Opinion
No. 56160-0-I.
May 22, 2006.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Whatcom County, No. 04-1-00079-6, Steven J. Mura, J., entered April 4, 2005.
Counsel for Appellant(s), Starck M. Follis, Attorney at Law, 412 N Commercial St, PO Box 5846, Bellingham, WA 98227-5846.
Carl a Jr Munson, Law Office of Carl A Munson, 104 W Magnolia St Ste 212, Bellingham, WA 98225-4345.
Martin Stanley Parks (Appearing Pro Se), 4000 Flynn Street #116, Bellingham, WA 98229.
Counsel for Respondent(s), Craig D. Chambers, Attorney at Law, Whatcom Co Prosecutor, 311 Grand Ave Fl 5, Bellingham, WA 98225-4048.
Kimberly Anne Thulin, Whatcom Cty Pros Atty's Office, 311 Grand Ave Ste 201, Bellingham, WA 98225-4038.
Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Coleman, J., concurred in by Grosse and Cox, JJ.
A Whatcom County Sheriff's Office deputy arrested Martin Parks after making a warrantless entry into Parks's trailer. Parks appeals. We affirm, as exigent circumstances justified the warrantless entry. From outside the trailer, the deputy viewed and smelled marijuana. The deputy also saw signs of a marijuana growing operation. When the deputy asked Parks for identification, Parks disappeared from the deputy's view. The deputy was justified in making a warrantless entry to ensure that Parks would not try to obtain a weapon.
FACTS
In January 2004, a Whatcom County Sheriff's Office deputy was investigating a report of a prowler at the Forrest Park Trailer Park. A person reported to the deputy that he could smell marijuana around trailer K1. The deputy walked up the driveway and the front steps of K1. As he approached the front door, the deputy could smell marijuana. The deputy knocked, and Parks opened the front door.
The facts of the events leading up to the arrest are taken from the trial court's findings of fact in Parks's suppression motion. Unchallenged findings of fact become verities on appeal. State v. Hill, 123 Wn.2d 641, 644, 870 P.2d 313 (1994).
With the door open, the deputy smelled a strong odor of marijuana. The deputy also could see two one-quarter ounce bags of marijuana, a loaded marijuana pipe, syringes, and pieces of aluminum less than three feet away. The syringes were related to Parks's diabetes, but the deputy did not know this at the time. The deputy advised Parks that he could smell marijuana and asked to see Parks's identification. Parks said he would get his driver's license.
Parks retreated around a corner of the entryway and out of the deputy's sight into the kitchen area of the residence. The deputy was aware that many persons associated with growing marijuana keep weapons in places of easy access, such as kitchens. The deputy followed Parks three or four feet into the kitchen. While Parks took out his driver's license from his wallet, the deputy observed a large bag of a material appearing to be marijuana on the electric range. The deputy asked Parks whether his "grow op" was in the backroom. Parks replied "yes" and stated that he had about 80 plants. The deputy arrested Parks.
Prior to trial, Parks moved to suppress evidence gathered subsequent to the deputy's warrantless entry. At the hearing, the deputy testified when he stood at the front door, he noticed that condensation had caused the ceiling to the trailer to rot out and that the ceiling was covered in mildew, which was indicative of a marijuana growing operation. The court ruled that the deputy's entry into the kitchen was justified by the deputy's concern for safety and that the deputy's subjective belief that Parks could pose a threat was reasonable. The court also ruled that the deputy was justified in entering the residence to secure as evidence the two bags of marijuana before they could be destroyed. Parks was convicted of manufacturing of a controlled substance. He appeals.
ANALYSIS
In the absence of exigent circumstances, "[t]he Fourth Amendment . . . prohibits the police from making a warrantless and nonconsensual entry into a suspect's home in order to make a routine felony arrest." The Washington Constitution provides that provides: "No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without authority of law." Wash. Const. art. 1, sec. 7. Because the language of article 1, section 7 is substantially different from the language of the Fourth Amendment, it offers heightened protection. State v. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d 814, 818, 676 P.2d 419 (1984) (ruling that the Washington Constitution did not allow a police officer to make a warrantless entry into a dormitory room upon viewing a pipe and seeds in the room when facts did not demonstrate a threat to the officer's safety, the possibility of destruction of evidence of a misdemeanor already charged, or a strong likelihood of escape). In determining whether exigent circumstances justify a warrantless entry and arrest of a felony suspect, courts examine a number of relevant factors:
"(1) a grave offense, particularly a crime of violence, is involved; (2) the suspect is reasonably believed to be armed; (3) there is reasonably trustworthy information that the suspect is guilty; (4) there is strong reason to believe that the suspect is on the premises; (5) the suspect is likely to escape if not swiftly apprehended; and (6) the entry is made peaceably."
State v. Flowers, 57 Wn. App. 636, 643, 789 P.2d 333 (1990) (quoting State v. Terrovona, 105 Wn.2d 632, 644, 716 P.2d 295 (1986)). "[I]t is not necessary that every factor be met to find exigent circumstances, only that the factors are sufficient to show that the officers needed to act quickly." State v. Cardenas, 146 Wn.2d 400, 408, 47 P.3d 127 (2002).
The State argues that exigent circumstances justified the deputy's warrantless entry. It contends that the deputy entered Parks's residence only to ensure his safety while Parks obtained identification. We agree. The deputy saw a small amount of marijuana from the front door. He detected a strong smell of marijuana. He witnessed signs of the "greenhouse effect," which is indicative of a marijuana growing operation. Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable to follow Parks into the residence in order to ensure that Parks would not obtain a weapon. For this reason, this case is distinguishable from Chrisman. In Chrisman, the facts did not demonstrate a threat to the officer's safety. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d at 821. Indeed, the initial decision by the officer in Chrisman not to accompany the resident into the room showed the absence of a concern for safety. Chrisman, 100 Wn.2d at 821. Exigent circumstances in this case justified the deputy's limited entry into the residence alongside Parks so that the deputy could make sure that Parks would not obtain a weapon.
Affirmed.
GROSSE and COX, JJ., Concur.