Summary
vacating sentencing no-contact order where not “specifically authorized in the Iowa Code”
Summary of this case from State v. GroverOpinion
No. 2-873 / 02-0893
Filed October 30, 2002
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Steven P. Van Marel, Judge
Defendant appeals the imposition of a no-contact order in conjunction with the judgment and sentence entered against him on the charge of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse. SENTENCE VACATED; REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING.
Daniel Gonnerman, Ames, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, Kristin Mueller, Assistant Attorney General, Stephen Holmes, County Attorney, and Rodrick Reynolds, Assistant County Attorney, for appellee.
Considered by Sackett, C.J., and Miller and Eisenhauer, JJ.
Matthew Olson appeals the imposition of a no-contact order in conjunction with the judgment and sentence entered against him on the charge of assault with intent to commit sexual abuse, in violation of Iowa Code section 709.11 (2001). He contends the district court imposed an illegal sentence or abused its discretion in ordering a previously entered no-contact order remain in effect for five years. We review the district court's sentence for errors at law and reverse if an abuse of discretion is demonstrated. See State v. Bradley, 637 N.W.2d 206, 210 (Iowa Ct.App. 2001).
In its judgment entry, the district court sentenced Olson to an indeterminate term not to exceed two years. The court suspended the sentence and placed Olson on probation for a period not to exceed two years. The court then imposed conditions on the probation: Olson was ordered to reside in a residential facility, complete sexual offender treatment, abstain from alcohol and not enter establishments dedicated to the sale of alcohol, and pay the fine, surcharge, costs, and restitution. The court placed Olson in the custody of the sheriff until an opening became available at a residential facility. Olson was ordered to register as a sex offender. The court then stated, "It is the further order of this Court that the previously issued no-contact order shall remain in effect for a period of five years." At the initial appearance the court had ordered Olson to have no contact with the alleged victim.
The State argues the extension of the no-contact order was a condition placed on Olson's probation. We disagree. From the court's statements during the sentencing hearing and the placement of the no-contact provision in the judgment entry, it is evident the court intended the no-contact order to be a separate order from the probation conditions. The issue for our consideration is whether the district court had the authority to impose the no-contact order. We find it did not.
When a term of sentence is not made a condition of probation, it must be specifically authorized in the Iowa Code. See State v. Manser, 626 N.W.2d 872, 875 (Iowa Ct.App. 2001). We find no authority in the Iowa Code allowing the district court to continue the no contact order. Accordingly, we vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing.