Opinion
No. 3D18-1483
07-10-2019
The State of Florida, Appellant, v. Jose Quintanilla, Appellee.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Gabrielle Raemy Charest-Turken, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Howard K. Blumberg, Special Assistant Public Defender, and Gabrielle McCabe and Manon Ferdani, Certified Legal Interns, for appellee.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing. Lower Tribunal No. 11-25683 An appeal from a non-final order the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Milton Hirsch, Judge. Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and Gabrielle Raemy Charest-Turken, Assistant Attorney General, for appellant. Carlos J. Martinez, Public Defender, and Howard K. Blumberg, Special Assistant Public Defender, and Gabrielle McCabe and Manon Ferdani, Certified Legal Interns, for appellee. Before FERNANDEZ, LOGUE, and MILLER, JJ. MILLER, J.
The State of Florida appeals the trial court's order suppressing evidence of Jose Quintanilla's blood alcohol analysis garnered pursuant to a compulsory blood draw under section 316.1933, Florida Statutes (2019). The State contends the trial court erroneously elevated the standard of proof required to conduct a compelled blood draw under the Fourth Amendment and improvidently imported into the blood draw statute an additional element of driver fault. For the following reasons, we reverse.
FACTS
Shortly before midnight on December 2, 2010, appellee, Jose Quintanilla, was operating a chassis cab truck with an attached cargo box, in rural, unincorporated Miami-Dade County. While negotiating a left-hand turn at a four-way intersection governed by a traffic control signal, Quintanilla collided with a significantly smaller sedan. The driver of the sedan was rendered unconscious and would later succumb to injuries suffered in the crash. Her passenger was ejected from the vehicle and was seriously injured.
Lieutenant Henry Suarez arrived first to the crash scene. He and two other responding officers detected the strong odor of an alcoholic beverage emanating from Quintanilla's breath. Additionally, they noticed Quintanilla appeared unnaturally "limber" and "fluid," and his eyes were "bloodshot" and "watery." Hence, they contacted Officer Mark Slimak, a twenty-one-year veteran of the Miami-Dade Police Department specially trained in alcohol-related investigations, to conduct a further probe.
Slimak arrived shortly thereafter and was briefed by Suarez and the other officers on their observations regarding Quintanilla's odor, demeanor, and appearance. He was also informed that Quintanilla was the driver of the truck involved in the crash. Slimak scrutinized the scene of the accident and ascertained from paramedics on the scene the critical nature of the injuries sustained by the occupants of the sedan.
Slimak noted the nature of the intersection, final resting position of the vehicles, positioning and magnitude of damage to the vehicles, trajectory of debris on the roadway, and road and weather conditions.
Slimak attempted to interview Quintanilla, however, a language barrier prevented meaningful discourse. Nonetheless, Quintanilla confirmed he was the driver. At that time, Slimak, himself, detected the odor of an alcoholic beverage coming from Quintanilla's breath and observed that Quintanilla's eyes were bloodshot and watery. As paramedics prepared to transport Quintanilla to a medical facility for accident-related injuries, Slimak ordered the treating paramedic to perform a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw on Quintanilla, pursuant to section 316.1933, Florida Statutes.
The State ultimately charged Quintanilla with one count of driving under the influence ("DUI") manslaughter, in violation of section 316.193(3)(c)(3), Florida Statutes, and one count of driving under the influence resulting in serious bodily injury, in violation of section 316.193(3)(c)(2), Florida Statutes. Thereafter, Quintanilla sought suppression of the blood alcohol test results, contending the warrantless, compelled withdrawal of blood violated the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and section 316.1933(1)(a), Florida Statutes. Specifically, Quintanilla asserted Slimak lacked probable cause to believe Quintanilla was driving under the influence or that he caused the accident. The lower tribunal conducted an evidentiary hearing on the merits of the suppression motion.
At the hearing, Slimak testified as to Quintanilla's odor of alcoholic beverage, unsteady gait, and bloodshot, watery eyes. Slimak explained that he was made aware of the extent of the injuries of those involved in the crash. He then offered his observations regarding the scene:
[T]his particular intersection is a four-way intersection. It's governed by a traffic light in all directions. Upon my arrival the box truck was, the final resting place was in a southwesterly direction, or facing south as if it was making a left-hand-turn in the southbound direction onto 147 Avenue. The other vehicle was in an eastbound direction in the intersection on the west side.He also stated that he observed physical damage on the front right side of the box truck and that "the front end of [the decedent's vehicle] . . . had very extensive damage, almost throughout the whole body of the vehicle." Slimak ultimately opined that Quintanilla "had violated the right of way of the [decedent's] vehicle traveling in an eastbound direction, and that [Quintanilla] appeared to be impaired . . ." Upon additional questioning, Slimak reiterated, "the driver of the truck impeded the other vehicle's right of way, and that driver appeared impaired."
