Opinion
No. COA12–394.
2012-11-6
STATE of North Carolina v. Dominique B. TOWNES.
Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Joseph L. Hyde, for the State. Tin Fulton Walker & Owen, PLLC, by Matthew G. Pruden and Noell P. Tin, for Defendant Appellant.
Appeal by defendant from judgment entered 9 November 2011 by Judge Hugh B. Lewis in Mecklenburg County Superior Court. Heard in the Court of Appeals 13 September 2012. Attorney General Roy Cooper, by Assistant Attorney General Joseph L. Hyde, for the State. Tin Fulton Walker & Owen, PLLC, by Matthew G. Pruden and Noell P. Tin, for Defendant Appellant.
McCULLOUGH, Judge.
Dominique B. Townes (“defendant”) appeals from the trial court's judgment by challenging an order denying his motion to suppress certain evidence seized from his vehicle during a traffic stop. Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because 1) the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct a lawful traffic stop, 2) the officer had no reasonable suspicion or probable cause to conduct a search of his vehicle, and 3) the officer detained defendant beyond the proper scope of the traffic stop. After careful review, we affirm.
I. Background
On 12 April 2010, Officer Casey Dowell of the Charlotte–Mecklenburg Police Department (“Officer Dowell”) was on patrol on Central Avenue in Charlotte, North Carolina, an area known for gang activity. Officer Dowell observed defendant's vehicle at a traffic light and entered defendant's license plate number into his police computer. Information provided by the Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) indicated that the vehicle was not insured. Specifically, the DMV information denoted “insurance stop” on defendant's registration information. Based on that information, Officer Dowell initiated a traffic stop of defendant's vehicle.
After initiating the traffic stop, Officer Dowell approached the vehicle. Defendant immediately informed Officer Dowell that he had a weapon in the vehicle. When Officer Dowell questioned defendant as to the location of the weapon, defendant informed Officer Dowell that he was sitting on it. Officer Dowell then asked defendant to exit and step to the rear of the vehicle. After defendant had exited the vehicle and was standing at its rear, Officer Dowell removed a Mack 10 machine pistol from the driver's seat where defendant had been sitting. Officer Dowell placed the firearm on the hood of his patrol vehicle and requested another unit to assist with the stop. Sometime thereafter, defendant produced documentation to Officer Dowell indicating he had valid insurance on the vehicle at that time.
Once a second officer, Officer Daniel Overcash (“Officer Overcash”), arrived at the scene, Officer Dowell informed defendant that he would not allow defendant back into the vehicle until the officer frisked it for weapons. Officer Dowell explained to defendant that he had to ensure there were no other weapons in defendant's vehicle before he could let defendant back into the vehicle and conclude the traffic stop. Defendant was not placed in handcuffs, and he was not under arrest at this time.
Over defendant's objection, Officer Dowell proceeded to search the vehicle. Once Officer Dowell began searching inside the vehicle for weapons, he smelled a strong odor of fresh marijuana behind the driver's seat. Officer Dowell was trained in the identification of drugs and drug packaging. Officer Dowell noticed an open cereal box behind the driver's seat and looked inside the box, discovering a bag of marijuana. Upon finding the marijuana, Officer Dowell decided to place defendant under arrest. Defendant was charged with carrying a concealed weapon and felony possession of marijuana. On 13 December 2010, defendant was indicted on both charges.
On 30 June 2011, defendant filed a motion to suppress evidence, which was later amended on 7 November 2011. Pursuant to the motion, defendant argued he was stopped without there being reasonable, articulable suspicion to believe criminal activity was afoot; he was detained beyond the proper scope of the stop; and his vehicle was searched in violation of his constitutional rights.
On 8 November 2011, the trial court held a hearing on defendant's motion to suppress. On 28 December 2011, the trial court entered an order denying defendant's motion, concluding that there was reasonable suspicion for the officer to stop the vehicle and that the officer's frisk of the vehicle for weapons was lawful.
On 9 November 2011, defendant pled guilty to the felony possession of marijuana charge and no contest to the carrying a concealed weapon charge. Pursuant to the plea agreement, defendant reserved his right to appeal the denial of his motion to suppress. The trial court sentenced defendant to a community punishment consisting of a four- to five-month suspended sentence and eighteen months' supervised probation. Defendant gave notice of appeal from the trial court's judgment based upon the denial of his motion to suppress in open court.
