Downey of her rights. Id. at 387. Downey continued to maintain her innocence, but was then confronted with evidence that police had obtained tying her to the scene and contradicting elements of her version. Ibid. We concluded that defendant was not in custody during the pre-Miranda interview. Id. at 397.
We reached a similar result in State v. McLaughlin, 310 N.J. Super. 242 (App. Div.), certif. denied, 156 N.J. 381 (1998), where the State bought the defendant his plane ticket, made his hotel arrangements, transported him to the Hughes Justice Complex, and interrogated him in a grand jury room. Id. at 249-53. Investigators were not in uniform or carrying guns, defendant was permitted to move about freely at the Justice Complex, and he was repeatedly reminded that he was free to leave. Id. at 280; see also Pierson, supra, 223 N.J. Super. at 64-68.
Here, the interrogation of defendant occurred not at the police station, but at a mobile office on the scene. The mobile office was a less coercive atmosphere than the police station. It was parked out on the public highway. Although defendant was not free to leave the accident scene, there was no proof that he was not free to leave the truck if he wished. Additionally, the record indicates the interrogating officers wore plain clothes.
The truck was brightly lit and had a folding chair and file cabinets. It bore no similarity to a vehicle designed for the transportation of prisoners. The interview was conducted there because it was quieter than the chaotic scene outside the truck. Defendant initially volunteered the fact that the victims wanted to race, and was simply asked to repeat and amplify his disclosure for recording.
The SCPO truck was thus less coercive than the back of a police car. Yet, courts in other jurisdictions have found that even an interrogation in the back of a police car under various circumstances may not rise to the level of a custodial interrogation under Miranda. See 2 Wayne R. LaFave et al., Criminal Procedure § 6.6(e) n. 59 (3d ed. 2007 & Supp. 2014) (comparing cases in which interrogations in police cars and vans were and were not deemed custodial).
In sum, we discern no basis to disturb the trial court's determination that defendant was not in custody when he made his various statements to police on June 26, 2010. Consequently, there is no basis to reverse his conviction.
Affirmed. I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true copy of the original on file in my office.
CLERK OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).