Section 316.122, Florida Statutes, provides: "The driver of a vehicle intending to turn to the left within an intersection or into an alley, private road, or driveway shall yield the right-of-way to any vehicle approaching from the opposite direction, . . . which is within the intersection or so close thereto as to constitute an immediate hazard."
The lower tribunal granted suppression, finding Slimak lacked probable cause sufficient to compel a blood draw. In its order, the trial court acknowledged that Slimak had probable cause to believe Quintanilla was operating a motor vehicle involved in a crash while under the influence of alcoholic beverages and that Slimak was aware the sedan occupants had suffered serious bodily injuries in the accident. The court further specified that the State had made a sufficient showing of exigent circumstances. However, it posited that an expert determination of driver fault was an element of section 316.1933, Florida Statutes, and proceeded to conclude that Slimak's qualifications were insufficient to endow him with the proficiency required to testify as an expert in traffic accident investigations. In disqualifying Slimak's testimony regarding driver fault, the trial court relied upon section 90.702, Florida Statutes, Daubert, and Frye, stating: "[O]pinions based solely upon common sense are not expert opinions and are not admissible as such. Thus . . . Officer Slimak's opinions and conclusions regarding accident causation were not admissible and not properly received." Accordingly, it found that probable cause of impairment, coupled with probable cause that the motor vehicle driven by the impaired individual was involved in a crash resulting in death or serious bodily injury, was insufficient to avoid suppression. This appeal ensued.
Slimak testified that he received multiple trainings in traffic investigation and that between 1985 and 2010 he participated in over one hundred traffic investigations.
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 113 S. Ct. 2786, 125 L. Ed. 2d 469 (1993).
Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a suppression order, "[w]e defer to a trial court's findings of fact as long as they are supported by competent, substantial evidence, but we review de novo a trial court's application of the law to the historical facts." Ross v. State, 45 So. 3d 403, 414 (Fla. 2010) (citing Cuervo v. State, 967 So. 2d 155, 160 (Fla. 2007)).
LEGAL ANALYSIS
As a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw implicates both constitutional and statutory issues, we bifurcate our analysis accordingly.
The trial court merged constitutional considerations and state statutory requirements in its analysis. However, while states may enact broader protections than those required by the United States Constitution, Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58, 62, 87 S. Ct. 788, 791, 17 L. Ed. 2d 730 (1967) ("Our holding, of course, does not affect the State's power to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than required by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so."), the search and seizure rights enumerated in article I, section 12, of the Florida Constitution "shall be construed in conformity with the [Fourth] Amendment to the United States Constitution, as interpreted by the United States Supreme Court," Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const. See also Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 171, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1604, 170 L. Ed. 2d 559 (2008) ("We have treated additional protections exclusively as matters of state law.").
I. Propriety of the blood draw under the Fourth Amendment
"A blood draw conducted at the direction of the police [constitutes] a search and seizure under the Fourth Amendment." State v. Liles, 191 So. 3d 484, 486 (Fla. 5th DCA 2016) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 767, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1834, 16 L. Ed. 2d 908 (1966); State v. Geiss, 70 So. 3d 642, 646 (Fla. 5th DCA 2011)); see Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. 141, 148, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1558, 185 L. Ed. 2d 696 (2013) ("Such an invasion of bodily integrity implicates an individual's 'most personal and deep-rooted expectations of privacy.'") (quoting Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 760, 105 S. Ct. 1611, 1616, 84 L. Ed. 2d 662 (1985)).
Both the United States Constitution and the Florida Constitution guarantee that "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause." Amend. IV, U.S. Const.; see Art. I, § 12, Fla. Const. "The touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness." Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248, 250, 111 S. Ct. 1801, 1803, 114 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1991) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 360, 88 S. Ct. 507, 516, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)). "The Fourth Amendment does not proscribe all state-initiated searches and seizures; it merely proscribes those which are unreasonable." Id. (citing Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 183, 110 S. Ct. 2793, 2799, 111 L. Ed. 2d 148 (1990)).