II. Standard of Review
Our review of a trial court's denial of a motion to suppress is “strictly limited to determining whether the trial judge's underlying findings of fact are supported by competent evidence, in which event they are conclusively binding on appeal, and whether those factual findings in turn support the judge's ultimate conclusions of law.” State v. Cooke, 306 N.C. 132, 134, 291 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1982). Any unchallenged findings of fact are “deemed to be supported by competent evidence and are binding on appeal.” State v. Roberson, 163 N.C.App. 129, 132, 592 S.E.2d 733, 735–36 (2004). In the present case, defendant has not challenged any of the trial court's findings of fact on appeal. The trial court's conclusions of law are fully reviewable de novo on appeal. State v. Hughes, 353 N.C. 200, 208, 539 S.E.2d 625, 631 (2000). “[T]he trial court's conclusions of law must be legally correct, reflecting a correct application of applicable legal principles to the facts found.” State v. Buchanan, 353 N.C. 332, 336, 543 S.E.2d 823, 826 (2001) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
III. Discussion
A. Reasonable Suspicion for Traffic Stop
Defendant's first argument on appeal is that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Officer Dowell made an illegal stop of defendant's vehicle. Defendant contends Officer Dowell's stop of his vehicle was illegal because the officer lacked the requisite reasonable suspicion to conduct a lawful traffic stop.
The Fourth Amendment's protection against unreasonable seizures includes “ ‘brief investigatory detentions such as those involved in the stopping of a vehicle.’ “ State v. Kincaid, 147 N.C.App. 94, 97, 555 S.E.2d 294, 297 (2001) (quoting State v. Watkins, 337 N.C. 437, 441, 446 S.E.2d 67, 70 (1994)). “% 7F “[A] traffic stop based on an officer's [reasonable] suspicion that a traffic violation is being committed, but which can only be verified by stopping the vehicle, such as drunk driving or driving with a revoked license, is classified as an investigatory stop, also known as a Terry stop.” ‘ “ Roberson, 163 N.C.App. at 132–33, 592 S.E.2d at 736 (alterations in original) (quoting State v. Wilson, 155 N.C.App. 89, 94–95, 574 S.E.2d 93, 98 (2002) (quoting State v. Young, 148 N.C.App. 462, 470–71, 559 S.E.2d 814, 820–21 (2002) (Greene, J., concurring))). Because operating a motor vehicle without maintaining the proper financial responsibility, or insurance, is a violation which can only be verified by stopping the vehicle, like driving with a revoked license, a traffic stop based on such a violation constitutes an investigatory stop.
“An investigatory stop must be justified by a reasonable suspicion, based on objective facts, that the individual is involved in criminal activity.” Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441, 446 S.E.2d at 70 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). Reasonable suspicion requires that “[t]he stop ... be based on specific and articulable facts, as well as the rational inferences from those facts, as viewed through the eyes of a reasonable, cautious officer, guided by [the officer's] experience and training.” Id. (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22, 20 L.Ed.2d 889, 906 (1968)). “The only requirement is a minimal level of objective justification, something more than an unparticularized suspicion or hunch.” State v. Steen, 352 N.C. 227, 239, 536 S.E.2d 1, 8 (2000) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). “A court must consider the totality of the circumstances—the whole picture in determining whether a reasonable suspicion to make an investigatory stop exists.” Watkins, 337 N.C. at 441, 446 S.E.2d at 70 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Defendant correctly contends, and the State agrees, that our Courts have consistently held that a police officer's mistake of law cannot form the requisite objective basis for a lawful traffic stop. See State v. McLamb, 186 N.C.App. 124, 127, 649 S.E.2d 902, 904 (2007) (officer's stop of the defendant for alleged speeding violation where officer was mistaken about the legal rate of speed for that area of highway was not objectively reasonable and therefore stop violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights). Defendant argues that in the present case, although Officer Dowell's police computer indicated an “insurance stop” on defendant's vehicle, Officer Dowell was unfamiliar with the precise meaning of an “insurance stop,” and therefore, Officer Dowell's belief that such information indicated defendant was committing a traffic violation was a mistake of law, rendering the traffic stop unlawful. We disagree.
