Opinion
Case No. 20070216-CA.
Filed February 26, 2009. Not For Official Publication
Appeal from the Second District, Ogden Department, 041906660 The Honorable Parley R. Baldwin.
Randall W. Richards, Ogden, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeffrey S. Gray, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Greenwood, Bench, and Orme.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Even assuming the trial court committed certain evidentiary errors when allowing hearsay or leading questions or in misleading Defendant by its rulings on his objections, and even assuming that those errors have been properly preserved for appeal or that the plain error doctrine is deemed to apply, Defendant has failed to demonstrate prejudice. See State v. Lafferty, 2001 UT 19, ¶ 35, 20 P.3d 342 (stating that a trial court's error "cannot result in reversible error unless the error is harmful" and thus "undermines our confidence in the verdict" so that "there is a sufficiently high likelihood of a different outcome," and that "[t]he burden of showing harmfulness . . . rests on the complaining party") (citations and internal quotation marks omitted) (omission in original), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 1018 (2001); State v. Cruz, 2005 UT 45, ¶ 16, 122 P.3d 543 (discussing "harm" element of plain error doctrine, which requires a showing that "absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome") (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). First, most of the alleged errors go to the form of questions, and even if objections had been made and sustained, the same information likely would have still been admitted through rephrased questions. Second, Defendant asserts that evidence regarding the location and condition of the stolen car would not have been admitted absent the improper questions, but at trial Defendant specifically stated that no dispute existed regarding the vehicle's location. Further, the State's questioning on this point advanced Defendant's trial strategy given that he claimed the evidence showed he could not have stolen the car because it was found in Arizona at a time when he was incarcerated in a Utah jail. And third, Defendant wrote a letter of apology to one of the victims, which was read in open court. Upon hearing the letter read, Defendant blurted out that he wanted to plead guilty.
Given these three circumstances, in addition to the strong evidence against Defendant generally, Defendant has failed to prove prejudice as a result of the trial court's alleged errors. The same can be said of his ineffective assistance of counsel claim, see generally Kell v. State, 2008 UT 62, ¶ 29, 194 P.3d 913 (discussing prejudice element of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim), although this claim is misplaced in any event given that Defendant represented himself at trial.
Defendant's only other argument that merits attention involves the trial court's reopening of the case to admit evidence that had been discussed during trial but not formally admitted. A trial court has discretion to allow a party to reopen its case to admit additional exhibits that were discussed but not admitted during trial. Cf. Lewis v. Porter, 556 P.2d 496, 497 (Utah 1976) (granting "[a] motion to reopen to take additional testimony . . . is [within] the sound discretion of the court"). In this case, the failure of the exhibits to be admitted was a mere technical oversight and the exhibits themselves were in no way a surprise to Defendant. Given the trial court's broad authority over such matters, it was well within the court's discretion to reopen the case to admit these exhibits.
Defendant raises additional issues on appeal which we have considered and determine to be without merit. We decline to discuss them further. See State v. Carter, 776 P.2d 886, 888 (Utah 1989) (stating that appellate courts "need not analyze and address in writing each and every argument, issue, or claim raised").
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR: Pamela T. Greenwood, Presiding Judge, Russell W. Bench, Judge