The Fourth Amendment "has been declared enforceable against the States through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth [Amendment]." Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S. Ct. 1684, 1691, 6 L. Ed. 2d 1081 (1961); see State v. Slaney, 653 So. 2d 422 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
"[The United States Supreme] Court has insisted upon probable cause as a minimum requirement for a reasonable search permitted by the Constitution." Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51, 90 S. Ct. 1975, 1981, 26 L. Ed. 2d 419 (1970). "'Probable cause exists where "the facts and circumstances within [an officer's] knowledge and of which [he] had reasonably trustworthy information [are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that" an offense has been or is being committed,' and that evidence bearing on that offense will be found in the place to be searched." Safford Unified Sch. Dist. # 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 370, 129 S. Ct. 2633, 2639, 174 L. Ed. 2d 354 (2009) (alterations in original) (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S. Ct. 1302, 1310-11, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949)).
"As a general rule, [the Court] has also required the judgment of a magistrate on the probable-cause issue and the issuance of a warrant before a search is made." Chambers, 399 U.S. at 51, 90 S. Ct. at 1981. "[S]earches conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated exceptions." Katz, 389 U.S. at 357, 88 S. Ct. at 514 (footnotes omitted); see McNeely, 569 U.S. at 148, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 ("[The United States Supreme Court has] held that a warrantless search of the person is reasonable only if it falls within a recognized exception [to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment].") (citing United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 224, 94 S. Ct. 467, 471, 38 L. Ed. 2d 427 (1973)). "One well-recognized exception . . . applies when the exigencies of the situation make the needs of law enforcement so compelling that a warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment." McNeely, 569 U.S. at 148-49, 133 S. Ct. at 1558 (quoting Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 459, 131 S. Ct. 1849, 1856, 179 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2011)). Thus, a warrantless, nonconsensual blood draw of a suspected impaired driver has only been found to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment if: (1) there was probable cause that the individual had been driving under the influence of alcohol; (2) the blood was drawn pursuant to a specifically established exception to the warrant requirement; and (3) the blood draw was performed in a reasonable manner. Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 770-71, 86 S. Ct. at 1835-36; State v. Slaney, 653 So. 2d 422, 425 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
In the instant case, the State firmly demonstrated the existence of exigent circumstances and Quintanilla does not challenge the manner in which the blood draw was effected. Thus, we focus our analysis on probable cause.
The Supreme Court, in a recent plurality opinion, explicated: "exigency exists when (1) [blood alcohol concentration] evidence is dissipating and (2) some other factor creates pressing health, safety, or law enforcement needs that would take priority over a warrant application." Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525, 2537 (2019) (plurality opinion). Moreover, "[w]hen police have probable cause to believe a person has committed a drunk-driving offense and the driver's unconsciousness or stupor requires him to be taken to the hospital or similar facility before police have a reasonable opportunity to administer a standard evidentiary breath test, they may almost always order a warrantless blood test to measure the driver's [blood alcohol concentration] without offending the Fourth Amendment." Id. at 2539.
The United States Supreme Court has explained, "[i]n dealing with probable cause, . . . as the very name implies, [courts] deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act." Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2328, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983) (quoting Brinegar, 338 U.S. at 175, 69 S. Ct. at 1310). Indeed, "[i]n determining what is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, [the United States Supreme Court has] given great weight to the 'essential interest in readily administrable rules.'" Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 175, 128 S. Ct. 1598, 1606, 170 L. Ed. 2d 559 (2008) (quoting Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 347, 121 S. Ct. 1536, 1554, 149 L. Ed. 2d 549 (2001)). "Finely-tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence . . . have no place in the [probable-cause] decision." Gates, 461 U.S. at 235, 103 S. Ct. at 2330. Our analysis instead relies on an evaluation of the totality of the circumstances. See, e.g., Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 244, 133 S. Ct. 1050, 1055, 185 L. Ed. 2d 61 (2013); Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 371, 124 S. Ct. 795, 800, 157 L. Ed. 2d 769 (2003).
