Opinion
Case No. 20000600-CA.
Filed July 5, 2002. (Not For Official Publication)
Appeal from the Fifth District, St. George Department, The Honorable G. Rand Beacham.
Brian K. Harris, Hurricane, for Appellant.
Mark L. Shurtleff and Karen A. Klucznik, Salt Lake City, for Appellee.
Before Judges Billings, Davis, and Greenwood.
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Perkins argues the first supplemental jury instruction given by the trial court regarding instruction 13F "improperly influenced the jury because it was nonresponsive . . . and tended to induce the jury to convict" Perkins. Instruction 13F was a verbatim recitation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-306 (1999). The first supplemental instruction was in response to the jury's written question, "Please explain 13F in layterms to us. We are having a problem because it says at one place `voluntary intoxication shall not be a defense' and then it says `unless such intoxication negates the existence of the mental state.'" The trial court sent the following response to the jury:
The language of Instruction No. 13F is quoted directly from the Utah Code. This language can be difficult to understand. It has been interpreted by courts of Utah as follows:
1. When the mental state necessary for the commission of an offense is "intent" or "intentionally," and the evidence proves that a defendant was so intoxicated that he was not capable of acting intentionally, that defendant's voluntary intoxication may be a defense.
2. When the mental state necessary for the commission of an offense is "reckless" or "recklessly," and the evidence proves that a defendant acted recklessly because he was voluntarily intoxicated to the extent that he was unaware of the risk involved in his conduct, that defendant's voluntary intoxication is not a defense.
We conclude the trial court committed no error. "`When a jury makes explicit its difficulties a trial judge should clear them away with concrete accuracy.'" State v. Couch, 635 P.2d 89, 94 (Utah 1981) (quotingBollenbach v. United States, 326 U.S. 607, 612-13, 66 S.Ct. 402, 405 (1946)) (emphasis omitted). The supplemental instruction was both responsive and a proper explanation of the law. See State v. Standiford, 769 P.2d 254, 265 (Utah 1988) (upholding jury instructions that "correctly state that voluntary intoxication may negate the mental element of a crime, except for the `awareness' element of recklessness and negligence"). We also do not see how this instruction would tend to induce the jury to convict Perkins. Cf. State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 79-80 (Utah 1981) (holding that jury instructions that failed "to relate the legal effect of intoxication to the facts of the case" and explain the effect of voluntary intoxication on general and specific intent crimes "confused and misled the jury" and prejudiced defendant).
Perkins also challenges a later supplemental jury instruction on the same grounds. After the trial court defined the term "wanton" for the jury in a supplemental instruction, without objection by Perkins, the jury then asked, "Can the defendant be guilty of wanton disregard of a visual or audible signal if he is unaware of this signal?" Perkins recommended that the jury's question be answered with only a "no." The trial court, however, responded to the jury with the following:
If a defendant is unaware of the signal as a result of his voluntary intoxication, his voluntary intoxication is no defense and he may still be found guilty. See instruction 13F and prior note. If a defendant is unaware of the signal as a result of something other than his voluntary intoxication, he may be found not guilty.
Again we agree with the State that this supplemental instruction was proper. "Jury instructions must be read and evaluated as a whole." State v. Lucero, 866 P.2d 1, 3 (Utah Ct.App. 1993). It is clear from the questions the jurors asked that they were struggling with how the voluntary intoxication defense related to the crimes charged, and more specifically, the charge of failure to respond to an officer's signal to stop. Therefore, the court's supplemental instruction was responsive to the jury's question.
In addition, the court's response was a proper statement of the law. Although "wanton" is not defined for purposes of the voluntary intoxication statute, "it is commonly thought of as `[r]eckless, heedless, malicious; characterized by extreme recklessness or foolhardiness; recklessly disregardful of . . . consequences.'" State v. Simpson, 904 P.2d 709, 713 (Utah Ct.App. 1995) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary 1582 (6th ed. 1990)) (alterations in original). Therefore, we agree with the State that the court's second supplemental instruction was a proper statement of the law.
Accordingly, we affirm Perkins's convictions.
WE CONCUR: James Z. Davis, Judge, and Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge.