Opinion
2016 KA 0007
06-03-2016
STATE OF LOUISIANA v. CAMERON PHILLIP WILLIAMS
Warren L. Montgomery District Attorney and Matthew Caplan Assistant District Attorney Covington, Louisiana Attorneys for Appellee State of Louisiana Christopher A. Aberle Mandeville, Louisiana Attorney for Defendant/Appellant Cameron P. Williams
NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION
APPEALED FROM THE TWENTY-SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR THE PARISH OF ST. TAMMANY STATE OF LOUISIANA
DOCKET NUMBER 526,869, DIVISION "D" HONORABLE PETER J. GARCIA, JUDGE Warren L. Montgomery
District Attorney
and
Matthew Caplan
Assistant District Attorney
Covington, Louisiana Attorneys for Appellee
State of Louisiana Christopher A. Aberle
Mandeville, Louisiana Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
Cameron P. Williams BEFORE: McDONALD, McCLENDON, and THERIOT, JJ. McDONALD, J.
The defendant, Cameron Phillip Williams, was charged by bill of information with simple rape, a violation of LSA-R.S. 14:43. He pled not guilty and, following a jury trial, was found guilty as charged and sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant appealed his conviction and sentence. We affirmed his conviction. We vacated his sentence and remanded for resentencing, because the trial court did not wait 24 hours or secure a waiver of time delays after denying the defendant's motions for new trial and post-verdict judgment of acquittal before imposing sentence. See State v. Williams, 13-1822 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/6/14), 2014 WL 3843850 (unpublished), writ denied, 14-1445 (La. 4/24/15), 169 So.3d 353. On resentencing, following remand, the trial court again sentenced the defendant to 20 years' imprisonment at hard labor, without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The defendant filed a motion to reconsider, which was denied. The defendant now appeals, designating three assignments of error. We affirm the sentence.
FACTS
For a full recitation of the facts, see State v. Williams, 13-1822 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/6/14), 2014 WL 3843850 (unpublished), writ denied, 14-1445 (La. 4/24/15), 169 So.3d 353.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER ONE
In his first assignment of error, the defendant argues resentencing is required, because, on remand, the trial court sentenced him under the erroneous beliefs that it did not have the authority to alter the original sentence and that it maintained the authority to modify the sentence in the future.
At the remanded sentencing hearing, the trial court informed counsel of the purpose of the hearing:
While you're looking for the report, let me put this in the proper procedural context. This matter was remanded back from the First Circuit because I did not wait 24 hours or secure a waiver of this required period after denying defendant's motion for new trial for post-verdict judgment of acquittal before imposing sentence pursuant to Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure Article 873.
So as a result of that remand, defense has filed a motion for reconsideration of my original sentence. Whether the remand allows a procedural window for this reconsideration to be appropriate or not, I'm not sure because the Court ordered me to resentence the defendant after that 24-hour delay, which I assumed has occurred by this time.
After denial of those post-verdict motions, it's appropriate for me to sentence at this time, but I'm allowing Mr. Burns to put on some evidence relative to the reconsideration, but I'm not sure it's procedurally appropriate. Go ahead.
The defense then called the defendant to the witness stand. The defendant expressed remorse for what had occurred on the night of the offense and took full responsibility for his actions. The trial court also allowed into evidence a report by Dr. Rafael Salcedo, a clinical psychologist who performed an evaluation of the defendant while he was in prison, as well as documents showing that the defendant had completed three phases of a sex offender treatment program and was taking college level courses while in prison.
The defendant takes issue with the trial court's following remarks at the remanded sentencing hearing. He argues that these remarks show the trial court misunderstood the scope of its authority:
I'm going to also address whether or not it's even procedurally appropriate for me to handle a motion to reconsider the sentence just because the Court remanded it to me for failing to keep in mind the 24-hour delay between denial of post-verdict motions. I'm going to deny the motion to reconsider the sentence on both substantive and procedural grounds, but since I am re-sentencing you at this time as per the order of the Court, I'm going to resentence you under Article 881.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure and reimpose the original sentence of 20 years that I imposed previously with credit for time served.
And what that means is that now I am legally able to address your sentence, and so that I want to give you some hope that I will consider this in the future if you consider the same tactics you're considering and if I have appropriate contact from the victim.
This doesn't mean that I want your family hounding her in order for her to come back in here and tell me, oh, it's okay now. I don't want that to happen, but since I am re-sentencing you pursuant to Article 881.1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, I think that I do now have a proper legal basis to address your sentence and that is the sentence I'm imposing.
According to the defendant, the trial court's foregoing remarks reveal that the court was "proceeding under a two-fold misapprehension of the law" when it sentenced him on remand. First, the defendant suggests the trial court thought it was ruling on a motion to reconsider sentence; thus, the trial court mistakenly thought it was limited to re-imposing a 20-year sentence. Second, according to the defendant, the trial court's belief that it could revisit the defendant's sentence in the future under LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 881.1 "is simply contrary to the law." The defendant points out that the court is without any jurisdictional authority to modify his sentence in the future.
The defendant's assertions are without merit. At the beginning of the remanded sentencing hearing, the trial court made clear that the purpose of the hearing was to sentence the defendant after this court vacated its originally imposed sentence. The trial court noted that the reason for such was because it had not obtained the defendant's wavier of delays and/or waited the required 24 hours following its denial of motions before imposing the original sentence. Despite the defendant's claim, the trial court's remarks do not suggest that it thought it was ruling on a motion to reconsider sentence. In fact, the trial court pointed out that the defendant's motion to reconsider sentence filed at the same time as this hearing was a separate and distinct issue, and that it was not convinced that such a motion was even appropriate at that point since the matter was before it on remand from this court to resentence the defendant. Moreover, the trial court specifically denied the defendant's motion to reconsider sentence both on substantive and procedural grounds before resentencing him.
Further, despite the defendant's contention, the trial court did not think it was limited to re-imposing a 20-year sentence. The trial court's admission of the defendant's testimony, Dr. Salcedo's report, and evidence of the defendant's treatment and school documentation precisely demonstrated the trial court's understanding of the defendant's effort to adduce possible mitigating circumstances for resentencing; otherwise, the trial court would have proceeded directly to resentencing the defendant without consideration of any other evidence. Before resentencing the defendant, the trial court made clear that it did not think that imprisonment was always required, that it considered Dr. Salcedo's report, as well as efforts the defendant was making while incarcerated. These considerations show the trial court understood that mitigating circumstances could potentially result in a lesser sentence.
Finally, despite the defendant's contention, the trial court did not improperly give him "hope" that it would reconsider the defendant's sentence in the future. In other words, the defendant claims that the trial court's remark that "I want to give you some hope that I will consider this in the future if you consider the same tactics," revealed that the trial court did not understand that it could have imposed any legal sentence on remand, and that it could not alter the sentence in the future. As noted, the trial court clearly understood that on remand it could have sentenced the defendant to a greater or lesser sentence than 20 years. Under LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 881.1(A)(1), the defendant had the right to file a motion to reconsider his second-imposed sentence. It is this potential motion to reconsider to which the trial court referred when it spoke of considering the mitigating factors presented to it in this hearing, as well as when it referenced potential testimony from the victim that might inure to the defendant's benefit, if indeed the defendant wound up before the court again, asking the court to reconsider his sentence. The defendant suggests in his brief that the trial court's belief that it could "revisit" his sentence was "contrary to the law," because the trial court did not set any future date for filing a motion to reconsider sentence. The time limitation of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 881.1(A)(1), however, is triggered by operation of law, and it is only when the trial court specifically allows for a longer period that it is to "set" a "future date" for filing a motion to reconsider. Based on the foregoing, this assignment of error is without merit.
The trial court stated, "This doesn't mean that I want your family hounding her in order for her to come back in here and tell me, oh, it's okay now."
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO
In his second assignment of error, the defendant argues defense counsel was ineffective. Specifically, the defendant contends that his trial counsel "misadvised" him during pretrial negotiations, which caused him to forego a plea deal and proceed to trial.
At the remanded sentencing hearing, the defendant testified that he regretted not "pleading out" in the beginning. When the trial court asked what he meant by this, the defendant told the court that his trial attorney had told him that he would be sentenced from one to three years if he proceeded to trial on a simple rape charge. The defendant's trial attorney was not representing the defendant at the remanded sentence hearing and, therefore, could not respond to these allegations.
When the trial court told the defendant it had a difficult time believing the attorney had told him such, the following exchange between the defendant and the trial court took place:
[Defendant]: This is what she told me. She said you can take probation now or you can take it to trial and do one to three years with the label.
[Court]: In various pretrials of this matter, my notes indicate that with a charge of sexual battery, one sentence was offered and the charge was eventually simple rape. And at the time of the pretrial, I offered a sentence of 15 years, and it was only after I heard the facts of the case that I decided that that was not an appropriate sentence, that it should have been a higher sentence.
[Defendant]: Nothing was ever made aware to me of 15 years at all. I had never heard that number before until today.
[Court]: So what happened when you got a 20-year sentence and you thought the most you could get was three years?
[Defendant]: I was shocked. I didn't know that was happening at all. I asked her and she said we're going to appeal it. You know, I figured that was obvious, but I had no idea and she didn't tell me -- I had no idea where that number was coming from.
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution mandates effective assistance of counsel to a defendant in a criminal proceeding. A claim of ineffectiveness of counsel is analyzed under the two-pronged test developed by the United States Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). To establish that his trial attorney was ineffective, the defendant must first show that the attorney's performance was deficient, which requires a showing that counsel made errors so serious that he was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment. Secondly, the defendant must prove that the deficient performance prejudiced his defense. State v. Serigny, 610 So.2d 857, 859-60 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1992), writ denied, 614 So.2d 1263 (La. 1993). Even if the defendant satisfies both prongs under Strickland, he still must show there was a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's error(s), he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59, 106 S.Ct. 366, 370, 88 L.Ed.2d 203 (1985).
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is more properly raised by an application for post-conviction relief in the district court where a full evidentiary hearing may be conducted. However, where the record discloses evidence needed to decide the issue of ineffective assistance of counsel, and that issue is raised by assignment of error on appeal, the issue may be addressed in the interest of judicial economy. State v. Carter, 96-0337 (La. App. 1 Cir. 11/8/96), 684 So.2d 432, 438. See Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. at 2064.
The defendant contends in brief that if, as suggested by the foregoing exchange, he "forwent a plea and proceeded to trial based either on trial counsel's misrepresentation of the consequences of being found guilty at trial or by counsel's failure to relate a plea offer, then counsel rendered unconstitutionally ineffective assistance for which a remedy must be fashioned."
We have reviewed the record and found nothing to show any discussions between the defendant and his trial counsel, or any other counsel, regarding guilty plea negotiations. Thus, we cannot verify the defendant's unsupported claims by review of the appellate record. Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, by their very nature, are highly fact-sensitive. State v. Henry, 00-2250 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/11/01), 788 So.2d 535, 540, writ denied, 01-2299 (La. 6/21/02), 818 So.2d 791. A defendant making a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must identify certain acts or omissions by counsel which led to the claim; general statements and conclusory charges will not suffice. State v. Jordan, 35,643 (La. App. 2 Cir. 4/3/02), 813 So.2d 1123, 1134, writ denied, 02-1570 (La. 5/30/03), 845 So.2d 1067.
Once a defendant has the assistance of counsel, the vast array of trial decisions, strategic and tactical, that must be made before and during trial rest with an accused and his attorney, and the fact that a particular strategy is unsuccessful, does not establish ineffective assistance of counsel. State v. Folse, 623 So.2d 59, 71 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1993). In this case, the defendant's allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel cannot be sufficiently investigated from an inspection of the record alone. Decisions relating to investigation, preparation, and strategy cannot possibly be reviewed on appeal. Only in an evidentiary hearing in the district court, where the defendant could present evidence beyond what is contained in the instant record, could these allegations be sufficiently investigated. Accordingly, these allegations are meritless or otherwise not subject to appellate review. See State v. Albert, 96-1991 (La. App. 1 Cir. 6/20/97), 697 So.2d 1355, 1363-64. See also State v. Johnson, 06-1235 (La. App. 1 Cir. 12/28/06), 951 So.2d 294, 304. This assignment of error is without merit.
The defendant would have to satisfy the requirements of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 924, et seq., to receive such a hearing.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR NUMBER THREE
In his third assignment of error, the defendant argues that his sentence is excessive. Specifically, the defendant contends that his 20-year sentence is unprecedented and fails to account for several mitigating factors.
The Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Louisiana Constitution Article I, §20 prohibit the imposition of cruel or excessive punishment. Although a sentence falls within statutory limits, it may be excessive. State v. Sepulvado, 367 So.2d 762, 767 (La. 1979). A sentence is considered constitutionally excessive if it is grossly disproportionate to the seriousness of the offense or is nothing more than a purposeless and needless infliction of pain and suffering. A sentence is considered grossly disproportionate if, when the crime and punishment are considered in light of the harm done to society, it shocks the sense of justice. State v. Andrews, 94-0842 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/5/95), 655 So.2d 448, 454. The trial court has great discretion in imposing a sentence within the statutory limits, and such a sentence will not be set aside as excessive in the absence of a manifest abuse of discretion. See State v. Holts, 525 So.2d 1241, 1245 (La. App. 1 Cir. 1988). Louisiana Code of Criminal Procedure article 894.1 sets forth the factors the trial court shall consider when imposing sentence. While the entire checklist of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 need not be recited, the record must reflect the trial court adequately considered the criteria. State v. Brown, 02-2231 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/9/03), 849 So.2d 566, 569.