The trial court found as fact that “Officer Dowell was informed that the defendant's car did not have insurance on by his patrol car's onboard computer system.” Indeed, Officer Dowell testified at the suppression hearing that he entered defendant's license plate number into his police computer, which returned “information about the vehicle” from “DMV [Department of Motor Vehicles].” Officer Dowell testified that included in that information was the fact that defendant “did not have insurance on the vehicle.” Officer Dowell further testified that based on the information received from DMV, he believed defendant did not have valid insurance on his vehicle on 12 April 2010. On cross-examination, Officer Dowell testified that when the DMV record on his computer indicates an “insurance stop,” it is “to draw your attention and let you know that their insurance is not valid.”
The status of defendant's insurance and whether defendant had maintained valid insurance on his vehicle is a question of fact, not one of law. The information received by Officer Dowell from the Department of Motor Vehicles is factual information concerning the status of defendant's insurance. At the suppression hearing, Officer Dowell explained his understanding of the reasons why DMV data may show an “insurance stop” on a vehicle, such as a lapse in coverage, failing to make a payment, failing to get a license plate reinstated after obtaining insurance, or obtaining insurance after notification of lapse. Defendant's attempt to misconstrue Officer Dowell's testimony as an indication that Officer Dowell did not have an understanding of the specific traffic violation for which he was stopping defendant is unpersuasive. Officer Dowell initiated the traffic stop of defendant's vehicle based on objective data from the Department of Motor Vehicles indicating defendant did not have valid insurance on his vehicle at that time.
Although Officer Dowell testified that he did not know “the specific rules and laws” on how DMV recognizes an insurance stop on a vehicle, such testimony does not reveal that Officer Dowell did not have a requisite understanding of the traffic violation at issue ô operating a motor vehicle without insurance. Officer Dowell simply testified he was not familiar with how DMV records the factual insurance information into the police computer system, not that he had no understanding of the traffic law defendant was suspected of violating. Rather, a reasonable officer in Officer Dowell's shoes could have inferred that, based on the objective data obtained through his patrol computer from DMV, defendant was committing a traffic violation, specifically that he was operating a motor vehicle without the proper insurance in violation of N.C. Gen.Stat. § 20–313 (2011). Although defendant produced documentation showing he had proper insurance in place at the time of the stop, that fact does not render Officer Dowell's decision to stop defendant's vehicle a mistake of law in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Defendant's documentation simply proved the officer's suspicion concerning the status of his insurance to be incorrect. “A traffic stop based on an officer's incorrect but reasonable assessment of facts does not violate the Fourth Amendment.” State v. Smith, 192 N.C.App. 690, 694, 666 S.E.2d 191, 194 (2008) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Kincaid, 147 N.C.App. at 98, 555 S.E.2d at 298 (officer's suspicion that the defendant was driving while his license was revoked, although incorrect, was based on specific and articulated facts and therefore the stop of the defendant's vehicle was legal). Accordingly, although Officer Dowell's suspicion regarding defendant's insurance status turned out to be incorrect, he nonetheless had the requisite reasonable suspicion to initiate a traffic stop of defendant's vehicle to investigate the status of defendant's vehicle insurance, as the trial court properly concluded.
B. Search of the Vehicle
1. Weapons Frisk of Vehicle
In Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 77 L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983), the United States Supreme Court held that a limited search or Terry frisk of a vehicle for weapons is constitutional if the officer has a reasonable articulable suspicion that the defendant is dangerous and may have immediate access to weapons. The Supreme Court explained:
Our past cases indicate ... that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger, that roadside encounters between police and suspects are especially hazardous, and that danger may arise from the possible presence of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect. These principles compel our conclusion that the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons. [T]he issue is whether a reasonably prudent man in the circumstances would be warranted in the belief that his safety or that of others was in danger. If a suspect is dangerous, he is no less dangerous simply because he is not arrested. If, while conducting a legitimate Terry search of the interior of the automobile, the officer should, as here, discover contraband other than weapons, he clearly cannot be required to ignore the contraband, and the Fourth Amendment does not require its suppression in such circumstances.
Id. at 1049–50, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1219–20 (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks, citations, and footnote omitted).
In State v. Edwards, 164 N.C.App. 130, 595 S.E.2d 213 (2004), this Court quoted Long in upholding an officer's frisk of the defendant's vehicle, despite the fact that the defendant was handcuffed and sitting on the curb at the time the search was conducted. Id. at 136–37,595 S.E.2d at 218. In Edwards, we considered the totality of the circumstances, including the defendant's actions during the stop, in determining that the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a weapons frisk of the vehicle. Id. In addition, we stated that “[d]espite defendant being handcuffed and sitting on the curb when the handgun was found, defendant was still in close proximity to the interior of the vehicle, and the possibility of him gaining immediate control of the handgun while handcuffed or once the handcuffs were removed was still present.” Id. at 137, 595 S.E.2d at 218. Thus, we held the officer's frisk of the defendant's vehicle for weapons was lawful. Id.
