Opinion
112,065.
06-05-2015
STATE of Kansas, Appellee, v. Landon James STECKLEIN, Appellant.
Michael S. Holland II, of Holland and Holland, of Russell, for appellant. Matthew W. Mullen, deputy county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Michael S. Holland II, of Holland and Holland, of Russell, for appellant.
Matthew W. Mullen, deputy county attorney, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, for appellee.
Before GREEN, P.J., ARNOLD–BURGER, J., and BURGESS, S.J.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PER CURIAM.
Landon James Stecklein was arrested for driving under the influence (DUI). After Stecklein refused to consent to the DUI testing under the Kansas implied consent laws, the police asked for and received a search warrant to obtain a blood sample from Stecklein. The blood sample revealed that Stecklein was above the legal limit. Before his bench trial, Stecklein moved to suppress the blood sample obtained by the police. The trial court denied Stecklein's motion to suppress and found Stecklein guilty of one count of DUI, second offense, and one count of failure to report damage to unattended property. Stecklein contends that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to suppress because the police were prohibited from asking for and receiving a search warrant to obtain a blood sample from him. As a result, Stecklein maintains that the police violated his statutory rights under the Kansas implied consent laws. We affirm.
The facts of this case are undisputed. On January 31, 2014, at 10:05 p.m., the police received a report of a hit and run accident. When the police arrived at the scene, a witness told them that he saw a dark colored pickup with license tag number 904FYN run over a mailbox. A police officer ran the license number through dispatch and was told that the truck was registered to Stecklein.
Shortly afterwards, some other police officers found Stecklein's tmck in a parking lot. The police officers noticed some indications of alcohol consumption and impairment, including alcohol odor on Stecklein's breath, bloodshot and watery eyes, and poor balance. Consequently, the police officers tested Stecklein for DUI. The police ultimately arrested Stecklein for DUI and brought him to the local law enforcement center.
At the center, the police provided Stecklein with the required implied consent advisories both orally and in writing. Stecklein refused to consent to testing under the Kansas implied consent statute. Following this refusal, the police applied for and received a search warrant to obtain a blood sample from Stecklein. The blood sample indicated that Stecklein's blood alcohol content level was .29. As a result, the State charged Stecklein with one count of DUI, second offense, under K.S.A.2013 Supp. 8–1567, a class “A” nonperson misdemeanor, and one count of failure to report damage to unattended property under K.S.A.2013 Supp. 8–1605, a misdemeanor.
Stecklein moved to suppress the blood test, arguing that under the Kansas implied consent statute the police were prohibited from obtaining a search warrant for a blood test after a driver refuses to submit to testing. The trial court rejected Stecklein's argument, stating:
“Well, I think the legislative intent is pretty clear when they amend the law to allow for search warrants when there's refusal. I don't see any problem with what was done in this case. Seems to be within the law. There was probable cause to believe defendant was driving under the influence of alcohol. He was asked to consent to a breath test.... He refused. Thereafter, the officers sought a search warrant for the blood. They're within their rights under the state statutes to do that. The motion to suppress is denied.”
Next, Stecklein waived his jury trial and stipulated to the earlier stated facts. Based on the stipulated facts, the trial judge found Stecklein guilty of DUI, second offense, and failure to report damage to unattended property. For the DUI, the trial judge sentenced Stecklein to 1 year probation after serving 5 consecutive days in jail, with a 6–month controlling sentence. For the failure to report properly damage, the trial judge sentenced Stecklein to a 30–day controlling sentence concurrent to his DUI sentence. The trial judge further ordered that Stecklein pay a $1,250 fine.
Did the Trial Court Err When It Denied Stecklein's Motion to Supress?
“An appellate court generally reviews a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress using a bifurcated standard. The trial court's findings are first reviewed to determine whether they are supported by substantial competent evidence. Appellate courts do not reweigh the evidence, assess the credibility of the witnesses, or resolve conflicting evidence. The ultimate legal conclusion regarding the suppression of evidence is then reviewed de novo. If the material facts in a trial court's decision on a motion to suppress evidence are not in dispute, the question of whether to suppress is a question of law over which an appellate court has unlimited review.” State v. Martinez, 296 Kan.
482, 485, 296 Kan. 482, 293 P.3d 718 (2013)
Because the facts in this case are undisputed, we exercise unlimited review in determining whether the trial court erred in denying Stecklein's motion to dismiss.
The only issue Stecklein raises on appeal is whether the Kansas implied consent law, K.S.A.2013 Supp. 8–1001, et seq. , allows a police officer to obtain a search warrant for a blood draw after a driver has already refused to submit to testing. Stecklein contends that the police were not allowed to obtain a search warrant after his refusal because “[i]t has been long established in Kansas that the Kansas Implied Consent Law was the sole and only avenue for an officer to obtain a breath or blood sample ... and that any attempt to obtain a breath or blood sample after the individual refused to submit to testing pursuant to the Kansas Implied Consent Law was inadmissible.” The State, however, contends that 2008 legislative amendments to the Kansas implied consent law allow police to obtain a search warrant for a blood sample after a driver refuses to submit to testing. In the alternative, the State argues that even if the amendments still prohibit a police officer from obtaining a warrant, Stecklein's blood test would still be admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
Although we express serious doubt that the 2008 legislative amendments to the Kansas implied consent laws prohibit the police from applying for and receiving a search warrant to obtain a blood sample from a driver after he or she refuses to submit to testing, we will, for the present purposes only, assume that the amendments prohibit the police from obtaining a search warrant after a test refusal. As a result, we will address the State's alternative argument that we should affirm the trial court because Stecklein's blood sample would still be admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
2008 Legislative Amendments to the Implied Consent Law
In 2008, the Kansas Legislature made major revisions to the implied consent statute. Before the 2008 amendments, K.S.A.2007 Supp. 8–1001(h) stated:
“After giving the foregoing information, a law enforcement officer shall request the person to submit to testing. The selection of the test or tests shall be made by the officer. If the person refuses to submit to and complete a test as requested pursuant to this section, additional testing shall not be given unless the certifying officer has probable cause to believe that person, while under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, has operated a vehicle in such a manner as to have cause the death of or serious injury to another person. If the test results show a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 or greater, the person's driving privileges shall be subject to suspension, or suspension and restriction, as provided in K.S.A. 8–1002 and 8–1014, and amendments thereto.”