Probable cause "requires only a probability or substantial chance of criminal activity, not an actual showing of such activity." Gates, 462 U.S. at 243 n.13, 103 S. Ct. at 2335. Here, the uncontroverted testimony demonstrated that Slimak possessed knowledge Quintanilla was operating the motor vehicle, and immediately thereafter, Quintanilla was observed exuding the odor of an alcoholic beverage, and exhibiting an unsteady gait and limberness, with bloodshot, watery eyes. See Schmerber, 384 U.S. at 768, 86 S. Ct. 1834 ("Here, there was plainly probable cause for the officer to arrest petitioner and charge him with driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxicating liquor."). Thus, the trial court correctly recognized that Slimak had probable cause to believe Quintanilla committed the crime of driving under the influence prior to ordering the blood draw. Accordingly, "the blood draw did not run afoul of the Fourth Amendment," as exigent circumstances were also demonstrated. Geiss, 70 So. 3d at 646.
II. Propriety of the blood draw under Section 316.1933 , Florida Statutes
Although interpretation of article I, section 12, of the Florida Constitution is circumscribed to jurisprudence from the United States Supreme Court, "the limiting language in article I, section 12 does not prohibit the legislature from passing statutes [that] give Florida citizens greater protections than the Fourth Amendment." State v. Langsford, 816 So. 2d 136, 139 (Fla. 4th DCA 2002). Florida has enacted additional statutory protections for compelling and conducting a blood draw in conjunction with probable cause of a DUI, codified in section 316.1933(1)(a), Florida Statutes. The blood draw statute provides:
"A State is free to prefer one search-and-seizure policy among the range of constitutionally permissible options, but its choice of a more restrictive option does not render the less restrictive ones unreasonable, and hence unconstitutional." Moore, 553 U.S. at 174, 128 S. Ct. at 1606.
If a law enforcement officer has probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by or in the actual physical control of a person under the influence of alcoholic beverages, any chemical substances, or any controlled substances has caused the death or serious bodily injury of a human being, a law enforcement officer shall require the person driving or in actual physical control of the motor vehicle to submit to a test of the person's blood for the purpose of determining the alcoholic content thereof . . .§ 316.1933(1)(a), Fla. Stat. In the instant case, the trial court concluded that the statutory language imposed a requirement upon the State to establish, through an expert, Quintanilla was at fault for the accident, prior to subjecting him to a compulsory blood draw. We disagree.
In construing a statute, "legislative intent is the polestar that guides a court's . . . analysis." State v. J.M., 824 So. 2d 105, 109 (Fla. 2002) (citations omitted). To interpret the Legislature's intent courts must first look at the actual statutory language, as "[t]he text is the law, and it is the text that must be observed." Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law 22 (Princeton Univ. Press, 1997); see also Aldridge v. Williams, 44 U.S. 9, 15 (1845). ("[As] the only mode in which [the will of the legislature] is spoken is in the act itself; . . . we must gather their intention from the language there used."). If the statutory language is clear, "courts have no occasion to resort to rules of construction—they must read the statute as written, for to do otherwise would constitute an abrogation of legislative power." Nicoll v. Baker, 668 So. 2d 989, 990-91 (Fla. 1996).
Here, there is no ambiguity. The statute requires "a law enforcement officer [to have] probable cause to believe that a motor vehicle driven by or in the actual physical control of a person under the influence of alcoholic beverages . . . caused the death or serious bodily injury of a human being," prior to compelling a blood draw. § 316.1933(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2019) (emphasis added). By the plain statutory language, the motor vehicle, rather than "the person driving or in actual physical control of the motor vehicle," must have caused the death or serious bodily injury. Accordingly, the statute is devoid of any requirement that the State establish a nexus between driver fault and the death or serious bodily injury, prior to the blood draw. As such, the trial court improvidently imported such requirement into the statute.