In State v. Parker, 183 N.C.App. 1, 644 S.E.2d 235 (2007), this Court, citing Long, again held that
[w]hen the law enforcement officer conducting a traffic stop reasonably believes that an occupant of the car is dangerous and may gain immediate control of a weapon, the officer may conduct a protective search of areas inside the passenger compartment of the vehicle where a weapon may be located. This brief search is known as a vehicle frisk, and its purpose is to ensure officer safety.
Id. at 8–9, 644 S.E.2d at 241 (citation omitted). In Parker, we upheld the officer's “weapons frisk” of the defendant's vehicle in light of the fact that the defendant informed the officer that there was a firearm in the vehicle while defendant and two other passengers were still seated in the vehicle, the frisk of the vehicle was brief, and the frisk was limited in scope to ensuring the officer's safety during the traffic stop. Id. at 11–12, 644 S.E.2d at 243.
In State v. King, 206 N.C.App. 585, 696 S.E.2d 913 (2010), this Court acknowledged the United States Supreme Court's conclusion in Long that “a car frisk was supported by reasonable suspicion because one weapon had already been found[.]” Id. at 590,696 S.E.2d at 916 (citing Long, 463 U.S. at 1050–51, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1220–21). In King, we noted that the United States Supreme Court and other jurisdictions have found the confirmed presence of a weapon to be a compelling factor in evaluating the reasonableness of a Terry weapons frisk. Id.
Most recently, in Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009), the United States Supreme Court reiterated its holding in Long, stating that the holding in Long continues to “permit[ ] an officer to search a vehicle's passenger compartment when he has reasonable suspicion that an individual, whether or not the arrestee, is dangerous and might access the vehicle to gain immediate control of weapons.” Gant, 556 U.S. at 346–47, 173 L.Ed.2d at 498 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Given these holdings, we conclude the trial court's conclusion of law that “the officer could lawfully conduct an auto frisk” under the “Terry v. Ohio standard” because he had reasonable suspicion to do so is legally correct.
In the present case, Officer Dowell testified that the area in which he stopped defendant was known for gang activity. Both Officer Dowell and defendant testified that defendant informed the officer at the outset of the traffic stop that he had a weapon inside the vehicle. When Officer Dowell questioned defendant about the location of the weapon, defendant stated he was sitting on the weapon. The trial court's unchallenged findings of fact likewise reflect that “the officer asked defendant if he had a weapon and the defendant told the officer that he was sitting on a gun.” Thus, based on defendant's own admission, Officer Dowell had a reasonable, articulable suspicion that defendant was armed and dangerous and had immediate access to a weapon inside the vehicle. See Parker, 183 N.C.App. at 12, 644 S.E.2d at 243.
Officer Dowell asked defendant to exit the vehicle and stand at the rear of the vehicle so the officer could remove the weapon from the vehicle. The trial court's unchallenged findings of fact indicate that “Officer Dowell retrieved a Mack 10 machine pistol from the driver's seat” of defendant's vehicle and that “a Mack 10 machine pistol is a semi-automatic assault weapon that can fire a large number of rounds from one clip.” In anticipation of allowing defendant to return to his vehicle in order to complete the traffic stop, Officer Dowell testified he then proceeded to conduct a weapons frisk of the rest of defendant's vehicle to ensure no other firearms were present inside the vehicle.
The record indicates Officer Dowell's weapons frisk of defendant's vehicle was limited in scope to the purpose of discovering any other weapons to ensure his personal safety. Further, defendant remained unsecured in close proximity to the passenger compartment of the vehicle, although defendant was standing outside the vehicle during the frisk. In addition, the trial court's unchallenged findings of fact show that “the search was approximately two to two and a half minutes in length[.]” As was the case in Parker, we believe the circumstances presented to Officer Dowell in the present case ô that defendant admitted to having a weapon in the vehicle, that Officer Dowell discovered a semi-automatic assault weapon in defendant's driver's seat, that defendant remained unsecured in close proximity to the vehicle during the search, and that the area was known for gang activity ô provided the officer with the knowledge necessary to conduct a frisk of defendant's vehicle for weapons. See id.
