Opinion
No. 56133-2-I.
February 11, 2008.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for King County, No. 04-1-00020-0, Gregory P. Canova, J., entered April 5, 2005.
Reversed by unpublished opinion per Cox, J., concurred in by Appelwick, C.J., and Agid, J.
The community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement does not apply unless police action is totally divorced from a criminal investigation. Here, the district court determined on remand from this court that the deputy's warrantless stop of the vehicle being driven by Lyllioune Wheatley was motivated, in part, by the deputy's belief that she might have been drinking. Because neither the community caretaking exception nor any other exception to the warrant requirement applies in this case, we reverse.
State v. Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 385, 5 P.3d 668 (2000).
On March 15, 2003, around 10:30 p.m., Deputy Carlos Bratcher was patrolling on southbound Interstate 5 near Federal Way. It was raining and the traffic was light. He testified on direct examination at the suppression hearing that he noticed Wheatley swerving within her own lane, as well as slowing down and speeding up. He stated that he was concerned she may have been experiencing a medical condition or mechanical problem with her car. He also speculated that another possible reason for her erratic driving was that "she could have been drinking." The deputy denied that he pulled her over for any traffic infraction or on suspicion of any criminal activity.
After stopping her car, he approached and asked about her well-being. According to the officer, when Wheatley responded, he smelled what he believed was alcohol on her breath. Following field sobriety tests by another officer who was called to the scene, it appears Wheatley was arrested on suspicion of DUI.
The State charged Wheatley with DUI. At the suppression hearing, the district court judge considered the evidence and arguments of counsel and ruled that the community caretaking exception did not justify the stop of Wheatley. He excluded the test results and dismissed the charges against her. The court did not enter any written findings or conclusions at that time.
The State sought review in the superior court, which reversed. We granted Wheatley's motion for discretionary review. We then issued an opinion remanding the matter to the district court to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by CrRLJ 3.6(b). We later granted Wheatley's motion to recall the mandates and afforded the parties the opportunity to provide additional briefing. No further briefing has been submitted to this court.
COMMUNITY CARETAKING
Wheatley argues that the community caretaking exception to the warrant requirement did not justify the stop in this case. We agree.
Warrantless searches and seizures are per se unreasonable and violate the Fourth Amendment unless an established exception applies. The community caretaking exception recognizes that law enforcement officers provide, and indeed the public expects them to provide, valuable services in the community that are unrelated to their law enforcement duties. For example, they render aid in emergency situations, provide routine checks on the health and safety of citizens, and generally assist those in need. The exception encompasses seizures conducted by law enforcement officers in furtherance of their community caretaking functions that are completely divorced from law enforcement. However, an intrusion under this exception may not exceed the scope of its limited purpose unless another exception to the warrant requirement applies.
State v. Acrey, 148 Wn.2d 738, 745-46, 64 P.3d 594 (2003) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967)).
Id. at 748.
See id.
State v. Houser, 95 Wn.2d 143, 151-52, 622 P.2d 1218 (1980).
See State v. Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d 373, 395, 5 P.3d 668 (2000) ("Once the exception does apply, police may conduct a noncriminal investigation so long as it is necessary and strictly relevant to performance of the community caretaking function. The noncriminal investigation must end when reasons for initiating an encounter have been fully dispelled.").
Once a court has determined that an officer acted pursuant to his or her community caretaking functions in a way that was totally divorced from law enforcement, it must balance the competing interests to decide whether the seizure was reasonable and passes constitutional muster. The seizure is only lawful if the public's interest in having police perform the community caretaking function outweighs the individual's interest in freedom from police interference. Thus, whether the exception applies as a routine check on health or safety requires the application of a two-pronged test: (1) whether the officer's actions were in furtherance of his community caretaking functions in a way that was subjectively divorced from law enforcement, and (2) whether the balancing test favors the public's interest in the caretaking function or the individual's interest in liberty. The community caretaking exception should be narrowly applied because of "`a real risk of abuse in allowing even well-intentioned stops to assist.'"
Id. at 387.
State v. O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d 564, 597, 599, 62 P.3d 489 (2003) (Chambers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Acrey, 148 Wn.2d at 750 (quoting Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d at 388).
On our initial review of the record, it was not entirely clear how the trial court reached its initial decision to exclude the evidence. Accordingly, we remanded for the entry of findings to clarify the record. We note that these findings and conclusions were not before the superior court judge at the time of the initial review.
The trial court expressly found on remand that Deputy Bratcher's suspicion that Wheatley might have been drinking was "a major (or at least equal) reason that this stop was made." Whether a stop is completely divorced from law enforcement is at least in part a subjective test. We do not review credibility determinations on appeal. Moreover, no one has challenged this factual finding. Accordingly, the trial court's finding that Deputy Bratcher was at least equally motivated by law enforcement concerns supports its legal conclusion that this stop does not fall under the community caretaking exception because it was not completely divorced from law enforcement purposes.
Clerk's Papers at 106.
State v. White, 141 Wn. App. 128, 141-42 n. 6, 168 P.3d 459 (2007); see also Kinzy, 141 Wn.2d at 386 (characterizing the emergency aid aspect of the community caretaking exception as including a subjective inquiry into the officer's intent); accord State v. Schroeder, 109 Wn. App. 30, 38, 32 P.3d 1022 (2001); State v. Chisholm, 39 Wn. App. 864, 867, 696 P.2d 41 (1985) (requiring a factual inquiry to determine whether the exception applies, including whether the stop was pretextual); O'Neill, 148 Wn.2d at 597 (Chambers, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part) (calling it a "subjective" test into the officer's intentions).
State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874, 83 P.3d 970 (2004).
Because the trial court resolved the issue on the first prong of the test — whether the officer pursued community caretaking functions in a way that was completely divorced from law enforcement — it did not reach the reasonableness balancing. Likewise, we need not reach the second prong of the governing test because we agree with the trial court's resolution of the first prong.
We have carefully reviewed the arguments that the State advances to support the superior court's decision. None satisfactorily address the dispositive issue: the finding of the trial court was that the stop was not totally divorced from an investigation of unlawful activity. Accordingly, we reject the State's arguments that the superior court correctly decided the issue.
We reverse the superior court order and reinstate the district court's order of dismissal.