(Emphasis added.)
Under the 2008 amendments, however, the legislature eliminated the above italicized language of this statute. Moreover, the legislature reorganized the statute, moving the remaining language to K.S.A. 8–1001(m). Consequently, K.S.A.2013 Supp. 8–1001(m), the applicable law when Stecklein was arrested, stated the following:
“After giving the foregoing information, a law enforcement officer shall request the person to submit to testing. The selection of the test or tests shall be made by the officer. If the test results show a blood or breath alcohol concentration of .08 or greater, the person's driving privileges shall be subject to suspension, or suspension and restriction, as provided in K.S.A. 8–1002 and 8–1014, and amendments thereto.”
In addition to this change, K.S.A. 8–1001 was further amended and K.S.A.2013 Supp. 8–1001(d)(3) now reads that “[a] law enforcement officer may direct a medical professional described in this section to draw a sample of blood from a person: ... (3) if the person refuses to submit to and complete a test, if the person meets the requirements of paragraph (2) of subsection (b).” Paragraph (2) of subsection (b) states “if the person was operating or attempting to operate a vehicle and such vehicle has been involved in an accident or collision resulting in serious injury or death of any person and the operator could be cited for any traffic offense, as defined in K .S.A. 8–2117, and amendments thereto....” Thus, a police officer may direct a medical professional to draw blood from a driver who refuses to submit to a test if the driver caused injury or death to any person while the driver was operating or attempting to operate a vehicle.
Good–Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule
Even if the police were still prohibited from obtaining a search warrant under the amended implied consent law, Stecklein's blood test results would still be admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. In Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 342, 107 S.Ct. 1160, 1162, 94 L.Ed.2d 364 (1987), the United States Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule does not apply to evidence obtained by police who acted in objectively reasonable reliance upon a statute authorizing warrantless administrative searches, but which is subsequently found to violate the Fourth Amendment. In State v. Daniel, 291 Kan. 490, 500, 242 P.3d 1186 (2010), our Supreme Court accepted the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule outlined in Krull. In determining that evidence obtained by the police via a statute that was later held unconstitutional was admissible under the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule, the Daniel majority first looked at whether the police were acting on an objective and reasonable reliance of the statute at issue in the case. Daniel, 291 Kan. at 501, 242 P.3d 1186. Then, the Daniel majority considered whether the legislature had abandoned its responsibility to enact constitutional laws when it enacted the statute at issue. Daniel, 291 Kan. at 504, 242 P.3d 1186.
Proceeding under the theory that the amended implied consent law still prohibits police from obtaining a search warrant after a driver refuses to submit to testing, we determine that Stecklein's blood test would still be admissible under the standards set forth in Krull and recognized by our Supreme Court in Daniels. First, whether the legislature made this amendment with the goal of undermining the Constitution is not at issue in this case. For instance, the prior implied consent law prohibited compulsory testing even though the federal Constitution permits compulsory testing. See State v. Brunner, 211 Kan. 596, 603, 507 P.2d 233(1973), disapproved on other grounds by State v. Murry, 271 Kan. 223, 21 P.3d 528 (2001). Consequently, if the legislature intended to now allow police to obtain a search warrant after a driver refuses to submit to testing, it would be constitutionally permissible.
Second, the police officer's action of getting a search warrant to draw Stecklein's blood after Stecklein refused to submit to testing was reasonable. Again, the 2008 amendments removed the language in the statute that expressly stated that a police officer could not pursue additional testing once a driver refused to submit to testing. By taking this language out, it was reasonable for a police officer to believe that he or she could now pursue additional testing by going to a neutral magistrate to obtain a search warrant for the driver's blood. The police in Stecklein's case clearly were not the only police who believed that they could obtain a search warrant following a driver's refusal given that the police in other cases have done the same thing. See City of Dodge City v. Webb, 50 Kan.App.2d 393, 329 P.3d 515 (2014), petition for rev. filed July 9, 2014; Hoeffner v. Kansas Dept. of Revenue, 50 Kan.App.2d 878, 335 P.3d 684 (2014), petition for rev. filed October 10, 2014.
Moreover, given that a magistrate judge signed the search warrant, there is no evidence that the police who obtained the warrant for Stecklein's blood were actively trying to violate the statute. Thus, based on this evidence, it was objectively reasonable for the police in Stecklein's case to rely on this interpretation of K.S.A.2013 Supp. 8–1001(m) and obtain a search warrant for Stecklein's blood sample.
Accordingly, we affirm the trial court even if the amended implied consent law does not give the police the authority to obtain a search warrant after a driver refuses to submit to testing because the results of Stecklein's blood sample would still be admissible under the good-faith exception of the exclusionary rule.
Affirmed.