The United States Supreme Court noted in Long that “[i]n evaluating the validity of an officer's investigative or protective conduct under Terry, the [t]ouchstone of our analysis ... is always the reasonableness in all the circumstances of the particular governmental intrusion of a citizen's personal security.” Long, 463 U.S. at 1051, 77 L.Ed.2d at 1221 (second alteration and ellipsis in original) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Here, as in Long:
[T]he officers did not act unreasonably in taking preventive measures to ensure that there were no other weapons within [defendant's] immediate grasp before permitting him to reenter his automobile. Therefore, the balancing required by Terry clearly weighs in favor of allowing the police to conduct an area search of the passenger compartment to uncover weapons, as long as they possess an articulable and objectively reasonable belief that the suspect is potentially dangerous.
Id. Thus, the trial court properly concluded that “[t]he presence of [a] Mack 10 machine pistol, a semi-automatic assault weapon that can fire a large number of rounds from one clip, gave the officer sufficient reason to conduct an auto frisk of the vehicle.”
2. Search Incident to Arrest
Although the trial court correctly denied defendant's motion to suppress after having concluded the officer's weapons frisk of defendant's vehicle was lawful, the trial court could likewise have denied defendant's motion to suppress on the grounds that Officer Dowell's search of defendant's vehicle constituted a lawful search incident to arrest.
In State v. Brooks, 337 N.C. 132, 446 S.E.2d 579 (1994), our Supreme Court held that a police officer obtained probable cause to arrest the defendant for carrying a concealed weapon based upon the defendant's statement that he “was sitting on the gun.” Id. at 145, 446 S.E.2d at 588. Our Supreme Court further held that “[h]aving the requisite probable cause to arrest the defendant, [the officer] was fully justified in searching the entire interior of the defendant's car during a search incident to that arrest. Therefore, all physical evidence discovered during that search was admissible against the defendant.” Id.
Recently, our Supreme Court revisited the appropriate parameters of a vehicle search incident to arrest in light of the United States Supreme Court's decision in Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 173 L.Ed.2d 485 (2009). In State v. Mbacke, ––– N.C. ––––, 721 S.E.2d 218 (2012), our Supreme Court held that, consistent with Gant, a defendant's vehicle can be searched, incident to arrest “ ‘when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search[.]’ “ Id. at ––––, 721 S .E.2d at 221 (quoting Gant, 556 U.S. at 343–44, 173 L.Ed.2d at 496). Also consistent with Gant, our Supreme Court held that “when investigators have a reasonable and articulable basis to believe that evidence of the offense of arrest might be found in a suspect's vehicle after the occupants have been removed and secured, the investigators are permitted to conduct a search of that vehicle.” Id. at ––––, 721 S.E.2d at 222. Our Supreme Court further noted that, “[i]n general, courts examining an offense involving weapons have inferred that the offense, by its nature, ordinarily makes it reasonable to believe the defendant's car will contain evidence of that offense, so that searching a defendant's car incident to an arrest for a weapons offense is almost always consistent with the Fourth Amendment.” Id.
In the present case, as we stated previously, the trial court's unchallenged findings of fact, supported by Officer Dowell's testimony, reveal that defendant informed Officer Dowell at the outset of the traffic stop that he had a weapon and that he “was sitting on a gun.” Officer Dowell testified that the weapon was “completely concealed.” Thus, at that point, Officer Dowell obtained probable cause to arrest defendant on the charge of carrying a concealed weapon. Brooks, 337 N.C. at 145, 446 S.E.2d at 588. During the search of his vehicle, defendant was not secured, but he was simply standing outside the rear of the vehicle near the passenger compartment. Thus, defendant was in a position where he could gain access to the passenger compartment of his vehicle. Accordingly, the first prong articulated in Gant and Mbacke permitted the search of defendant's vehicle as a lawful search incident to arrest.
