Opinion
No. H14H-CR030570570
March 5, 2004
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON "MOTION FOR ACQUITTAL"
On December 5, 2003, a jury found the defendant, Abdul Peay, guilty of two counts of Burglary in the First Degree pursuant to General Statutes § 53a-101, subsections (a)(1) and (a)(2), one count of Assault in the Second Degree in violation of General Statutes § 53a-60(a)(2), and one count of Interfering With a Peace Officer in violation of General Statues § 53a-167c.
On December 15, 2003, the defendant filed a "Motion for Acquittal," claiming that the jury only deliberated on one count in determining his guilt on all four counts. In support of this claim, the defendant claims that the length of time spent on jury deliberations was inadequate. He states that the jury failed to independently analyze each and every aspect of the case presented and failed to adhere to their responsibilities as jurors, in violation of his constitutional rights to due process and equal protection under the law pursuant to the 5th, 6th and 14th Amendments to the United States Constitution and Article I, Sections 7 and 8 of the Connecticut Constitution.
Practice Book Section 42-51 provides that the judicial authority, upon motion of the defendant or upon its own motion, shall order the entry of judgment of acquittal as to any offense specified in the verdict for which the evidence does not reasonably permit a finding of guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Such is not the substance of the defendant's motion. In his written motion and during oral argument, he has claimed no specific deficiencies in the evidence that might establish the guilty verdicts were not based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Rather, he argues that juror misconduct occurred during deliberations and is seeking to impeach the jury's verdict.
A motion for judgment of acquittal based on insufficient evidence must also be filed within five days after a verdict unless the judicial authority allows additional time during the five-day period. Practice Book Section 42-52. No such allowance has been permitted to the defendant here.
On January 12, 2004, the court conducted a preliminary hearing to inquire into the allegations of juror misconduct set forth in the defendant's motion. At that hearing, the defendant admitted he had no affidavits, evidence or testimony to proffer in order to support his assertions that the jury didn't deliberate long enough and only deliberated on one, rather than all four counts. Unlike other cases involving allegations of juror misconduct, the defendant had no offer of proof that he had testimonial or other evidence warranting the convening of an evidentiary hearing into his claims. In fact, he stated he had no evidence as to what may have happened in the deliberating room.
A trial court is required to conduct a preliminary inquiry, on the record, whenever it is presented with any allegations of jury misconduct in a criminal case, regardless of whether an inquiry is requested by counsel. State v. Brown, 235 Conn. 502, 525-26, 668 A.2d 1288 (1995). The "form and scope of the inquiry that a trial court must undertake when it is presented with allegations of jury [bias or] misconduct will necessarily be fact specific." State v. Bangulescu, 80 Conn. App. 26, 49, 832 A.2d 1187, 1202 (2003). The trial court must consider "(1) the criminal defendant's substantial interest in his constitutional right to a trial before an impartial jury; (2) the risk of deprivation of the defendant's constitutional right . . . and the credibility of the allegations of jury misconduct; and (3) the state's interests of, inter alia, jury impartiality, protecting jurors' privacy and maintaining public confidence in the jury system . . ." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Jackson, 73 Conn. App. 338, 355, 808 A.2d 388, 403, cert. denied, 262 Conn. 929, 814 A.2d 381 (2002).
Brown, Bangulescu, and Jackson involved external factors. In Brown, an anonymous letter alleging juror exposure to racially derogatory remarks about the defendant was brought to the court's attention while the jury was still empaneled. In Jackson, two jurors were overheard discussing this case during a break in the trial, before the case was fully presented to them. The trial court in Bangulescu considered the approach of the prosecutor by a member of the jury panel who handed the prosecutor a magazine article about a business connected to the facts in the case. There is no such obvious external factor presented here that would require an investigatory hearing.
The defendant's motion in this case was filed ten days after the jury was discharged. The essence of his claim is that the jury could not have reached the verdict it did in the time that it did. The defendant downplays the fact that the jury began its deliberations the afternoon of the day before its verdict, listened to the read back of several witnesses' testimony, and did not return a verdict until the afternoon of the day after it began its deliberations. In addition, the evidence presented at trial by the state was not lengthy or complicated, and the defense presented only one witness' brief testimony. The jury was provided a copy of the court's instructions during its deliberations, and the charges, other than interfering with a peace officer — Assault in the Second Degree and two counts of Burglary in the First Degree — were alleged to have occurred at approximately the same time or very close in time, relative to the same incident, a single burglary that resulted in an assault with a crowbar on one victim. Some of the necessary elements to establish proof of' the first three counts are similar in nature.
Courts are not to infer misconduct from the duration of the jury's deliberation. State v. Miller, 56 Conn. App. 191, 200, 742 A.2d 402, 407 (1999). "The length of time that a jury deliberates has no bearing on nor does it directly correlate to the strength or correctness of its conclusions or the validity of its verdict. In fact, the length of time of the jury's deliberations is a double-edged sword. A short deliberation, rather than being indicative of a lack of diligence, may in fact attest to the strength of the [prevailing party's] case." State v. Hernandez, 28 Conn. App. 126, 136, 612 A.2d 88, cert. denied, 223 Conn. 920, 614 A.2d 828 (1992); Baldwin v. Jablecki, 52 Conn. App. 379, 384, 726 A.2d 1164 (1999).
As a result of the preliminary inquiry it has conducted, the court concludes that the defendant's allegations of misconduct or bias during the deliberations are mere speculation. To succeed on a claim of juror bias or misconduct, "the defendant bears the burden of proving that misconduct actually occurred and resulted in actual prejudice." State v. Jackson, supra, 73 Conn. App. 356; State v. Bangulescu, supra, 80 Conn. App. 50. The defendant must raise his contention of juror bias or misconduct from the realm of speculation to the realm of fact. He has not done so in this case. The court sees no need to conduct any further inquiry into these unfounded assertions of improper jury deliberation. There is nothing here that points with any specificity to the occurrence of events that would have deprived the defendant of his constitutional right to a fair and impartial jury. Permitting further exploration of such speculative attacks on verdict based on mere conjecture as to what may have occurred during deliberations could invade jurors' privacy and seriously undermine public confidence in the jury system. For the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion is denied.
KELLER, J.