Indeed, a close historical examination of the DUI manslaughter criminalization statute, 316.193(1), further buttresses our contemporary reading of the blood draw statute, 316.1933. Prior to 1986, DUI manslaughter was deemed by the Florida Supreme Court to be a "strict liability crime," devoid of any element requiring proof of driver fault. See State v. Hubbard, 751 So. 2d 552, 556 (Fla. 1999) (reaffirming the conclusion that "neither specific intent nor a causal connection between the prohibited act of driving while intoxicated and the resulting death were elements of [the pre-1986] DUI manslaughter [statute]"). In 1985, the criminalization statute read, in relevant part: "If the death of any human being is caused by the operation of a motor vehicle . . ." § 316.1931(2)(c), Fla. Stat. (1985). In 1986, the Florida Legislature amended the criminalization statute, inserting a causation requirement. The amended statute read: "[a]ny person . . . [w]ho, by reason of such operation, causes: [t]he death of any human being." § 316.193(3), Fla. Stat. (1986); see Magaw v. State, 537 So. 2d 564, 567 (Fla. 1989) (concluding that the 1986 amendments to section 316.193(3), Florida Statutes, introduced causation as an element of the crime of DUI manslaughter); see also Hubbard, 751 So. 2d 552 (under the terms of the amended statute, a demonstration of driver misoperation or error is inherent). Conversely, as already discussed, the blood draw statute does not have such a causation requirement. Given this history, and applying long-established tenets of jurisprudence, the variance between the language selected in codifying the probable cause necessary to justify a compulsory blood draw versus the language used to enumerate the elements of DUI manslaughter, supports the presumption that "different results were intended" by the Legislature. Fla. State Racing Comm'n v. Bourquardez, 42 So. 2d 87, 90 (Fla. 1949) (Hobson, J., dissenting) ("[W]here language is used in one section of a statute different from that used in other sections of the same chapter, it is to be presumed that the language is used with a different intent.") (citation omitted).
In the instant case, Slimak had sufficient evidence to conclude that Quintanilla operated a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcoholic beverages. Moreover, as he was aware of the severity of the injuries suffered by the occupants of the sedan, as a result of the collision, he had probable cause that "a motor vehicle driven by" Quintanilla "caused the death or serious bodily injury of a human being." § 316.1933, Fla. Stat. (2019). Accordingly, the blood draw complied with the statutory requirements embodied in section 316.1933.
As stated, the blood draw statute does not require probable cause of driver fault. Even if such a showing was mandated, Slimak's testimony indeed met that threshold, as he personally conducted a comprehensive preliminary accident investigation and rendered a "common sense" causation opinion. See United States v. Hager, 710 F.3d 830, 836 (8th Cir. 2013) (courts "apply a common sense approach . . . considering all relevant circumstances [to] determine whether probable cause exists.") (quoting United States v. Gleich, 397 F.3d 608, 612 (8th Cir. 2005)); see also People v. Gocmen, 115 N.E. 3d 153, 159 (Ill. 2018) (holding the arresting officer permitted to opine as to whether motorist was under the influence of drugs for purposes of determining probable cause); State v. Rothenberger, 885 N.W.2d 23, 34 (Neb. 2016) (declining to adopt a bright line rule requiring a full drug recognition expert protocol be administered as a prerequisite to a finding of probable cause and holding that "when determining whether probable cause exists to arrest a suspect for driving under the influence of drugs, the same familiar, commonsense principles which govern all arrests apply"); United States v. Brooks, 270 F. Appx. 382, 386 (6th Cir. 2008) ("Although testimony from a firearms expert likely would have been necessary to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the gun qualified as an 'automatic firearm' under the [applicable] statute, 'standards such as proof beyond a reasonable doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence . . . have no place in the [probable cause] decision.') (second and third alterations in original) (citation omitted); State v. Dishman, 311 N.W.2d 217, 219 (Wis. Ct. App. 1981) ("[A]s a matter of law, expert testimony is not required in every case at a preliminary hearing to show probable cause that a substance is marijuana.").
CONCLUSION
We conclude the warrantless, compelled blood draw was constitutional, in accord with the Fourth Amendment, as it was well-supported by both probable cause and exigent circumstances. Further, section 316.1933, Florida Statutes, contains no requirement that law enforcement determine the cause of a crash prior to ordering a compulsory blood draw, and importing such an unpenned requirement into the statute spurns the common understanding that a vaunted accident reconstruction expert is not necessarily readily available to travel to every fatality crash site and causation is not always capable of speedy determination. Consequently, we conclude that the State sufficiently demonstrated the probable cause necessary for a compulsory blood draw under section 316.1933, Florida Statutes. See Palazzotto v. State, 988 So. 2d 123, 124 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) ("Section 316.1933(1)(a) allows a forcible blood draw after a traffic accident with serious bodily injury where there is probable cause to believe that the driver was under the influence of alcohol."). Accordingly, we reverse the suppression order entered below.
Indeed, "the frequency of preventable collisions . . . is 'tragic,' and 'astounding' . . . [a]nd behind this fervent language lie chilling figures, all captured in the fact that from 1982 to 2016, alcohol-related accidents took roughly 10,000 to 20,000 lives in this Nation every single year." Mitchell, 139 S. Ct. at 2535-36 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). --------
Reversed.