Furthermore, having retrieved a semi-automatic firearm from the driver's seat of defendant's vehicle, Officer Dowell likewise had a reasonable articulable basis to believe that defendant's vehicle may have contained other firearms, gun boxes, holsters, ammunition, spent shell casings or other indicia of ownership of the firearm. See Mbacke, ––– N.C. at ––––, 721 S.E.2d at 221. Thus, further search of defendant's vehicle was also lawful as a search incident to arrest under the second prong articulated in Gant and Mbacke. The fact that defendant was formally arrested on the concealed weapon charge after the search of his vehicle was conducted is of no consequence. “A search is considered incident to arrest even if conducted prior to formal arrest if probable cause to arrest exists prior to the search and the evidence seized is not necessary to establish that probable cause.” State v. Mills, 104 N.C.App. 724, 728, 411 S.E.2d 193, 195 (1991).
In his appellate brief, defendant concedes Mbacke is controlling on this issue. Accordingly, the trial court could have properly denied defendant's motion to suppress evidence on the basis that Officer Dowell's search of defendant's vehicle satisfied either criterion for a search incident to arrest under our Supreme Court's holding in Mbacke.
C. Scope of Detention
Defendant finally argues the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress because Officer Dowell no longer had grounds to detain him after he produced documentation showing he had valid insurance. Defendant contends that once he produced documentation showing valid insurance on the vehicle, any reasonable suspicion Officer Dowell may have had evaporated and Officer Dowell was therefore required to conclude the traffic stop. Thus, defendant argues the search of his vehicle occurred during an unlawful detention, thereby requiring suppression of the evidence.
“ ‘The scope of the detention must be carefully tailored to its underlying justification.’ “ State v. Morocco, 99 N.C.App. 421, 427–28, 393 S.E.2d 545, 549 (1990) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 75 L.Ed.2d 229, 238 (1983)). Nonetheless, an extended detention is constitutional if the officer has other grounds which provide a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity. See State v. Jackson, 199 N.C.App. 236, 241–42, 681 S.E.2d 492, 496 (2009); State v. McClendon, 350 N.C. 630, 636, 517 S.E.2d 128, 132 (1999) (“In order to further detain a person after lawfully stopping him, an officer must have reasonable suspicion, based on specific and articulable facts, that criminal activity is afoot.”). Although Officer Dowell's underlying justification for the traffic stop in the present case was to determine whether defendant had valid insurance on his vehicle, the record indicates defendant informed Officer Dowell of the concealed weapon at the outset of the stop, prior to his giving Officer Dowell any documentation regarding his vehicle insurance.
At the suppression hearing, Officer Dowell testified that “[w]hen [he] approached the vehicle, [defendant] let [the officer] know pretty quickly that [defendant] had a weapon in the vehicle.” In addition to Officer Dowell's testimony, defendant testified at the suppression hearing that he did not show his proof of insurance to Officer Dowell “right away” and that he immediately informed Officer Dowell that he had a weapon. Moreover, defendant states in his appellate brief that he did not provide the insurance documentation to Officer Dowell until after Officer Dowell had removed the firearm from the driver's seat and placed it on the hood of his patrol vehicle.
Thus, once defendant informed Officer Dowell that he was sitting on a firearm, and after Officer Dowell removed the firearm from defendant's driver's seat, Officer Dowell obtained not only a reasonable articulable basis to further detain defendant and search for weapons, but also probable cause to arrest defendant for carrying a concealed weapon, as we have explained above. Defendant contends that he produced his insurance documentation prior to Officer Dowell's search of the vehicle and argues that, because Officer Dowell's suspicion regarding defendant's insurance had been dispelled and because Officer Dowell had removed from the vehicle the firearm to which defendant alerted, the officer no longer had reasonable suspicion to detain defendant further for the vehicle search. However, the fact that Officer Dowell had removed a single firearm, one to which defendant had alerted him, does not negate the possibility that defendant's vehicle may have contained other weapons to which defendant could gain access. Therefore, defendant's contention that the scope of his detention violated the Fourth Amendment is without merit.
IV. Conclusion
Defendant has not challenged the trial court's conclusion that the marijuana “was found in plain sight during the legitimate auto frisk[.]” Accordingly, because we conclude that 1) the officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct a lawful traffic stop based on objective DMV information that defendant's vehicle was uninsured, 2) the officer had both reasonable suspicion to conduct a vehicle frisk for weapons and probable cause to arrest defendant and search defendant's vehicle incident to that arrest once defendant informed the officer that he was sitting on a firearm, and 3) the scope of the detention was not unlawful, we hold the trial court properly denied defendant's motion to suppress the evidence discovered and obtained during the officer's search.
Affirmed. Judges HUNTER, JR. (ROBERT N.) and ERVIN concur.
Report per Rule 30(e).