The goal of LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 is to have the sentencing court articulate a factual basis for the sentence, not rigid or mechanical compliance with the article's provisions. Where the record clearly shows an adequate factual basis for the sentence imposed, remand is unnecessary even where there has not been full compliance with LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1. State v. Lanclos, 419 So.2d 475, 478 (La. 1982). The trial court should review the defendant's personal history, his prior criminal record, the seriousness of the offense, the likelihood that he will commit another crime, and his potential for rehabilitation through correctional services other than confinement. See State v. Jones, 398 So.2d 1049, 1051-52 (La. 1981). On appellate review of a sentence, the relevant question is whether the trial court abused its broad sentencing discretion, not whether another sentence might have been more appropriate. State v. Thomas, 98-1144 (La. 10/9/98), 719 So.2d 49, 50 (per curiam).
The defendant was sentenced to 20 years' imprisonment at hard labor without benefit of parole, probation, or suspension of sentence. The maximum sentence for simple rape is 25 years. See LSA-R.S. 14:43(B) (the applicable law in 2012, and prior to a 2015 amendment). The defendant argues that the record wholly fails to show that he "is anywhere close to being the worst kind of offender or that he committed the offense in anything close to the most serious manner." The offense, according to the defendant "was committed in nearly the least serious manner imaginable." Further, the defendant had no felony record and was fully employed. The defendant contends there is "a blurry line between the commission of 'date rape' and young persons drinking too much and engaging in sex, which in hindsight seemed unwise or undesirable." The defendant acknowledges he "crossed that line" but claims he "could not have crossed it very far."
Simple rape is now referred to as third degree rape. See LSA-R.S. 14:43(C).
We note initially that the defendant's reliance on the "worst kind" language is misplaced. These factors of "worst offense" and "worst offender"0 have no application in this case because the defendant was not sentenced to the maximum sentence of twenty-five years. See State v. Mance, 00-1903 (La. App. 1 Cir. 5/11/01), 797 So.2d 718, 721 (stating that maximum sentences are reserved for cases involving the most serious offenses and the worst offenders).
Despite the defendant's contention regarding mitigating factors, the trial court, who presided over the defendant's trial and imposed both sentences (the original and on remand) thoroughly considered LSA-C.Cr.P. art. 894.1 and the relevant factors in this case. Moreover, the record before us clearly established an adequate factual basis for the sentence imposed. See Lanclos, 419 So.2d at 478.
The victim in this case was physically bruised and battered during her encounter with the defendant. In her impact statement at the defendant's original sentencing hearing, the victim spoke of the emotional and psychological impact of having been raped by the defendant:
Today, however, I'm here to discuss not what happened but how it has affected me, the impact it's had on my life for eight months, almost exactly eight months today. For those eight months because of one person's selfish desires on one night I've lived in depression, nightmares, paranoia, insomnia, anxiety, and fear. I will never again be the person I was eight months and one day ago, but I am stronger.
At the original sentencing hearing, the trial court supported the defendant's sentence with several reasons. The court noted that the defendant had not admitted to any culpability for his crime and had given "nothing ... but excuses." The court also noted that the defendant's crime was "extremely violent" and any lesser sentence would deprecate the seriousness of the offense. He referenced a doctor's observation that the victim's physical condition was "one of the worst situations he'd ever seen" and that this doctor had extensive experience with treating victims of sexual assault. The trial court stated that the level of violence of the offense indicated an undue risk that the defendant would commit another crime in any period of suspended sentence. Continuing, the trial court stated the defendant's conduct showed deliberate cruelty to the victim and that he knew or should have known the victim was particularly vulnerable.
At the remanded sentencing hearing, the trial court gave reasons for again sentencing the defendant to 20 years' imprisonment. He repeated the particularly violent nature of the crime, noting the victim's bruises, and the disarray of and loud noises from the crime scene. He noted the defendant's previous position that the victim had consented to the acts constituting the offense but was pleased to see that the defendant was now contrite. The trial court also expressed concern over the defendant's allegations that his trial counsel failed to advise or misadvised him about his sentencing exposure. He noted that the attorney was well respected in the district, and he had a very difficult time believing she would not have correctly advised the defendant.
Considering the trial court's thorough review of the circumstances and the nature of the crime, we find it did not abuse its discretion. Accordingly, the sentence imposed by the trial court is not grossly disproportionate to the severity of the offense and, therefore, is not unconstitutionally excessive. This assignment of error is without merit.
SENTENCE AFFIRMED.